factual
Bargaining allows escape that prisoner's dilemma doesn't
Taking a meta step to escape an inequitable equilibrium is more plausible in bargaining than in the prisoner's dilemma: in the prisoner's dilemma even allowing communication does not guarantee cooperation (the only equilibrium is bad), whereas the bargaining game has a fair equilibrium available—but conversation alone may still fail because those getting more benefit from getting more and often engage in special reasoning to justify the status quo that benefits them.
factualpending
Speaker
Cailin O'ConnorEvidence Quote
“the people getting more, it's really good for them to get more. And so just a conversation like, "Hey, what's happening isn't fair, let's fix it up," may or may not be persuasive”
Source
113 | Cailin O'Connor on Game Theory, Evolution, and the Origins of Unfairness— Sean Carroll's MindscapeCreated: 6/13/2026, 12:26:23 AM
My Notes
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