Claims

2 claims in “game theory”

Uncertainty and Bluffing Are Correct Calculations

The first cause of war is not a 'miscalculation' but a correct calculation under imperfect information: when you genuinely don't know your opponent's strength and they have an incentive to bluff that they're strong to get a better deal, your optimal strategy may sometimes be to attack to find out—like calling or bluffing in poker—and even without bluffing, if both sides start with sufficiently different priors about relative strength, that inherent uncertainty alone is a risk factor for war.

causalgame theory — Chris Blattman

pending

Commitment Problems Drive Preventive War

The commitment problem—best understood through preventive war—occurs when an opponent will be much stronger in the future and you could head that off now by attacking; even though the rising power could promise a good deal later or give up something now, when they cannot credibly commit to honor that promise (because there's no enforcement architecture), the bargain breaks down and war becomes attractive, as seen in WWI (Russia's rise vis-a-vis Germany), the Iraq invasion (Saddam's potential WMD), and Russia's fear of a Western-armed Ukraine.

causalgame theory — Chris Blattman

pending