Claims

Patterns have a fundamental drive or pressure to become enriched over time; they are not static platonic forms but actively interact with the physical world, seeking opportunities to change and enlarge.

Intelligence is necessary for reality to unfold because intelligence is the only thing capable of discerning pattern; moreover, it is not a passive discernment but an active, embodied participation where the agent and the pattern co-constitute each other—the conscious being sees patterns, engages with them, and transforms them.

There are two versions of panpsychism: the problematic version adds mental properties to a perfectly working physics as unnecessary decoration, while the defensible version reformulates physics itself as fundamentally protocognitive, making cognition a feature of deeper reality rather than an addition to it.

Russell's atomic facts are neither mental nor material but rather neutral with regard to mind-body distinctions, and Russell is a neutral monist: qualitatively there is only one kind of property, but quantitatively there are many atomic facts, making him a monist about quality and a pluralist about quantity.

Nature itself is value-laden, not value-neutral; values are not created by human minds and imposed on nature but are intrinsic to nature itself.

External relations are relationships between things that do not spring from the essential nature of those things; they are artificial relationships imposed on entities and leave those entities essentially the same as they were before (exemplified by Descartes' mind-body relationship).

Internal relations are relationships that pertain by virtue of the essential nature of the entities related; entities are defined in terms of their relationships to other entities, as in Hegel's master-servant relation where to be a servant is to be defined by the relationship to a master.

Whitehead uses 'vibratory existence' to describe the transient, coming-and-going nature of particular things, which applies equally to organisms (which are biodegradable), quanta of energy in quantum physics (which come and go), and events (which are the ultimate units of reality).

The fallacies of simple location and misplaced concreteness are the cardinal sins of mechanistic philosophy because they fail the test of empirical adequacy, as these abstractions are inadequate to concrete experience.

The dichotomy between mind and matter (Cartesian dualism) is a sheer abstraction; every event has both physical and conceptual aspects (a double-aspect theory) because events are constituted by both physical prehension (causation from prior events) and conceptual prehension (relation to eternal possibilities).

In the 18th-century atomistic view, space and time have a separative character (things are separated in space and separated in time); Whitehead argues space and time also have a prehensile character—prehension (causal connectedness) is of the very nature of events, so space-time events are intrinsically interrelated.

Concrete fact is process, fundamentally constituted by prehensive events; each event is an individualized matter of fact arising from individualization of underlying activity, not from substantial independence.

Whitehead reinterprets Berkeley's idealist claim 'to be is to be perceived' as 'to be is to be prehended'—reality is constituted by prehensions (acts of apprehension) rather than by perceived objects, with God's thinking making prehensions, not things.

The fallacy of simple location is the mistaken assertion that things have fixed locations in space and time abstracted from all other relations; in reality, locations are defined by relationships to other things, and when time is included, there is no simple location because all movement is relative.