Russians are now the junior partner in their relationship with China, with China as the dominant partner.

Fragmentation of Russia in the current context would be the worst possible outcome because the U.S. needs a coherent Russian state with a strong central government to maintain control of nuclear weapons, making it in the Western interest to NOT want Russian fragmentation.

Neither Russia nor Ukraine is currently in any mood to negotiate, with Putin believing he can outlast the West and mobilizing the Russian economy for the first time since the war started in support of military operations.

The key question is whether the West and United States can sustain public support for providing military and economic support to Ukraine at current levels; Gates believes this can be sustained through the rest of 2023 and that Europeans and the administration remain committed, but the question is whether marginal voices could become more central if the war remains a protracted slog with neither side gaining significant advantage.

Sanctions have not had dramatic short-term impact on Russia, but their long-term impact is significant for Russia's economic trajectory.

Alternative bilateral and multilateral agreements outside of NATO could provide sufficient sophisticated weapons and military capabilities to Ukraine to make it militarily powerful and invulnerable, deterring Russian invasion without absolute commitment to send NATO forces.

The United States and Europe have promised and are delivering significant armor and military equipment to Ukraine including Abrams tanks, Leopard tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles, and mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicles used in Iraq and Afghanistan, but the critical issue is the speed of delivery, not the total amount of equipment.

The Ukraine war has given Xi at least a few lessons about Western and democratic alignment: first, the speed and severity with which the West came together on sanctions, which surprised both Xi and Putin who believed in the narrative of Western decline; second, the performance of the Russian military, which should make Xi wonder whether his own generals and weapons are as good as he's been told.

The timing of negotiation opportunities depends entirely on developments on the battlefield and how long the conflict continues.

Sweden and Finland joining NATO is a fundamental change in the security balance in Europe and demonstrates how badly Putin miscalculated, as it represents the opposite of his goal of containing NATO.

The West has consistently underestimated what Ukrainians could accomplish and endure throughout the first year of the war, suggesting that pessimistic Western assessments about Ukrainian capabilities should be viewed skeptically.

Two competing clocks constrain the Ukraine war outcome: Russia is mobilizing 300,000 men (mobilized last fall) plus another 120,000 from annual conscription with talk of further mobilization, and the question is how fast Russia can equip and train these soldiers and deploy them for spring offensives; Ukraine's clock is how fast Western equipment can be delivered and integrated with trained personnel. Russia may launch an offensive as early as February 24th, the anniversary of the invasion.

Putin has significantly weakened Russia probably for a generation to come as a result of the war.

In 1989, Gates (as deputy national security adviser) obtained President Bush's authority to form a small, secret contingency planning group to plan for the Soviet Union's collapse, which took place 2.5 years later, chaired by Condoleezza Rice. The main conclusion was that maintaining a strong central government in Russia and control over 40,000 nuclear weapons after the Soviet collapse was critically important.

China is benefiting economically from the Ukraine war by selling goods (like semiconductors) that Russia cannot obtain from the West and by receiving discounted oil and gas from Russia, as are the Indians.

A Russian general (later identified as wanting to withdraw from Kherson) was prevented from doing so by 'the powers to be Putin in Moscow,' demonstrating Putin's direct interference in operational decisions and his reluctance to accept military advice from field commanders.

It is unrealistic to think Ukraine can retake Crimea in the near term, though it may be able to retake most or all of the territory the Russians seized in eastern Ukraine in the Donbas; Crimea is 'critically important for Putin' because of its strategic value and the Russian naval base located there.

Russia has not been able to establish air superiority over Ukraine or even over the battlefield in eastern Ukraine, which raises questions about how important aircraft like F-16s would be to the actual fight, making the provision of F-16s potentially moot given Ukraine's significant air defenses.

Russian drone and missile attacks on Ukraine are aimed at terrorizing the Ukrainian people and breaking their will to fight, not achieving military objectives in the ground war where the actual outcome will be determined, and these attacks have failed in their terror objective.

As long as Western material provided to Ukraine does not allow Ukraine to attack targets inside Russian territory, Putin has been 'pretty reluctant' to escalate in any significant way, suggesting that restrictions on Ukrainian strike range provide a de facto escalation limit that Putin respects.