The Republican Party realized they needed to harness the power of the technology sector to amplify their message and at least prevent technology from working actively against them as it had in the past.

Circumstances will be a huge driver of Treasury Secretary Bassent's results, as treasury secretaries are always hamstrung by circumstances, but the problems are particularly acute now because things have gone so far in debt accumulation.

On the GDP growth component, if nominal GDP reaches 3% with 4-5% inflation through continued rate cuts, there is a 'tail to be spun' to the electorate that the 333 goal is met, even though real growth would be minimal, and voters won't distinguish between nominal and real GDP.

Post-2008 financial crisis policy has been designed to stabilize the financial system and generate animal spirits to drive risk assets higher, successfully increasing risk appetite but creating a generation expecting perpetual stock market gains.

Real systemic change—not just electoral cycling—involves changes to the monetary system, Western living standards, and affordability of daily goods; such changes create pressures that can lead to secession movements and institutional breakdown.

The most important principle of long-term investing is that the permanent loss of unreplaceable capital is the greatest sin one can commit when trying to compound wealth over time, making capital preservation the paramount concern.

The last monetary system reset was in 1971 when Nixon closed the gold window, which was a 'stealth change' more significant than FX rate shifts but not understood by most people as a fundamental transformation of the monetary system.

Stan Druckenmiller sat out of the technology sector in 1992 believing it was ridiculously overvalued, couldn't take it anymore, dove in anyway, and lost a billion dollars of Soros's money in a very short period—later saying when asked what he learned, 'nothing, I knew I shouldn't have done it but I did it anyway.'

Every Treasury bond that doesn't get bought is a problem for the US Treasury, and the Treasury Department will likely struggle to price anything in the 10-30 year range on the curve unless conversations have been had with friendly central banks beforehand.

A Trump administration might face economic headwinds that the establishment creates through use of economic institutions and data; however, Trump has shown he can turn such challenges into rallying cries against the 'deep state' rather than being hamstrung by them.

Post-Ukraine and post-freezing of Russian central bank assets, there has been an implicit shift toward 'every man for himself' in central bank policy, as sovereigns realized there isn't a 'magic fire hose' from a country doing well that can bail out the rest of the world.

The Fed cutting rates with markets at record highs and unemployment low suggests either the Fed genuinely believes rate cuts are appropriate in this environment or it is more worried about the government's ability to finance its obligations than about inflation risk.

One should approach 2025 with an open mind and not dismiss extreme scenarios out of hand; even scenarios that seem nonsensical deserve consideration rather than reflexive dismissal.

Unemployment, inflation, and immigration are the three critical drivers of political decision-making and backlash heading into 2025 because no government can solve these problems without inflicting significant economic pain, yet they will attempt politically expedient but economically destructive solutions like handing out checks to address inflation.

America will heal from its current cultural divisions, though the process may be painful, and it will heal much faster than people expect—not in the way it healed after the Civil War (with centuries of ongoing division) but through faster cultural reconciliation.

Political upheaval across the West (Trump's election, UK Labour's shift, similar movements in France and Germany) is not fundamentally left versus right but rather a vote against incumbency everywhere, driven by life not feeling good for people and their inability to afford daily essentials.

The UK Labour government under Keir Starmer has had disastrous approval ratings as low as any prime minister's ever been at that point in their term, having already been forced to break election promises, raise taxes, upset pensioners and working men and employers within their first six months in office.

America survived four years of Trump presidency before, demonstrating that the claims that Trump's election would be the end of America, end of democracy were nonsensical, and this realization has created fatigue and acceptance about Trump 2.0 rather than the chaos narrative of the first term.

Trump has been unusually visible as a president-elect, stepping into the vacuum created by Biden's absence, and has effectively been treated as president since November rather than waiting until January 20th, suggesting the public and establishment have already ceded power transition.

The Democratic establishment and mainstream media appear exhausted by the political fight, having 'given up' as evidenced by their focus on pardons and protections rather than resistance, suggesting resignation to Trump 2.0.