In his second term Trump deliberately selected yes-men and yes-women rather than advisers who would present alternatives, facts, and cost-benefit analyses, because in his first term he came to see such advisers as trying to obstruct him; this advisory structure explains much of what has happened in the second term.

Trump believes that if he has good personal relations with the head of a foreign government, then the US automatically has good state-to-state relations with that country—a belief that explains why he thought he could resolve the Russia-Ukraine war in 24 hours by sitting down with his 'friend' Putin, even though Putin pursues fixed Russian national interests regardless of any personal rapport.

Trump's relationship with NATO behaves like ocean waves—appearing favorable at the crest when he says nice things, but not durable—and he continues to suggest the US should not defend NATO members that fail to meet spending targets, a stance the Russians find very interesting.

When an American president introduces massive uncertainty into what he says, allies find the cost of being an ally rises because they can no longer rely on or predict US behavior, which ultimately undercuts rather than expands American influence.

At the 2018 NATO summit in Brussels, Trump had not decided whether to withdraw from NATO until the very moment his microphone was turned on, asking Bolton just minutes before whether to do it, and neither Bolton, Pompeo, nor Mattis knew what he would say until he said it.

Trump has no overarching philosophy or national security grand strategy and does not engage in policy in the conventional sense; he is episodic, ad hoc, and transactional, making the move directly in front of him rather than playing a complex long-term game.

Trump tends to listen to whoever was the last person in the room and seeks out people he expects to agree with his initial hunch; he can sometimes be persuaded primarily by arguments that he will personally benefit in prestige, public approval, or stock market reaction, rather than by normal policy debate.

Trump cut the National Security Council staff from about 400 to roughly 125-130, a dramatic reduction that sets the structure back 30-40 years and has caused the NSC coordination process to break down, allowing departments to act independently—exemplified by the Department of Defense halting weapons and ammunition to Ukraine without the president knowing.

Having a single cabinet member (Marco Rubio) double as both Secretary of State and national security adviser undermines the proper NSC process because a national security adviser must be an honest broker outside any other bureaucracy, ensuring all stakeholders are heard; the Kissinger precedent was an exceptional crisis-era exception that Ford soon ended by appointing Scowcroft.

If the US genuinely wanted to stop Russia earning hard currency from oil and gas, it should have prohibited Russian exports outright rather than using a price-cap mechanism, which was adopted only because politicians feared higher gasoline prices if Russian oil left the international market; Trump's sanctioning of India but not China—which buys far more Russian oil—shows he is not serious about shifting the war's direction.

The 2019 Trump-Zelensky phone call—in which Trump pressured Zelensky to investigate alleged Ukrainian interference in the 2016 election and to find Hillary Clinton's server—left Zelensky with little stored goodwill in Trump's personal esteem, contributing to the hostile February 2025 Oval Office encounter that JD Vance worsened.

Trump's recent supportive statements toward Ukraine (saying they could win, continuing weapons sales to NATO members for transfer, and providing intelligence) stem not from a desire for Ukraine to win but from his desire to get out of a situation he is not winning, because he divides the world into winners and losers and refuses to be associated with losing; his ultimate motivation is the Nobel Peace Prize.

Trump's pattern of making big promises and big threats that he then fails to deliver on (the 'taco' / Trump Always Chickens Out phenomenon) reflects a failure to understand transaction costs: taking positions and then abandoning them is not cost-free, and a maximalist bargaining position only works as part of a coherent strategy, which Trump lacks.

Trump sees everything solely through the prism of how it benefits him personally—not necessarily financially but in terms of his presidency—rather than asking what is in the US strategic interest, what the risks are, or what the opportunities are.

European NATO members are finally increasing defense spending primarily because of Russia's 2014 and 2022 invasions of Ukraine rather than because of Trump's blunt threats, and using crude coercion to get results—rather than reasoned argument about the growing Russian threat—invites more of that destructive conduct in the future.

Trump genuinely thought Vladimir Putin was his friend, both at the start of Bolton's tenure and visibly in the way the two interacted with one another.

Trump said after meeting Kim Jong-un in Singapore that 'we fell in love,' but Kim certainly did not reciprocate, illustrating the mismatch when Trump is in the room with such leaders.

Trump administration officials largely don't care about the negative second-order consequences of how they deliver messages (an ends-justify-the-means attitude), but the harsh delivery—seen in the Oval Office Zelensky clash and Vance's Munich speech—does real damage to US standing, even when the underlying argument (Europe must pay for its own defense) is one many Europeans accept.

Withdrawal with Strait closed would be a disaster

If Trump withdraws while the Strait of Hormuz is still closed and Iran controls it, it would be a disaster: Gulf allies like Saudi Arabia and the UAE would see the U.S. as a totally unreliable ally, Europe would suffer, and Asian allies watching the U.S. back down would lose hope of American support against Chinese hegemony starting with Taiwan.

Blockade Hormuz rather than seize Kharg Island

Rather than seizing Kharg Island, the U.S. should stop the flow of Iranian oil by blockading the Strait of Hormuz, diverting any Iranian oil tankers to the port of Fujairah to be effectively interned until the war ends, since the Iranians cannot protect tankers in open ocean; ground troops would only be useful to seize high ground around the Strait to prevent small-boat and drone raids.