Xi may actually thrive in power and have little incentive to step back as he ages; the job itself is what keeps him energized and in motion, like a shark that must keep moving or it dies, and he is unlikely to move to the 'second line' and play the Deng role of informal power behind the scenes unless his health dramatically fails.

China's support for Russia in the Ukraine war has been consequential but limited; while Wang Yi made an impolitic remark that China's support would be much more visible if it were truly robust, the actual material support China has provided (mostly older equipment) would not have been decisive in changing the war's outcome if even dramatically increased.

Xi's first state visit after becoming leader was to Moscow to meet Putin, signaling early that Xi wanted to put a premium on that relationship; they have met 40+ times and publicly called each other 'best friends,' though this image may or may not be authentic, the War in Ukraine intensified an entente that was already underway.

The U.S. cannot drive a wedge between Russia and China because their strategic interests are too deeply aligned and the triangular dynamic (viewing the U.S. as the common threat) is baked into both leaders' worldviews; tactical efforts to entice one side away from the other are essentially futile.

Russia is more chaotic and violent than China in its internal politics and foreign operations; Putin has allowed public opposition (Navalny), eliminated internal rivals through violence and poisoning, and conducted assassination operations abroad; the CCP, by contrast, keeps purges and eliminations quiet, does not tolerate the same level of public opposition, and does not conduct assassination operations abroad at the scale Russia does.

From Xi's perspective, supporting Russia (at least enough to prevent Russian defeat) is the right strategic bet, because a Russian collapse would allow the U.S. to pivot fully toward containing China; keeping Russia in the game as a strategic partner serves China's interests even if it comes at some cost to China's economy.

The PLA has not been to war since the late 1970s conflict with Vietnam and some minor 1980s skirmishes, creating a generational gap where very few current high commanders have combat experience or have been 'shot at in anger'; Xi places a premium on selecting officers who have that experience because he believes hardship and having been tempered by conflict are essential qualities for military leadership.

The PLA's military modernization over the past decades has fundamentally changed the military balance in the Western Pacific, with China negating U.S. military advantages in the region according to a recent bipartisan Pentagon commission; however, this deterrent effect is not primarily about enabling an invasion of Taiwan but about preventing U.S. intervention.