From an elite-politics-dynamism perspective, the current era is a 'nadir' compared to earlier decades: Xi's big-bang consolidation is over and leadership, PLA modernization, and economic reform are all in cruise control, even as China is more powerful as a share of global national power than ever before.

Xi will be disinclined to move to the 'second line' (the late Deng model) and will instead try to push off dealing with succession, leaning toward the Mao model, because he has two historical examples of succession going badly, a cult of personality, and a belief that he is indispensable—making a voluntary step-back a low-probability event absent real health issues.

Potential successors without real PLA connections (like Hua Guofeng, Zhao Ziyang, and Hu Yaobang historically) failed to stick; because Xi is preventing any party figure from developing those military connections, it will be very hard for any future successor to consolidate.

Xi's analysis of younger potential successors faces a hard information problem because he lacks personal relationships with people in his age cohort's children's generation, unlike US presidents who blend one or two close associates with many professionals—Xi's Standing Committee is uniquely composed almost entirely of decades-long friends.