Chinese leaders are signaling directly and clearly to the Trump team that they will not engage in high-level encounters between Presidents Trump and Xi without substantial preparation, which contrasts with Trump's apparent preference for unprepared engagement.

Many of the biggest structural impediments to US-China trade negotiations are systemic and structural rather than merely tariff-based, making 90-day fast-track negotiations unrealistic for resolving substantive trade issues.

Critics often claim that the 'Competition Without Catastrophe' framework lacks a clear end-game, but this criticism wrongly applies Cold War historical expectations; the US did not actually have a clear plan for Soviet decline for much of the Cold War, with even premier strategist Kissinger believing the US was in relative decline.

Countries appreciate that their best chance to secure peace and stability is a stronger partnership with the United States, and this can be achieved under Republican, Democratic, or new kinds of leadership in the United States.

Campbell's assessment of Chinese elite determination to challenge the United States across every vector has been reinforced by his direct interactions with Chinese officials and Xi Jinping during his time in the Biden administration.

Chinese elite have a deep sense of American decline that pervades their strategic assessment, and they often simultaneously overestimate their own power in certain circumstances.

High-level US-China diplomatic engagement puts a huge burden and risk on the relationship by making it dependent on occasional calls between the two leaders and a fragile set of interactions, requiring extraordinary preparation for success.

The Biden administration's 'Competition Without Catastrophe' framework, which sought long-term coexistence with China while accepting ongoing competition without a definitive end-state, was partially realized through substantial improvements in allied partnerships and regional strategic alignment.

China has successfully seeded negative views about NATO across Southeast Asia, making an explicit 'Asian NATO' framework politically impossible because it would trigger fears and resentment even among close US partners.

In the rise and fall of great powers, size and scale is one of the most important variables—examples include the British Empire's dominance from a small island due to industrial revolution first-mover advantage, and subsequent diffusion of that capability to Germany, Russia, and the United States.

The French-German independent brigade during the Cold War is a model showing that allies can create deep military integration even against initial institutional resistance and skepticism.

One of the great successes of American foreign policy is maintaining extended nuclear deterrence over the Indo-Pacific such that dozens of countries that could have developed nuclear weapons have chosen not to because of strength of American guarantees.

The pressures on nuclear reconsideration in Asia are real and growing due to three factors: (1) Putin walking close to nuclear use edge in Ukraine, (2) North Korea continuing nuclear arsenal buildup and long-range system testing, and (3) China embarking on one of the largest nuclear builds in modern times, with up to 1,000 new systems over the next decade.

To counter nuclear proliferation pressures, the US will probably need stronger conventional military engagement and technological cooperation with allies, plus consideration of certain kinds of joint nuclear command and control arrangements similar to US-Germany and US-Britain arrangements during the Cold War.

Trump administration tariff rollout was haphazard, poorly planned, highly dependent on Trump's final say, and in constant need of revision, making it extremely difficult for key industries to operate with the predictability they need.

There are risks that Trump's tariff approach could have far-reaching unforeseen consequences that linger for decades, comparable to the unintended consequences of the 2003 Iraq invasion.

The Trump administration has inadvertently signaled it expects to accomplish large strategic purposes in very short timeframes, both on Ukraine and on trade, which differs from how major strategic outcomes actually develop.

China is not prepared to give in to US trade pressure and is betting that pain will hit the United States first, particularly through immediate consumer impacts from increased tariffs on goods that make up daily life.

Xi Jinping is not interested in a bold, from-the-blue invasion of Taiwan but is gradually and dramatically ramping up tensions in hopes that cumulative pressure, deep Chinese engagement in Taiwan, and US unpredictability will cause Taiwan to reconsider its future.

The Trump administration has not turned its strategic attention fundamentally to the Indo-Pacific; most focus remains on Europe and Iran, and the little Indo-Pacific attention exists is primarily through a commercial lens rather than strategic one.