Lobo Tirado
About
Commodities analyst and investor; newsletter writer with 30,000 subscribers; author of 'The Independent Speculator'
Cast within
No topic-region cast yet — this appears once Lobo Tirado's compiled claims are aligned into a topic region's argument tree.
Claims by Lobo Tirado (20 of 34)
Uranium, not gold, was Lobo's highest conviction speculative trade for 2023, and it doubled; but for 2024, gold is his highest conviction because of recession and labor market breakdown, and gold pulled a sharp price increase before the recession was undeniable, suggesting it was already pricing in the downturn.
Major gold mining companies (Newmont, Barrick, Agnico Eagle) mismanaged the previous gold bull cycle from 2001-2011 when gold went up sevenfold; despite commodity appreciation, these companies' free cash flow went negative, causing investors to rationally avoid the stocks even though the underlying metal was soaring.
The current context is different from the 1970s gold bull cycle because in the 1970s the dollar was pegged to gold (it was defined as a specific amount of gold), so when Nixon slammed the gold window in 1971 it created a unique coiled-spring effect; modern cycles cannot replicate the 1970s exactly because the dollar is no longer pegged, and history rhymes but never repeats.
There is a 5+ year gap between current supply coming online and the next wave of uranium projects, because the projects currently in the pipeline are not yet permitted—they cannot break ground even if fully funded; this supply gap, combined with escalating demand (China building 150 reactors by 2035), supports sustained high uranium prices over years.
Many investors lump uranium into the broader 'energy sector' (a Bloomberg classification artifact), which has negative correlation with recessions; thus when investors hear 'recession outlook,' they automatically sell energy stocks including uranium, not realizing uranium (nuclear baseload) behaves differently from oil.
The official unemployment rate of 4.3% significantly understates true unemployment; a reasonable base case is to double the reported number, or alternatively use the U6 unemployment measure (the government's own former methodology) which currently stands above 7%, making the unemployment situation much more alarming than headline figures suggest.
National average statistics like GDP mask a K-shaped economic divergence where Wall Street and the wealthy are doing well while Main Street and the average worker suffer; this bifurcation cannot persist indefinitely without 'the map tearing' because you cannot have two populations moving in opposite directions sustainably.
GDP as an economic metric is problematic because its inputs are methodologically questionable, and the government is reporting on itself ('the fox reporting on the health of the chickens'), so reliance on GDP figures should be tempered; looking at actual reality through multiple data points is preferable to trusting government statistics.
Federal Reserve Chair Powell is reluctant to cut rates because he wants to avoid being remembered as Arthur Burns (who presided over the 1970s stagflation) and instead wants to emulate Paul Volcker (who aggressively fought inflation); fear of repeating the 'transitory inflation' mistake makes him cautious about easing policy too soon.
China made a major strategic error with its rigid COVID-19 lockdowns: the lockdowns were so prolonged and intense that they traumatized the population, and when restrictions were lifted, people remained too fearful to resume normal economic activity, undermining the recovery and contributing to China's real estate and broader economic problems.
Gold mining companies in the current cycle (2023-2024) are performing better in Q1 and Q2 than in the previous cycle—all three largest US gold producers beat guidance, margins are improving, and the industry is 'not fumbling the football' this time, which could change investor perception and drive capital inflows to the sector.
Kazatomprom is the world's largest uranium producer and also the lowest-cost producer, so their production decisions have huge impact on uranium pricing, similar to how Nvidia dominates the AI space; when Kazatomprom announced a 20% voluntary production cut years ago it helped support prices, and they influence the global uranium supply-demand balance significantly.
Kazatomprom recently announced they will increase uranium production by only 5% in 2024, but this is actually a 50% reduction from their original plan (which was 10% increase); this seems bearish on the surface but is actually less bad than expected, and more recently they announced 12% growth for 2025 while petitioning to lower their permitted production levels due to ongoing supply chain constraints (sulfuric acid, construction delays).
Uranium is recession-resistant relative to oil because uranium powers baseload energy for hospitals, airports, and other critical infrastructure that must operate 24/7/365, whereas oil demand can fluctuate as consumers reduce driving; historically uranium prices were sideways-to-up in the last four recessions, with only the GFC showing decline (which was due to a 2007 spike correction, not the recession itself).
Puerto Rico offers significant tax incentives for US investors, including 100% capital gains tax holiday on both short-term and long-term gains for individual investors, and low corporate tax rates for business owners, making it an attractive location for speculators and business operators from a financial perspective.
My Notes
Loading notes...