China's system functions as a learning system in which orders from the top leadership cascade down through party and state organs, ensuring that data strategy articulated by Xi translates into coordinated policy implementation across government and corporate entities.

Matt Oresman observes that Beijing's messaging through Wang Yi (former Foreign Minister, now chief) was uncompromising: the U.S. must stop all behavior detrimental to China's interests; this is more authoritative and suggests lower trust than the softer messaging through Qin Gang.

China's data policies formalize the principle that acquiring data commercially and sharing it with the military is part of state data strategy, meaning corporations operating in China cannot draw a meaningful distinction between commercial and military data use.

Chinese drone manufacturers DJI and Autel, widely used by U.S. law enforcement, pose data security risks because their technology, software configuration, and components have not been embedded and tested with the same rigor the U.S. government applied to Huawei and ZTE components before excluding those companies from telecom systems.

The primary recommendation of the report is increasing transparency around data risks through more research and knowledge, which is needed given the opacity of Chinese data collection and corporate-state ties.

The report recommends broadening the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) review process beyond traditional sectors to include semiconductors, critical infrastructure, cyber, and other technology sectors based on the model that successfully excluded Huawei and ZTE from U.S. telecom systems.

The CFIUS review process could be improved by being faster and more decisive in rejecting investments that do not meet national security thresholds, rather than prolonging review processes; additional capacity is needed to evaluate foreign companies seeking to invest in or operate within the United States.

Oresman notes that China already uses mechanisms of economic coercion and trade punishment against countries, and is working with Russia to reshape the world order toward multipolarity—establishing that China has demonstrated intent and capability to weaponize economic leverage.

Oresman notes that data propaganda is ineffable (hard to measure impact), making it difficult to assess how information control and data in the hands of competitor countries reshape outcomes, but argues this is no reason to avoid examining the mechanism.

Oresman notes that Beijing's demand for U.S. non-interference in China's interests is logically impossible given that the U.S. and China are in strategic competition—you cannot compete without actions that adversaries view as harmful to their interests.

Oresman agrees with the assessment that the U.S. should begin mitigating risks by not voluntarily offshoring critical data infrastructure and should take decisive steps toward understanding where data goes and making appropriate choices about integration.

Chinese companies like BGI (previously Beijing Genomics Institute), Wuxi AppTec, and E Gene are acquiring inroads into Western pharmaceutical and genomics industries, positioning personal medical and genetic data from U.S. citizens into China's integrated data acquisition system.

When combining complex corporate structures with internal party governance and operation in foreign jurisdictions unfamiliar with Leninist organizational integration, Chinese enterprises present a significant national security risk, particularly when the directing country (China) is identified by the U.S. as the greatest strategic competitor.

Xi Jinping treats the control of data as a master key to cementing China's position globally in the economy and becoming a more powerful strategic actor on the world stage, having stated in 2013 that whoever controls data and big data will control or shape future cores of development.

The Chinese Communist Party has a unique organizational history as an underground organization that had to operate covertly around political and legal spheres in early 20th century China, creating institutional advantages in connecting disparate parts to achieve political objectives in opaque, slow, and deliberate ways.

Oresman argues that Xi Jinping frames history as an inevitable Marxist-Leninist process moving toward multipolarity, positioning China on the 'right side of history' and the U.S. on the wrong side, and that Xi believes the U.S. has no choice but to acquiesce to this historical process.