What confuses Europeans is that the Trump administration's China policy is unclear, the Middle East policy end game is unclear, and the overall strategic direction is unclear, making it very hard for Europe to come up with a coherent policy when constantly getting unexpected things thrown at them.

Mark Rutte, the NATO Secretary General, is the only European leader who is an open cheerleader for the Iran war, which puzzles many Europeans and Americans because he is supposed to be chairman of an alliance of 30+ countries, yet he is openly cheering for a war that many European leaders wanted to be consulted on and didn't think was a good idea.

The European Union has built up substantial geo-economic tools since 2017, particularly since 2019 under the von der Leyen Commission, including the anti-coercion instrument which is a 'bazooka' allowing the Commission broad leeway to punish coercive actors through trade restrictions, tariffs, denial of investment access, and other mechanisms.

The difference between Greenland and the Middle East/Iran crisis is that Greenland involves sovereign European territory with a clear red line and genuine threat of military occupation, whereas the Middle East involves European responsibility without European ability to influence the conflict, making Greenland a clearer case for unified European response.

Germany, by the end of the decade, will invest or spend the same amount of money on defense as France and the UK combined, fundamentally transforming how Europe thinks about defense and how it can act.

The future of transatlantic relations should be a much more equal relationship where Europe occasionally acts as a 'tough love friend' saying 'hang on a minute, you're not getting our bases, this is for your own good, this will backfire and demolish stability in the Middle East and impact energy markets.'

The marriage analogy describes the current transatlantic situation: the husband (US) told the wife (Europe) to stay home and take care of the kids, and after 5 years the wife wanted to go back to work, but the husband has gotten used to the wife taking care of everything and doesn't like it, creating second thoughts in Washington about whether they wanted Europe to actually do what it's now doing.

The US still has allies everywhere with access and bases and global power, which is a main difference between China and the US, but the US 'used to' have this—the language shift indicates the alliance network is no longer 'very solid' as it once was.

The AfD would need to fundamentally change to come to power, but in doing so it would also become much less of a threat; the most plausible scenario is AfD as a silent partner in a minority CDU government cooperating on domestic policy but without veto power on foreign policy.

The European Commission has played its hand on trade and sanctions quite well but has been held back by member states who are not allowing it to play this role fully and are basically tying its hands.

Europe is in a moment where the big things Trump wanted from Europe have been delivered, so it is now up to Europe to say 'a deal's a deal, no more tariff threats' and to point out that they need time to implement changes through legal processes rather than executive orders.

Europe is torn on China because it is simultaneously a partner for cooperation on climate and renewables, an important market for exports, and a source of foreign direct investment, but also a competitor advancing so quickly it's overwhelming Europe by selling into non-American markets as a result of US-China tariff wars.

Rather than pivoting to China, the first three months of 2026 show Europeans realizing they need to reach out to 'middle powers'—Canada, Japan, Korea, Australia, New Zealand, India, South Africa, Latin American countries—to develop alternative suppliers for critical inputs.

The second Trump administration doesn't seem to have the most optimistic transatlantic future in mind; this suggests the relationship is at risk under current US leadership.

Europe was much more comfortable with the first Trump administration and Biden administration which had a clear China line, allowing Europeans to coordinate and pivot together on tariffs, export controls, technology, and chips.

A NATO minus US line has emerged where no European country is getting seriously involved in clearing the Strait of Hormuz as long as active hostilities continue, because Europeans weren't consulted on the Iran war and there is no military solution to the Strait of Hormuz—the mighty US Navy cannot be aided by European frigates in solving this.

Europeans don't want to become a superpower like China or the United States; what they are focused on, especially since the second Trump administration, is building up their own defenses nationally and through the EU to deter Russia from future attacks, not to project power in the Middle East or South Pacific.

The scenario where a rearmed Germany gets the AfD in power thanks to Trump's encouragement and then invades Poland is a fanciful scenario that shouldn't be worried about too much.

With the Americans, there is hope that come 2029 a more reasonable Republican or a Democrat will be in power in the White House, allowing for more transactional, less emotional engagement; with China, there is no such prospect of acceptable future leadership.

Merz is concerned that next year France will have a far-right person in the Elysée (presidency), which will leave him with very little to work with on European integration.