If the Russian army suddenly unraveled and Ukraine won the war, that would be great but it feels less likely than a year ago when the Russians were in flight from Artyomovsk and Kherson.

It would be beneficial if China's economic troubles translated into a political crisis, as Xi Jinping's reassertion of one-party rule dictatorship is dangerous not only for China but for the world.

The probability of a recession in the next year is much higher than market consensus believes because real interest rates have risen tremendously, and the economy is more leveraged now than it was in Paul Volcker's era despite the size of monetary tightening being comparable.

Monetary policy acts with long and variable lags; the average lag is ~9 months from tightening to slowdown, but it could be considerably longer under current circumstances, so it's premature for the 'transitory' team to declare victory.

People in Europe and the UK are more worried about American politics than Americans are, particularly over the prospect of Trump withdrawing support from Ukraine.

If there is a recession and Joe Biden is the Democratic nominee, he will lose the election; historically, no U.S. president has been reelected after a recession in 100 years except Coolidge in 1924, and Biden's current polling mirrors Gerald Ford and George H.W. Bush at similar points in their presidencies.

The Democratic Party is fielding a very elderly candidate with a weak running mate against Donald Trump, who in many other countries would not be able to run given his conduct on January 6, 2021, creating an amazing potential constitutional crisis.

The United States has profound social problems out of sight—including mental health epidemics and opioid epidemics—that compound the economic and political risks.

The U.S. and China are in Cold War II, which carries significant risk of hot war in its early phases; this is the biggest risk underpriced by markets and policymakers.

The U.S.-China relationship is not good; despite Biden's talks of détente and visits by administration members to China, Beijing's sentiment remains that the U.S. is pursuing conscious policy of technological and economic containment to keep China in second place in the Indo-Pacific.

The U.S. fiscal deficit is now projected at 8% of GDP for the current year—far larger than previously thought—which is extraordinary for an economy at full employment and signals a major structural fiscal crisis.

For most of U.S. history, the country spent more on defense than on debt service; by the end of the current year, it will be paying more on debt service than on defense—a structural problem for a country in major geopolitical rivalry with China.

A second Trump administration would be radically different from his first term: planners in the America First movement have a plan, it does not include establishment restraining figures like Mattis and McMaster, and the priorities will shock many people—beginning with protectionism and a purge of the Department of Justice and anti-Trump bureaucratic elements.

Robert Lighthizer, Trump's trade representative, when asked what Trump would have done if he'd won in 2020, answered that he would have raised tariffs, confirming Trump's sustained commitment to protectionism.

Early 2021, Larry Summers and Ferguson argued an inflationary accident was happening due to massive fiscal overshoot—the stimulus continued even after the economy would heal naturally with vaccines—and the Fed accommodated this by purchasing a very large proportion of new Treasury debt in 2021-22.

Unless there is a productivity miracle or Congress reforms the tax system and brings entitlements under control—which Ferguson thinks highly unlikely—debt will grow very fast over coming decades according to CBO forecasts.

Globalization is not dead; international trade and capital flows have been dialed back from their 2007 peak but are nowhere near the retreat seen after 1929; decoupling between U.S. and China is exaggerated because Apple still produces ~80% of hardware in China, not 100%, but still concentrated.

Globalization's shape is shifting due to both conscious policy (U.S. reducing China exposure, Supply chains moving) and structural shifts (Chinese labor costs no longer competitive; Mexico now outpaces China in U.S. trade due to proximity and competitiveness).

The idea that manufacturing can be brought back entirely to the United States is implausible because production is much more expensive domestically; microchip production is substantially more expensive in the U.S. than in Taiwan or South Korea.

Jack Ma was brought low by Xi Jinping, exemplifying how the CCP reasserted control over big tech companies, reducing Chinese economic dynamism.