New York City abruptly canceled its congestion charge program, which Paul views as inexplicable policy incompetence that he personally felt tempted to join protests supporting the congestion fee despite it technically worsening his air quality.

Oil has to inflate over time based on dollarized markets and everything else monetary policy-related, despite strong oversupply fundamentals suggesting downside; this creates uncertainty but is a key bull element.

Technological improvements globally and AI in particular will put downside pressure on oil from both greater efficiency of use and greater supply, suggesting oil is under pressure from both demand and supply sides.

Trump successfully pressured China not to buy Iranian oil during his first administration and stated that as a result Iran was 'flat broke,' and he indicates he would repeat this policy in a second term.

The energy challenge is a major election issue between Conservative and Labor in the UK, with both sides having shifted the policy axis back toward accepting fossil fuel and nuclear necessity.

Following the Ukraine invasion, dollar-oil correlation flipped from negative to positive because the US became the world's dominant hydrocarbon supplier (both oil and coal), making oil price increases beneficial for the US economy and dollar strength rather than harmful as under the old petrol dollar model.

Saudi Arabia's oil exports to the US have declined from roughly 3 million barrels per day 10-15 years ago to approximately 300,000 barrels per day today, reflecting US energy self-sufficiency from shale and Saudi's strategic reorientation toward Asia (India, Pakistan, China).

Russian oil and oil products have remained at the same pre-invasion levels despite sanctions because routes have shifted, so the physical impact of bringing Russia back into global markets through peace would likely be more on sentiment than reality, though gas-to-Europe dynamics matter since Nordstream is effectively destroyed.

New Zealand, the UK, and other jurisdictions are reversing certain green policies because they've realized going to zero on domestic energy supplies is a mistake; this is partly due to recognizing energy security challenges and the decision to reframe the 'S' in ESG as standing for 'security' after the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

The only conspiracy in oil is a conspiracy of ignorance on the part of consumers; people are now much better informed and realizing that if they want an iPhone they need gas-fired power and are still dependent on coal, which is why green policy is losing support.

Canada's target of 100% zero-emission vehicle sales by 2035 with interim targets of 20% by 2026 and 60% by 2030 reminds Paul of Stalin's Five-Year Plan, which was internally inconsistent and mathematically impossible; California tried an all-electric vehicle standard in the 1980s and never met it before canceling it.

Consumers don't have the appetite for EVs outside of China, where as a totalitarian state you can impose comprehensive energy policy; if you could be a dictator of the US for one year, you could make enormous differences especially given politicians' ignorance of energy.

The IEA's oil demand forecasts are self-defeating because if 8 million barrels per day of spare capacity actually materialized, you would have to price that capacity before you arrived at it, making very low oil prices required to balance supply and demand.

The biggest single reason why EV standards will be impossible to meet is that people don't want to buy EVs.

Future prices of oil are priced nominally (not adjusted for inflation), and for 2-year-ahead futures, oil is priced a couple of dollars below current spot, which when adjusted for expected inflation suggests oil is priced too low for future periods.

The US unconventional revolution (shale oil and gas production) has made the US the biggest oil and gas producer in the world, which is wildly underestimated in importance; this happened 10-20 years after the original petrodollar agreement, making the agreement less relevant than it was.

OPEC's stated desire to add more oil production was met with a bearish market reaction because the spare capacity issue is about how long Saudi Arabia is willing to hold over 2 million barrels of spare capacity rather than produce it, and the resumption of growth in UAE (traditionally Saudi's biggest supporter) has dwindled because Iran, Venezuela don't have quotas and Iraq is barely included.

Gold is going crazy and the Yen is falling out of bed after 20 years of stability; these are signals of underlying currency dynamics, but it's very hard to second-guess how long printing $7 trillion into an economy the scale of the US will continue to circulate and multiply.

The only realistic way to prevent structural oil oversupply from driving prices well below $60, potentially to $50 or lower, is through sanctions on Iranian exports or through reduction of US Shale production, both politically challenging in current contexts.

The petrodollar agreement between US and Saudi Arabia is controversial about whether it actually existed; Saudi currency remains pegged to the dollar and functional currency for global oil industry (investments, sales) is dollar-denominated, including historically Russian gas exports to Europe.