The third element of the Armenia-Azerbaijan negotiations—connectivity, the restoration of road and rail links plus Armenia-Turkey normalization—is the most promising because economic interdependence is the most effective way for Armenia to restore lost deterrence, making connectivity a strategic imperative, not merely an economic one.

The 2020 war and September 2023 military capture of Nagorno-Karabakh set two dangerous precedents: the validation of the use of force over diplomacy, and the victory of authoritarian power over democracy—both of which, if left unaddressed, could undermine faith and confidence in democracy and Western ideals.

Russia is described as an angry, vengeful power on the horizon seeking to regain its lost influence in the region and in Armenia.

Azerbaijan is acting with an emboldened, sometimes reckless defiance of Russia, believing it has stronger blind Turkish support than it truly does, and there will likely be a price to pay over the medium to long term.

The principal worry for Armenia is not the legitimacy of its democracy—whose credentials are real and hard-fought—but the weakness of the institutions of democracy, whose institutional development should be the coming priority, especially for the West.

For Armenia the real obstacle to EU aspirations is not the CSTO or the Russian military base but its membership in the Eurasian Economic Union ('Putin's prison'), and there is no real Armenian will to leave that bloc—largely as a lesson learned from Georgia about not provoking Russia.

Iran has long neglected and refuses to return to its traditional role as a regional player in the South Caucasus, remaining overwhelmed by everything else, so the current dynamic is essentially between Russia, Turkey, and to a degree the EU—with Iran notably absent.

Russia's distraction and being overwhelmed by its failed invasion of Ukraine created both an opening and an opportunity for Azerbaijan to challenge Russia, leaving Moscow reactive and not paying attention to developments on the ground.

The Armenian government has reached a post-war accommodation in which it is 'cutting its losses,' treating Nagorno-Karabakh as gone, with no move to rearm or retake lost territory—and the current peace treaty is strictly bilateral, having nothing to do with Nagorno-Karabakh directly.

Even if signed, the peace treaty is punitive and has no international guarantee or guarantor, so Armenia's strategy is to resist the Russian orbit by diversifying security partners while betting heavily on Armenia-Turkey normalization as the positive game-changer.

The current round of Armenia-Azerbaijan talks has excluded both the West and Russia, which localizes the post-war negotiations and helps prevent Russia from becoming more of a spoiler; the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh thus also means the loss of an instrument of leverage for Russia.

Negotiations over the language of the peace treaty are effectively closed; the only remaining holdup is the signing ceremony itself, which is important to Azerbaijan as a 'certificate of achievement' heralding its victory.

A democratic, legitimate leader of Armenia is not much of a threat to Putin's Russia given Russia's economic leverage and dominance over key sectors of the Armenian economy, especially energy—so there is no genuine crisis or real risk of direct Russian intervention at present.

Armenia has adopted a new, transactional strategy based on a belated recognition that Russia is an unreliable partner, deliberately diversifying security partners not to replace Russia with the West but to balance, contain, or counter Russia—dismissing NATO membership, choosing India (and Japan, South Korea, China) for arms precisely because they are less provocative to Russia.

Two indicators signal whether the Russia-Armenia relationship has reached genuine crisis: first, whether Vladimir Putin himself (rather than Lavrov, Peskov, or the foreign ministry spokeswoman) elevates the anti-Armenia discourse; and second, a 'bellwether test'—whether Russia demands to reopen negotiations over subsidized natural gas supplies to Armenia.

The recent weakness and incompetence of the Russian armed forces revealed by the failed Ukraine invasion is an important lesson in the near abroad, but it is an aberration, not the norm—implying the window of Russian weakness is temporary and 'the clock is ticking' for Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey to lock in gains.

A direct US role in the region is not welcome from an Armenian perspective, because if the US prioritizes Armenia-Turkey normalization it would provoke an unnecessary reaction from both Moscow and Erdogan; the EU is the less provocative and already-engaged actor, with an unprecedented deployment of EU monitors in Armenia.

The Pashinyan government, despite approval ratings below 20% and a heated dispute with the Armenian Orthodox Church, is most likely to win the June 2026 election—less because of support for the government than because of fear and hatred of the opposition, as there is no credible alternative.

Armenia's 2018 change of government was a rare victory of nonviolent people power, which (from an American perspective where nonviolence usually fails) gives Armenia a rare commodity—legitimacy based on genuinely democratic credentials—positioning it better than its neighbors for real stability.

The Armenian church conflict is both less and more than it seems: less because it is unfinished personal business between the impulsive prime minister and a notoriously corrupt, authoritarian church head tied to the previous government; more because it connects to Russia, evidenced by the arrest of a Russian-Armenian businessman and a weapons seizure tied to a fifth alleged coup attempt.