Rule Symposium features 'living legends' segment where successful multi-billion-dollar company builders are interviewed on stage to share their lessons and help attendees become better investors.

Rick Rule bought silver in the $20 range because it was deeply out of favor and hated, and bought it in anticipation that when the hate subsided the price would rise.

Rule Symposium provides 46 hours of programming in 4 days with access to recordings for a year, and offers a money-back guarantee if attendees don't get value—only ~0.1% of attendees request refunds, with just 3 refunds out of 1,400 online attendees last year.

Parabolic stock charts (called hockey stick charts in Canada) have back sides that are just as steep as the front sides, and the descent is less fun than the ascent, so Rule did not care where the reversal would occur.

Oil and gas represent a bull market 2-2.5 years out, making it a 'certain event' that Rule is willing to accept time risk for, rather than imminent (near-term) opportunity.

Silver thesis remains valid at $100 but has less value than at $20 because much of the required price move has already occurred; therefore, the speculative case for silver stocks is now superior to physical silver.

Copper offers superior risk-reward across the commodity spectrum due to a structural supply deficit; copper should have seen a 20-25% price increase due to 7% of world supply being removed from production, but did not.

Rule's original price target for silver was 50, but he was wrong and it went to 75; when the reasons to own a position go away, the position must go away regardless of potential further upside.

Rule procrastinated on selling his silver because he was busy with opening a bank, and by the time he acted the price had risen further; but he does not fear missing out and the timing delay did not bother him.

Rule allocated about 25% of silver proceeds to physical gold as his savings vehicle, distinct from speculation, even though gold was a better speculation at $2,000 than at $4,500.

Rule bought Industri Panles, a large Mexican mining company that controls Fresnillo, and two silver juniors (Abra and Visla Silver) to add leverage/sizzle to the portfolio.

More marginal silver producers have outperformed higher-quality ones in the recent rally because less-efficient companies with low margins and high costs generate higher margin expansion when prices rise.

Rule's strategy when younger was to buy smaller companies with substantial valuation disparities relative to majors, but current market has less obvious disparities, so he now builds a more beta-centric portfolio focused on large companies like Exxon.

Rule sees two bear cases for oil: (1) peace in Iran, Russia-Ukraine, and Venezuela, which would take 5-6 years for those nations to restore oil production and exports; (2) a synchronized global recession or depression that crashes demand despite structural supply deficit.

Technology has allowed the private economy to generate significantly more GDP growth with less capital expenditure than Rule expected 10 years ago, preventing government spending from completely crowding out private investment.

Technology-driven automation in low-skill sectors will eliminate jobs and cause political friction; McDonald's will replace 40 $20/hour workers with 4 $60/hour machinery technicians, which is economically efficient and good for consumers but catastrophic for displaced workers.

Rule is currently overweight precious metals (due to prior positioning), overweight copper throughout his life, underweight iron (expected worse economy), and significantly underweight oil and gas relative to target allocation.

Copper has a 'coiled spring' characteristic: tension has partially unwound in the last 4 weeks as copper performed well, but for most of the year it seemed strangely muted despite fundamental supply shortfall.

Rule could not find platinum senior miners to buy; despite Sabani being run by a good friend, political risk seemed extreme, so he bought platinum juniors and a physical platinum/palladium trust instead.

Of ~120 uranium juniors worldwide, only 6-7 have enough uranium to bother with, requiring very careful selection; many juniors have insufficient uranium resources despite marketing claims.