The Bank of England highlighted that goods inflation is always zero or negative (a structural fact), so the real focus should be on service inflation, which remains uncomfortably high and is the main inflation risk; this is an insight that U.S. commentators have overlooked.

Growth and inflation are likely to run 'considerably harder' than consensus expects, primarily due to fiscal policy, which is large and unlikely to shrink even under a Trump presidency that may preserve tax cuts while cutting direct spending.

The US is engaged in three expensive military/geopolitical conflicts (Russia-Ukraine war, Middle East conflict, and cold war with China) alongside climate policy spending, all of which are structural fiscal drivers unlikely to shrink regardless of political leadership.

Labor has been 'completely neutered' in this cycle with no self-reinforcing wage-price spiral, which is unusual historically, but Atlanta Fed wage data shows wages still running above 5%, and there is no reason wages won't catch up over time as workers rebuild lost purchasing power.

The vast majority of consumers spend every dollar they earn and do not accumulate savings; consumption is driven by income effects, not wealth effects, except for high-net-worth individuals.

Existing home sales have dried up because homeowners are locked into low mortgage rates and unwilling to move; this forces homebuilders to perform well, creating a supply constraint that supports home prices despite rate increases.

Every government is trying to loosen its housing market through policy (Canada's short-term rental taxes, similar efforts elsewhere) because housing shortages are pervasive, supporting prices and residential demand.