Foley questions whether Xi Jinping's deprioritization of GDP was a deliberate choice or was forced by declining economic growth; after 40 years of rapid growth, marginal returns diminish and 10% growth becomes impossible, potentially forcing the regime to seek alternative sources of legitimacy.

Yuan Foley argues that the 1980s and 1990s may have been exceptional rather than representative of normal Chinese political development; the last 10 years represent a return to the 2,000-year historical norm of unrestricted imperial/authoritarian rule where politics dominates economics.

Funding families (red families) naturally die out after about three generations when younger members cease participating in politics and pursue other interests (art, fashion, design); the power of red families gradually declined through the 1990s-2000s as their members exited politics or died.

If economic growth became unachievable (due to marginal decreasing returns), Xi's shift to alternative sources of legitimacy (anti-poverty, anti-corruption campaigns that people welcomed initially) would be a rational strategic choice, not a destructive error.

Funding families (founding elite families like the Deng, Ma, Chen Yun, Bo, and Chen families) agreed to power-sharing arrangements after the revolution to guarantee their descendants would also have a share of power; the Central Advisory Commission institutionalized this family-based power sharing.