Ben Rhodes: The Warren and Anita Manshel Lecture in American Foreign Policy

The international order that existed is fractured and no longer monolithic; the world now consists of a US-led collection of like-minded countries (G7, NATO, selective alliances), a Chinese bloc of countries and institutions (Belt and Road, BRICS), and many rising powers that shop between the two and pick which arrangement suits them best on particular issues.

“there's not been all these changes and that International order doesn't exist anymore it's fractured there's a US collection of like minded countries there's a Chinese block of countries and institutions there's a whole bunch of rising powers that going to pick and choose between”

European politics are fragmenting in the wrong direction for collective decision-making: Putin-friendly right parties in Hungary and Slovakia, EU-skeptic hybrid governance in Italy, far-right National Rally as real challenger in French election, and fracturing German politics make it unlikely Europe will achieve the collective strategy it needs.

“however the politics in Europe right now are kind of moving the other direction um where you see you know the kind of foothold for the Putin friendly right and Hungary and Slovakia the kind of Maloney hybrid model where they're tough on Russia but kind of EU skeptic in Italy you've got a French election um coming up in which the national front National rally the far right party uh is a real Challenger you got German politics fracturing so it's not exactly the ideal moment for Europe to be blazing a trail in the direction of collec decision- making”

Kamala Harris began her campaign with populist messaging criticizing corporate America but was pressured to dial back this rhetoric in favor of entrepreneur/startup messaging, surrendering the anti-corporate frame.

“and this was reported and the kamla started pretty populist and then someone kind of got to her and was like Hey like you know just dial that back a little bit you know and suddenly she's putting out plans for entrepreneur and and and startups instead of saying Corporate America is a part of the inequality problem in this country”

Victor Orban transformed Hungary from a liberal democracy to a soft autocracy within a decade using a playbook of packing courts with friendly judges, drawing parliamentary districts to entrench power, changing voting laws to favor supporters while disadvantaging opponents, enriching cronies through corruption, restricting civil society, using social media to demonize opponents, and wrapping it in identity politics framing of 'true Hungarians' versus Muslims, immigrants, and liberal elites.

“Orban got elected on a right-wing populist backlash to the financial crisis he packed the courts with fared judges who had find in favor of his power grabs he Drew parliamentary districts to kind of entrench his party and power beyond their vote sh changed the voting laws to make it easier for his supporters to vote and harder for his political opponents to vote he enriched a bunch of cronies through corruption who then poured that money back into financing his politics he uh started putting restrictions in harassment of Civil Society um trying to control what they could do what universities could teach um he used social media to kind of demonize and harass his opponents um and he wrapped it all up in an Us Versus Them Bo us the true hungarians against them the Muslims the immigrants the liberal Elites you know George Soros”

Problems of excessive wealth concentration and oligarchy were created by policy choices (tax system changes, regulatory framework changes, antitrust enforcement changes, campaign finance restrictions removal) so they can be fixed by policy changes—they are not inevitable features of capitalism.

“part of what I was writing about after the fall is the fact that you had this kind of unbridled form of capitalism the last you know post- Reagan decades but the convergence between capital ISM and technology and kind of National Security this has kind of created this Unholy power structure that is just further and further concentrated wealth because part of what you I always push myself is to realize that there was never some it's never going to be perfect it never was right like there always going to be some people have more money than other people and corporations and but why is it gotten so out of joint and so disproportionate a lot of that is policy choices right to deregulate to to to have get rid of a progressive tax system”

The United States has progressively shifted from a liberal democracy toward a hybrid regime or soft autocracy over the past decade, following a playbook visible in Viktor Orbán's Hungary: court-packing, gerrymandering, voting law changes, media control, oligarchic corruption, and scapegoating of minorities.

“I asked a Hungarian opposition figure um you know how did Orban Victor Orban transfer this country from a liberal democracy to kind of a soft autocracy on that Spectrum in a decade and he said well that's easy you know Orban got elected on a right-wing populist backlash to the financial crisis he packed the courts with fared judges who had find in favor of his power grabs he Drew parliamentary districts to kind of entrench his party and power beyond their vote sh changed the voting laws to make it easier for his supporters to vote and harder for his political opponents to vote he enriched a bunch of cronies through corruption who then poured that money back into financing his politics he uh started putting restrictions in harassment of Civil Society um trying to control what they could do what universities could teach um he used social media to kind of demonize and harass his opponents um and he wrapped it all up in an Us Versus Them Bo us the true hungarians against them the Muslims the immigrants the liberal Elites you know George Soros um and I remember thinking wow that's a pretty familiar Playbook”

The Iran nuclear deal was not actually subject to substantive policy debate about centrifuges or uranium enrichment monitoring; it was reframed as identity politics—proof that Obama was weak and colluding with brown peoples—to delegitimize both the agreement and Democratic governance.

“I you know take the Iran deal I don't think Trump had deep opinions about how many centrifuges should be allowed to operate at the Nan's facility or or you know what the modalities of the Uranian enrichment stockpile monitoring you know it was you know these are some brown people that we're giving some money to you know um it connected to this Obama's not one of us you know he's making deals with these people and he's letting these people across the border you know”

The old rules-based international order is dead because large powers (US, Russia, China) now routinely exempt themselves from rules they enforce against others, exemplified by US enforcement of ICC indictments against Putin while refusing ICC jurisdiction over Israeli actions in Gaza.

“no rules-based order can work if the big countries just choose not to follow the rules um by the way that's true in life as well as foreign policy you know um and uh and there's always been some of that but I think over the last decade there's been a you know now it is that's the norm you know if you're us or Russia or China you kind of just you exempt yourself from the rules you don't do anything that is inconvenient to you”

Restoring an international order based on rules requires a major shock—either another world war or a significant economic/fiscal crisis—to create sufficient political pressure for great powers to subordinate their interests to collective rules.

“I think what it's going to take uh unfortunately is some kind of shock you know um it took the shock of World War I and actually two of those you know because the League of Nations didn't get across the Finish Line in Congress but it took that shock to write all these rules you know to say we should have rules governing when you can go to war and how you can fight a war and how you get nuclear weapons and all these other things and I just think you know we we going to need a shock”

USAID has historically been used for regime change operations and influence campaigns (e.g., Twitter disinformation campaign in Cuba, clandestine funding through Miami PO boxes), raising legitimate questions about whether to reconstitute it without addressing these regime-change aspects.

“there was this story that broke in the news of some kind of crazy usaid funded like Twitter disinformation campaign in Cuba and and and I finally was fed up cuz I had no idea I was I'm negotiating I don't know what they're doing so I was like I would like a spreadsheet that shows all the USA ID funding for Cuba and they're like well we can't do that you know and then it was like well no I need I I this is crazy I'm not trying to shut you down with some 21-year-old interns I just want to know what the money is you know and and by the way this was not some you know this was like well I won't say who the Stafford was but let's just say it was not someone that agreed with what I was trying to do in Cuba and this was the most insane list of spending I've ever seen in my life like I I think I can say this now but say there were PO boxes in Miami literally Post Office boxes in Miami getting usaid money”

The Trump administration ran on legitimate critiques of post-9/11 overreach and failures in Iraq and Afghanistan, and promised greater discipline from a national security establishment that has been slow to learn lessons from forever wars, which are meritorious critiques.

“president Trump ran for re-election promising to transform America's foreign policy and its place in the world um and some of those critiques are ones that you know people like me could find meritan and certainly uh a majority of Americans could find meridin uh after the failures of post 911 overreach in places like Iraq and Afghanistan he was going to enforce you know greater discipline along a among a national security establishment that he calls the Deep State um that has been slow uh to learn the lessons of of those forever Wars”

The executive order approach of the Trump administration (producing many orders that read like press releases) is a symptom of legislative weakness: Trump can't pass this legislation in Congress so he's using executive orders, giving the appearance of strength while actual power is more limited than it appears.

“it's a bunch of executive orders that read like press releases and they can't pass legislation so they that's why they're doing a million executive orders because he's got a three majority in the house he couldn't legislate this stuff if he could legislate it he would”

Elections and the electoral pendulum remain as guardrails on presidential power, with the possibility of midterm elections in two years and a presidential election in four years allowing the pendulum to swing back.

“but there are elections um and uh I'm not one of these people that thinks you know Trump is going to stay in power again for a term I mean there'll be a midterm election in two years and there'll be an election in four years and the Pendulum can and very likely will swing um um it's not guaranteed”

US sanctions policy is overused and ineffective, with most heavily sanctioned countries (Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Venezuela) remaining under the same governments despite decades of sanctions.

“the United States vastly overuses the tool of of economic sanctions and the rest of the world is completely sick of it and by the way not just the people being sanctioned the Europeans everybody has to cooperate with these crazy sanctions regimes and and by the way let's look how they've worked out the most heavily sanctioned countries by the United States are Cuba Iran North Korea Venezuela wow that's really worked out like we really Chang those governments”

Self-censorship by individuals and institutions (companies, media, academics) in response to Trump administration pressure would represent a fundamental loss, and people with platforms should refuse to self-censor even in face of threats because the alternative is accepting authoritarian outcomes.

“and I don't understand what's the point like I I don't understand what's the point of having a platform if you don't say what you think um what's the point of you know running a company if you you know are worried that like like doge is going to come and shut you down because you have some diversity initiatives I mean it's just this is crazy this and there's not there's not actually that much real power behind it you know it's a bunch of executive orders that read like press releases and they can't pass legislation”

Autocrats and ethnonationalists depend on cynicism and apathy, so resistance requires artists, writers, civil society, and individuals maintaining hope and solidarity across boundaries to prevent the normalization of authoritarian worldviews.

“what what what autocrats or you know dictators or ethn nationalists want they depend on cynicism and apathy right cynicism nothing matters apathy nothing can change there have to be enough actors around the the world governments Civil Society individuals artist writers right it's not just we we let we let the all these conversations be dominated by politicians there has to be enough so uh solidarity and creativity uh in those spaces to both kind of main get through this and then help inform what's built on the other side”

Speaking truthfully on controversial topics even when it risks platform or career is essential moral stance; if people self-censor due to fear of retaliation (deportation, business shutdown, social stigma), the authoritarian project is complete; people with platforms should model refusal to self-censor and fill the space with speech that vulnerable groups cannot safely make.

“the next four years institutions and people are going to be under tremendous pressure to self-censor and the moment you allow that to happen it’s over you know it really is it’s not worth it it’s just not worth it um and yes people should take risk into account I I you know if they’re going to be like deporting people who do parti in certain protests like I mean that person may have a view but more powerful people then it’s all the more important that those people don’t self-censor”

The Trump administration's announcement of territorial expansion ambitions (Panama Canal, Greenland, Gaza) represents not a reassertion of American confidence but rather bullying behavior toward smaller countries and a dangerous legitimization of nationalism-based territorial conquest at a time when Russia, China, and Israel are already normalizing similar aggression, thereby further eroding the post-WWII international order based on state sovereignty.

“he's insisted that the US should take back the Panama Canal take control of Greenland from Denmark um despite repeated objections from those governments and the people of Greenland Denmark and Panama”

Hyper-politicization of everyday life benefits the most potent brand of identity politics in human history—majoritarian ethnonationalism—and reducing the role of identity in political discourse would actually disadvantage ethnic nationalism more than other political movements.

“this hyper politicization is is is not only is it just kind of boring but it's ultimately advantageous to like the most potent brand of ethnic of of identity politics and human history which is majoritarian ethnonationalism”

Individual citizens should understand what they value, where they get information, what they participate in or not, and start from that level of reflection before thinking about community and policy, as the foundation for political change.

“let this is a time to to to to see that who each of us are I mean I really mean this like individually you know what are you valuing where and how are you getting your information what are you participating in or not participating in um unfortunately like a lot of you have been doing some deep reading on life in certain political systems and and you know you you have to start from that level and build out what is happening in my community what is happening in my municipality uh the best ideas I think are going to come from cities and states and communities and how does that Ripple up into a healthier political culture and politics”

Current US spending, deficits, lack of central bank authority, and crypto deregulation suggest an unsustainable fiscal position that may trigger economic correction, which could create political conditions for international rules negotiation.

“there's something unsustainable I'm no econ there're many much smarter economists here at Harvard than me or I didn't even really do well in I forgot the number of class it was but um um but there's just something unsustainable about you know levels of spending deficits lack of Central Bank Authority what they're doing with crypto right now um so I I I I I I there's a correction that will have to happen to return to some form of of rules-based order”

Trump has capacity to broker Ukraine ceasefire because conditions have aligned: Ukrainian capacity to hold front lines is eroding, European war fatigue is growing, and Russia has incentive to consolidate territorial gains and regroup, but success requires offering Ukrainians credible post-war security guarantees and European integration.

“the biggest challenge is giving the ukrainians enough in terms of uh a political Horizon in Europe and security assurances that a they could probably accept a degree of territorial loss that is going to be tough for them to swallow but the B they can feel assured that the war won't just start again in three or four years”

Political pendulums swing left and right (and apparently in other directions now), meaning opportunities will emerge to address inequality more aggressively than Obama did post-2008.

“you know pendulums swing back and forth left right in and apparently in other directions I don't even really know what this is right now um and and I have to think again it's a conversion of what was asked about the international order there's probably have to be some economic or fiscal crisis I think to kind of give the jolt that is necessary”

President Biden's foreign policy slogan 'America's back' was useful in appealing to Europe and NATO allies but failed to resonate with the rest of the world, which does not want to return to a time when the US and Europe told them what to do, revealing a fundamental misconception about what international order is possible.

“he had a slogan that he used when he was running for president the first time that I actually think you know informed his his worldview and his foreign policy which was America's back I if you remember that and it was kind of like well let's just roll this clock back there was no Trump you know um and there's not been all these changes and what I think he found is that was a useful worldview in like Europe and with NATO and with a handful of Asian allies but the rest of the world is like we don't want to go back to when you guys told us what to do”

Instead of defending existing institutions, Democrats should focus on democratic reform: court reform, money-and-politics reform, voting rights reform—issues one can run on and build consensus around at state and local level, then nationalize those approaches and messages.

“how do we instead of if Trump kind of wants to ignore those institutions or or kind of remake them in His image um and and Democrats have kind of been defending their integrity and Biden I think reflects a kind of very institutionalist view how do we become about reform you know what is a different kind of democratic system in this country look like and by the way you can be four things that might not pass the first year in your office that's fine Trump was for plenty of things in 2015 that seemed crazy and now nobody thinks it's weird that they're building a wall you know I mean so you can before court reform money and politics reform voting rights reform you know but you can try to build consensus in in in in States you know I think one thing the Democrats have to do is innovate on Democracy at the state and Municipal level and then try to nationalize those approaches and those messages”

Climate change is creating inefficiencies in clean energy transition because the US is building one critical mineral supply chain for clean energy while China builds another, whereas it would be more efficient to negotiate a shared commitment to clean energy and coordinate supply chains, avoiding proxy conflicts over rare earth minerals.

“climate change we are in the process already of decoupling critical mineral Supply chains that are necessary for clean energy transition um it is not the most efficient way to deal with climate change for there to be a whole Chinese supply chain on critical minerals for clean energy and then a whole separate American Le one and then probably places like the Democratic Republic Congo get torn apart by proxy wars like better to negotiate a shared commment Around clean energy right”

The freezing of USAID assistance has tangible immediate consequences for people around the world who depend on foreign assistance for protection from terrorism, disease prevention, and rising global influence of China, thereby undermining US geopolitical strategy even as it purports to counter China.

“the Elon Musk supervised dismantlement of USC ID well that's something that's happening now that is having tangible consequences for people around the world who've been cut off from foreign assistance um whether those are organizations or whether those are you know um programs that americ amans expect to protect them from terrorism or from disease um or from you know the rising Global influence of who Trump identifies as the preeminent competitor to the United States China under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party”

China has built infrastructure across Africa (African Union headquarters, roads in East Africa, ports along the coast) while the US is dismantling its development capacity, meaning the US cannot win geopolitical competition with China by eliminating the insufficient commitment it already has to competing in those spaces.

“I remember going in the Obama years to the African Union in in Ethiopia um and we were there with a very counterterrorism focused agenda um and we went out to the African Union outside of ois and it's a beautiful building um it's you know the preeminent political institution in Africa that building was built by the Chinese government the road to that building was built by the Chinese government um the ports uh along the coast of East Africa are built by the Chinese government”

The removal of guardrails from people with political power and wealth (represented by Trump-Musk nationalism blended with libertarian mindsets) reflects what American society currently prioritizes, and things that would have seemed ludicrous eight years ago (Elon Musk dismantling entire federal agencies, Trump making various statements) now seem normal due to cultural shift driven by politics and broader social issues.

“so I just think that this kind of blending of the Trump musk you know nationalism and libertarian mindsets um is one in which guardrails are removed from people with political power and people with wealth and again this comes back to this idea of it's kind of a reflection of what the society currently prioritizes in this country”

The Trump administration's late-stage superpower-in-decline approach prioritizes squeezing as much juice as possible out of what remains of American power rather than developing a strategy for resurgence, thereby handing off the residue to someone else to deal with.

“I would again argue that it rather than a kind of golden age um as as president Trump said in his inaugural address it's kind of like your late stage superpower and decline Vibe you know I mean this is not uh this is not like a strategy for re Resurgence it's kind of a strategy for squeezing as much out of the much juice as we can out of uh what remains um and then handing it off to someone else to deal with uh the the residue”

Different foreign policy is required from different national identity and conceptions, making it necessary that those critical of current policies work to shift what national identity and national pride look like domestically before attempting to change foreign policy.

“and ultimately that's what it's going to take um to have a different foreign policy um and so I would argue that those of us who are alarmed by these Trends um have to recognize that we're not going back to some past um you know I found some things to criticize in President Biden's foreign policy”

Instead of competing with China on AI through containment and denial, the US should negotiate shared norms around AI with China and other major countries to prevent AI from producing biological weapons and remove it from nuclear command and control systems, which would be more rational than competitive isolation.

“wouldn't it be better to sit down with the Chinese and say instead of like having these competitive you know processes what are the Norms around AI you know I'm a security guy how do we prevent it from producing biological weapons how do we get it out of nuclear command and control uh um obviously there's societal disruption questions proliferation questions um that is a much more rational way of dealing with this um than being in this kind of you know we're going to try to keep as much stuff away from you”

Connecting economic message (addressing wealth inequality) to politics is necessary because wealth inequality is itself a political problem—it is how you get an oligarchy with billionaires like Musk, Bezos, and Suar sitting behind the president at the inauguration.

“and connecting your economic message you're you know I agree with Chris Murphy like the the idea of dealing with wealth inequality seen as an economic issue it's also a politics issue because that's how you get an nean musk and that's how you get you know that Tableau of um you know uh Jeff Bezos and Elon and suar and all these people at the inauguration um we don't want an oligarchy you know in this country we have one”

The reason American politics is so polarized is partly because it has become so much about identity, and there is an opening to try to remove these identity conversations from the center of political space—both because Trump drove them there and because a more identity-neutral politics would be preferred by most people.

“part of the reason why American politics so polarized is because it's become so much about identity and I think there's an opening to try to remove these identity conversations from the center of the political space I mean Trump kind of drove them there um through his behavior and and and ultimately you know his brand of kind of ethn nationalist identity politics is is both numerically larger and um more capable of dividing political opposition”

Democrats need to build far greater collaboration and connectivity with center-left and progressive civil society and political parties around the world, similar to what the far right has done for 15 years through shared media strategy, shared political strategists, and shared lessons learned.

“I've been a big proponent for a long time um with some people who are in this room of there being far more kind of collaboration and connectivity between between for again I'm reflecting of you but Center left and Progressive Civil Society political parties um around the world and all you have to do is look at what the farri has done for the last 15 years it's incredibly networked you know shared media strategy shared political strategists shared Lessons Learned um and so if you again it's not unlike if you want the country to have better foreign policy if you want the the international order to reflect a different political momentum you have to generate that political M momentum too”

The Democratic party has shown unnecessary reluctance to be populist due to irrational fear of Bernie Sanders, who was saying popular things that resonated with voters, and this reluctance prevented Democrats from articulating populist economic critiques.

“I think it speaks to a unnecessary reluctance of the democratic party to be populist like there was this fear of Bernie you know um and I'm not saying that like it had you know but it was like it was an irrational fear of Bernie you know um who was the most popular things like even if you don't think Bernie Sanders should have been the nominee in 16 or 20 like he was saying really popular things”

Corporate America's visible alignment with the Democratic party on DEI initiatives was largely window dressing (addressing concerns of employees) rather than genuine commitment to corporate reform, and Democrats failed to articulate corporate power as a central problem in inequality.

“there also was a strange kind of where the corporate America was visibly aligned with the Democratic party was on these you know social kind of di type initiatives but which in many cases were totally window dressing you know I mean so you know because somebody has a chief ex officer or something that the Republicans are saying oh see they're in bad with the Democrats the you know these corporate Elites when actually that was kind of not for the Democrats it was for their own employees”

Political pendulum swings between left and right are real and likely, so progressive forces should prepare for moment when crisis (economic or fiscal) creates openings for major policy change, learning from Obama's 2008 financial crisis response which prioritized system preservation over inequality reduction.

“and pendulums swing back and forth left right in and apparently in other directions I don't don't even really know what this is right now um and and I have to think again it's a conversion of what was asked about the international order there's probably have to be some economic or fiscal crisis I think to kind of give the jolt that is necessary frankly like dismantling the US Federal Workforce and cutting taxes and increasing spending and deregulating the crypto industry is seems like it's going to bring that about you know rather than later um and so part of it is how do you make sure that you know when the moment emerges you can really try to address this in a policy basis more aggressively than than Obama did after the financial crisis um you know he kept the system alive um but you know clearly you know in retrospect if something like that were happen again I'd say go right for the inequality”

When the US threatens countries with tariffs and trade conflict, they will not confront the US directly but will instead shift their alliances to China for investment and technology, which will accelerate over the next four years even if the immediate effects are not visible on US news cycles.

“I think if you threaten countries with terrorists if you humiliate foreign leaders if you kind of pick these types of fights they may be very nice to you right um you know you might not want to go up to the bully in the schoolyard and and you know punch back but you're probably going to go over to the other corner of the schoolyard and find another group of people to hang out with and I think that's what's going to happen over the next four years that we are going to see uh a whole host of countries either becoming more Regional in their cooperation looking to China for investment or technology um and so it won't show up overnight not everything in the world happens on an American News cycle um but it happens uh and it's already happened over the last eight years and it's just going to accelerate”

When everything in politics becomes identity signaling, it's hard for people to pick and choose on issues because picking selectively (like supporting Trump on tariffs but not USAID) signals disloyalty to the identity group.

“it makes it harder for people to pick and choose because if it's all identity it's hard for you to be like well I agree with Mr Trump about these things but I really like USA ID to get back to it”

China's AI applications in robotics and manufacturing are more aligned with what most developing countries want from AI than US chatbots, so the US may win the 'race' for the best chatbot while China wins the geopolitical competition.

“most countries are not looking for that they're looking for robotics so that their factories can be more efficient you know they're so we may win some race for the best chatbot but the Chinese uses of AI are actually more aligned with what most of the world wants from AI you know particularly developing countries”

Other countries are now stepping forward to champion international human rights and ICC enforcement (South Africa most prominently on Palestine) as the US withdraws, potentially infusing these institutions with different perspectives that could be more equitable than when founded by Western powers.

“you see other countries stepping forward to fill that space right I mean South Africa most prominently uh on the Palestinian issue but but you know on other issues too um they they're different countries stepping forward and that might Infuse those institutions with different perspectives and the ones that created them”

The clandestine USAID funding in Cuba was controlled by Congress, not the executive branch—Congress funneled money through loopholes to preferred groups—and Rhodes could not stop it despite being involved in negotiations, revealing congressional control of shadow foreign policy operations.

“and that was not the federal government that was Congress right that was people in Congress who control that budget you know just fun shoveling money through a bunch of loopholes to their preferred groups and and we at least with a lot of effort brought it all into the sunlight so I I actually couldn't turn off the funding because it was congressionally appropr well I guess I could have uh I thought uh because it was statutory congressionally funded I couldn't in the executive branch just stop it”

Building solidarity across countries and institutions that insist on right and wrong, true and false, objective reality versus disinformation is necessary to weather the current rough period and preserve capacity for more rational approaches to international affairs.

“building solidarity across different sets of countries and institutions um to kind of weather a pretty rough period um now now that doesn't immediately do as much for the people in Gaza as it should but but actually I think it is what preserves some capacity for there to be a return to a more rational um or more fair-minded uh approach to to to not just that issue but to um to to other issues”

Trump made foreign policy into an identity politics issue starting in 2014 when the Republican Party ran ads linking Ebola-infected ISIS members crossing the border with Iranian support, which presaged Trump's later use of foreign policy for identity signaling.

“this substantively there's a basis for this obviously Ukraine we've seen this I think what Trump has done and we were chatting that about this before is he He Turned foreign policy into an identity politics issue um and I felt this in 2015 because 2014 when Trump was already kind of the party was already becoming Trump even before Trump because it was kind of the foxify of the Republican party because there were ads in 2014 I remember midterm elections that tied together it was a uh there were Ebola infected Isis members who were going to cross our Southern border with the support of the Iranian revolutionary guard that was actually a true like set of ads that ran in that campaign cycle”

USAID dismantling will accelerate US geopolitical loss to China because the US is voluntarily surrendering already-insufficient soft-power capacity in regions where China is investing heavily—African Union facilities, ports, infrastructure—making it impossible to compete on the same terms.

“the idea that we're going to win some big geopolitical competition with China by dismantling the already insufficient amount of commitment the United States has to um competing in those spaces um you know I I I think it's going to be the opposite”

Democrats have been defending institutions like the federal workforce and the National Security Enterprise that Americans are already fed up with, inadvertently becoming defenders of establishment politics and globalization rather than reformers, ceding populist ground to Trump.

“we were so in opposition to Trump that we felt the need to defend you know all the institutions like defend the Integrity of the federal Workforce and the National Security Enterprise and you know kind of Congress and you know defend all these things that Americans are actually you know pretty fed up with um and it kind of became a proxy for defending even globalization itself”

Activists and organizations should not self-censor about Gaza or other political issues regardless of costs, as self-censorship defeats the entire purpose of having a platform; there is not enough real power behind Trump's executive orders to enforce many of these directives.

“I made a decision like a few years ago to not self-censor on anything you know um I have some views that are not that helpful to some future confirmation hearings um it'd be more helpful if I ran like AstroTurf right-wing organizations and got drunk apparently um but uh which you know um but on Gaza like and I'm not this is not an a rizing point at all like it really isn't it's just like I was like we never self-censored I don't think and guess what like nobody showed up and arrested US you know yet uh and and our audience got bigger um and I still got invited to play like there's people like these systems are designed to make you self-censor now I know we're in a place where actually it goes beyond that um from what I've read um but you know that doesn't mean there not other spaces to express yourself and and I just think we're going to be living it's not just Gaza the next four years institutions and people are going to be under tremendous pressure to self-censor and the moment you allow that to happen it's over you know it really is it's not worth it it's just not worth it um and yes people should take risk into account I I you know if they're going to be like deporting people who do parti in certain protests like I mean that person may have a view but more powerful people then it's all the more important that those people don't self-censor you know if there going to be a stigmatization and targeting of of more vulnerable people with kind of Retribution then other I'd like to see other people step forward and and and fill that space because otherwise what's the point like what what is the point of having a platform if you don't say what you think um what's the point of you know running a company if you you know are worried that like like doge is going to come and shut you down because you have some diversity initiatives I mean it's just this is crazy this and there's not there's not actually that much real power behind it you know it's a bunch of executive orders that read like press releases and they can't pass legislation so they that's why they're doing a million executive orders because he's got a three majority in the house he couldn't legislate this stuff if he could legislate it he would you know”

Dismantling USAID during the Gaza humanitarian crisis is short-sighted because it destroys the agency and capacity needed to execute reconstruction work—clearing rubble, removing unexploded ordnance—demonstrating lack of strategic vision about how pieces of foreign policy fit together.

“ironically if he wanted to kind of rebuild Gaza he's actually destroying the agency that would do it um in usid and already the freeze on assistance is you know making it impossible for usid to fulfill just the humanitarian ceasefire in Gaza never mind the arduous task of clearing rubble and clearing unexploded bombs and and reconstruction um and so kind of speaks to this short turism the lack of seeing things pieces of how they fit together”

Trump-era nationalism reflects late-stage superpower decline, not resurgence, and represents a strategy of extracting maximum value from remaining US power and handing off the residue to future leaders rather than genuine renewal.

“it's kind of like your late stage superpower and decline Vibe you know I mean this is not uh this is not like a strategy for re Resurgence it's kind of a strategy for squeezing as much out of the much juice as we can out of uh what remains um and then handing it off to someone else to deal with uh the residue”

Democrats should pivot from institutional defense to institutional reform, proposing court reform, money-and-politics reform, and voting rights reform as affirmative platforms, building consensus at state and local levels, then nationalizing successful approaches.

“how do we instead of if Trump kind of wants to ignore those institutions or or kind of remake them in His image um and and Democrats have kind of been defending their integrity and Biden I think reflects a kind of very institutionalist view how do we become about reform you know what is a different kind of democratic system in this country look like and by the way you can be four things that might not pass the first year in your office that's fine Trump was for plenty of things in 2015 that seemed crazy and now nobody thinks it's weird that they're building a wall”

Linking economic message with political reform is critical: addressing wealth inequality must be framed as both an economic and political issue because concentrated wealth enables oligarchic capture (exemplified by Elon Musk's USAID dismantlement and billionaire alignment at Trump's inauguration).

“connecting your economic message you're you know I agree with Chris Murphy like the the idea of dealing with wealth inequality seen as an economic issue it's also a politics issue because that's how you get an nean musk and that's how you get you know that Tableau of um you know uh Jeff Bezos and Elon and suar and all these people at the inauguration um we don't want an oligarchy you know in this country we have one”

Progressive Civil Society, political parties, and center-left organizations globally should increase collaboration and coordination to build political momentum for a different international order, matching the far-right's cross-border networking and strategy sharing.

“I've been a big proponent for a long time um with some people who are in this room of there being far more kind of collaboration and connectivity between between for again I'm reflecting of you but Centre left and Progressive Civil Society political parties um around the world and all you have to do is look at what the farri has done for the last 15 years it's incredibly networked you know shared media strategy shared political strategists shared Lessons Learned”

USAID regime-change funding was congressionally appropriated and Congress controlled the budget, meaning members of Congress used USAID as a vehicle to fund preferred political groups rather than the executive branch directing misuse.

“and that was not the federal government that was Congress right that was people in Congress who control that budget you know just fun shoveling money through a bunch of loopholes to their preferred groups”

Democratic party's blend of economic populism and reform agenda (inequality reduction, institutional reform, democracy protection) is the only way to prevent oligarchy and restore legitimacy.

“the Democratic party again needs to blend its economic populism with its reform agenda because they're ultimately everything should be about preventing what we saw at that inauguration like that that is what's wrong those like four guys guys um unless you count Jeff Bezos's um date um I are they I don't know if they're married but um you those four guys um you know standing behind the president in front of the cabinet that's the problem”

It is possible for Americans to have a sense of shared national identity and national pride based on affirmative things rather than grievance, taking things away from others, or defining identity against an external enemy, and both political parties have demonstrated this capacity at different times.

“it's possible for Americans to have a sense of shared national identity and a sense of of of national pride that is about affirmative things um that's not just about taking things away from other people or it's not just about grievance or it's not just about another another whether that other be at home or abroad um it is possible and both political parties have done this um to have a different concept of national identity”

Democrats walked into a trap by defending all existing federal institutions (Federal Workforce, National Security Enterprise, Congress, etc.) against Trump, when Americans are actually fed up with these institutions, causing Democrats to defend entities that have lost public support and become proxies for defending globalization itself.

“the challenged the Trap that you know I've written about this but the the Democrats walked into people like me walked into at times um is that we were so in opposition to Trump that we felt the need to defend you know all the institutions like defend the Integrity of the federal Workforce and the National Security Enterprise and you know kind of Congress and you know defend all these things that Americans are actually you know pretty fed up with with um and it kind of became a proxy for defending even globalization itself”

Trump will try to divide European countries against each other using tariffs to pick winners and losers, but Europe should resist this trap by finding ways for like-minded EU countries to coordinate on issues like Ukraine or trade without waiting for Brussels consensus.

“my recommendation would be don't fall into the Trap what Trump wants and what what he's going to do is he's going to try to divide all the Europeans against each other and he's going to use things like tariffs to pick winners um and to punish losers and the losers are almost always going to be Centre left or you know governments um and that if you fall into that trap you know you're no European country is big enough to be in the weight class with the US and China”

Biden's foreign policy slogan 'America's Back' was insufficient because it attempted to restore a pre-Trump international order that no longer exists and that most of the Global South actively rejected, preferring independence to US dictation.

“he had a slogan that he used when he was running for president the first time that I actually think you know informed his his worldview and his foreign policy which was America's back I if you remember that and it was kind of like well let's just roll this clock back there was no Trump you know um and there's not been all these changes and what I think he found is that was a useful worldview in like Europe and with NATO and with a handful of Asian allies but the rest of the world is like we don't want to go back to when you guys told us what to do”

The rules-based international order is dead because big countries simply choose not to follow rules when inconvenient, and the same principle applies to domestic life: no system can function if powerful actors opt out when rules are inconvenient.

“no rules-based order can work if the big countries just choose not to follow the rules um by the way that's true in life as well as foreign policy you know um and uh and there's always been some of that but I think over the last decade there's been a you know now it is that's the norm you know if you're us or Russia or China you kind of just you exempt yourself from the rules you don't do anything that is inconvenient to you so you only follow the rules when it is totally aligned with your interest and then the rest of the world sees that and they say well why should I follow these rules”

Dismantling USAID while simultaneously proposing to take over Gaza reconstruction eliminates the very agency and institutional capacity that would be necessary to actually rebuild Gaza, demonstrating short-termism and inability to see how pieces fit together in foreign policy strategy.

“ironically if he wanted to kind of rebuild Gaza he's actually destroying the agency that would do it um in usid and already the freeze on assistance is you know making it impossible for usid to fulfill just the humanitarian ceasefire in Gaza never mind the arduous task of clearing rubble and clearing unexploded bombs and and reconstruction”

Trump has capacity to negotiate a ceasefire in Ukraine given alignment of factors: Ukraine's declining ability to hold front lines, European fatigue with war, and Russia's massive losses creating mutual interest in slowing conflict, though the challenge is giving Ukraine political horizon in Europe and security assurances that allow it to accept territorial loss without risking renewed war in 3-4 years.

“there was already a kind of an alignment of factors you know uh Ukrainian um uh you know Ukraine feeling like their capacity to hold the front line was has been steadily eroding a fatigue with the war in Europe um but also massive losses in Russia we don't even know what it looks like under the hood there um I just can't imagine that I know that Russia can withstand a lot but they have some interest in at least you know um slowing this thing down and and so I think there's you know there's some arrangement that could be made”

A nation's foreign policy is a pretty accurate reflection of its psyche and what is going on in the body politic at the time, making the JFK-era expansion of USAID a signal of a country that saw itself as a newly minted superpower with an expansive vision of defending freedom and buttressing international institutions, whereas the Trump era dismantling of USAID reflects a nation that feels like it's growing smaller both literally in size and in self-conception.

“the extent to which a nation's foreign policy is a pretty accurate reflection of its psyche uh of what is going on in the body politic at the time”

A shock—either a military conflict at the scale of a world war or an economic/fiscal crisis—will likely be necessary to return to some form of rules-based order in which big countries feel it is in their interest to follow inconvenient rules, absent which there is no clear mechanism for reform other than bottom-up pressure from public opinion.

“I think what it's going to take uh unfortunately is some kind of shock you know um it took the shock of World War I and actually two of those you know because the League of Nations didn't get across the Finish Line in Congress but it took that shock to write all these rules you know to say we should have rules governing when you can go to war and how you can fight a war and how you get nuclear weapons and all these other things and I just think you know we we going to need a shock”

Donald Trump has an agenda that is the dream scenario for corporate deregulation and regulatory capture—fossil fuels will self-regulate, tech companies gain autonomy—yet the Democratic party was left holding the bag for being perceived as in bed with corporations, representing a failure of Democratic messaging and strategic thinking.

“part of what is so odd about American politics today is that Donald Trump has an agenda that is the dream uh the you could not have a bigger corporate dream of regulatory capture by you know fossil fuel companies are going to self-regulate now the tech companies you know it's this is not new it's the same been the same thing in American politics since 70s um and yet somehow the Democrats were the ones left holding the bag for being in bed with corporations”

The risk of nationalism in multiple places with multiple older strong men (all men) is great power conflict, which is particularly precarious given active conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza and the Taiwan situation.

“and so you know he is reflecting something that has happened in this country um and and I think the risks to it are the construction of an American order sorry of an international order that is kind of meant to actually check American excesses um or at worst you know this brand of nationalism in this many places um with this many older strong men and they're all men um can lead to to to real great power conflict”

The suppression of Palestinian and Palestinian American speech and narratives is a chilling preview of what will happen to other marginalized groups' speech on DEI, women's rights, and other issues if the pattern continues.

“what has been done to speech around Palestinians and Palestinian Americans is a chilling preview of what's going to come to other issues if you can silence people for expressing totally legitimate views about what has happened to the people of Gaza don't think that won't happen on Dei on women and gender issues on things that you're not even thinking right now”

Trump's opposition to the Iran nuclear deal was not based on substantive disagreement about centrifuge operations or uranium enrichment monitoring, but on identity-based opposition to Obama negotiating with 'brown people' and giving them money.

“at the risk of being a little pretty blunt about it I you know take the Iran deal I don't think Trump had deep opinions about how many centrifuges should be allowed to operate at the Nan's facility or or you know what the modalities of the Uranian enrichment stockpile monitoring you know it was you know these are some brown people that we're giving some money to you know um it connected to this Obama's not one of us you know he's making deals with these people”

The period ahead presents an opportunity for reconstruction if the country survives it, and universities are central to that reconstruction as sources of alternative knowledge and institution-building.

“there's opportunity in that uh as someone who's going through a home renovation right now that is getting more expensive by the day um you know this is a rebuild not a renovation and and there's opportunity in that the really truly is to to come about on the other side if we make it to the other side um with the opportunity to build something new uh and again universities are going to be Central to that because uh it's going to be a pretty Blank Slate”

Health and stability in American domestic politics are prerequisites for effective foreign policy, and what people see in American democracy shapes how people globally view democracy as a system.

“what's going to make us more effective in in foreign policy is if we are healthier home um and what is going to help Advance democracy again in the world is not and this pains me to say as a speech writer like the speeches the presidents give about democracy it's going to be what people see uh in democracies like the United States”

Trump cuts a familiar picture from history as an aging strong man musing about territorial expansion for personal consolidation of power and legacy construction, a transactional ethnonationalist in a world full of similar figures.

“frankly if you strip that away Trump cuts a very familiar picture from history which is an aging strong man musing about territorial expansion for his own consolidation of power and construction of a legacy uh you know a transactional ethn nationalist in a world full of those people um”

The unconditional provision of military assistance for the obliteration of Gaza by the world's largest superpower for a year and a half is a fault line that should concern all people about what kind of world we will live in.

“for a year and a half the world's largest superpower was providing unconditional military assistance for the absolute obliteration of a densely populated area of two million people um if that's not enough um I would caution that be be wary of where that mindset might travel to”

Jake Sullivan's 'Foreign Policy for the Middle Class' was substantively good in proposing clean energy and technology investments but was politically ineffective because Biden did not narrator the story of why investment is better than tariffs, and the branding itself ('middle class foreign policy') was incomprehensible jargon to voters.

“I mean look the the idea of you know the US embracing aspects of industrial policy right and huge investments in our clean energy sector in our technology sector and our basic research I think was a smart and necessary corrective to you know Decades of of of either underinvestment or kind of trust that markets would address some of these challenges um so that's the aspect of that policy that I liked I think that it was kind of um it was too like it was Tethered to um um some more hegemonic actions in terms of their Farm policy that it was kind of schizophrenic”

Regulation of social media faces rearguard action from tech companies and is unlikely to solve the misinformation problem, so more viable strategies include populating platforms with alternative information, alternative platforms/sources, localization of media, and encouraging people to seek information outside toxic online spaces.

“there's been a rear guard action from the t companies for a long time to prevent that from evolving into meaningful regulation and now um I I I have very little hope that that's that that we can look to regulation to save us from the excesses of social media so um in that regard or in that environment um I actually think kind of connects to the one of the last things I was saying here like I'm I I just have to think that you know there there's a couple ways you can go about dealing with that um one is just by the kind of populating of platforms with alternative information and you know information that aligns with you know My Views and and having a podcast as a part you know we try to do that on YouTube and other places um but I think more importantly again like I I actually think like we you have to kind of help I mean as someone who has an eight and 10-year-old daughter keep hoping that that like Generations always have a backlash against what the people before them were doing like waiting for the analog backlash year you know like the this is this fun like is this is It's I I I don't find it that enjoyable to be on any of these platforms anymore and so I actually think there needs to be in addition instead of people being like drug addicts and being like I hope someone comes along and makes these drugs less potent you know um that were like you know what maybe this isn't where I should be getting my information you know and and that people are coming up with alternatives to how to get information and Alternatives of how to shape their views”

What gives Rhodes hope is that the problems causing oligarchy (tax policy, regulatory choices, anti-trust enforcement, campaign finance rules) were all created by policy choices and therefore can be reversed.

“Part of what gives me hope is these problems were created by policies like the changes in the tax system changes in the regulatory framework changes in anti trust enforcement changes in the absence of restrictions in money and politics so they can be fixed by policy changes you know they really can't there's this effort to kind of make you think that it's inevitable that you know Elon Musk will have $200 billion dollar you know there's that's not inevitable that's a creation of government policies um and you know pendulums swing back and forth left right in and apparently in other directions”

There is an opportunity and necessity to build something new after the current political moment—not a renovation but a rebuild—and universities will be central to this because they will be starting from a blank slate.

“as someone who's going through a home renovation right now that is getting more expensive by the day um you know this is a rebuild not a renovation and and there's opportunity in that uh as someone who's going through a home renovation right now that is getting more expensive by the day um you know this is a rebuild not a renovation and and there's opportunity in that the really truly is to to come about on the other side if we make it to the other side um with the opportunity to build something new uh and again universities are going to be Central to that because uh it's going to be a pretty Blank Slate”

Palestinian American speaker expressed that being dehumanized and having narratives ignored by the U.S. is longstanding experience, and questioned how human rights and global power structures can function when the U.S. uses its position to block international justice mechanisms (ICC) that target U.S. allies.

“as a Palestinian American I grew up in a military City so I’m used to kind of living in the shadows our narrative being ignored accepting the ignorance of the country and being so dehumanized I suppose my question so I found a lot of peace in your podcast the last 16 months so just want to say thank you for reporting and sharing a narrative that has been so hidden um thank you I struggle a lot especially with the last two days just understanding what the world can have as power and leverage when the US keeps shutting everything down um like obviously we’re ignoring the icj ICC and the rest of the world has vocalized a different opinion so I’m just curious your position of how the world can move forward if the US is this roadblock”

'Foreign policy for the middle class' and 'bottom-up, middle-out' are incomprehensible bureaucratic framings that no real human would ever use; politicians and foreign policy experts sound baffling to ordinary people and need to simply tell people what they're doing in plain language rather than inventing jargonistic brands.

“I also again Jake is a longtime friend in colleague um so but I the The Branding of f policy for the middle class is like exactly like kind of what the Democratic party does that no human being would ever say that you know I mean like like like my advice to to people who worked in foreign policy in the government and I used to be one of them is is you don’t have any idea how incomprehensible you some sound to people um just tell people what you’re doing like you don’t have to put some label foreign policy for the middle class or bottom up middle out”

Democratic politicians should not follow every Trump or right-wing influencer provocation, as hyper-politicization favors the most potent and powerful form of identity politics, which is majoritarian ethnonationalism.

“it means not following every every you know provocation from Trump or you know right-wing influencers um because because again like this hyper politicization is is is not only is it just kind of boring but it's ultimately advantageous to like the most potent brand of ethnic of of identity politics and human history which is majoritarian ethnonationalism”

Trump is a lame duck president by definition (term-limited) and some Republican senators know he will be gone in two years, creating space for bipartisan cooperation on specific issues where left-right convergence exists, even if the parties cannot resolve fundamental differences.

“Trump is a lame duck um I mean he's trying his hardest to counteract that impression and he'll be able to for a while but you know these some of some of these Republican senators were like to this year they know they're going to be there two years after he's gone you know um and I think what you do is you try to find islands of cooperation you know you're not going to resolve the differences between the parties but can we just find some things where where there is some left right convergence where there is some agreement and and just kind of you got to keep coming at it”

When designing a new international development agency, the most important question is what issues people around the world actually care about, and polling shows they prioritize education, health, science, technological cooperation, and entrepreneurship rather than counterterrorism or nuclear weapons concerns that dominate US foreign policy.

“I used to occasionally ask for public opinion polling about if we're going to Africa if we're going to Southeast Asia what what is most most important of these people you know I thought about like a campaign president's talking to these people what do they care about what do they want to work with the United States about on and every time the answers were education health science and technological cooperation entrepreneurship guess what's not on the list you know terrorism you know nuclear weapons uh the things that we talk to them about um or even in these democracy spaces”

There is opportunity in the collapse of the old order to build something new and better, but only if we 'make it to the other side,' implying significant near-term risk of catastrophic outcome.

“there's opportunity in that uh as someone who's going through a home renovation right now that is getting more expensive by the day um you know this is a rebuild not a renovation and and there's opportunity in that the really truly is to to come about on the other side if we make it to the other side um with the opportunity to build something new”

The most rational thing for Europe to do would be to make more collective decision-making across technology policy, climate policy, trade policy, migration policy, and approach to major powers (China, Russia, India), and negotiate with regional blocs and developing countries from position of collective strength rather than fragmented national positions.

“in this world the most rational thing would be for Europe to make more Collective decision-making across the board you know and this always gets casts around NATO and military spending but I mean what is the European technology policy what is the European climate policy what is the European trade policy um what is the European approach to migration the more collectively they can make those decisions the more they can navigate a world with China and Russia and the United States and India”

The United States stopped Ebola from reaching America by building a huge network of clinics in West Africa through USAID, demonstrating that development agencies pursuing effective governance and economies and hope do prevent terrorism and disease emergence better than counterterrorism approaches.

“guess who stopped Ebola from getting the United States it was usid like they literally built a huge Network in West Africa of of clinics to stop Ebola so this isn't just all soft stuff this is you know how do you prevent Isis from regenerating in Iraq you know um and again that's not counterterrorism actually it's it's not it's it's a effective governance it's effective economies you know it's it's hope”

The concept of 'foreign policy for the middle class' is Democratic branding jargon that no actual human would use when speaking; effective political communication requires dropping labels and telling people what is actually being done in simple language.

“the The Branding of f policy for the middle class is like exactly like kind of what the Democratic party does that no human being would ever say that you know I mean like like like my advice to to people who worked in foreign policy in the government and I used to be one of them is is you don't have any idea how incomprehensible you some sound to people um just tell people what you're doing like you don't have to put some label foreign policy for the middle class or bottom up middle out”

Trump is a 'lame duck' who will be politically constrained once the midterm cycle begins in two years, when Republican senators will need to position themselves for the post-Trump era rather than defend all his policies.

“Trump is a lame duck um I mean he's trying his hardest to counteract that impression and he'll be able to for a while but you know these some of some of these Republican senators were like to this year they know they're going to be there two years after he's gone you know um and I think what you do is you try to find islands of cooperation”

Younger generations always have a backlash against what the previous generation was doing, and this may include a natural analog/anti-digital backlash against social media platforms, creating space for alternative information and participation modes.

“I actually think like we you have to kind of help I mean as someone who has an eight and 10-year-old daughter keep hoping that that like Generations always have a backlash against what the people before them were doing like waiting for the analog backlash year you know like the this is It's I I I don't find it that enjoyable to be on any of these platforms anymore”

Many people currently practice self-censorship out of fear of retaliation, but no one has actually been arrested for expressing views on Gaza or protesting, and the speaker's own experience shows that expressing unpopular views does not result in professional or legal consequences.

“I made a decision like a few years ago to not self-censor on anything you know um I have some views that are not that helpful to some future confirmation hearings um but uh which you know um but on Gaza like and I'm not this is not an a rizing point at all like it really isn't it's just like I was like we never self-censored I don't think and guess what like nobody showed up and arrested US you know yet uh and and our audience got bigger um and I still got invited to play like there's people like these systems are designed to make you self-censor now”

Trump did not run on dismantling USAID, acquiring Greenland, or the US occupation of Gaza, so the current flurry of announcements represents something beyond campaign promises and suggests either a loss of self-confidence or ideological capture.

“Trump did not run on the platform of dismantling usid um he didn't run on Greenland um he certainly didn't run on the US occupation of Gaza um and and as I was watching this play out um I couldn't help thinking that rather than showing a sense of strength you know this kind of feels to me like an America that's actually lost self-confidence”

Democrats failed to stand up to their own donor base on issues and this failure was worse after Trump's first term when Democratic donors told Kamala Harris to moderate her populist message and adopt pro-entrepreneurship positions instead.

“there was just a lot the failure to stand up to your own donor base you know and uh that's that we've seen that on a range of issues in the Democratic party um you know and this was reported and the kamla started pretty populist and then someone kind of got to her and was like Hey like you know just dial that back a little bit you know and suddenly she's putting out plans for entrepreneur and and and startups instead of saying Corporate America is a part of the inequality problem in this country”

Bipartisanship in foreign policy is still possible because there are substantive areas of agreement (Ukraine, agricultural trade, etc.) and Republican senators who know they'll still be there after Trump leaves office.

“I think you again it's a version of detoxifying you know Trump is a lame duck um I mean he's trying his hardest to counteract that impression and he'll be able to for a while but you know these some of some of these Republican senators were like to this year they know they're going to be there two years after he's gone you know um and I think what you do is you try to find islands of cooperation”

Sullivan's industrial policy was schizophrenic because it combined investment-focused policy with hegemonic actions like trying to cut off China's access to chips and technology—when a more pragmatic negotiation approach on supply chains could have made clean energy cheaper by avoiding duplicative investment.

“it was kind of um it was too like it was Tethered to um um some more hegemonic actions in terms of their Farm policy that it was kind of schizophrenic in a way because it was like we're adjusting to this new world we got to keep up we got to invest in these places um but you know we're also going to like you know kind of flex um our 1990s muscles on the world stage and and we're going to try to you know like I said cut off the Chinese from everything and and and so I think as a substantive matter it kind of addressed part of the problem but it it it could have been accompanied by um more pragmatism in other spaces right in other words yes all well and good to negotiate you know with Congress and get all this funding for clean energy here but like how do you negotiate with even allies to make sure that those subsidies aren't at odds with what Europeans or or others are doing on climate that we're not kind of again creating redundant duplicative Supply chains that make clean energy more expensive”

China is attempting to reconfigure its economy to position itself as a superpower in clean energy and technology, betting that these will ultimately be the dominant sectors, while still maintaining significant manufacturing and other economic activities.

“they've tried to kind of reconfigure their economy so that they are poised to be a superpower in clean energy and Technology betting that those are ultimately going to be I'm sure they still do plenty of manufacturing and other things but like they you know they for a variety of reasons some domestic and some International theyve really bet on that”