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Michael McFaul, President Obama’s ambassador to Moscow, drew on history to discover what makes Putin tick.
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McFaul argues that the West missed critical opportunities to integrate Russia into the democratic world in the 1990s and after 2008, and that Putin's regime is now in structural decline due to overextension in Ukraine, though predicting its fall remains difficult.
- NATO expansion should have occurred faster when Russia was weak, and Georgia and Ukraine should have been armed earlier as deterrence
- Putin's initial rise to power depended on contingent factors (1998 financial crash, Chechen war) that could have been different, making his presidency historically contingent rather than inevitable
- The invasion of Ukraine represents Putin's strategic overextension and marks the beginning of the end of Putinism, evidenced by military fractures like the Wagner mutiny
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In a famous David Frost interview before Putin was president, Putin said he thought Russia should join NATO, which would be a great idea, and McFaul suggests Putin now wants people to forget this history because he needs NATO as an enemy to justify his current policies.
“back then he was asked what do you think in NATO actually he was in a very famous interview in in London David Frost did the interview even before right as he he was president-elect and he said well I think we should join that would be a great idea he told that to George Robertson actually um who who's been on this podcast is that right who tells this exact same story extraordinary extraordinary tale yeah well he wants you to forget that history right he wants you to forget that because he needs NATO as this enemy as part of the justification”
McFaul notes that June 12 has been renamed from 'Russian Federation Independence Day' (commemorating the 1990 declaration of sovereignty from the Soviet Union under Yeltsin) to simply 'Russia Day,' a rebranding that obscures the historical meaning and reflects Putin regime revisionism about the 1990s.
“I want to add a footnote because you said something about history and made a there was a day it was it was Russia day uh and and this is an interesting revision of History so the day is June 12 1990 the day that Russian Federation declared independence from the Soviet Union Boris Yeltsin did that in 1990. it's now been forgotten and now it's just called Russia day like you know uh their national day because it is is it still the 12th of June yeah and most 90 of people don't know why but I know why”
Volodymyr Zelensky was an 'accidental president' elected because Ukrainian voters were tired of the status quo, unlike Putin who rose through KGB and political calculation, and when Zelensky visited Stanford in summer 2021 six months before the invasion, his approval rating was only 20% due to internal Ukrainian divisions.
“he's an accidental pres rather he was a he was an accidental president not like Putin he was a uh a president who is elected because Ukrainian elector that the people were tired of the status quo um and everybody knew there was going to be a chance for a candidate like him uh there was another guy by the way somebody I knew better who was thinking about getting in that space But when zelenski got in it's like okay he's going to be the outside guy when he visited Stanford campus two years ago this is the summer of 2021 six months before The Invasion uh I think his approval rating was 20 percent a lot of fighting inside Ukraine like there often has been over the last 30 years”
On the night Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, McFaul was on a phone call with his friend Sergey Lashenko (a member of Zelensky's team) debating scenarios about whether Ukraine should evacuate or stay; after a two-hour discussion, Lashenko said 'This is an academic debate, they're not going anywhere, they're staying here'—a momentous decision by Zelensky with significant risks.
“I was actually on the phone with one of my friends who works for him the night the Russians invaded and we were debating scenarios should they leave should they not um uh it's about a two-hour back and forth and at the end of it my friend his name's Sergey lashenko he said Mike this is an academic debate they're not going anywhere they're staying here and that was a momentous decision uh with a lot of risk much of which we still don't know about”
Putin had a 'pretty good run' where the Russian economy improved on his watch (though due to oil and gas prices rather than his policies), he took control of the media to create a compelling narrative that Russians believed, and he achieved four consecutive military victories (Chechnya, Georgia, Ukraine 2014, Syria 2015) before overextending in Ukraine in 2022.
“I even I would have to admit that he had a pretty good run he got the economy got going on his watch but it was because of oil and gas prices but you get credit for it you know um if you're there um he he he managed to take over the media to kind of create this narrative that lots of Russians buy into um and he went four for four with his Wars right chechnya Georgia Ukraine the first time Syria 2015. so he was on a run and then he overextended this time”
After the 1998 financial crisis forced out Nemtsov, Yeltsin initially appointed a communist, Primakov, as prime minister, but the Yeltsin circle feared allowing a communist to run for president would destroy them, so they appointed the obscure KGB operative Putin instead, planning a small war in Chechnya (with speculation it was deliberately started) to make Putin look like a strong man, then he became president-elect and was ratified by the Russian people.
“he initially appoints a communist because that's the only one that could get through the parliament and then they're like we cannot allow this communist his name was primakov to run for president that'll destroy us all and that's when they come up with this idea let's get this obscure KGB guy Putin to become Prime Minister oh and then let's have a little war in chechnya I don't know if that's was started on purpose or not but there's lots of speculation that they started it on purpose to have this strong guy Putin and then he becomes uh appointed president-elect and then he that is ratified by the Russian people three months later by the Fool's flag um operation against the block of flats the residential flats that supposedly by the chechens but we're we still even because they don't know terrorist attacks alleged terrorist attacks that allow Putin to look like the strong man”
Vice President Biden's first meeting with Putin in March 2011 was preceded by a historically significant one-on-one meeting with President Medvedev, where Medvedev agreed to support the use of force against Libya to stop genocide in Benghazi, marking true multilateral cooperation, while Putin the next day categorically opposed this intervention, revealing a major split between Putin and Medvedev.
“the night before then we met with president medveda and in that meeting was truly historic because it was in that meeting I was the note taker there was this me Medvedev a guy named prohodko and Biden because medveda told everybody the rest of the delegation including people like Bill Burns who's our current head of the CIA you got to go chill in the in the waiting room this just needs to be a one-on-one because he didn't want the rest he didn't want love Roth and these other people there that's when he agreed with us about the use of force against Libya now again that didn't go the way we had planned but this was true multilateral cooperation to stop genocide in Benghazi and it was a Russian leader agreeing with us the next day we had the same conversation with Putin and Putin categorically said that's a bad idea”
When McFaul was appointed US Ambassador to Moscow in 2011, the policy of engaging pro-democracy activists was not his decision but Obama Administration policy, which McFaul had helped formulate in 2009, and continued a model established by President Reagan's 1988 visit which included meetings with dissidents.
“well first I I want to emphasize it wasn't my decision to do that that was our policy but I helped to rate the policy back in 2009. um and and you wouldn't have been appointed if you were completely opposed to that policy presumably uh and and uh it's just I think it's important for people to remember because it's been forgotten um that when President Obama went to Moscow for the first time in July of 2009 uh he spent the first day of that he was our meeting with the government but he spent the entire second day meeting with non-governmental people so he met with the business Community he met with students he met with civil society a parallel Summit and then he met with the opposition and um I'd forgotten about the Ford I remember that but I want you to know that the summit from my point of view was modeled after Ronald Reagan's trip in 1988 very consciously on my part I was I helped to design that trip because he had a very famous luncheon with dissidents at spasso house the ambassador's resident and I wanted to replicate that in fact I think it's chapter 29 out of George Schultz's memars call uh where he talks about dual track diplomacy engaged the state but also engage Society”
Boris Nemtsov was the democratically elected governor of Nizhny Novgorod during an economic depression three times worse than the Great Depression, making his re-election during such severe hardship remarkable and demonstrating electoral competence—and he was Jewish, contradicting claims that a Jewish leader could never be elected in Russia.
“he at the time was the governor of Nissan he had been democratically elected um at a time of an economic depression three times worse than the American economic depression so think about that for a minute right really hard to be re-elected in a time of depression um by the way he's Jewish so people say you could never elect a Jewish leader he was elected in nice which is in the heart of you know uh industrial Russia”
Boris Nemtsov was a committed democrat and liberal who went to support the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004, and had he become president in 2000, Russian history would have been dramatically different—he was assassinated in 2015 while walking over a bridge near the Kremlin with his girlfriend by a Chechen gunman, though his family believes the Kremlin ordered the assassination.
“he was a committed Democrat a committed liberal during the orange revolution in Ukraine in 2004 he went and supported the orange revolutionaries in Ukraine um and I knew like I said he was a personal friend of mine the history of Russia could have been very very different he said he was assassinated in 2015 how how and who by he was walking over a bridge just 500 meters from the Kremlin out at night with his girlfriend we know who pulled the trigger he was a Chechen uh who ordered the assassination to this day is not clear but I can tell you what his family thinks he was killed by the Kremlin according to them”
When Putin initially came to power, he had obscure, unsettled views on many issues and didn't understand markets, so he surrounded himself with pro-market advisors who would have been comfortable at the Hoover Institution, implementing policies like a 13% flat tax and lowered corporate taxes—reforms Putin has since moved away from as he evolved.
“but initially he was a very he was rather obscure guy uh he didn't have set views on a lot of things he didn't understand markets uh and so he surrounded himself with the people I know all these people well who were very pro-market they would be very comfortable here at the Hoover institution uh you know the flat tax that's one of our ideas from the Hoover institution never happened in the United States of America they adopted it back then 13 flat tax individual income uh lowered corporate taxes um did a lot of Market things he's moved away from that now he's he's evolved”
McFaul's meetings with pro-democracy activists as ambassador were controversial in the Obama Administration, with some officials believing it interfered with other important work like arms control, and others arguing it was a distraction from more pressing national interests, reflecting a fundamental dilemma in American foreign policy between pursuing interests versus values.
“um I want to be honest with you was controversial because there were people back in Washington you know if you're working on arms control they're like this is getting in the way of our important things that we're doing um and there were others that was like you know why do we care this is we have more important issues right and this is a dilemma in American foreign policy that goes back to the French Revolution you know or is it our interests or values um and it was not easy for me”
Between the 1911 collapse of the Qing Dynasty in China and the 1949 Communist takeover, and between 1917 and the Bolshevik consolidation in Russia, there were 'interregnums' during which liberal, republican, and democratic alternatives existed but were later overthrown by autocrats—these forgotten periods are important for understanding that authoritarian outcomes are not pre-ordained.
“and there's these two interregnums that don't get enough attention and it's part of you know I'm very interested in counter factuals and things that could change history and so I'm interested in the collapse of the onshat regime in China and Russia that there was some hope that could lead to a republican democracy so 1911 in China 1917 in Russia Russia it happens over a matter of months in the Bolsheviks take over the China story is a lot more complicated uh the collapse of the onsha regime is 1911 the Communists don't take over doll 49 and that period it's the Civil War it's World War II but it's also uh the book is called the age of openness China before Mao and Frank writes about that this forgotten history of liberal ideas of Republican ideas of elections of rule of law”
Putin claims he opposed the collapse of the Soviet Union, calling it a tragedy greater than any other in the 20th century, and positions himself as the correction to the 1990s and Boris Yeltsin era, but McFaul argues this is revisionist because Putin actually worked for Yeltsin and only joined anti-communist nationalists after losing his job in Leningrad through electoral defeat.
“he wants his people and maybe the rest of the world to believe that he was against the collapse of the Soviet Union this was a tragedy you know greater than any other in the 20th 20th century and he wants people to believe that he's somehow the correction to the 90s to Boris Yeltsin and that whole time uh but people forget that he worked for those people when did I meet him I didn't meet him in a protest that you know neo-nationalist jeronofski was running although I went to those protests by the way I met journalski during this period too he wasn't at the neo-communist protests against the collapse of the Soviet Union he was working for the people that brought about the collapse of the Soviet Union”
In the Wagner Group mutiny of July 1, 2023, the Putin regime wanted to liquidate Yevgeny Prigozhin and knew they would eliminate him on July 1, so Prigozhin went on an unplanned 'wild run,' made it to Rostov-on-Don with no resistance, and was on his way to Moscow before Putin faced a choice between a bad outcome (negotiating with Prigozhin) and a worse outcome (military conflict), choosing the bad option and calling Prigozhin a traitor four hours later—a sign of weakness.
“number two that he you know they wanted to liquidate him and he knew it was July 1st and he would be done and so he you know went on this wild run uh and they couldn't liquidate him July 1st and he made it to rostov with no resistance and he was on his way to Moscow and then Putin faced a bad outcome or a worse outcome and chose bad to negotiate with this guy but just four hours later he'd called him a traitor that's not a strong look uh that is not a strong look at all”
The most comprehensive sanctions against Russia ever have been implemented by a coalition of approximately four dozen democracies, which is a 'fantastic achievement,' though McFaul's working group on sanctions initially faced rejection from European capitals and the Biden Administration when proposing these measures.
“well there's good news and bad news so um the good news is that we have put in place we being it's a coalition of four dozen democracies they're all democracies maybe Singapore's joined down a little bit um the the most comprehensive sanctions against Russia ever and that's fantastic achievement uh when we I run a working group on sanctions when we started publishing our papers about what should be done a year and a half ago uh we were rejected by you know European capitals the Biden Administration this is like this is too crazy this is too nuts”
Zelensky has become a 'remarkable wartime president' who has risen to the moment, transforming from a leader with 20% approval before the war to demonstrating fantastic leadership during the crisis, and is personally friendly, speaks Russian, and retains his ability to joke even during bombing despite being in bunkers.
“I think he has become a remarkable wartime president um I was actually on the phone with one of my friends who works for him the night the Russians invaded...I think he has really risen to the moment and a fantastic leader he as a person he's a very nice guy he's very friendly we speak Russian together um I remember I saw the first time I talked to him after the war had begun I got on a zoom call I thought I was speaking to his chief of staff Andre yermak and instead of Andre who I talked to rather there frequently he was sitting there in the bunker and he said Mark you look great you know there's still really sunny there he loves Stanford by the way uh he's like oh my God you know you look so great must the mother must be great and I said Mr President you don't look so great because he'd throw this scraggly beard uh and obviously he was in you know in a horrible moment but he still could joke around about you know his memories of Stanford campus”
McFaul believes Putin is currently 'safe' and does not expect him to be overthrown or to face a coup in the near term, but he is witnessing 'the beginning of the end of Putinism,' though predicting revolutions and coups is extremely difficult and unreliable, as evidenced by poor predictions made by political scientists and the CIA.
“unfortunately I think he's safe I I am not in the camp that thinks uh that he'll be overthrown or a coup um let me also say in paraphrase I've written about revolutions and coup in my academic life and uh one of the phrases I wrote about revolutions paraphrasing somebody else I'm sure was before revolutions happen they seem impossible after they happen they they look inevitable so I want to be humble I we're not good at predicting these things um and I work five years in the government and I would say the same thing about the CIA they're not very good about it either so it's not just us political scientists that are bad um so I don't see those scenarios but I also think we're witnessing the beginning of the end of putinism”
In retrospect, the West should have expanded NATO as fast as possible in the 1990s when Russia was weak and armed Georgia and Ukraine, following Ronald Reagan's principle that peace comes through strength, rather than adopting a cautious 'don't poke the bear' approach that left a 'gray zone' of countries between Russia and NATO where military interventions have subsequently occurred.
“um I believe that we should have expanded NATO as fast as we could when Russia was weak and we should have armed those countries uh Georgia as well and Georgia as well uh and and you know Ronald Reagan used to say peace through strength um Russia's never or the Soviet Union has never invaded a NATO country uh by the way NATO has never invaded Russia the Soviet Union but I think back then and I remember those debates I was a part of those debates about NATO expansion oh we can't poke the bear we can't poke the bear you know and uh as a result we left this gray zone of countries between Russia and NATO and where have we seen military interventions precisely in the gray Zone”
Multiple Russian generals have been removed and arrested since the Ukraine invasion, which McFaul interprets as evidence that 'the guys with the guns'—military leadership—are not united behind the war, indicating that Putin is losing control over key power structures.
“and that frigosian still all out there that there are lots of generals that have been removed and others that we think are an arrest uh these are signs that the the guys with the guns um are not United behind this war and you know that's a sign that Putin is losing control”
The Obama Administration pursued cooperation with Russia on four key issues: negotiating a new START treaty to reduce nuclear weapons (signed 2010), diversifying supply routes to Afghanistan away from Pakistan by using the Northern Distribution Network through Russia, implementing comprehensive multilateral sanctions against Iran in 2010, and expanding counterterrorism operations including the raid on Osama bin Laden in Pakistan.
“uh President Obama had an idea that we should replace the old start treaty which was expiring in 2009 with a new start creating and reduce the number of nuclear weapons in the world and we did that 2010 we saw he signed that treaty and then the Senate ratified it at the end of the year second we decided whether it was right or wrong I was not my policy decision but we decided to expand the work in Afghanistan and to expand uh attacking terrorists not just in Afghanistan but in neighboring countries including one in a very dramatic way in 2011 when we violated the sovereignty of Pakistan and killed Osama Bin Laden”
Russia's 2008 invasion of Georgia should have been met with sanctions and military aid to Georgia, but the Bush Administration did neither, imposing no sanctions and sending no weapons, which was a major missed opportunity for deterrence.
“I joined the White House the National Security Council just months after Russia had invaded Georgia August 2008. um and I had testified in September 2008 about My Views about how we should respond to that um by January um we had done very little the Bush Administration didn't sanction anybody they didn't send any weapons uh to Georgia”
McFaul's favorite counterfactual involves Putin's rise to power: if the 1998 Asian financial crisis had not crashed the Russian economy, Boris Yeltsin would not have been forced to appoint a new prime minister, and Boris Nemtsov (the democratic heir apparent who was governor of Nizhny Novgorod) would have become president instead of Putin, fundamentally altering Russian history.
“well the one I know the best there may be others that I'm a student of but the one I know both from my own writing and I know the the people involved and it's had a giant consequential impact on history is about Putin coming to power now counterfactuals I'm not a historian but I know a lot of historians the best counter factuals are the ones where you just have to change a little bit precise history yeah it must just be the the nail on the Horseshoe as it right so if you go back Putin Boris Yeltsin is re-elected in 1996. and almost immediately they start preparing for his successor because he's in bad Health drinking and The Heir Apparent was a guy named borisnamsov uh and borsten so if he was a friend of mine actually I knew him well before he was assassinated in 2015. he at the time was the governor of Nissan he had been democratically elected um at a time of an economic depression three times worse than the American economic depression...in between coming to Moscow and the next election there's what we call a an exogenous shock something not even related to Russia it was the 1998 financial crash starts in Thailand Korea and then eventually overtakes Russia a huge financial crash inside Russia it's still a democracy so the government has to resign and so numsoft's career effectively as the heira parent ends with that”
The 1999 apartment bombings (operation against residential flats allegedly by Chechens) were suspected terrorist attacks that allowed Putin to appear as a strong man, though responsibility remains unclear; McFaul does not definitively assert they were false-flag operations but notes speculation about their origins.
“and he becomes uh appointed president-elect and then he that is ratified by the Russian people three months later by the Fool's flag um operation against the block of flats the residential flats that supposedly by the chechens but we're we still even because they don't know terrorist attacks alleged terrorist attacks that allow Putin to look like the strong man”
When McFaul first met Putin in 1991 as a deputy mayor working for Anatoly Sobchak, Putin made no impression whatsoever; he had no personality and would not have made McFaul's list of 5,000 potential future Russian presidents.
“no impression I'm glad you asked so genuinely none at all uh at the time he was the deputy mayor for a guy named Anatoly sub Chuck uh I was working for an American NGO that promotes democracy that's why we were meeting with him ironically uh we were meeting with some Chuck he was the mayor and he was this charismatic pro-european pro-democratic big big you know former law professor big personality Putin had no personality whatsoever and if you had asked me then name 5 000 people that might become the next president of Russia he wouldn't have made my list”
Putin's famous 2021 essay on the historical unity of Russians and Ukrainians is 'pretty bad history' and 'revisionist history' but reveals his mindset; his historical views have also changed over time, which is why he felt compelled to write long essays to establish his position for history.
“it's pretty bad history it's revisionist history but it reveals a lot about his mindset um and by the way we don't have time to go through it all but his mindset has changed over time too I think I think that's an important thing to understand about him he had different views 20 years ago than he has today um and and that's why he felt the need to write long essays like that to kind of you know that's a marker he's putting down for history”
The existence of paramilitary organizations like the Wagner Group is a sign of military weakness rather than strength, demonstrating that a strong state relies on unified military command rather than needing private military contractors.
“so number one you don't have paramilitary organizations if you have a strong military so the very existence of pagosian many years ago I think was a sign of weakness”
McFaul's fundamental view of Russian power going back to briefing President Bush in 2001 was that the critical question is not whether Russia is a great power or weak power, but whether Russia is 'inside our tent' (the democratic tent) or outside it.
“I remember I I had the honor to to brief President Bush before he first saw Putin back in 2001. and we had this big conversation about power and you know is Russia Great powers or weak power and back then they were a declining power and some were even talking about the Russian Federation might fall apart and I said Mr President uh we're really bad at understanding power trajectories 20 30 years down the road uh what we should really care about are they inside our tent or Not by which I meant the Democratic ten um because if they're not in the Democratic tent we want to shore up the democracies who are with us”
In spring 1988, McFaul encountered a Soviet woman, Tatiana Krasnaya Pavlova, at the African Institute who was the Soviet Union's leading Zimbabwean expert and who told him that the real revolution was happening in the Soviet Union itself, not in southern Africa—this encounter led McFaul to begin studying Soviet reformers and dissident movements early, before most Western observers recognized the system's fragility.
“uh Tatiana krasna piffs of us her name she was the Soviet Union's leading zimbabweanor and as we walked out of the African Institute she'd never met an American and she just was not going to let this opportunity slip through her fingers so she followed me out and we spent the next several hours talking about my dissertation and when she's finally figured it out she said why are you writing about revolutions and Angola and Zimbabwe the real Revolution is happening here this is spring of 1988 when the rest of the world was euphoric with Gorbachev and his reforms”
The Obama Administration's Russia 'reset' policy in 2009 was an accidental outcome of history, not a designed diplomatic strategy, and the original concept was to disagree with Russia on many issues while preventing disagreements from being linked in ways counter to US interests, particularly regarding Georgia and Ukraine.
“the reset that word and how that locked in was an accident of history that wasn't something by Design at all at least that was not my impression um but the original ideas were pretty simple which is we're going to disagree with these folks on a lot of things uh we're going to not allow our policy to be linked in ways that are counter to our interests in places like Georgia and Ukraine”
McFaul uses a parking violation metaphor to argue for escalating rather than static sanctions: if an illegally parked car gets one ticket, then left parked another day receives a second ticket, and after five days accumulates five tickets, so Putin's army occupying Ukraine should face ratcheting sanctions every single day the occupation continues.
“and the way I the metaphor I like to use is uh you know if you you park your car illegally here on Stanford you get a ticket pretty hefty one by the way um if you leave your car there a second day you don't do anything you get a second ticket you leave it there five days you get five tickets Putin's Army is wrongfully parked occupying in Ukraine and so every day we should be ratcheting up the sanctions”
The Vilnius NATO summit offered only incremental progress on Ukraine's path to membership, not sufficient improvement over the Bucharest Summit in 2008, and McFaul argued for more concrete progress; the phrase 'when conditions are met' in the communiqué is passive and vague rather than explicitly stating what conditions Ukraine must meet.
“my argument was in the run-up to vilnews it at least has to be an improvement over the last major signal of support for Ukraine's membership which was the Bucharest Summit in 2008. Putin wants you to believe that whether that the alliance has been pushing since 2008 and it's just a matter of you know minutes before Ukraine's joining that's complete and utter nonsense it's it's just there's been no effort it's been stuck that whole time...I still think spelling out there's this phrase in the in the the communique that says when conditions are met uh passive tense by the way um and I think they had they spelled out what those conditions would be so that the ukrainians knew what they had to do to join uh that would have been progress”
McFaul wrote his first critical article about Putin in March 2000, even before Putin was elected president, criticizing his anti-democratic ways, and the things he worried about then have tragically come true, showing that the warning signs were visible from the beginning.
“you know I I wrote my first critical article about Putin in March of 2000 uh even before he was elected president because of his anti-democratic ways and and tragically the things I was worried about then have have turned out to be true”
Alex Darling, a Soviet historian at Stanford, taught McFaul that claims about what states, individuals, or regimes are thinking or intending require rigorous epistemological grounding, not speculation—a lesson that has persisted for 40-50 years and shaped McFaul's approach to understanding political actors.
“I remember throughout the margins um I bet she wrote 40 or 50 times how do you know uh how do you know how do you know because I was saying things about the Soviet Union this Khrushchev that Brezhnev this and that lingers with me you know 40 or 50 years later how do we when we say we know how Estates or individuals or regimes are thinking or intending to he really taught me that lesson”
McFaul rejects the goal of improving relations with any country (China, Russia, France, UK) as a diplomatic objective; instead, the goal should be achieving specific security, economic, and moral objectives that serve the American people's interests, with diplomatic engagement being one of multiple possible means (diplomacy, coercion, military force) rather than an end in itself.
“why do you hate that expression because I don't think we should ever try to improve relations with any country China Russia France Great Britain I don't think that should ever be the goal the goal should be things that the American people think are in their interests uh like I said reducing the number of weapons getting rid of terrorists stopping Iran from getting a nuclear weapon and then you decide okay these are our goals security economic and and by the way moral goals but I was a big proponent of pushing for democracy and human rights not everybody in the administration agreed with me and then you decide what's the means to achieve that objective and sometimes it's diplomacy sometimes it's engagement sometimes it's coercion economic coercion sometimes it's even military force but the means should never be become the goal”
George Kennan was the last US Ambassador to be PNG (persona non grata) by Russia, and McFaul was warned he might suffer the same fate, but he decided he would not be like ambassadors and journalists in 1930s Moscow who, to protect their positions, took advice from Russian officials to remain silent about human rights violations during Stalin's terror.
“they said very negative things about me at one point I would I was told by somebody close to Putin that you're about to become George Kennan he was the last Ambassador that was PNG um uh by the way his photograph is on the wall of spasa house all the ambassadors are and every night I would go had been there longer than Ken and I was like well if they throw me out now I won't be the shortest serving Ambassador uh they never did throw me out they later put me on the sanctions list but I was about to say you were banned from Russia after the end of your house in 2005 another another great uh badge of honor um from that regime I think well they they both banned me they also have threatened to arrest me so it's even worse for me I want to add a footnote because you said something about history and made a there was a day it was it was Russia day uh and and this is an interesting revision of History so the day is June 12 1990 the day that Russian Federation declared independence from the Soviet Union Boris Yeltsin did that in 1990. it's now been forgotten and now it's just called Russia day like you know uh their national day because it is is it still the 12th of June yeah and most 90 of people don't know why but I know why uh anyway I went to this reception at the Kremlin uh with Putin and I had all these people run away from me they were afraid of me and one of his close people said Mike you know you just gotta shut up you gotta stop talking about these things that's in your interests and as I was walking out I remembered other leaders and other ambassadors and other journalists who are also in the Kremlin in the 30s and made choices during Stalin's time to take the advice of the Russian that I just met and I just decided that day I don't care if I'm thrown out tomorrow I'm not going to be that person”
Europe's reduction of dependency on Russian oil and gas through actions like price caps, which McFaul wanted to 'rip off' the band-aid on back in 2009 but couldn't convince allies to implement, is now happening—though McFaul argues this was a policy outcome forced by war rather than foresight.
“what Europe has done in terms of reducing its dependencies on Russian oil gas that was a Band-Aid I wanted to rip off back in 2009 when I was in the government I wrote a whole paper about why this is not in our interests as an alliance so we couldn't convince our our allies to do that they've not done that that's great”
Putin's obsession with the perception that the US is supporting democratic movements and revolutions is, in McFaul's view, a tragic and primary driver of why he invaded Ukraine.
“and he's obsessed with this and it's tragically I think why he invaded Ukraine in his mind we're always supporting small D Democrats that's what I would call them he would call them you know neo-nazis”
The Russian regime used McFaul as a 'boogeyman' and portrayed his meetings with pro-democracy activists as evidence of American interference, specifically to help Putin win his 2012 re-election by increasing anti-American sentiment, and it was effective enough that McFaul was later placed on Russian sanctions lists.
“they needed the United States of America to be a boogeyman again to help Putin one first win re-election remember he'd been prime minister before and then he decided to throw Medvedev to the side um but they needed this anti-americanism and I kind of became the poster child for it um I want to be honest with you was controversial”
McFaul is interested in counterfactual history and how small changes could alter major historical outcomes, noting that the best counterfactuals require minimal changes to actual history.
“the one I know the best there may be others that I'm a student of but the one I know both from my own writing and I know the the people involved and it's had a giant consequential impact on history is about Putin coming to power now counterfactuals I'm not a historian but I know a lot of historians the best counter factuals are the ones where you just have to change a little bit precise history yeah it must just be the the nail on the Horseshoe as it right”
McFaul studied Russian at Leningrad University in 1983 and later researched at the Pushkin Institute in Moscow, wrote his Stanford undergraduate thesis on Soviet interventions in Eastern Europe (1956, 1968) and the near-intervention in Poland (1980-81), with a thesis advisor (Alex Dallin) who repeatedly wrote in margins 'how do you know?' challenging assumptions about Soviet intentions.
“you studied Russian at Leningrad University in 1983 and later researched at the Pushkin Institute in Moscow”
McFaul left his position as ambassador on the exact same day Russia invaded Crimea in 2014, marking a dramatic coincidence that highlighted the immediate transition from his diplomatic service to the security crisis.
“you left at the same time almost as the invasion of Crimea yes um the exact day the exact day”
Vladimir Zhirinovsky, the Russian ultra-nationalist, denounced McFaul in 1994 for appearing on the television program 'Ludi' (People), which compared Russian problems to how democracies solve them in the West, because Zhirinovsky opposed McFaul's public advocacy for democratic practices on national television.
“uh we don't know we didn't know at the time uh the events happened close at the time um the reason he denounced me was I was living in Moscow again this time working at the Moscow Carnegie Center we just started it that year 94.95 and I co-hosted a television program called Ludi called people and it was a kind of silly show in retrospect but uh the idea was we have all these problems in Russia how do democracies solve them so the Russian host Andre bustritsky's his name he's still working there by the way he would say look at all these problems we have this is horrible how do they deal with them in the west and then I would come on and say well in America we vote and you know and Mr jernowsky didn't like the fact that I was on National Television”
A bullet was fired into McFaul's office window around 1994, close in time to Zhirinovsky's denunciation of him, though the relationship between the two events and whether they were connected remains unclear.
“were the two events related in in any way uh we don't know we didn't know at the time uh the events happened close at the time”
McFaul is writing a book titled 'Autocrats versus Democrats: Lessons from the Cold War for How to Deal with China and Russia Today' that applies historical lessons to current great power competition.
“my book is called autocrats versus Democrats and it's lessons from the Cold War for how to deal with China and Russia today um and it's I've been working on it for years”
Despite comprehensive sanctions and Western support, the war in Ukraine continues unabated, which is why McFaul believes significantly more action is needed.
“and yet the war still going on this horrible barbaric invasion of Ukraine and so we got to do more”