Then What? Assessing The Military Implications Of Chinese Control Of Taiwan | Hoover Institution
What this covers
March 3, 2023 Hoover Institution | Stanford University
On behalf of Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific Region and its National Security Task Force the Hoover Institution invites you to Then What? Assessing the Military Implications of Chinese Control of Taiwan on Friday, March 3, 2023 from 12:00 - 1:15 pm PT.
The military implications of Chinese control of Taiwan are understudied. Chinese control of Taiwan would likely improve the military balance in China's favor because of unification's positive impact on Chinese submarine warfare and ocean surveillance capabilities. Basing Chinese submarine warfare assets on Taiwan would increase the vulnerability of U.S. surface forces to attack during a crisis, reduce the attrition rate of Chinese submarines during a war, and likely increase the number of submarine attack opportunities against U.S. surface combatants. Furthermore, placing hydrophone arrays off Taiwan's coasts for ocean surveillance would forge a critical missing link in China's kill chain for long-range attacks. This outcome could push the United States toward anti-satellite warfare that it might otherwise avoid, or it could force the U.S. Navy into narrower parts of the Philippine Sea. Finally, over the long term, if China were to develop a large fleet of truly quiet nuclear attack submarines and ballistic missile submarines, basing them on Taiwan would provide it with additional advantages. Specifically, such basing would enable China to both threaten Northeast Asian sea lanes of communication and strengthen its sea-based nuclear deterrent in ways that it is otherwise unlikely to be able to do. These findings have important implications for U.S. operational planning, policy, and grand strategy.
ABOUT THE PARTICIPANTS
Caitlin Talmadge is associate professor of Security Studies in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, as well as Senior Non-Resident Fellow in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution, and Research Affiliate in the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. During fall 2022 she also holds the Kissinger Chair in Foreign Policy and International Relations at the United States Library of Congress. Professor Talmadge’s research and teaching focus on deterrence and escalation, U.S. military operations and strategy, and security issues in Asia and the Persian Gulf. She is author of The Dictator’s Army: Battlefield Effectiveness in Authoritarian Regimes (Cornell, 2015), which Foreign Affairs named the Best Book in Security for 2016 and which won the 2017 Best Book Award from the International Security Studies Section of the International Studies Association. In addition, she is co-author of U.S. Defense Politics: The Origins of Security Policy (fourth edition, Routledge, 2021), and she is currently writing a book with Professor Brendan Green on nuclear escalation risk in the emerging deterrence environment.
Kharis Templeman is a research fellow at the Hoover Institution and part of the Project on Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific. Templeman is a political scientist (Ph.D. 2012, Michigan) with research interests in Taiwan politics, democratization, elections and election management, party system development, and politics and security issues in Pacific Asia.
Source description (no synthesized summary yet).
Chinese control of Taiwan would significantly strengthen China's military capabilities in the Western Pacific by enabling submarine basing and ocean surveillance from Taiwan's eastern deep-water ports, fundamentally altering the U.S.-China military balance and threatening U.S. surface forces and regional allies despite current constraints on Chinese undersea capabilities.
- Taiwan's location at the center of the first island chain allows China to bypass current anti-submarine warfare barriers that constrain Chinese submarines based on the mainland
- Basing submarines and passive acoustic sensor arrays on Taiwan's eastern deep-water ports would give China a more survivable and reliable means of targeting U.S. surface forces in the Philippine Sea
- Even with China's current military capabilities, controlling Taiwan creates meaningful military advantages; longer-term improvements in submarine quietness would magnify these advantages for both conventional and nuclear deterrent missions
This asset isn't compiled yet
You're seeing its claims, ranked. Compile it to build the argument threads, weight them, and check each claim against your library — the full view.
Taiwan's strategic location in the Western Pacific at the center of the first island chain, sitting astride major exits from China's coastal seas into the Philippine Sea, gives it inherent geostrategic military importance.
“intuitively there's some reasons to think that the island does have geostrategic importance as they say in real estate location location location um if you if you look at a map of where Taiwan is it's smack in the middle of the first island chain it sits astride the major exits from China's Coastal Seas out into the Philippine Sea and and therefore the the rest of the Pacific”
Chinese submarines have not achieved the quietness levels of U.S. submarines because submarine noise reduction is very technically hard, requires continuous innovation over many years, and is not as simple as acquiring intellectual property through espionage.
“the question of of why does China not have quieter submarines is a real Puzzler um I don't think we totally know the answer to that um you know I think uh it is really technically hard it's it's very hard um to you know get to the the level for instance that the United States has achieved I mean the United States this is this is a project that it has been continuously innovating on for for years and years you know we never stopped yeah I mean we never stopped when the Cold War ended we just kept regenerating we were several Generations um ahead of where we were you know when the Cold War ended and we were we were doing pretty well then um so it's very technically hard it's not as easy as like I'm gonna you know get your USB drive and you know figure out how to solve solve all these uh you know uh cavitation issues”
The United States has maintained a significant 70+ year commitment to Taiwan since June 1950, creating reputational stakes that extend far beyond the Taiwan Strait if the U.S. were to abandon that commitment.
“The United States has actually had a significant uh interaction with uh the people and government of Taiwan for over 70 years since June 1950 and Taiwan would not exist as a de facto independent state today if it were not for U.S intervention during that time and so abandoning that 73-year commitments uh would have reputational consequences far beyond the Taiwan Straits”
Paul Wolfowitz's teaching that a long protracted war over Taiwan cannot be won and must not be fought should be the message to Beijing, coupled with reinforcement of the deterrent through U.S. and allied military presence, similar to Cold War containment strategy.
“to come much more immediately to the potential of a war over Taiwan anytime soon I'm become very much of the opinion that it's going to be hard to keep it a short war and I go to Reagan's paraphrasing what Reagan said about nuclear war to say a war over Taiwan cannot be won must not be fought and that's the lesson we should send send to Beijing Reagan didn't mean that we should therefore abandon Berlin he meant we should reinforce the turns um”
Scenarios where China coerces Taiwan (short of military invasion) and Taiwan capitulates would free up Chinese military resources, political energy, and bureaucratic capacity previously dedicated to Taiwan contingency planning for use in other strategic domains like the Indian Ocean.
“let's pretend that you're wrong and um the war is actually really fast and maybe it's not even an invasion maybe China tries to coerce Taiwan and it works and Taiwan rolls over and uh you know then China has all of the resources that it had been uh dedicating toward a Taiwan campaign Taiwan contingency and all of that political energy and bureaucracy and all the platforms and all of that um freed up to do something else would that help China uh do what you're talking about in the northern Indian Ocean yeah I think it would that would not be good”
The United States deployed the SOSUS (Sound Surveillance System)—a hydrophone network of passive acoustic sensors—across the northern Atlantic during the Cold War to detect Soviet submarines attempting to transit to the North Atlantic, and similar systems are currently deployed along the exits of the first island chain.
“the first of these barriers is a type of barrier that the United States had in the Cold War if you're if you've ever heard of Celsius or the sound surveillance system which was a hydrophone network that the U.S deployed across the northern Atlantic in the Cold War to basically catch Soviet submarines that were you know going to try to do battle with nato in the North Atlantic uh you know these are uh long range deep water hydrophone networks so you know basically microphones passive acoustic sensors that work in very very deep water utilizing something called the the Deep sound channel on the floor of the ocean and provide persistent open ocean uh detection capability against uh first Soviet submarines and now now today China these summaries and these are strung along uh as I said the exits to the first island chain”
Capabilities can drive intentions in future strategic decisions, meaning that giving China military capabilities from Taiwan control could change China's strategic objectives and desires in ways that aren't predictable based on current intentions.
“capabilities can drive intentions too and so I think that's one big implication Caitlyn of your work which is the day after China controls Taiwan are the intentions going to change about what what China wants and the answer is maybe right”
Taiwan is today a liberal democracy of higher quality than many others that transitioned during the third wave, making it geopolitically important for demonstrating democratic governance in Asia and potentially influencing the PRC itself toward democratic development.
“Taiwan today is a liberal democracy a higher quality democracy than many of the others that transitioned during the third wave and the U.S has had a long-standing interest in seeing Taiwan develop towards a liberal Democratic model potentially to influence uh not only other countries in the region uh in the U.S security Alliance but especially the PRC itself and have a positive developments on that trajectory”
U.S. security cooperation with allies in Asia, including Taiwan, is constrained by legal and diplomatic limits on what the U.S. can share and what it can do with Taiwan compared to what the U.S. is providing to allies like Ukraine.
“we don't have the ability to plug into their C4 ISR Network we can't give them the common operating picture we can't provide to Taiwan today a fraction of what we're providing to Ukraine on a daily basis”
Taiwan is the United States' 10th largest trading partner and the main supplier of the most advanced semiconductors, making it economically important to the U.S.
“Taiwan is the US's 10th largest trading partner Taiwan is as most of our audience uh knows uh the United States main supplier of the most advanced semiconductors”
PRC propaganda claims that the U.S. only cares about using Taiwan as a military platform to contain China and prevent China from ending a century of humiliation, and this narrative is gaining traction in Taiwan public opinion.
“it is one prominent strand of PRC propaganda to develop the argument that this is all we care about the only reason why we want Taiwan is so we can keep it from becoming a PRC military asset and oh by the way keep the PRC from ending A Century of humiliation and just use it as a military platform for ourselves to contain uh China and um it now appears I think it is one of the most alarming developments uh in the current uh calculus uh that this is actually gaining traction among Taiwan public opinion”
Chinese submarines are currently based inside the first island chain, concentrated especially at Hainan Island, which requires them to pass through anti-submarine warfare barriers and choke points to reach the Philippine Sea where they could threaten U.S. surface forces.
“currently we live in a world where Chinese submarines are based inside the first island chain you know concentrated especially at Hainan island you can see that noted on the map here um and the geography is very important uh as far as their ability to actually reach U.S service forces standoff forces that might be in the Philippine Sea and the reason is that currently because Chinese submarines are based inside the first island chain in order to get to the Philippine Sea which you can see on this this map here and actually threaten U.S surface forces that are operating there they have to pass through these these choke points at the exits to the first island chain”
MacArthur famously described Taiwan as an unsinkable aircraft carrier and submarine tender, but analysts typically mention this reference without substantial analysis of what it would actually mean if China controlled the island.
“we often hear references to MacArthur's famous description of the island as an Unsinkable aircraft carrier and submarine tender and then the analysis kind of moves on without much discussion of what would it actually mean if if China were to gain control of Taiwan”
Passive acoustic sensor arrays deployed off Taiwan would be more survivable and reliable than the alternative sensing methods China currently relies on (Over-the-Horizon radars, SIGINT satellites, imaging satellites, aircraft and ship-based sensors) because they are difficult to locate and can be protected by air defense networks and mining.
“this would be an important Advantage for China because uh you know it can string these passive acoustic arrays off Taiwan and you might say well can't the US just go and do some cable cutting can't the us can't we cut their arrays can't we cut the fiber optic cables that go ashore for data processing and you know that's harder when when your enemy controls the the land where they're they're going to Shore and the water is immediately surrounding them so you know China can also have air defenses on Taiwan it can mine the areas around the hydrophone cables so um you know this is a sensor that I think is essentially pretty pretty survivable um and in many ways more survivable and more reliable than some of the other uh sensors that China would otherwise in the status quo be relying on”
If the U.S. cannot interrupt the hydrophone kill chain feeding information to Chinese satellites and missiles, it would face the difficult strategic choice of escalating to anti-satellite warfare, which would be a bad day as president and represents a significant operational problem.
“if the United States does something else to interrupt that kill change so is it going to engage in anti-satellite attacks against uh the satellites then if it can't interrupt the the sensor networks that are that are feeding that information to the satellites um maybe that that isn't a decision I'd I'd really want to have to make as president that that sounds you know like a bad day having to escalate to anti-satellite Warfare”
U.S. policy toward Taiwan is ultimately a political question that cannot be answered by military analysis alone, but understanding Taiwan's military value is an important input to political decision-making.
“you know ultimately us U.S policy tour Taiwan is a political question uh it's not a question that you can answer with military analysis alone and Military analysis is what I've presented here so you know there's there's some limits here um however we do think that understanding taiwan's military value is an input to political decision making”
China is constrained by its geography in ways it needs to break out of, and its activities in the South China Sea, while perhaps not as significant for U.S. military power, do have implications for balances of power vis-à-vis China's regional neighbors.
“a number of points in our analysis that point to how constrained China actually is by its geography that you know having to base military forces inside the first island chain um you know is is a challenge that I think is is often you know it's staring us right in the face but we often don't don't uh think about it and I do think that some of its other activities like in the South China Sea while perhaps not as significant from the perspective of uh U.S military power perhaps do have implications for um balances of power vis-a-vis China's Regional neighbors”
Taiwan's own defense posture and readiness to commit resources to defense are central to effective deterrence against Chinese coercion or attack, independent of U.S. capabilities.
“I think you know even if the United States did did push harder to develop some of these these capabilities in Taiwan itself you know Taiwan would have to also commit resources and would also have to have the Civil military relations to to kind of you know support um these these sorts of activities I also think in terms of a simple mirror Imaging um it's not totally clear like what what Taiwan would gain from from developing a submarine force on the on the the Eastern deep water ports I mean I guess it's something to think about um if that would would actually help them in the scenarios that they're worried about for for Chinese coercion or Chinese attack but I do think that the the question of taiwan's own defense posture is absolutely Central to deterrence”
Even if the U.S. completely exits the region and abandons all regional commitments, a war over Taiwan could still become a major power war involving Japan and China because Japan understands Taiwan's military value and would likely become militarily involved in efforts to stop a Chinese takeover.
“for those who would kind of like to to wash their hands of the region and you know end uh you know all regional Alliance commitments you know not only kind of cutting Taiwan loose but uh you know pulling back from the relationships with with Japan and Korea and other states in the region um you know I would just note that if the analysis that we've put forward here about the military value of the island is correct it suggests that uh you know if China were to try to retake the island there are probably other states in the region most notably Japan that uh you know could become militarily involved in an effort to stop that which means that a war over Taiwan even in a world where the U.S has exited the region uh can still become a major power War a war that involves Japan and China and Taiwan”
The primary focus of Talmadge and Green's analysis is how Chinese control of Taiwan would affect China's ability to conduct the surface denial mission—attacking U.S. surface forces operating in the Philippine Sea post-reunification.
“in our analysis we focus specifically on the question of how control of Taiwan and the potential basing of Chinese military assets on Taiwan would affect uh China's ability to engage in the surface denial mission that is the the mission of going after U.S surface forces in the Philippine Sea post-reunification”
Over-the-Horizon (OTH) radars, which China could use to find U.S. surface forces in the status quo, are vulnerable to jamming and kinetic attack in wartime because they are big, fixed, emitting targets that would likely be destroyed early in a conflict.
“it has Over the Horizon Radars that are located on the mainland um and yeah those can potentially find U.S service forces at really long distances they're also vulnerable to jamming and in a big war I think they're also pretty vulnerable to kinetic attack because uh they're big fixed emitting targets that you know are going to be going after you know U.S carriers and those seem like the kind of thing that in in a serious War of the type we're talking about here um will not be long for this world”
U.S. security cooperation with Philippines through Title 10 and Title 22 programs provides tools for enhancing regional defense posture and should be intensified to support potential countermeasures to Chinese Taiwan control.
“I think not only for military reasons but I think for political reasons there's going to be a big demand for the U.S to to do more um and I think it would probably spur allies to do more too um and you know to get more serious about some of these these missions of trying to integrate be more interoperable”
Developing submarine port infrastructure like what China could use on Taiwan—even for a technologically advanced nation like the United States—would take approximately five to ten years, though China may be able to accomplish it more quickly given its capability for rapid construction.
“we actually did look at this question because it's very important right and it's something I didn't talk about explicitly but um you know they just because they have submarines and they have Taiwan doesn't mean they actually have the ports built and constructed in the infrastructure and and all of that and they don't I mean those ports are not are not developed for this uh purpose right now and we spent some time actually trying to figure out well you know how long would it take to construct Parts like this how how and we thought how long would it take the United States and we came up with an estimate that you know it could be years I mean it could be like five to ten years to really develop um these ports if you were the United States and then we started thinking is China the United States um and we started thinking is China good at building things quickly I mean I think there's there's actually a lot of reasons to to question different aspects of Chinese military power and to not always assume that they're 10 feet tall and you know every capability is going to actually become reality um but I I actually think that um building things quickly is something they're actually very good at”
Chinese imaging satellites are inefficient for finding U.S. surface forces because there are not many of them, they are very inefficient random searchers across the enormous Pacific, and carriers, while large, are not that big relative to the size of the ocean.
“China has Imaging satellites um but you know there there aren't that many of them and they're they're very inefficient random Searchers when you're talking about the entire Pacific and trying to find you know carriers seem big but not that big when you don't talk about the entire Pacific”
Taiwan's lack of urgency in defense planning over the last 20 years regarding submarine and sensor capabilities appears to be changing, possibly in response to increased threat perception.
“I'm struck by overall the last you know 20 years the lack of urgency in some of taiwan's own defense planning about about these issues and I I sense that maybe some of that is starting to change”
The United States does not claim that Chinese submarines would gain advantage over U.S. attack submarines in the Philippine Sea, as U.S. submarines retain significant survivability advantages versus Chinese anti-submarine warfare capabilities, which are relatively underdeveloped.
“we're not making the argument that Chinese submarines would get a big leg up on U.S undersea forces U.S submarines that were operating in the Philippine Sea which I think still retain very important survivability advantages versus Chinese ASW capabilities which are relatively underdeveloped”
The oceans becoming transparent through open-source technology and artificial intelligence would be bad for the United States because it would take away a relative advantage, but it would be even worse for other countries with fewer undersea advantages.
“would it be bad if the oceans became transparent for the US yeah yeah that would be bad um but I think it'd be more bad for other countries that you know have even fewer advantages in this area to begin with so I don't know how it would actually affect kind of the the US China balance um but you know it would it would take away an area of relative Advantage for the U.S so it's it's a concern”
Democrats and Republicans have sometimes disagreed about China policy and Taiwan, with one desk (China desk) advocating containment and another (Japan desk) advocating forward deployment, requiring policy referee judgment.
“it's former various things and uh including assistant Secretary of State for East Asia when the biggest fight was between the China desk and the Japan desk and I was the referee you can tell which way I called it I call the mostly I call them away”