U.S. Has Reached ‘Choose Your Poison’ Moment: Save the Dollar or Save Treasuries | Gromen & Makori

Central banks stopped buying Treasury bonds on net 12 years ago, while foreigners have continued buying but increasingly through tax havens (Cayman Islands, Luxembourg, Ireland, UK) and hedge funds rather than stable official sector investors, meaning Treasury buyers have become increasingly fickle with monthly/quarterly mandates.

“central banks haven't bought a treasury bond on net in 12 years. um foreigners have bought a lot of treasury bonds, but then you look at who it is and it's, you know, the UK hedge funds, Cayman's hedge funds, Luxembourg tax haven, Ireland, American tax haven. Um those have been your biggest biggest increases. Um which again is fine. It's just a much more fickle foreign creditor uh with monthly or quarterly mandates, right?”

SWIFT data showing 90% of global FX trades and >50% of global export invoicing in dollars masks the real story because SWIFT doesn't include Chinese payment system (CIPS), which has grown 7-8x since 2016 and now handles ~$7-8 trillion/year in yuan-denominated payments.

“those numbers all site only Swift, that does not include the Chinese u uh international payment system, uh, CIP. Uh and so CIPS since 2016 since the US really started weaponizing the dollar um it is it has risen I think seven or 8x I think they're doing seven or eight trillion dollars a year uh in Chinese yuan denominated payments”

The core impediment to a grand U.S.-China trade deal is that the U.S. will not transfer high-end semiconductor technology to China while China wants access to those chips, and without resolving that issue, China will only offer token concessions like soybean purchases that do not address the structural trade imbalance.

“China wants access to more high-end chips, and the National Security Organization uh establishment doesn't want that...I don't think we want to give the Chinese our our highest end chips And if that's the case, I think the Chinese will probably throw a couple of bones on, you know, buying a bunch of soybeans or something and buying some oil, whatever. I mean, that that helps, but you know, we're not going to balance our trade deficit with the Chinese over the back of oil.”

Gold needs to be revalued between 3-5x from current levels to restore its historical average relationship to U.S. foreign-held treasuries (40-60% of Treasury value), implying gold prices of $15,000-$22,000, which represents merely mean reversion rather than crisis pricing.

“Gold's got to rise between 3 and 5x from here to get back to its long-term historical [music] average relationship relative to US foreign held treasuries. So what uh 15,000 to 22,000? [music] Does that not seem conservative if it just follows historical norms?...You know, that 3 to 5x just gets us back to the long-term reversion of the mean.”

War is stimulative to the industrial base (morally offensive as that may be), and the Iran conflict specifically benefits the US energy sector to the extent that Iranian competitors are offline, though US oil companies show little motivation to increase production significantly due to uncertainty about whether Hormuz will remain closed.

“war is stimulative to the industrial base. All else equal, as as morally offensive as that may be, that's just reality. Um, and obviously what we're seeing in the energy sector, you know, to the extent a competitor is offline, that's good for the US energy sector. Now, so far the US private sector is not very motivated to increase oil production.”

The Nash equilibrium for a new monetary system involves gold pegged to oil at a fixed ratio (500-1000 barrels of oil per ounce of gold), allowing each nation to make its own energy policy while maintaining stable relative valuations and preventing currency manipulation.

“pegging gold to oil in some sort of range is where this has to end. Revalue gold 500 barrels of oil per ounce of gold,000 barrels of oil per ounce of gold. Then you have a fixed unit of savings measured in energy measured in real money. And every nation can make its own energy policy based off of that.”

President Trump stated 'he who owns the gold makes the rules,' Scott Bessent identifies as a gold bug, the administration has discussed Fort Knox audits, and Trump personally wants to visit Fort Knox to verify gold holdings, suggesting official interest in gold revaluation and system restructuring.

“Gold has been uh a topic for the Trump administration since uh the beginning uh of this second term. Uh the president made certain comments like he who owns the gold makes the rules. He has the gold makes the rules. There's we know that Scott Bent is a self-proclaimed gold bug if you will.”

True interest expense in the United States is around 100% of federal receipts when calculated as interest plus entitlements obligations, meaning if rates rise the government's total fixed obligations exceed all tax revenue.

“the true interest expense in the United States today even with the tariff benefit which is probably going away on some measure is right around 100% of receipts federal receipts”

The adjusted Warren Buffett metric (total equity market cap minus federal debt, divided by GDP) has surpassed levels from 1Q2000 and 4Q21 for the first time since then, indicating complete 'La La Land' equity valuations unsupported by economic fundamentals, suggesting equities are dangerously overbought.

“the adjusted Warren Buffett metric total equity market cap minus the federal debt divided by GDP...in 3Q8 that suggest suggested another 60% upside in the S&P. Um that's about what we got to to 4Q21 when it hit 100% for the first time since 1 Q2000 um on the adjusted metric. Uh at any rate in 4Q25 that surpassed the 1Q2000. So we are now in complete and total laand on equity valuations relative to the size of this economy. So you know it's only hit those numbers twice. 1Q 2000, 4Q21. Both times were bad times to be buying, you know, to be overweight equities.”

Gold surpassed US Treasury securities as the largest official reserve asset 4 years ago (around 2021), and this trend has been accelerating as central banks continue to buy gold at increasing levels while Treasuries remain flat, validating Groman's long-standing forecast.

“You called that four years ago. We've we've seen that tipping point already happen. Uh we do know that as this is happening, central banks continue to buy gold uh at increasing levels. China continues expanding its gold holdings. The People's Bank of China now on its 18th consecutive month of gold uh approaching spree.”

The best-case scenario is the U.S. 'declares victory and goes home,' Iran operates a toll collection system on Hormuz, prices some energy in Chinese yuan openly, permanently undermining the U.S. defense umbrella's credibility across Middle East and Asia, and pushing the world toward a more volatile, inflationary, multipolar configuration.

“the best case option is we declare victory and go home and Iran runs a tolling operation and they probably price some of that energy in yuan openly that permanently discredits the US defense umbrella across the Middle East and probably in Asia to some degree as well and you get a big shakeup in the world and that's a that's a more volatile more inflationary more multipolar sort of you know crazy world I think that's where we're headed”

China has been signaling to Yellen and possibly Bessent that it would accept a weaker dollar allowing gold to rise (Nash equilibrium), with the Chinese government being aware of the 1985 Plaza Accord outcome for Japan and determined not to repeat that error of allowing currency appreciation without compensating asset revaluation.

“the Chinese have been Sandy yelling and probably bestin too is like hey you want a weaker dollar let gold rise. That's the Nash equilibrium...the Japanese didn't really have a choice. They were militarily occupied by the United States...there are no US military troops in China unlike Japan. And so China is just not going to do...the Chinese have been Sandy yelling and probably to Bessant too is like hey you want a you want a strong a weaker dollar let gold rise that's the Nash equilibrium”

Higher gold prices are beneficial for U.S. trade deficit reduction because gold's rising value means less volume is needed to settle trade deficits, but this contradicts the conventional narrative that gold strength is bad for America, creating a logical tension in public discourse.

“Ultimately, you would rather have more balanced trade where we're sending them goods than gold. But in the meantime, you know, to the extent that dollar is more appropriately valued against gold, um, that's a good thing, I think, for America, for the world, for China, for everybody involved...it's so interesting, right? is another one of these dichotoies. People people will put the, you know, X, you'll find we report a trade number and the trade deficit's way down as it's been in recent months and say, look at Trump. He's succeeding. Great. And then you go, okay, well, it's nonmonetary gold. It's driving it. A big part of the improvement is is we're shipping out gold that has risen a bunch in price, which means the dollar's fallen a lot.”

Oil company executives will not increase production significantly in response to current high prices because they expect Hormuz to eventually reopen and prices to crash, making long-term investments uneconomical without government guarantee of perpetual Hormuz closure.

“if you are a private uh company, as US oil majors are, you have a duty to your shareholders to maximize returns. and you're looking at a situation where you're being told and you presume that at some point Hormuz will reopen again. And so if you re, you know, make a bunch of investments, oh, by the way, at higher interest rates thanks to the war, um, to increase production and then Trump signs a deal with whoever and the straight reopens. Not that I think that that's likely to happen in the very near term, but if he does, again, if I'm a CEO of an oil company and I'm trying to make a decision as a CEO of an oil company, which means I need to evaluate things based on a a 5year, 10 year, 20 year payback, not, hey, I need to make my quarter on this month's trading as a hedge fund, then there's no way I'm going to increase oil production.”

Central banks need to hold reserves in assets that will preserve purchasing power in commodity terms during a period when the reserve currency sponsor (US) needs negative real rates, a weaker dollar, and below-inflation Treasury yields. Only gold fits this requirement.

“Um and that's gold, not treasuries or other sovereign debt for that matter. Um, you need an asset that will preserve your purchasing power in commodity terms at a time when the sponsor of the system, the global reserve currency issue with the United States, as we talked about at the at the top of the show, they need negative real rates to avoid a problem, right? They need a weaker dollar. They need they can't let they need treasuries to yield below uh inflation”

The Trump administration likely miscalculated the Iran conflict severity, partly because it was emboldened by the Venezuela operation's apparent success without realizing that success was built on covert payments to prevent armed resistance, and Iran cannot be coerced the same way.

“I think they miscalculated in part based on the success of Venezuela. Hey, look how easy it is to go in and seize a foreign leader. Well, part of that is because we are paying off the people not to shoot at us. Um and that's fine. Like we've done that in other operations. Uh Iran is not Venezuela.”

Saudi Arabia's Bark payment system (12M users, ~1/3 of population) has signed deal with China's Alipay for digital QR code payments outside dollar system in yuan/riyal cross pairs, exemplifying how non-SWIFT alternatives are spreading in the Gulf.

“the uh Bark BK, BRQ, excuse me. It's a payment system uh based out of Saudi Arabia. Uh it's one of their largest. It's 12 million users, nearly a third of their population. Uh they just signed a deal with China's Alipe to do digital QR code payments outside the dollar system, all in presumably, you know, Chinese yuan in Saudi real.”

Groman's base case for the world monetary system 5 years from now: DXY trades in the 60s, gold trades above $10,000, 10-year yield 3.5-4%, Chinese yuan 4-5 to the dollar (much stronger), stronger euro, weaker pound, oil ~$80/barrel, and a much stronger US industrial base with more balanced trade and a more robust Chinese consumer.

“My base case is that you we see DXY probably trading in the 60s. Uh I think we see gold trading over $10,000. I think we see a 10-year Treasury yield that's probably three and a half to 4%. Uh I think we see a Chinese yuan that trades against the dollar probably four or five uh down from where we are today. Uh what 6.78 or something like that. Uh stronger euro uh weaker pound. Uh, I think we see um oil that probably trades, you know, in that world probably 80 bucks a barrel, something like that. Um, and I I think you see a much stronger US industrial base uh and a much more robust Chinese consumer uh and more balanced trade. That's that's where I see things in five years. Um, that's a pretty optimistic case. I think that's that's things work out. Okay. Um but that's that's my base case.”

If Hormuz is not reopened by June 1st, it would be so catastrophic that markets literally cannot contemplate it. Markets are thus pricing in June 1st reopening as certainty despite Iran's demonstrated capability to maintain closure. This is 'hope is not a strategy' pricing.

“when I look at markets that are basically, you know, I mean, I saw something the other day where, you know, somebody's assuming, hey, you know, Hormuz is going to reopen by June 1st, no matter what, you know, because if it goes beyond June 1st, it's so bad. We can't even sort of really contemplate what that implies. And so, it's just going to open. I was kind of like, you know, hope's not a strategy.”

The 10-year Treasury yield has already hit 4.4-4.5% multiple times since March 27th and kept being suppressed through jawboning, peace deal announcements, and Hormuz reopening claims—each one clearly false or misleading but serving the purpose of managing expectations.

“jawbon right is a way that has been used over the last month, which is, oh, we have a peace deal. Every time the 10-year Treasury yield, almost every time over the last month or so that the 10-year Treasury yield hits 4.4% and goes through it, uh, we have a peace deal. Um, and 10-year yields go down, dollar goes down, and, um, oil gets hit. Uh, Hormuz, hey, we have a Hormuz reopening April 17th, which was an absolute bold-faced lie, but oil got smashed on it. 10 year Treasury yields got uh you know were lowered on it.”

The TNX metric (10-year Treasury yield times oil price) is at elevated levels only seen twice in 50 years: January 1980 (before double-dip recession) and March 2008 (before financial crisis), both indicating current levels are dangerously high and historically associated with major equity underperformance.

“I look at TNX, uh, you know, the 10-year Treasury yield times oil going back 70 years. Um, that combined number, you know, and the reason those two are important are high rates and high oil are kryptonite to a financialized economy like the US. Uh the current level, it's only been higher twice in the last 50 years, 55 years. January 1980, right before a vicious double dip recession and uh March of 2008, both times not great times to be chasing equities.”

If the Iran war was a 5D chess strategy, it doesn't make sense because the industrial base needs Hormuz to stay closed forever to invest in onshoring and production, but the Treasury market is priced on Hormuz reopening someday. These are two fundamentally opposite needs that cannot both be satisfied, which is why Groman believes it was a miscalculation rather than strategic brilliance.

“the oil sector in America and the industrial sector in America needs hormuse to never reopen again. How do we these are two fundamentally opposite needs like so much else. And that's where I kind of scratch my head a little bit on like the 5D chess thing.”

The reserve currency issuer (US) will never default on debt—they will always print the money instead. Therefore, measuring assets in the reserve currency is like measuring bridge span with a rubber band. You must use a hard ruler (gold) to measure real value.

“because the reserve currency issuer has a debt problem and the reserve currency issuer is never ever ever going to default on their debt. They're always going to print the money. Then you can't, you know, that's like trying to measure, you know, the span of a bridge with a rubber band. It's like, well, how far do we have to go across to like, well, that's how you get people killed. So, you know, you've got to use a hard ruler, and that's gold for me is the hard ruler.”

The Trump administration doesn't want to balance trade deficits by swapping manufactured goods for oil, because gasoline prices of $6-7/gallon would trigger broader economic crisis (higher 10-year yields, unaffordable interest expense), undermining the energy independence goal.

“we're not going to balance our trade deficit with the Chinese over the back of oil. At least I hope not because gasoline will be freaking $7 a gallon. And then we're going to have again go back to the first discussion of if gasoline six, seven bucks a gallon, what's the 10ear yield and can the American economy afford it?”

The question of whether current equity market strength is a 'crackup boom' driven by front-running liquidity injections (where valuations don't matter) or a temporary correction before further downside is ambiguous. Groman's base case is he will get another opportunity to deploy cash at lower levels, but acknowledges he could be wrong and the crackup boom could already be in progress.

“that's a $64,000 question. Um February 28th through March 27th, I look super smart. S&P down 10. March 27th to now, I look super dumb. S&P up, you know, 18% or 17% from that point in time. Um, I spend a lot of time every day, probably more time than I should, thinking about that. Is is is that what I'm watching? Am I watching the crack of boom and they don't matter and it's just front running the print or is there going to am I going to get another crack at this? And I I you know, my base case is I'm going to get another crack because of what I'm seeing in bonds and what I am seeing in Hormuz and what I'm seeing in inflation. Um, but I could be wrong.”

Since Trump met with Chinese leadership in fall 2024, gold became the single largest U.S. export for five of the last six months, exceeding jet engines, automobiles, and pharmaceuticals in value, with exports going to China, Hong Kong, Switzerland (which then ships to China), or Persian Gulf, suggesting de facto settlement of trade deficit in gold.

“fast forward to shortly after Bessant and Trump met with the Chinese in Korea last fall and all of a sudden, gold shoots up to being the single biggest export of the United States of America. bigger than jet engines, bigger than automobiles, bigger than pharmaceutical preparations. Uh, five out of the last six months, gold exports, non-monetary gold exports have been the biggest export of the United States. Why? Where's it going? Well, as it turns out, it's going to either China or Hong Kong, which is China, or to Switzerland, which is then you look at Swiss data and where's the Swiss gold been going? [laughter] it's been going to China”

The Trump administration is making strategic mistakes by showing up for negotiations with China rather than forcing China to come to the U.S., suggesting the U.S. does not have the leverage it claims and China's negotiating position is stronger than publicly acknowledged.

“We're said to have all the cards and yet this is the second straight trip where he has gotten on the plane and gone to Asia. It's not an easy trip. And so if we have all the cards, why are we going there? That's my first observation. Um my my base case is we don't have all the cards. Not even close. I think China's hand is much stronger than what um has been advertised here.”

High-profile resignations of Joint Chiefs of staff members before and after the Iran war started suggest that military leadership warned the administration about problems, but an organizational culture where the CEO 'doesn't like bad news' prevented these warnings from influencing decision-making.

“There were a couple of pretty um high-profile resignations and and uh [snorts] of a couple of joint chiefs of staff people right before the war started and right after the war started. And if I was a betting man, I would suspect some of that was around people saying, 'Hey, this is a bad idea. this is going to happen and we're going to get jammed up. And in an organization where the CEO doesn't like bad news, that's a career limiting report.'”

Sulfuric acid shortages from Hormuz disruption are preventing American farmers from getting adequate fertilizer, forcing a shift from corn and wheat to soybeans (which require less nitrogen), resulting in lowest U.S. wheat crop since 1972 and predictable commodity price inflation.

“you're seeing sulfuric acid shortages that just are for, you know, impacting fertilizer markets. You're seeing, uh, the wheat, you know, wheat went limit up this week because, um, we are planting our our, uh, we're producing the lowest wheat crop in America since 1972. Why are we doing that? Well, some the the American Farm Bureau did a survey. 48 to 78% of American farmers cannot get all the fertilizer they need. So, what do you do when you can't get all the fertilizer you need or can't afford it? Uh, simple. You don't plant corn and you don't plant wheat. You plant soybeans because soybeans needs a lot less uh nitrogen- based fertilizer. So, guess what the crop report said? A lot more beans getting planted, a lot less wheat, a lot less corn. And so, boom, wheat goes limit up.”

Trump invoked the Defense Production Act to force oil production increases because market prices alone (at $100+/barrel) did not incentivize corporate investment, suggesting the 5D chess explanation is questionable since $100 oil should be sufficient without government coercion.

“You would think a $100 oil, you wouldn't need the government to say, 'Hey, you need to increase production.' But I think part of the reason he invoked the DPA was exactly to try to backs stop this this dilemma he's created by the war which is we want to increase domestic production. Great. Let's say it is 5D chess. Great. We've taken Iran offline. How long is poor muse going to be offline? Because markets are still priced including the treasury market of which the US government's funding is still priced based off of a hormuz that's going to reopen again someday.”

In the last week of February 2025, after the Iran war started, the consensus was that the 10-year Treasury yield would drop sharply due to a 'risk-off' dynamic, but instead yields dropped only 3-5 basis points and then spiked to almost 4.5%, the dollar rose, and the S&P 500 fell 9% from end of February to end of March, indicating the debt spiral dynamic was already beginning.

“U if you recall, we go back to the last day of February. We start the war over that weekend. Consensus was that the 10-year Treasury yield was going to drop sharply because risk off... And instead we did we did get about a 3 to five basis point drop for a cup of coffee in the 10-year yield from call it 3.94 to 3.9 and then it ripped to almost 4.5%. And we saw the dollar rise and we saw the S&P drop 9% from the end of February to the end of March.”

China is the world's largest copper producer and is experiencing difficulties obtaining Chinese sulfuric acid due to Chinese export bans, and rare earth supplies are also affected, showing how the Hormuz closure creates cascading supply chain shocks across critical commodities.

“Chile, huge copper producer. They're having trouble getting Chinese sulfuric acid. due to export bans, uh, rare earth. So, you're just seeing these dynamics”

The current liquidity injections are temporary and 'only buy a little time', while 10-year yields are already back to problematic levels near 4.5%, and very hot inflation prints (PPI printing 6% recently) mean the crisis will return in a big way in the next couple of months as lagged inflationary effects from supply chain disruptions hit the economy.

“but again, that just buys a little time and now we're into sort of the next iteration. 10-year yields are back to problematic levels, four almost 4.5%. We're starting to get hot, very hot inflation prints, PPI printing 6% this week. Um, the choice is going to come back to them and I think it's going to come in the next couple of months in a big way because again, Hormuz is still closed. it isn't going to reopen anytime soon. And now we're starting to see the the inflation, you know, the lagged effects of these inflationary uh issues because of supply chain interruptions are really going to start hitting in the next four to 8 to 12 weeks.”

Electrical infrastructure companies are attractive because they are the 'shovel and pick makers to the whole AI thing,' providing necessary grid infrastructure regardless of which AI provider wins, avoiding the need to pick individual AI winners.

“electrical infrastructure equities, I really like just they are, you know, the the shovel and pick makers to the whole AI thing. I don't have to I'm I'm it's out of my belly wick. I'm not smart enough to figure out which hyperscaler is going to win and who's got the best AI and all that. And and you know what, at the end of the day, they all need electricity. And you know, the companies I own, they supply they supply the stuff to make the electricity.”

Bitcoin long-term will reach price levels around 200k (implied from earlier conversation), but near-term it will not separate from software equity dynamics without a major monetary system crisis event that forces emergency central bank asset purchases ('a real big print').

“I still think Bitcoin long term will go to those price levels. The challenge for me in the short run is it's if you look at how Bitcoin's been trading...But I think in the long run it will increasingly become more of that neutral reserve asset. I also think you know Bitcoin is is is to get a real big spike you need a real big print as as my my friend Larry Leard calls it. And and we just we you know we're seeing this this dripped in liquidity but we're not getting the real big print.”

The Trump administration still appears to be pursuing the strategy of weakening the dollar to re-industrialize the US and achieve economic sovereignty, as evidenced by the choice to allow Hormuz to remain closed and support domestic energy production, even though this creates Treasury market stress.

“on some level it looks like they're still pursuing it. Um right because ultimately you know if inflation's going to run 8 to 10% and they say it's only going to run four and um you know bond yields will be kept one way or another uh at at affordable levels. Um, you know, those are significantly negative real interest rates, which are really what you need.”

Since March 27th 2026, the U.S. authorities have been injecting dollar liquidity through methods other than traditional Treasury shifts, reverse repo drawdowns, or outright QE, evidenced by dollar weakness, lower 10-year yields, lower inflation readings, and coordinated weakness across oil, stocks, Bitcoin, and gold all from the same pivot date.

“it looks like in terms of the market action over the last uh from from March 27th to now the reaction has been injections of dollar liquidity. The question is from where uh it hasn't been done in the way it's been done in the past where there have been clear treasury shifts to the front end in the case of Yelen where there's been Yellen running down the reverse repo in the case of Yelen uh where there's been Fed u not QE uh in as in the case in 2020 or 2019 excuse me or outright Fed QE of course in 2020 and 2021. So you can see the dollar weaken since March 27th. You can see 10-year yields come down since March 27th up until the last week or so. Uh you can see the reaction in inflation. You can see the reaction in stocks. You can see the reaction in Bitcoin. You can see the reaction in gold. They're all kind of the same reaction from March 27.”

Bringing dozens of corporate executives to China negotiations suggests the U.S. has not finalized deal terms and is in early-stage discussion of what a potential agreement might look like, rather than closing a pre-negotiated deal.

“I think the reason we're taking all these corporate execs is quite possibly to kind of lay out to help consult in real time what any possible deal might look like...if they had a deal that was like signed, sealed, delivered, ready to go, I don't think he brings all these people because he wouldn't want to share the spotlight with any of them. he would want to be the guy who engineered the deal.”

China is employing strategic ambiguity and delay tactics in negotiations, knowing that Trump faces political pressure in 6 months (midterm-adjacent timing) and will have less leverage after that, so China can afford to wait out the current political window.

“they know Trump if if nothing changes, they think they know Trump is in deep deep water in six months uh in midterms and then they'll have they will have a different set of political interactions with the United States”

30 of 33 Iranian missile sites on the coast overseeing Hormuz are still functioning after 2 months of U.S. military operations, indicating either ineffective targeting or Iranian resilience that should have been anticipated but apparently was not.

“you saw the New York Times the other day, oh 30 of the 33 missile sites on the coast overseeing Hormuz are still functioning after we have given them heck for two months.”

Iran has forced evacuation of U.S. military bases in the Middle East and retains fire control capability over the Strait of Hormuz, which means the conflict cannot be resolved militarily without full escalation or negotiated settlement, creating a strategic stalemate.

“if they've forced the US to evacuate a lot of their M East bases, as I hear they have, what's the plan here?”

U.S. oil inventory draws are at unprecedented unsustainable rates; storage tank bottoms will be hit in Europe by end of June and in U.S. by late June/early July, according to Jeff Curry's analysis, meaning the physical constraint will force either Hormuz to reopen or oil prices to spike even higher.

“the rate at which we are drawing inventories is unprecedented. It is unsustainable. We're going to be hitting, you know, Jeff Curry, who used to run commodities at Goldman, we're going to be hitting tank bottoms in Europe by the end of uh by the end of this month or end of this month, mid June. We're going to be hitting tank bottoms, storage tank bottoms in the United States late June, early July.”

When Treasury auctions fail and volatility index (MOVE) spikes above 115 (toward 120-130 intervention threshold), the U.S. authorities face a binary choice: inject liquidity to save the bond market or let bond yields spike and crush growth, with the March 2026 terrible Treasury auctions and 115 MOVE spike being the first warning signal.

“March 23rd, 24th, 25th, terrible auctions. Uh you saw the move Treasury volatility index rise to 115 on a spike, which is going back five, six years. When that number gets to 120, 130, you get interventions by the US authorities. That's a sign we're moving into this this debt spiral issue.”

The main thesis could be derailed if there were political upheaval in China or Russia (coup, revolution) that installed leaders willing to sell off national resources to Western interests at pennies on the dollar, restoring Western dominance and making gold worthless, but Groman assigns low probability to this scenario.

“What possibly derails your theory on gold here? uh political strife in China um political strife in Russia where those two leaders are replaced by the modern-day era of Boris Yeltson who you know is a drunk who sells off the the wealth of the both of those countries to you know American oligarchs for pennies on the dollar...I don't think that's going to happen, but that's that's what it would really take, I think.”