Stephen Kotkin: Sphere of Influence III - The Chip on the Shoulder
What this covers
This lecture was recorded on 26 April 2017 at the IWM Library.
Populist revolt within countries has its complement in a populist revolt against the liberal, rules-based international order, which is driven by three revisionist powers – China, Russia, Iran – that have rich histories as civilizations, empires that once extended well beyond their current size, a powerful sense of historic entitlement and of historic grievance. Today their quest for enlarged spheres of influence in East Asia, Eurasia, and West Asia (or the Middle East), respectively, has reinforced, and in turn been reinforced by, a politics of resentment inside many countries of Europe and the U.S. The chip on the shoulder politics of the moment are perhaps best exemplified by Russia, because of the steepness of its decline. Is this a passing phase or a new normal, in Russia and beyond?
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Kotkin argues the Western liberal order faces structural self-initiated decline, not external collapse; Russia is in irreversible decline despite military posturing, China poses no existential threat but cannot substitute for US power, and the central threat is American self-displacement through loss of will and political entrepreneurship.
- The West's success has generated resentment and populism domestically, not from external rivals
- Russia's sphere of influence is economically negligible and strategically negative-value, while China's rise depends on US partnership and security guarantees
- The alternative to US-led order is not Chinese or Russian hegemony but international anarchy
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Neither Russia nor China can overturn the liberal international order and replace it with their own system; the real threat is not external displacement but internal self-destruction, which is what happened to communism—internal collapse rather than external conquest.
“communism couldn't be brought down from without and the us-based power in the world cannot be brought down from the outside either it can however as in the case of Communism be brought down from the inside that's the threat the threat is the same resentment the same populist politics in intern AAL terms at the level right of the International System but coming out of Washington not coming out of Beijing or not coming out of Moscow”
Nationalism should be seized as a political instrument by democratic forces rather than ceded to anti-democratic ones, because transnationalism and internationalism are inherently minority ideologies while only nationalism can be majoritarian.
“it's very important to seize nationalism and make it work as an instrument for you including defending the European Union if you give up nationalism if you seed nationalism you are automatically in the minority transnationalism internationalism is ipof facto a minority ideology only nationalism can be majoritarian”
Russia's fundamental predicament is that it considers itself a providential power (a great power with a special mission) but is relatively weak compared to the West, creating a structural gap that drives the recurring quest for a strong state, which cyclically generates economic spurts followed by prolonged stagnation.
“Russia's predicament which is that it wants to be a great power it considers itself what we call a providential power a power under Providence or under God right it has a special mission in the world this is the core this is the core of Russia the problem however is that they are not the greatest power they consider themselves a providential power but they are relatively weak Visa the West there's a a gulf or an asymmetry a gap and so what you see in Russian history is you see the Quest for a strong state to manage or maybe even overcome the Gap with the West”
The Western liberal order is a stunning achievement that needs to be preserved; however, the West is in self-initiated, self-started structural decline (not collapse or Soviet-like scenario) driven by the West's own actions, not external pressure.
“the Western sphere of influence is a stunning achievement and needs to be preserved but is in a decline a self started right self-initiated structural decline not an end not a collapse not a Soviet scenario but there are problems with the West that the West itself has been doing to itself not Russia not China”
China has no 'California'—its western territories are desert that is advancing eastward through farmland; if everyone in China drinks one extra glass of water daily, the desert moves toward Beijing; this ecological challenge is more fundamental than any military or economic issue China faces.
“the other thing you see from this map is that China has no California that's the single biggest problem geopolitical problem of China...here's what they've got you see this you see what this is this is Farmland this is Desert this is encroaching desert this is what China's West looks like that desert is moving and it's eating and eating the Farmland...if everybody in China drinks an extra glass of water every day this thing heads for Beijing right that's their ecological challenge”
Successful systems produce winners and losers; winners have a tendency to 'kick the ladder away'—climb to the top, remove the ladder, and restrict access so only their children can reach the top; this is organizational sociology 101 and requires continuous disruption to keep systems open.
“systems become aifi the successful when they get successful kick the ladder away they climb up they're on the top and then the ladder goes and it's only for their kids it's only for their people this is you know sociology 101 org Theory 101...every system needs to be jolted it needs to be broken open”
China has 20 neighbors (14 land, 6 sea)—more than any other country, including Russia and the Soviet Union—and is in disputes with many; this represents a severe geopolitical constraint on Chinese power compared to the US and Britain, which had oceanic buffers.
“Chinese sphere of influence question China has 20 neighbors as we discussed in the first lecture it's got more neighbors 14 on land and six on sea than any other country ever it has more neighbors than Russia has it has more neighbors than the Soviet Union had”
The US must be rooted in democratic support; American Grand Strategy cannot succeed if it is only briefed in think tanks but not supported by the majority of the American public, because in a democracy the people must support geopolitical commitments.
“because we live in a democracy and in a democracy you have to have the people support this because if the people don't support it then it's only a briefing in a think tank brilliant briefings in think tanks about how us Grand strategy should look are different from something rooted in a democratic poity that a majority of people will approve because it speaks to National interest”
The gap between Russia and the West widened even more during the 1990s democratic period, driving the quest for a strong state under Putin; to achieve internationally competitive development, Russia would have to overturn the existing Putin system and current elites—a deep hole where the regime itself must destroy itself for progress.
“what happened in the 9s was the Gap with the West grew even more the Gap with the West kept growing so the state collapse problem was one element but the other problem was Visa the West worsening relationship in in terms of the power Symmetry...to get anywhere better what do they have to do they have to overturn the existing system they have to destroy the Putin system and the current Elites to get any internationally competitive model that is a deep hole you're in when your own regime has to destroy itself for your country to move forward”
Geopolitics is wrongly dismissed as a problem when in fact it is the solution; the West won the Cold War through geopolitics, the world was built through geopolitics, and it will be sustained only through geopolitics.
“geopolitics is wrongly dismissed as the problem when in fact it is what can be the solution we have an escape from geopolitics mentality we have a fear of the return of geopolitics for the right that is to say people who consider themselves conservative they are above geopolitics there's a kind of pure American hegemony for the left geopolitics is so evil that it must be transcended with pulled sovereignty and Multinational institutions these are not only wrong they're not only mistakes but they're politically dangerous views because we got to where we were through geopolitics the Cold War was W because of geopolitics the world was built because of geopolitics and it will be sustained only geopolitics is our friend”
Populism is merely another word for politics; when democratic mechanisms reveal the 'losers' of successful processes—people whose voices have not been heard—and they give voice to their resentment, this is called populism but is fundamentally an expression of democratic representation.
“when we see Democratic mechanisms able to reveal what we might call The Losers of some of our processes that is to say the people whose voices have not been heard they feel the system does not work for them and yet because of democratic mechanisms they've been able to give voice to their resentment to their their disappointment to their anger we call this now populism populism is of course just another word for politics”
Communism has ended permanently because the elites (the pigs) discovered that illiberalism with private property and markets is far superior for their personal enrichment and power compared to communism with state property; the structural cause of Soviet collapse was the crushing weight of the capitalist West, which lived daily in the consciousness of Soviet elites through status symbols and the visible success of Western societies.
“Communism ceased to work for the pigs the pigs as you know from Animal Farm was uh the group that Orwell chose for the Communist Elites instead they discovered that illiberalism with private property and markets is much Superior to illiberalism with this communism nonsense...they lived in a capitalist world and they suffered under a capitalist example or sphere of influence remember I talked about the East German Elites how did they mark their status they were Western suits they had Western perfume for their wives and Mistresses they drove Western cars their entire life was completely suffused with status symbols of the capitalist world right this was true of the entire block”
The quest for a strong Russian state invariably culminates in personal rule, not genuine state strength; the conflation of state interests with the political fortunes of one person (Putin) means the regime defends itself, not Russian state interests, and Russian patriots can legitimately criticize the regime on nationalist grounds.
“the Quest for the strong state culminates in what what does it culminate in does it culminate in a strong State never it culminates in personal rule every single time it's astonishing and then we have the conflation of State interests with the political fortunes of one person so people say you can't criticize Putin because he's defending Russian State interests but he's not defending Russian State interests I can be a Russian Patriot and criticize that regime because that regime is defending itself”
The main threat to Russia is roiling internal resentment; before the oil price collapse, the crony economic system was already dead-ended at zero growth; Russia squandered its post-Soviet revival and would need to overturn the entire existing system to achieve competitive development.
“meanwhile back at home you have a cauldron of roing resentment the main threat to Russia yes that's right that's the main threat to Russia...even before the oil price plunge the crony economic system had dead ended it was Zero growth before the collapse of the oil prices essentially they squandered their Revival”
Hong Kong and Taiwan represent existential threats to the Chinese political system as alternative political models, more fundamental than Tibet and Xinjiang where ethnic assimilation is possible; China's inability to forcibly assimilate Taiwan represents the deepest threat to CCP legitimacy.
“the big ones are Hong Kong Taiwan because those are alternative political models right so you have Manchuria and inner Mongolia are gone they've been overrun by Han Chinese outer Mongolia is currently independent Tibet and shin Jang are being assimilated forcibly by China with the ethnic Strife but it's very hard to assimilate the Hong Kong and the Taiwan because it's an alternative political model this is the deepest threat to the Chinese political system”
University humanities and social sciences curricula teach that there is no objective truth, that 'truth is just your interpretation' and 'truth is your class position'; this prevents students from being able to distinguish truth from falsehood and makes it impossible to call Trump a liar without first establishing that objective truth exists.
“our universities that are denying that there's something called a higher truth they're telling me you can't speak about truth you can't know the truth truth is just your interpretation of reality truth is just your subject position and where you're talking from...if we can't identify a higher truth we can't say that Trump is lying”
China's sphere of influence through ports and infrastructure (the 'greater Eurasia') looks significantly different from Russia's small territorial holdings and is modeled on British Empire strategy; China owns significant stakes in 200,000 merchant marine ships and strategic ports globally where it has major ownership interests.
“this is the China greater Eurasia does it look different from that little piece of Crimea right danet and lugans transnistria does it look a little bit different...these are ports abroad where China owns a significant ownership stake China's Merchant Marine is 200,000 ships 200,000 ships and these are the ports where they have a significant in many cases more than 51% interest you'll notice that it looks a lot like the British Empire doesn't it yeah”
Even if the US cannot imagine being displaced by China, the Chinese cannot imagine being successfully displaced by the US either; both sides can cooperate rather than compete because the alternative (conflict) is catastrophic for both.
“but no it's not inevitable and that's the calculation they have to make and then we have to make a similar calculation on our side which is to say how much of China's rise is okay by us and how much of China's rise is a problem for us right that's negotiation and diplomacy not only military”
The central fact of international politics is anarchy—the absence of a higher authority; having one country in charge of the system is rare and very costly for that country, and very difficult to manage, which is why complete US dominance cannot and will not persist indefinitely.
“the central fact about International politics is anarchy it's not somebody being in charge somebody being in charge is rare because it's very costly to that country to be in charge and because it's very difficult to manage to have the kind of power that stretches”
Russia's interventions in Syria have produced negative strategic value for Russia: Assad is a butcher controlling a ruined sliver of territory, 400,000 people are dead, the country has been destroyed, and this gives Russia no real allies, no functional state, and no economic benefit—only illusory leverage and international infamy.
“they have a butcher they've got a butcher who controls a sliver of a former country that butcher is internationally hated many people in Russia can't stand him they're supporting him what long-term strategy is that...Syria is a prime example of Russian failure if that's where you're successful Syria where 400,000 people have been killed”
Maintaining the Putin regime requires widening the gap with the West, so those defending the regime are explicitly arguing for increasing isolation and worsening Russia's relative power position.
“to maintain the Putin regime means widening the Gap with the West it widens every year those people who are apologist for the Putin regime this is your argument you're saying we want to widen the Gap with the West because that's what that regime is doing”
East Asia has unresolved World War II grievances deeper and more volatile than those of inter-war Europe after World War I; these grievances are actively present in societies and media, creating combustible narratives of victimization and humiliation that could spark conflict.
“then you have the roiling East Asia problem World War II it's not over yet in East Asia it didn't end the Cold War it's not over yet in East Asia this is a big problem there is tremendous roing historical grievance tremendous grievance over the war which is unsettled and it's the kind of grievance that's as greater greater than we saw in inter War Europe the Grievances over World War I...they're right there in the societies on their media all the time so we have a combustable narrative victim of humiliation in the past and adversaries trying to hold it down in the present”
China cannot and will not displace US power in maintaining the international liberal order; China is a beneficiary of the current order (as is the EU) and cannot replace the US's role in guaranteeing global security and open markets because it lacks the capacity and desire to underwrite a global rules-based order.
“it cannot replace the US to underwrite the international order it cannot and China knows this right let alone the fact that a leader of any open system must itself be open but openness is potentially the killer threat to the Chinese regime...China does not want to overturn the international order because they are the prime beneficiaries besides the US and the EU China in any case lacks the capacity let let alone the desire to underwrite a global international order”
Russia's takeover of Crimea created a pro-Western, Ukrainian-speaking, more unified Ukraine, which is the opposite of Russian strategic success; Putin inadvertently created Ukrainian nationalism and eliminated the electoral advantage Yanukovych had through Crimean votes, making Western-oriented leaders more viable.
“now Ukraine is more pro-western than ever and more Ukrainian than ever and nothing like yanukovich could come to power now because Crimea doesn't vote inside Ukraine anymore...he creates Ukrainian ISM Ukrainian isation Ukrainian solidarity so you tell me how that's a quote defense of Russian national interest”
The issue is not inequality but upward mobility; societies prosper when upward mobility increases even if inequality increases; societies decline when upward mobility decreases even if inequality decreases; the left focuses on inequality when the real problem is opportunity and mobility.
“the issue is mobility upward Mobility if inequality is increasing but upward Mobility is increasing we're in great shape shape right if inequality is decreasing and upward Mobility is decreasing we're nowhere right...the focus on inequality inequality is a condition of prosperity the issue is mobility upward Mobility”
The Thucydidean trap—the idea that conflict between a rising power (China) and a declining power (US) is inevitable—is based on flawed historical reasoning; patterns are not laws, and history remains open as long as leaders understand structural forces and avoid miscalculation.
“social science does this it takes a couple of historical examples and then it decides that there's a rule or a law or a trap...patterns are not laws patterns are what you learn from history but history doesn't necessarily repeat itself history is open as long as you understand the structural forces at work right War comes from miscalculation”
Experts on China offer contradictory interpretations: the literature says China becomes aggressive when it feels strong and also becomes aggressive when it feels weak; this contradiction reflects uncertainty about Chinese decision-making because the political system is opaque and has never been tested with this much wealth before.
“what do the experts on China say right they say that China becomes aggressive when it feels strong and that it becomes aggressive when it feels weak that's what the literature says right...this is the first time in history that a country has been this wealthy with this opaque a political system cuz opaque political systems smother wealth they don't create wealth but the Chinese system is completely opaque and the second largest economy in the world”
Even without external shocks, China faces slower economic growth, corrosive corruption, demographic and environmental stress, and inability to stabilize the political system enduringly—challenges significantly greater than anything the CCP has dealt with in its history.
“even if there are no shocks there's slower economic growth there's corrosive corruption there's demographic and environmental stress and there's inability to stabilize the political system enduringly...what the Chinese Communist Party leadership faces are challenges significantly greater than anything they've dealt with up till now”
The US has done many bad things and made mistakes, but has shown resilience; the 1970s (Watergate, Vietnam, oil shock) looked like decline but were followed by success; Trump cannot bring about massive destruction of the US system; Western systems have tremendous resilience.
“the US has done many bad things including to itself and it's come out the other side even stronger I remember the 70s that's where these lectures began if you were alive in the 70s and the mid-70s would you have predicted the success that followed Watergate Vietnam oil shock right there's a resilience there's a tremendous resilience in the western sphere of”
10 million Russians live abroad beyond the former Soviet Union—approximately the size of the entire Russian middle class—located in London, Israel, Berlin, Vienna, and US universities, earning 20% above market average in all countries they inhabit, indicating the best people are leaving.
“10 million Russians are abroad beyond the FSU that's the size of the Russian middle class inside Russia yeah that's London Israel Berlin Vienna Princeton University Stanford University that's where they are and they're earning 20% above Market average in all the countries they're in what does that tell you they're the best people and they're leaving at 20 to 30,000 a year”
Russia's actual sphere of influence is geographically and economically insignificant: it includes Crimea, eastern Ukraine territories, Transnistria, and parts of Georgia—all told a small territory; the Russian-speaking population share has declined in the former Soviet space (Ukraine from 34% to 24%, Georgia declining, Lithuania increasing); Russia's economy is 1.127 trillion dollars, 115th the size of the US economy, under 2% of global GDP.
“here it is that's your Russian sphere of influence...look at their sphere of influence here's the language 1994 Russian language 2016 Russian language look at the direction of Russian language lvia Ukraine from 34% to 24%...the whole Russian GDP 1 127 trillion look at the size of the Russian economy 115th 115th the size of the United States economy”
China's percentage of world trade is rising sharply and recently, following the trajectory of the British Empire's rise and subsequently the US eclipse of British power; China is moving toward similar global commercial and strategic dominance through explicit strategy.
“the percentage of World Trade look at this US percentage of World Trade this is the British Empire they created the world economy this is the US eclipse of the British Empire you can see already in 1900 Lookout right before the British Empire in fact the British Empire is going to grow to its biggest height after that after 1900 in the in war period and now look at China and look how recent that is and look at the trajectory right the sharpness that's what we're dealing with”
The US promotes an open, market-based economic order that has brought prosperity (unevenly, as markets always do); multinational institutions help create and sustain this order; this liberal international order is constructed from values, institutions, and rule of law, not just military power.
“the US promotes an open market-based economic order you don't think that's brought Prosperity it has brought Prosperity not evenly because markets never bring even Prosperity never but the absence of markets we know what that brings the multinational institutions who help create them and who's helped sustain them so this is the liberal International order”
Russia is a special power in decline distinct from Angola because it has cyber warfare, nuclear weapons, and unique geopolitical characteristics, but these do not compensate for the structural economic and demographic problems that will determine its long-term trajectory.
“so they are a special power in Decline that makes them different from for example Angola...they have cyber warfare as we discussed the first lecture yes they have nuclear weapons as we discussed the first lecture right so they are a special power in Decline that makes them different”
The US provides security in all key regions and denies hegemonic predominance to any single country; this is genuinely difficult and costly, funded by US taxpayers; without this, you get international anarchy, not Chinese or Russian dominance.
“the US provides Security in all the key regions because it denies hegemony it denies predominance to any one country in the key regions you don't think that's hard that's really hard and that's really costly that costs a lot I'm a taxpayer in the US I'm paying for this...the alternative is not a US order that makes mistake after mistake...but the alternative is you guessed it Anarchy”
War results from miscalculation by elites, not from accidentally stumbling into conflict; even WWI, often called accidental, involved thousands of conscious orders to move military forces, showing deliberate decision-making by narrowly-concentrated decision-making apparatus.
“War comes from miscalculation it comes from miscalculating risks miscalculating benefits or costs right war is not an accident...just to move the horses just to move the fodder that the horses ate took more than 1,000 orders from the Kaiser's office so you don't Sleepwalk into war when you have to send a thousand orders”
The Western elites do not understand the populations they govern; Pauline Kael's comment about not knowing anyone who voted for Nixon while Nixon won in a landslide exemplifies how disconnected coastal elites are from the millions of people whose grievances drive populism.
“remember I told you about Pauline kale she was the film critic of the New Yorker in the in the 60s and 70s and the most read film critic in the United States and she said Nixon could never have won the election I don't know a single person who voted for Nixon and she was right she didn't know a single person who voted for Nixon but Nixon won in a landslide”
The West is defined by values and institutions (markets, private property, prosperity, open societies, free economy, liberal constitutional order, democracy), not by opposition to an external other; the West is a self-defined set of principles that non-Western societies like Japan can join by adopting these values and institutions.
“the West is defined on its own terms I can tell you what the West is about right it's about markets private property Prosperity open societies right free economy open societies and liberal constitutional order and democracy that's what the West is about...it's not a geographical term because Japan was able to join that sphere of influence and it joined only on those terms”
Political entrepreneurialism is a crucial variable for European success and for defending liberal democracy; while some contemporary leaders (Trump, Orban) are political entrepreneurs Kotkin dislikes, their techniques and entrepreneurial methods are worth studying because competitive political entrepreneurs are necessary to defend democratic institutions.
“political entrepreneurialism we forget how valuable and important this is political entrepreneurialism is the key variable Orban is an entrepreneur Trump is an entrepreneur I could go on I could name the rest of the people you probably dislike with every fiber of your body but I look at them I study them and I say if I don't share their values I want to see their techniques”
Populism, while containing many problematic elements, is a legitimate democratic response to system closure; when democratic mechanisms reveal 'losers' whose voices have been excluded, their resentment and anger is politics, not pathology, and ignoring these voices is itself politically dangerous.
“I'm Pro democracy with a small D and so the brexit vote for me was completely legitimate those people had no voice and their voice was exposed...maybe they have regrets the campaign was mendacious...but I'm good if Marine Le Pen is successful what does that mean to me that means that there are people who are listening to her and think that the system is not working for them”
China's success and rise have been enabled by US power and the liberal international order; Deng Xiaoping chose to shift from Soviet alliance to US alliance in 1979 because of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan's success as US security partners; China's ability to sell manufactured goods into US markets was essential to its rise.
“there has been nothing more important to China's success than the US the US is the single biggest factor to China's success...dun sha ping looked at this and said how did this happen and it happened because they were partners with whom partners with the United States and they sold manufacturing Goods into the US market...when dun sha ping came to the US in 79 it changed from the Soviet Union as a sphere of influence to the US”
The European Union is a profound success: 28 member states (now 27 after Brexit) vs. the founding 6, representing integration that seemed impossible in Kotkin's lifetime; Europe has mismanaged the communication of this success, speaking about crisis instead of achievement, undermining public support despite unprecedented accomplishment.
“Europe is a profound success there are now 28 Minus one countries in the EU in my lifetime I never imagined that this was possible I still remember the founding six I still remember the difficulty of adding even any to the six now I've got 28 Minus one...Europe has mismanaged the success and now talks not about success but about crisis”
In the 2016 election, 489 of the wealthiest counties voted for Clinton; Clinton won California by over 4 million votes and New York by over 2 million votes, but lost the rest of the country by over 3 million votes, showing extreme geographic and class polarization.
“489 of the wealthiest counties in the US they voted for Clinton yep and what about the rest the remaining yeah guess who they voted for Trump won 30 States Clinton won 20 States Clinton won California by more than 4 million she won New York by more than 2 million and she lost the rest of the country by more than 3 million”
Trump speaks with 'truthful hyperbole'—lying in a way everyone understands is exaggerated; the problem is that contemporary universities deny there is any 'higher truth' against which to measure Trump's lies, making it impossible to define what makes Trump's speech misleading.
“we have his truthful hyperbole which everyone so far at this institute has agreed with me that it's lying...Trump is lying how do we know he's lying because there is something called a higher truth that we can identify”
Trump broke open the American political system by destroying the Bush and Clinton dynasties in a single election cycle; while he has achieved nothing substantive and is dishonest, his disruption of entrenched political monopolies was strategically important for opening the system to new voices.
“he broke open the American system this was very important he's achieved nothing and that system is holding on but he created an opening he destroyed the bush Dynasty he destroyed the Clinton Dynasty in a single electoral cycle I love him for that...he's not fixing anything and he's created a family regime”
Despite Western success, there is pronounced unhappiness and mess that needs to be explained, captured in the phrase 'everything is amazing and nobody is happy.'
“despite the success nobody is happy there is a mes which is quite pronounced and needs to be explained uh you can see I have borrowed from the preeminent philosopher of our time this problem that everything is amazing and nobody is happy”
Modern authoritarianism operates as the rule of the few in the name of the many—not the rule of the few in the name of the few as in old authoritarianism—and requires four components: a coercive apparatus, a revenue stream (not economic growth), control over life chances through reward and punishment, and a deep well of powerful legitimating stories (narratives of national glory, enemies, threats).
“modern authoritarianism which is the rule of the few in the name of the many the rule of the few in the name of the many...there were four components there was the coercive apparatus you can't really get by without the coer of apparatus there was the revenue stream not economic growth they don't really need that they need cash flow there was control over life chances to be able to reward and punish people by denying them their job by denying them perquisites and they needed a deep well of powerful stories all of this was brittle without the stories the threats the enemies the Grievances and of course the national Glory stolen”
Violence and xenophobia in authoritarian regimes operate like an accordion—they can be calibrated up or down depending on the effectiveness of the regime's narrative legitimacy; if the 'national glory' mythology is very effective, the regime can reduce violence and xenophobia because people buy the story and coercion becomes less necessary.
“you can calibrate the amount of violence you use you can calibrate the xenophobia violence and xenophobia for authoritarian regimes are like the accordion they can open it wide or they can close it a little bit if for example the national Glory stolen mythology is very effective if people buy into this then the need for the violence can be reduced and the cost of the violence they don't have to pay the regimes”
Russia is simultaneously strong and weak, authoritarian and lawless, traditionalist in values yet cynical and valueless, and appears to be in irreversible decline despite being an amazing civilization; it is the most corrupt, highly urbanized, well-educated country in the world with massive underinvestment, tiny economy, capacity at 85%, shrinking labor pool, and hemorrhaging talent at 20,000-30,000 professionals per year.
“Russia is a difficult place to understand simultaneously strong and weak authoritarian and yet Lawless right traditionalist in its values and yet valueless or cynical right everything could change overnight and yet in 300 years it looks the same...it's in decline in a way that's breathtaking the anguish of patriotic Russians it's the most corrupt highly urbanized well-educated country in the world and it has a lot of competition massive long-term under investment the economy is Tiny and capacity is at 85%...Heming Talent every year 20 to 30,000 professionals”
A new equilibrium is needed in which the US recognizes other states' interests while upholding core values; this balance is necessary for the liberal international order to persist, requiring both American restraint and commitment to universal principles.
“there's got to be a new equilibrium somehow in which we recognize other states interests but we uphold core Valu there's got to be otherwise the thing doesn't last”
China is attempting to build an alternative 'California' through infrastructure in Pakistan, Burma, and via Gwadar port and pipelines, but this 'western coast' runs through politically difficult territories (Pakistan, Burma) rather than being domestically controlled like the US California, making it strategically more fragile.
“they have no California but guess what they're building a California here's guad we talked about a dual use port originally commercial now also military and you can see the Chinese built infrastructure right through Pakistan onto the ocean here's the same story but in Burma...it's a gas pipeline right it's for commercial reasons and then we have an outlet to the Bay of Bengal...the problem with their California is it has to go through Pakistan and it has to go through Burma”
The world today is a result of Western success: the West has expanded to its greatest extent, other places have copied the West, and they have paid homage to the West by trying to undermine it because it is so strong and powerful.
“we are dealing with success meaning that we tend to speak mostly about crisis about failure but I instead think that the world today is a result of our success it has been built by the West the West has expanded to its greatest extent other places have copied the West and in fact they've paid homage to the west by trying to undermine the West because it's so strong and so powerful”
China is an opaque political system, the first time in history that a country has been this wealthy with such opaque governance; opaque systems typically smother wealth rather than create it, yet China achieved this, creating unprecedented challenges for US policy in understanding Chinese intentions and decision-making.
“this is the first time in history that a country has been this wealthy with this opaque a political system cuz opaque political systems smother wealth they don't create wealth but the Chinese system is completely opaque and the second largest economy in the world”