Sole US Navy Oiler in the Middle East - USNS Big Horn - Damaged | September 23, 2024
What this covers
Navy Oiler, USNS Big Horn (Underway Replenishment) Damaged September 24, 2024
In this episode, Sal Mercogliano - a maritime historian at Campbell University (@campbelledu) and former merchant mariner - discusses the damage to the US Navy's Military Sealift Command oiler USNS Big Horn due to a grounding or allision in the Gulf of Oman on September 23, 2024, and how this highlights the vulnerability of US Navy logistics for its forward deployed carrier strike and amphibious groups.
#navy #oiler #logisitcs
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00:00 Big Horn Grounding 04:22 US Navy Logistics Shortfall 11:00 World War Two Historical Examples - Neches and Neosho
gCaptain Forum: USNS Big Horn Grounding https://forum.gcaptain.com/t/usns-big-horn-grounding/70744/4
dear_ comsc on Instagram https://www.instagram.com/dear_comsc/
Oiler USNS Big Horn Damaged off the Coast Of Oman, No Fuel Leak Detected https://news.usni.org/2024/09/24/oiler-usns-big-horn-damaged-off-the-coast-of-oman-no-fuel-leak-detected
Navy Ships: Turning Over Auxiliary Ship Operations to the Military Sealift Command Could Save Millions https://www.gao.gov/products/nsiad-97-185
Source description (no synthesized summary yet).
The US Navy's logistics infrastructure is dangerously vulnerable due to insufficient oiler capacity and single points of failure, exemplified by the USNS Big Horn grounding, which threatens the ability to sustain carrier strike groups in peer conflict scenarios.
- Only 14 operational Kaiser-class oilers and 2 Supply-class ships must support the entire US Navy fleet, with 5 additional vessels in shipyards and replacements (John Lewis class) experiencing operational delays
- The Big Horn is the sole oiler supporting the Abraham Lincoln strike group with no immediate backup, forcing difficult logistical trade-offs if reinforcement is needed
- Historical parallel: USS Neosho and USS Nez losses in WWII demonstrated that vulnerable, unarmed logistics vessels are attractive targets, a lesson the modern Navy seems unprepared for
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The Big Horn is the sole oiler currently providing fuel and jet fuel for all operations supporting the Abraham Lincoln nuclear-powered aircraft carrier strike group, making the strike group vulnerable if the oiler is disabled.
“this is the oiler that was providing fuel for the Lincoln strike group now while the Abraham Lincoln is a nuclear power powered aircraft carrier its planes and its escort vessels require the Big Horn to provide them with Fuel and jet fuel for all their operations”
Modern peer-conflict scenarios (US vs. China, Russia, or Iran) require sustained carrier strike group operations for protracted periods, which demands not only combat vessels but also replenishment ships; the Big Horn incident demonstrates vulnerability in this critical capability.
“if you start talking about people looking at scenarios for a potential peer-on-peer confrontation whether the US versus China or Russia or even Iran you have got to sustain a carrier strike group and other groups for protracted periods of time that means not just carriers and airwings and cruisers and destroyers and sub Marines and all the other ancillaries you need you need replenishment vessels”
The USNS Big Horn, one of 14 Kaiser-class oilers operated by Military Sealift Command, suffered damage to at least one rudder and flooding in the after steering compartment following a grounding or allision in the Middle East on September 23, 2024.
“usns us naval ship big horn out in the Middle East this is one of 14 Kaiser class Oilers operated by the US Navy's military seff command...was involved in either an alision or a grounding that has damaged at least one of the ship's Rudders led to flooding of the after steering compartment”
Prior to the Cold War's end, the US Navy operated with a two-tier replenishment model: 'station ships' (manned by Navy crews) that provided immediate support to battle groups, and 'shuttle ships' that traveled to forward bases for resupply, allowing efficient fuel rotation and continuous operations.
“inherently what we have done basically since World War II was operate two types of vessels one were called station ships station ships were the ones that would provide immediate assistance to the battle group in other words these are the ones that came alongside and refueled the carriers the Cruisers the Destroyers the amphibious groups in the meantime you would have shuttle ships that would go back to the forward bases grab the fuel grab the ammunition grab the cargo and meet those station ships out at Sea”
The US Navy has historically operated three tiers of fuel supply: armed Navy oilers (with weapons), unarmed USNS oilers (merchant-crewed, operated by Military Sealift Command), and commercial tankers chartered by the Department of Defense, providing redundancy and resilience in sustained operations.
“back in the day we had a fleet of Oilers you had USS Oilers with navy Crews and weapons on board they were backed by a fleet of usns msse Oilers that were running from port to port bringing it up and then behind them behind them I had even talked about them were commercial Oilers commercial tankers that were bringing fuel up to the forward bases”
The USS Lexington (CV-2) raid on Wake Island in January 1942 required an oiler escort, the USS Neosho, which was sunk by Japanese submarine I-72, leading US Navy leadership to recognize that Oilers required defensive escort because they are high-value logistics vessels vulnerable to attack.
“the USS Lexington CV2 is sent on a mission to raid Wake Island this is January of 1942 Lexington has the range to get to Midway EXC me Lexington has the range to get to Wake Island and back but there's no no margin for error...she's going to refuel in route to Wake Island and then on withdrawal from Wake Island from an Oiler and the oiler in this case is a ship called the USS Nez the Nez is not a fast Oiler...she sailed from Pearl Harbor to meet the Lexington however nees ran a foul of the Japanese submarine i72 and was sunk and this convince the Americans that in future operations they had to defend their Oilers”
Admiral Nimitz orchestrated an elaborate logistics plan during the Coral Sea operations to maintain continuous fuel flow to Yorktown, Lexington, Enterprise, and Hornet strike groups for approximately one month, after which supplies would be exhausted without additional replenishment.
“Admiral Nimitz and his staff at commander-in-chief Pacific Fleet had orchestrated a very elaborate Logistics plan to keep fuel flowing into the region to support not just Yorktown and Lexington but also Enterprise and Hornet they could do for a month but after that they were going to run out of fuel it's a beautiful Symphony of movement of ships and cargo”
By World War II's later stages, carrier strike groups operated with sufficient depth of fuel vessels such that they could sustain losses and continue operations, due to deliberate post-1942 logistics restructuring following Nez and Neosho losses.
“so that when carrier strike groups later in the war go into combat they have a depth of fuel and vessels it is not really dependent on just a single ship or a single point of failure”
The closest oilers available to reinforce the Big Horn are the USNS Leroy Grumman in the Mediterranean supporting the USS Eisenhower strike group and the USNS Rappahannock near Singapore, requiring significant operational trade-offs if either is diverted.
“the closest Oilers to reinforce them is one up in the Mediterranean the pent which is supporting the was Battle group and then another one here off of Singapore the rapic”
The John Lewis-class replacement oilers (John Lewis, Harvey Milk, Robert F. Kennedy) have experienced significant construction delays and operational problems; the John Lewis has spent more time in shipyards than conducting actual underway replenishment since entering service two years ago.
“the John Lewis which came into service two years ago has not yet entered full operational service hasn't done deployment yet it has spent almost more time in Shipyard than it has in actually conducting underway replenishment uh it is back up in vior in Portland for a second Post delivery availability”
The USS Neosho (one of 12 fast oilers converted from commercial ships) was attacked by Japanese carrier strike forces (Shokaku and Zuikaku under Admiral Hara) during the Battle of the Coral Sea in May 1942, was bombed and sank after 4 days, leaving Lexington and Yorktown without fuel replenishment support.
“it is in May of 1942 when the US decides to send a strike group into the Coral Sea...the carriers Lexington again and Yorktown this time are going to be supported by the fast Oiler Neosho...the USS Neosho is attacked by the Japanese carrier strike group under Admiral Hara this is the shukaku and zaku they bomb the escort vessel of Neosho USS Sim sink it Neosho gets bombed it stays afloat for 4 days eventually sinking on May 11th and the Yorktown Lexington strike group find themselves without fuel”
The US Navy operates 14 Kaiser-class oilers and 2 Supply-class fast combat support ships (totaling 16 vessels) to support the entire US Navy, while 5 additional oilers are scattered in shipyards in Singapore, Alabama (2), South Carolina, and Portland Oregon.
“when you have 14 or Oilers and then two Supply class uh fast combat ships a mix of Oiler and dry cargo ammunition ship when you have 16 ships to support the US Navy you're going to run those ships pretty hard”
Kaiser-class oilers are single-hull vessels capable of carrying 180,000 barrels of fuel (a mix of diesel and jet fuel), were constructed from the mid-1980s to mid-1990s, and are being phased out by the newer John Lewis-class.
“Kaiser class Oiler these were originally a class of 18 vessels uh the construction began in the mid 1980s the last vessel was finished in the in the mid1 1990s big horn is a single Hull Oiler can carry 180,000 barrels of fuel a mix of diesel fuel and jet fuel”
Of the original 18 Kaiser-class oilers planned, 2 were never completed (Benjamin Isherwood and Henry Eckford), 1 was transferred to Chile, 1 (USS Pecos) was taken out of service, with 1 more (USNS John Lenthall) scheduled for near-term decommissioning.
“these vessels were really the backbone for underway replenishment they are being phased out by a new class of vessels we'll talk about the John Lewis class of the 18 Kaiser class Oilers that were constructed two of them were never completed the Benjamin isherwood and Henry eford...were never finished...of the 16 vessels one has been transferred to Chile and another vessel the deal has been taken out of service with one of the 14 ear Mark to be taken out of service shortly the John lenthal”
The use of single-oiler-per-strike-group logistics demonstrates a pattern of treating logistics as an administrative afterthought rather than as a core strategic capability, creating vulnerability to even minor incidents like groundings.
“the fact that big horn is taken out by a grounding demonstrates the vulnerability of logistics and that is the point of raising this”
A 1997 GAO report recommended that the Navy turn over operation of multi-product auxiliary ships (station ships carrying oil, ammunition, and cargo) to Military Sealift Command with civilian Merchant Marine crews, citing potential cost savings from eliminating Navy crews and the ability to run civilian-crewed vessels more intensively without Navy personnel rotation limits.
“this was a GAO report General Accounting Office report of 1997 that discussed the turnover of auxiliary ship operations to the military seal of command...the recommendation at the end of the goo report given the potential savings that could result if the Navy turned over the operation of the seven active multiproduct auxiliary ships...to MSE for crewing with civil service Mariners”
Japanese sinking of Nez (January 1942) and Neosho (May 1942) was not intentional targeting strategy but rather accidental by-products of Japanese operations; however, it demonstrated US logistical vulnerability and prompted the Navy to become more logistically resilient with greater depth of vessels and supplies.
“let's be clear Japanese didn't set out to do that that was kind of accidental when they did it however what it did was demonstrated it demonstrated the logistic vulnerability of the United States and it made the United States become much more logistically Resolute and and rounded them out so that they could suffer losses and sync it up”
The primary issue Kagano seeks to highlight is not the individual grounding incident but the larger structural problem of insufficient oiler numbers and lack of strategic reserves, which creates cascading vulnerabilities across the force.
“the purpose of this video today is not to highlight the fact that a ship has suffered an accident...what I want to highlight here is the issue of how precarious the US Navy's Logistics is”
An unarmed oiler with civilian crew, such as the Big Horn, is an attractive military target; potential adversaries would likely prioritize attacking logistics vessels as the US's strategic vulnerability, similar to Japanese targeting of US oilers in WWII.
“and by the way an unarmed Oiler With a Civilian crew on board if I am planning how to interdict the US military that's what I'm looking for much like the Japanese did when they sank Nez in January of 1942 and Neosho in May of 1942”
The shift to civilian crew manning of logistics vessels, while cost-saving in peacetime, removed regulatory limits on vessel deployment tempo, allowing the Navy to run support ships harder than it could with Navy crews, contributing to material degradation and accidents.
“it took Navy Crews off these vessels allowed you to put them onto warships and because now civilian Crews man the vessels you didn't have to worry about the personnel and operation tempo of the vessels where rules prevented you from deploying vessels for so many days at Sea Under Navy rules didn't have those with civilian Crews and so you can run these ships ragged”
Military Sealift Command has experienced a pattern of incidents with ship groundings (Woody Williams off Gabon, USNS Allen Shepard off Bahrain, USNS Big Horn in the Arabian Sea), indicating systemic issues beyond random accidents.
“the purpose of this video today is not to highlight the fact that a ship has suffered an accident you know MSC has run a series of issues here recently with ship groundings uh we we had uh the Woody Williams grounding off of Gabon we had the usns Allen Shepard grounding off of Bahrain accidents happen there's no denying that”
The US Navy maintains a Tanker Security Program with 10 civilian tankers available for charter, but current policy restricts deployment of these vessels to no more than 180 days, limiting their utility for sustained operations.
“we're starting to bring vessels on we've got a tanker security program that's got 10 tankers however we the tanker security program when we don't allow those ships to be charted by the government by the Department of Defense for more than 180 days”
Kagano expresses empathy for crews aboard the USNS Big Horn, stating that Military Sealift Command personnel work well but are 'treated poorly' by the US Navy and deserve more leave and better conditions.
“I hope you enjoyed today's episode I know I didn't enjoy it because I feel for the crew on board usns Big Horn my thoughts are with all of you men and women on board the ship you guys do uh yman work you don't get the acknowledgement that you should you're treated poorly in my opinion by the US Navy you need more leave you need everything”
The Secretary of the Navy reportedly rejected a proposal to lay up 17 ships, suggesting the Navy recognizes some level of capacity need but lacks a comprehensive logistics strategy to address the underlying vulnerability.
“the Navy did it's one of the reasons why we see the crewing problem that is happening and why they're talking about laying up ships the 17 ships although I have heard that the secretary of the Navy has sunk that idea they're not going to lay up the 17 ships now”
Kagano asserts that the Big Horn incident was publicly reported by independent maritime analysts (John Conrad at GAP Forum, Sam Lirton at USNI News) before the Navy released official information, demonstrating that operational security was not violated by discussing it after public disclosure.
“I am I'm not the one who causes this I know you would much rather not this hit the news and there's people who are going to sit there and scream that I'm violating operational security but again I didn't release this I waited till the information was out there”