Jim Collins — Good to Great — The Knowledge Project #67
What this covers
An earnest student and powerful teacher, best-selling author of Good to Great and more, Jim Collins goes under the hood and shows what all enduring companies have in common. We talk luck, leadership, and business longevity.
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Collins argues that great companies are built through disciplined execution of integrated principles—level 5 leadership, confronting brutal facts, understanding hedgehog concepts, building flywheels, maintaining 20-mile marches, and scaling innovations via bullets-to-cannonballs—rather than visionary leaps or luck; leadership itself can be learned through embracing responsibility and serving others rather than being taught.
- Great companies result from 30+ years of cumulative discipline across multiple reinforcing principles, not single breakthroughs; flywheels compound only when all components execute well
- Good luck cannot make you great, but bad luck can kill you; what separates winners from comparisons is return on luck—how they capitalize on identical random events
- Leadership is learned through practice and mentorship by seeing what must be done and exercising the art of getting people to join you, not taught as an isolated skill
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Level 5 leadership is characterized by a paradoxical blend of personal humility and indomitable will, where the leader's ambition is channeled entirely into a cause or company larger than themselves rather than into personal aggrandizement, and this can be learned and developed even by those who begin as entrepreneurial and charismatic.
“the ambition the burning driving exhausting relentless just like we can never stop ambition is all channel outward into the company or into a purposes larger than them”
You cannot confuse decision process with outcome; a good decision process can produce a bad outcome due to probabilistic risk, and you can get a good outcome from a bad process, which is dangerous because it reinforces bad decision-making and compounds in the wrong direction over time
“if you do not confuse decision process and and outcome like if I could if I could go to all high schools and just say what is the low one course that everyone should have before they graduate in the in the math and sciences areas it would be statistics right B probability and statistics because we live in a probabilistic world when our brains aren't wired for even people have been trained in statistics and probability make probabilistic errors all the time”
The critical difference between companies that leap from good to great versus comparison companies is not access to better information, data, or industry insight—both see the same facts—but rather the capacity and willingness to confront brutal facts directly rather than discount them, which is a psychological choice not a data availability problem.
“is there any evidence that the people at critical junctures of industries or critical junctures of kind of strategic decision or inflection had better information than their comparisons right did they have better knowledge of the industry better insight better data better any of that the answer is we can find no evidence that they have that or that they even necessarily had better analysis”
Parrish uses decision journals where he writes down his decisions in advance and then evaluates them afterward; he finds that people are often right on outcome but wrong on reasoning—they rationalize why they were right when the actual reasons were different
“we use the concept of decision journals with people and often what happens is people will start writing out their decisions and they'll do it in advance and then they'll go back and evaluate them and what they'll find and it's really humbling for people is that they were right but when they read the reasons they were right they're not quite as right as they want to be and then you have this mental sort of justification that goes on right well I knew that this was gonna play out differently or this was gonna happen and we sort of convinced ourselves that were right even though we're not right”
The historical research methodology Collins developed requires looking at the same moment in time from the perspective of decision-makers then (not with hindsight), using paired comparisons of companies with similar starting conditions but different outcomes to isolate causal factors.
“if you're if you're Grove and Moore at Intel and Bob Noyce at Intel in the you know in the early 1970s and you're making decisions what did the world like to them to that that's the way you have to do it right nuts that's why we do the historical analysis but then Giri added a second part he said but you have to ask how did they look at it and what decisions did they make and how did they think about those decisions different then another company like the comparison”
A&P and Kroger both faced the same industry shift toward larger stores and scanning technology in the late 1960s-early 1970s; A&P defended why their model should continue despite evidence, while Kroger looked at scary facts head-on; Kroger became the dominant grocery chain while A&P declined, showing the difference between discounting and embracing brutal facts
“in the early late 60s early 70s and I know go back into history a lot but I'm I'm a historian by Nature you have two grocery chains you have Kroger and A&P they have a significant footprint a and P by all rights should be Kroger today the grocery store industry starts to change moving towards larger footprint stores uses of certain kind of technologies like scanning devices and so on and so forth it's a familiar story of how things unfold now if you look at what happened at that moment in time what was different if you go over to the A&P folks you see a lot of defense of why their model should continue to work the way it is despite the facts that they can see in front of it right in front of themselves they it will explain away ugly facts”
A flywheel is not a set of aspirations or action steps drawn as a circle, but rather an understanding of the inexorable underlying logic that drives momentum—each component must inevitably drive the next, and the entire system stops or slows if any single component fails (multiplying by zero), making execution on every component equally critical.
“a flywheel is not a set of aspirations or action steps simply drawn as a circle so that you could say you have a flywheel a flywheel is an understanding of the inexorable underlying logic that drives that momentum machine you have to be able to say for each part of the flywheel why will it drive the next part almost inevitably”
Getting the right people on the bus before deciding where to drive it (first to and chand principle) is more important than having a brilliant strategy, because great people can adapt strategy to changing conditions while brilliant strategies without great people cannot execute; additionally, reframing hiring decisions as who decisions rather than what decisions increases hiring discipline.
“we have the discipline to get the right people before you decide what to do the principle is first to and chand back on decision making very quickly on that we talk all the time about you know decisions one of my big takeaways from our research about decision making is try to change every what decision into a who decision not what should we do about this cybersecurity threat but who should we have involved in it”
The hedgehog concept is the intersection of three dimensions: (1) what you are deeply passionate about, (2) what you can realistically be the best in the world at, and (3) what drives your economic engine; understanding this intersection at a very deep and simple level enables consistent disciplined decisions that accumulate momentum.
“find your hedgehog concept which is what you're passionate about what you can be the best in the world at and what drives your economic engine and understanding that in a very deep and simple way so you can make a series of disciplined decisions consistent with that”
Steve Jobs underwent a transformation from an arrogant, self-focused entrepreneur (Steve Jobs 1.0) to a humble, mission-focused leader (Steve Jobs 2.0) after being forced out of Apple; he could not have built what Apple became as 1.0, and 2.0 could never have started Apple as 1.0 did
“what you really find in the research is that the greatest company builders often started as entrepreneurs we could go through a whole list of them and they grew into the ability to do that so that they could really become great company builders they that miss that there's an entrepreneur and there's a company builder and they're different animals is simply wrong it's the cause is simply a matter of choice and do you decide to become Neph if there's a stark example of that it's Steve Jobs 1.0 - Steve Jobs 2.0”
The key to improving decision-making is identifying patterns where you are consistently wrong and then building that into your process, structure, or environment so that if you're making a repeated type of decision, you get better at it
“going back and saying where am i consistently wrong and how do I get how do I make that part of my process my structure of my environment so that if I'm making a repeated type decision I get better at it”
Time horizon in decision-making is critical: if leaders only focus on maximizing quarterly returns, they will never make the large disciplined investments (cannonballs) needed for long-term flywheel expansion, but if they commit to a 20-year March, they'll make fundamentally different decisions.
“if all you were trying to do was to maximize the returns in the next two years then you would never fire a huge cannibal that's truly the fly will extension cannonball hmm you have to you have to think 20 years right long term thinking definitely plays into”
Cognitive biases are useful for post-hoc explanation of why mistakes were made but not effective for preventing mistakes in advance because intelligent people can rationalize away any bias checklist by constructing stories about why it doesn't apply to their situation.
“cognitive biases are sort of great for explaining why we make mistakes in hindsight but they're not necessarily really good for preventing or anticipating mistakes in the future because what happens is any reasonably intelligent person sits down in front of this checklist and then creates all of these stories in their head about why overconfidence doesn't apply in this case”
When Steve Jobs returned to Apple, he spent 1997-2003 ensuring the Macintosh flywheel was really turning and cost was under control before firing any significant cannonballs, demonstrating that great leaders first stabilize their core before pursuing expansion.
“97 to 2000 to 2003 is make sure that we pay attention to what we have make sure that the flywheel as we understand it is actually turning don't deviate from that we got to really make the most of the Macintosh computer right so they did that well”
Collins taught the flywheel principle to Amazon's executive team in fall 2001 during post-9/11 darkness and the dot-com crash aftermath; he emphasized responding to difficulty by doubling down on building the flywheel rather than panicking
“after good to great came out I was invited up to Amazon I don't even remember who was specifically that asked me to go up there but I went up and I met with the executive team and I believe the board and stuff like that but all I did was teach didn't tell them what to do didn't give them direction didn't consult with them right you know these people are really smart they're a lot smarter than I am and they could just take ideas if I just taught them all but one of the things I emphasized because 2001 was a dark time it was a fall of 2001 so the world felt dark number one number two is post.com bust and people had questions and what was going to happen with all kinds of companies but Amazon as well and I taught the flywheel principle as well as you know well five and first two brutal facts Hedgehog flywheel the whole deal and challenge with the idea that you respond to this difficult time by understanding and doubling down on building a flywheel you know panic”
Microsoft and Digital Research received the same massive luck event (IBM seeking an operating system for the IBM PC in the 1980s), but Microsoft's Bill Gates recognized its value, immediately moved to secure it, and built a flywheel around standards and extensions, while Digital Research squandered the opportunity; this exemplifies return on luck being the variable that separates winners rather than luck access itself.
“iBM is looking for an operating system one of them in Pacific Grove California it's digital research the other is a small company in Seattle called Microsoft that makes computer languages iBM is looking for an operating system for the IBM PC they go to both companies and their initial instinct if anything was they wanted to work with digital research because they had actually an operating system”
The great UCLA basketball team under John Wooden had a 10 national championship run in 12 years (1962-1974) that looked like instantaneous breakthrough from the outside, but internally took over a decade of flywheel turning before the breakthrough became visible
“breakthrough - tendency started a run of 10 NC to a championships in 12 years from I believe it was 1962 to 1970 for something like that that was sort of the era right and you would have thought that in 1962 there was this instantaneous breakthrough it banging Wooden's teams jumps on you know jump on into everybody's consciousness and it's wow right but if you really look at it that story had been in progress for well over a decade”
People operate at the level of feelings first, not facts; intellectual understanding is secondary to emotional experience, and leaders who understand this can navigate conversations more effectively by attending to the emotional dimension rather than assuming rational persuasion will work.
“people do not operate first and foremost at the level of Fox they operate at the level of feelings and you go into a discussion or a negotiation or a classroom or in you go an intellectual level but that the real level people are at is feelings”
It's healthy to allow yourself emotional expression like crying after difficult life events rather than immediately moving to purely rational coping, and the balance between emotional and rational responses should be contextual rather than always favoring rationality.
“I'm not sort of purely stoic about this stuff we're you know life happens and you just sort of put on this armor and you go through it I'm a person and I have emotions and I think this we also tend to over exert ourselves towards rational behavior and I think that there's there's a spectrum between emotional and rational”
The Amazon flywheel—lower prices on more offerings → increased customer visits → attracted third-party sellers → expanded store and distribution → grew revenues on fixed costs → enabled lower prices—demonstrates the power of understanding inexorable underlying logic; Amazon's genius was not in discovering flywheels but in crystallizing how their specific flywheel would turn.
“here's what they did now I want to share with you what they do was they said if you really want to harness the flywheel you need to crystallize how your specific fly will turn and let's spend a moment on this one because it really illustrates the power of a fly well what a fly will is so here's a sketch of what it was a picture going around in a circle right it starts at the top we're going to lower prices on more offerings okay so that's the start at the top of the fly well”
The Apple iPod case study shows that early versions of a bullet don't have to be immediately profitable or even successful; Apple fired the iPod bullet between 2001-2003, described it minimally as a 'natural extension of the digital hub strategy,' and didn't presume it would become the biggest business driver until it was validated through the Windows port and showed continued momentum.
“you go back to I think was the 2002 or 2003 Apple 10k report and you read it at the time they described give the iPod like three sentences a natural extension of our digital hub strategy or something and they still saw it at that moment it's like dad Macintosh is the center of the world we got this extension thing of this iPod that's all I said about its really fascinating”
Katherine Graham of the Washington Post didn't plan to lead but grew into level 5 leadership when her husband's suicide created a personal crisis; her sense that the Post had a noble role in the world pulled her level-5 ambition out and she became one of the great executives of her era.
“she felt that the post had a noble role in the world and she had to step up to guard and protect and lead around that and then what happens the Pentagon Papers the labor strikes massively difficult decisions her indomitable will for what she as saw as the cause of the post even though she hadn't necessarily ever seen herself in this role it just pulled the level-5 ambition right out of her”
The pattern of great companies' second major innovation (the second cannonball)—such as Marriott's hotel chain following restaurants, Disney's theme parks following films, Intel's microprocessors following memory chips, or Apple's smart devices following computers—typically becomes the largest value driver and revenue source for the company for decades.
“usually the second cannonball from abort the cannonball process on top of an existing flywheel becomes the biggest part of the company marriott started in restaurants bullit the Cannonball hotels right Apple started in personal computers followed the Cannonball smart handhelds Intel started out and memory chips followed the cannonballs microprocessors and beyond and so that's that notion of you've got the flywheel your toy while marching but then your bullet to cannonball and usually not always but usually theme parks to Disney right versus films that second extension of the flywheel that came in the bullet cannonball becomes the really big momentum in the company usually for decades”
Luck is asymmetric as a cause: bad luck can kill a company, but good luck cannot make a company great, so the critical variable is return on luck—how effectively an organization capitalizes on identical random events relative to comparison companies.
“good luck cannot cause a great company but bad luck can be the cause of the death of a company so luck is asymmetric to the negative bad luck can kill you but good luck cannot make you great”
West Point's 200+ year track record of building leaders of character demonstrates that with conscious attention and systemic design, institutions can systematically phase-shift the distribution of leadership capacity in young people to the right (increase average capability), suggesting that leadership development is not mysterious but can be engineered through deliberate structures and culture.
“this institution has been in existence for over 200 years where it sees as its role in the world is to build leaders of character right si you get you get young men and women who come in to West Point and that's like a factory and what comes out the other side are leaders it's what they do”
The 20-mile march principle—hitting a consistent target (e.g., 20% net income growth, or profitability, or doubling components every 18 months) every single year regardless of conditions—produces superior long-term results compared to erratic high-growth strategies, and the advantage becomes more pronounced in turbulent environments because the consistency forces companies to innovate ahead of disruptions rather than react to them.
“company a is going to achieve an average annual that didn't come growth of 25% a year for two decades so rapid growth average annual that income growth twenty-five percent a year for two decades company being coming off the same base for the same kinds of products same kinds of technology same kinds of customers same potential and as future is gonna grow as average annual that income growth at 45 percent a year over the same two decades”
Great entrepreneurs can become great company builders if they make the choice to grow; this is not a matter of different species (entrepreneurs vs. company builders) but of deliberate development; many of history's greatest company builders started as entrepreneurs and grew into the role.
“there's an entrepreneur types and there's company builder types and that and what you want to run out if you're kind of entrepreneurial confidence then you need to hand it over to the company built or type and then they take it from there as if they're like different species but what you really find in the research is that the greatest company builders often started as entrepreneurs”
Collins' encounter with Jerry Porras' graduate course in interpersonal dynamics (business 374) revealed that people operate fundamentally at the level of feelings, not facts; this realization surfaced suppressed feelings about his father during the course and demonstrated that much of his drive was channeled from unresolved emotional trauma, challenging the notion that people are primarily rational actors.
“people do not operate first and foremost at the level of Fox they operate at the level of feelings and you go into a discussion or a negotiation or a classroom or in you go an intellectual level but that the real level people are at is feelings”
Productive paranoia is not about paranoia or fear, but about conscious attention to what could genuinely harm you and proactive management of downside risk; this differs from complacency and is the key to staying out of the five stages of decline.
“productive paranoia doesn't mean not doing old things it's productive paranoid it's worried agreeing about the things that the world could really do to you and protecting yourself against those so that you stay alive you're managing those downside risks”
A luck event is defined by three criteria: (1) you didn't cause it, (2) it has potentially significant consequence (good or bad), (3) it came as a surprise in some form—timing, form, or that it happened at all.
“we defined a luck event and I think it's a good definition of luck a luck event is any event that meets three tests what you didn't cause it to it has a potentially significant consequence good or bad so bad luck is the one that's potentially you know bad a consequence good is good luck is the good consequence could you have to look at both and three you came as a surprise in some form either the timing of it the form of it that had happened at all”
Built to Last and Good to Great studied greatness through different lenses (built to last emphasized enduring visionary companies with deep purpose beyond profit; good to great emphasized inflections from mediocrity to outperformance); built to last companies showed longer-term endurance, suggesting that deep sense of responsibility to the world may be more important for multi-generational success than the factors highlighted in good to great.
“if I kind of stand back and I say what did that built to last visionary companies have that not all of the good to great companies had is I think this sense of incredibly deep sense of responsibility to the world and what they were doing in their eyes”
Learning to identify flywheels after they've begun turning (at 1 million turns rather than 10 turns) is a more realistic and profitable investment strategy than trying to predict flywheels in early stages; you can still capture 1 million-to-10 billion turns of compounding even if you miss the 1-to-1 million phase.
“I don't think you want to find a flywheel at only 10 turns if it's a great flywheel hmm so maybe we'll talk in a minute about the Amazon flywheel because that's what stimulated me further thinking about Amazon would it be so bad to pick up a flywheel when it's already at a million turns but you can understand it if it's on its way to 10 billion turns you don't necessarily have to have found it before the flywheel is really turning or even early you might just be able to find it when it's far enough along that you can really understand it”
The doom loop is the inverse of the flywheel: when a company gets disappointing results and doesn't understand why, it panics and reacts by pursuing new directions, programs, or leaders without addressing root causes, creating a cycle of false hope followed by more disappointment that compounds into irrelevance.
“the do loop is exactly the opposite...something happens it produces disappointing results...they panic they look for a new direction or a new program or a new leader or a new acquisition or a new technology or something and because that never really produces a great result produces sort of a burst of false hope but but it's like kind of drinking a sugar drink as opposed to getting back to your core training”
Who luck—meeting people who change your trajectory or invest in you at key points—is distinct from statistical luck, and the ability to recognize and cultivate who luck relationships is itself a capability that can be developed.
“people think about luck is kind of what luck and I've had great who luck in my life and who luck is when you come across somebody who changes your director trajectory or invests in you bets on you gives you guidance at key points”
Leadership is best learned when a young person steps into a role that demands growth (like a teacher becoming principal or principal becoming superintendent) and grows into that responsibility while developing a clear sense of what must be done and exercising the art of getting people to want to do what must be done.
“I saw when I did a study on education when I was looking at schools that went through an inflection to produce better results for kids in the most adverse environments that you could find and you would find often a teacher who became a school principal and had to go from teaching to leading and they would grow into this leadership role”
Collins served as the class of 1951 Chair for the Study of Leadership at West Point (2012-2013) and discovered that West Point cadets reported higher happiness than Stanford MBA students, attributing this to an epoch of service, communal success, understanding that failure is growth, learning to support each other, and having significant responsibility by age 22-24.
“for 2012 and 2013 I had the it was a real honor to serve as the class of 1951 chair for the study of leadership at the United States Military Academy at West Point”
Good by Choice research studied companies that grew from startup to IPO to achieving 10x better performance than their industries over multi-decade periods in highly turbulent sectors (semiconductors, biotech, airlines, medical devices); they found that 10x winners did not receive more luck than comparison companies but instead had dramatically different return on luck—capitalizing on identical random events where comparisons did not.
“in great by choice that we were studying companies that ended up going from startup to IPO to 10 times better than their industries in the most turbulent industries we could find semiconductors biotechnology Airlines medical devices”
Scaling innovations via bullets-to-cannonballs requires firing many small-scale bullets (calibration investments) to validate assumptions with minimal resource commitment, then converting validated bullets into large cannonballs (major investments) along the existing flywheel; comparison companies either fail to fire enough bullets, fail to convert bullets to cannonballs, or fire large uncalibrated cannonballs, all of which correlate with entering the doom loop.
“suppose instead what you did was you took a little bit of gunpowder you put it in a bullet you fire that bullet at the ship it misses but you've got enough time to recalibrate because you're 30 degrees off fire another shot you're 10 degrees off recalibrate again ping you hit the side of the ship and now you take your Gunpowder now you put it in a cannonball and you fire it on a calibrated line of sight”
Decision-making cannot be reduced to a single learnable skill or checklist; instead, effectiveness comes from understanding that all decisions are contextual, requiring intelligent preparation beforehand (anticipating likely decision types and relevant knowledge), deliberate attention to one's decision process rather than just outcomes, separation of decision quality from outcome luck, and systematic learning from past decisions via decision journals.
“there is no skill called decision-making there's no skill called problem-solving it's all contextual and that doesn't sound very useful but it is in a way if you think of life as well what can I do with that information well now I can intelligently prepare right”
Collins' motivation has shifted across his life: in youth, much drive came from channeled emotional trauma and external validation; as he has aged (now 61), the work itself has become self-perpetuating fuel, creating 'generative emotion' that is joyful and intrinsically motivated rather than externally driven or trauma-based.
“I know that I'm 61 is that what drives me changes though because when I was younger so much of what drove me I think was you know from experiences like that and so forth right and do you create sort of just a drive as I've gotten older you know what I've really found is that I don't need the fuel of that because the work itself the love of the work is its own self-perpetuating fuel”
Leadership effectiveness is partially contextual—leaders successful in one environment may not succeed in another (Eisenhower succeeded in military and presidency but struggled as university president)—but evidence shows some leaders learn to be effective across very different contexts (Gates moving from Microsoft to global health), suggesting context matters but is not absolutely determinative.
“there's almost everything is is affected by social context and you never know how you're going to behave you how you're going to react in any given situation until you're there and that's why we should always be very humble about our own sense of ourselves”
Collins' personal flywheel is curiosity → rigorous research → chaos-to-concept insight → writing and teaching → impact and resources → reinvestment into the next big questions; this demonstrates how individuals, not just organizations, can harness flywheel principles for cumulative development.
“here's the essence of it it starts with curiosity I'm just interested in really interesting and big questions I'm for racially curious and if I if I have a really great big question then I can't help but then want to translate that into rigorous research”
Collins met Joanne at Stanford, and four days after their first date, they became engaged on the basis of mutual recognition that each could commit fully to the other; they approached it as a leap of faith, not a calculated decision, and this has sustained a 39-year marriage that has served as the foundation for his research and life work.
“we both had this incredible instinct I don't know where it came from we both had this incredible instinct that the other person could go all in with this I don't know how you process it but it was just this leap of faith that the other person is going to be able to commit to this the way I'm committing to it and will never blink will never blink”
Vulnerability and honesty about failures and difficult personal experiences by exceptional people is rare in public discourse and media, yet could help others feel less alone and learn from genuine human struggle rather than curated success narratives.
“I found that really hard to get people to I mean you sort of get that 30,000 foot view but I want to go in the weeds and I want to talk about you know what that was really like and what does it feel like when you are sitting on your couch crying because you you got divorced which is you know something I've done”
General Austin (four-star general from West Point era) had a transformative realization mid-career: rather than managing his career advancement, he shifted focus to taking care of his people, after which 'they wouldn't let me fail' and everything changed; young people seeking career advice should shift from 'how do I advance' to 'how can I be useful and take care of my people.'
“partway through his career he he was worried a little bit about you know promotions is he getting promoted fast enough his career right and one day he just woke up and changed and he said I'm not gonna take care of my career anymore I'm gonna take care of my people and the moment I did that everything changed because they wouldn't let me fail”
Great companies fall through a predictable five-stage process: stage 1 is hubris born of success (confidence converted to arrogance); stage 2 is undisciplined pursuit of more (aggressive overexpansion, uncalibrated cannonballs, acquisition sprees); stage 3 is denial of risk and peril as evidence mounts; stage 4 is visible decline with reactive grasping for salvation that deepens the doom loop; stage 5 is capitulation to irrelevance or death. Stages 1-3 are invisible from outside while the company still appears healthy.
“Stage one is not success but it's hubris bored of success it's when that success gets converted into arrogance that then leads to stage two”
Collins is optimistic about the future because the leadership capabilities he sees in young people coming up—those at West Point, on his research teams, and elsewhere—are genuinely strong
“we live in an era when it's easy to for people to feel pessimistic I absolutely reject I'm incredibly optimist and my reason I'm optimistic is because what I see in the leadership capabilities of the generations that are coming and I think will be in very good hands”
Bill Azir was Collins' professor and mentor as a graduate student at Stanford, then advocated back to the deans to get Collins the opportunity to teach the entrepreneurship and small business course at Stanford Graduate School of Business when Collins was 30
“a great mentor named Bill Azir who was a professor of mine when I was a graduate student at Stanford and who then went back for me with what the deans to get me to teach this entrepreneurship and small business course”
Circuit City's fall from being a great company confirmed the principles rather than refuting them because the research never claimed that great companies stay great forever; rather, the research identified principles that correlate with periods of excellence, and Circuit City's failure shows what happens when companies stop living by those principles.
“one of them for example being Circuit City a my response to that was at Ohio research is wrong our research was right we because our research is never oh these are great companies forever right our research is about studying errors and episodes in history from which we can derive principles that correlate with the best results and if company cease to live to those principles they're going to fall right”
Nothing is ultimately permanent on a cosmic timescale (Earth will become a red giant in billions of years), so executives shouldn't claim perpetual success; however, achieving a five-decade run of excellence in the business and corporate world is genuinely excellent and a meaningful aspiration for leaders.
“I don't believe anything is ultimately permanent I've been looking for two half billion years the earth you know this uncharted or red giant none of this matters right so you have to if we give them time frame you know mean forever no you know but I mean but do you mean in a really big context”
Collins reinvested all profits from Built to Last into the Good to Great research project with no guarantee of success; when he wrote large research checks his wife Joanne expressed hope that he would 'find something', exemplifying the risk and faith involved in long-term research pursuits.
“I took all the money that were making from this and I'm throwing it into another big question...I remember writing these checks for like researchers and data and you know all this money is going out like the wumei have only had one successful project but all this money is going out I'm writing these these checks right there just going out of our account they remember Joanne just looking at me one day of saying I sure hope you find something”
Steve Jobs was hired by Collins to speak to his Stanford MBA class in 1988, three years after being forced out of Apple; Jobs approached the session with grace about his situation rather than bitterness, demonstrating that how you handle adversity reveals character.
“he could have been really bitter and angry and I'm sure he felt hurt I know that but he channeled all of it...he just simply said hey I got booted out of my last company”