The Very American Roots of Trumpism | The Ezra Klein Show
What this covers
After last week’s episode, “The Emergency Is Here,” we got a lot of emails. And the most common reply was: You really think we’ll have midterm elections in 2026? Isn’t that naïve?
I think we will have midterms. But one reason I think so many people are skeptical of that is they’re working with comparisons to other places: Mussolini’s Italy, Putin’s Russia, Pinochet’s Chile. But we don’t need to look abroad for parallels; it has happened here.
Steven Hahn is a Pulitzer Prize-winning historian at New York University and the author of “Illiberal America.” In this conversation, he walks me through some of the most illiberal periods in American history: Andrew Jackson’s Indian Removal Act of 1830, Jim Crow, the Red Scare, Japanese American internment, Operation Wetback. And we discuss how this legacy can help us better understand what’s happening right now.
This episode contains strong language.
00:00 - Intro 1:50 - The foundations of American illiberalism 7:30 - Andrew Jackson’s illiberal tradition 14:40 - The Palmer Raids and the Red Scare 16:20 - Fascism abroad and at home 22:35 - The Johnson-Reed Act 24:38 - McCarthy’s Trumpist rhetoric 32:17 - Why liberals embrace illiberalism 37:50 - Operation Wetback 42:00 - Why Obama leads to Trump 44:58 – Mass incarceration 48:00 - Why this keeps happening 53:42 - You’re always going to be protesting this s*** 57:12 - What would a renewed liberalism look like? 1:04:00 - A pure liberal movement can’t win
Read the full transcript here: https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/23/opinion/ezra-klein-podcast-steven-hahn.html
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Stephen Hahn argues that illiberalism—characterized by hierarchies, exclusion, and the prioritization of community will over rule of law—is not a aberration in American history but a persistent, deeply embedded tradition that recurs across centuries and is currently resurging through Trump, requiring sustained vigilance rather than hopes for final victory.
- Illiberalism predates and runs parallel to liberalism throughout US history, expressed through deportations, expulsions, and exclusions from Jackson to McCarthy to mass incarceration
- Trump's rhetoric and policies echo historical precedents (Jackson's defiance of courts, McCarthy's institutional purges, Operation Wetback) but emerge from continuous demand for hierarchical belonging, not aberrant disruption
- Suppression of illiberal movements can work temporarily but fails catastrophically, revealing the movement was far stronger than understood; the liberal-illiberal cleavage is now primary and enduring
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The reflexive desire to interpret Trump through foreign historical analogies (Putin's playbook, Franco, Mussolini, Hitler) obscures the fact that deportations, expulsions, and politically potent illiberalism have deep, continuous precedent within American history itself, making this a domestic fight that America has cycled through repeatedly with losses and victories.
“One thing I've noticed is a tendency, an understandable one, one I've used too, to understand what Trump is doing here as best analogized to something that has happened somewhere else at another time in another place...But one thing that looking at these other analogies for all of their uses can do is make it seem like what's happening here has no precedent here. But it does. Deportations, expulsions, a deep form of politically potent illiberalism has always been with America.”
Hitler praised American immigration policy and saw westward expansion as the American version of 'Lebensraum' (living space), and Nazi and American scientists shared work on eugenics, operating as part of a joint project.
“I mean doesn't Hitler praise American immigration that he was a great advocate of westward expansion because this was the American version of breathing room. you know the Nazis and American scientists uh were sharing a lot of uh of their work about eugenics. I mean they kind of sensed that they were sort of advocate they were involved in a pro in a joint project.”
A world organized around slavery and personal domination of enslaved people, and authoritarian enclaves in the South and elsewhere with longstanding hierarchies of power supported by many who saw benefits, shows that illiberalism was satisfying and provided meaning to people's lives in prosaic daily ways until threatened.
“you think about um you know a world that was organized around slavery and the personal domination of people who were enslavers. You think about a variety of what one scholar has called authoritarian enclaves not only in the south but in other parts of the United States where there were hierarchies of power that were longexisting and that were supported by a lot of people because they they basically saw benefits that came from it.”
Hitler praised American immigration policy and westward expansion as the American version of Lebensraum (breathing room), and Nazis and American scientists shared eugenics work, suggesting they saw themselves as involved in a joint project.
“I mean doesn't Hitler praise American immigration that he was a great advocate of westward expansion because this was the American version of breathing room. you know the Nazis and American scientists uh were sharing a lot of uh of their work about eugenics. I mean they kind of sensed that they were sort of advocate they were involved in a pro in a joint project.”
Herbert Croly, a founder of the New Republic and advocate of Teddy Roosevelt's new nationalism, was suspicious of Jeffersonian democracy and believed many people in the United States didn't understand the national purpose, so politics should be conducted by trained experts.
“Herbert Crowley is a good example because he was one of the founders of the new republic. He was one of the advocates of Teddy Roosevelt's new nationalism. And yet he was very suspicious of what he called Jeffersonian democracy. He thought that many people in the United States didn't understand the national purpose and that therefore politics really should be conducted by those who were trained by those who were experts.”
Without saying America was moving toward Nazism, many Americans in the 1920s-early 1930s admired Mussolini as a strong, active figure pointing to Europe's future, because he seemed to recognize the limitations of liberal states that had fallen into question—this shared admiration between America and fascist regimes reflected common anxiety about liberal democracy's viability.
“there were people obviously who in the 1930s um very much embraced uh what was going on in Germany on many accounts. There were many people in the 20s and into the early 30s who thought that uh Mussolini was really uh pointing out the future that um the Euroatlantic world uh was headed because he seemed to be somebody who was uh active, engaged, strong and recognized the limitations of a kind of the liberal state that had really fallen into real question.”
In the McCarthy era, institutional response was mostly 'bending the knee'—universities, workplaces, and other institutions quickly tried to identify and expel people who could be regarded as threats, resulting in job losses, blacklisting, and exclusion from labor unions at a critical moment in labor history (late 1940s-early 1950s).
“I think the response was mostly bending the knee I think that uh universities workplaces uh other institutions uh were very quick to try to uh identify uh people who could be regarded as threats and for the most part they were expensive held. Um people lost their jobs, they were blacklisted, um they were run out of important political positions or they could not seek. Uh they were excluded from labor unions at a very critical point uh in our labor history in the late 1940s, early 1950s when organizations like the CIO were increasingly uh powerful.”
One response to liberalism's failures has been to look for an alternative politics 'better at confronting power,' but no such alternative has emerged successfully anywhere in history—abolitionism is the closest example of a social movement that took on 'the biggest and most intractable power in the United States' through Black abolitionism.
“historically I think there have been important moments in the past where social movements have even if they haven't entirely won or were able to gain political power as we under think about abolitionism which took on you know the the biggest uh the most intractable power in the United States and I think about abolitionism as black abolitionism. and about enslaved people who managed to take down uh a system that of plantation slavery that had uh created the wealthiest people in the United States and people who own disproportionate power.”
Operation Wetback showed the ease of building a repressive apparatus, and Eisenhower appointed Earl Warren and then criticized it as his worst mistake, and had to go through a second Brown decision to provide enforcement means, showing moderate Republican limitations on preventing segregation.
“it sort of gives us an idea of the really uh you know sort of repressive uh impulses and the ease of building a repressive apparatus. You know Dwight D. Eisenhower you know admittedly it's easy to look back compared to what we're situated with now. But you know when the Warren Court came down with the Brown decision in 1954, uh his response was, you know, appointing Earl Warren to the court was the worst mistake he ever made and they had to, you know, go through a second Brown decision to provide some means of enforcement.”
Rights, due process, and courts were products of very divisive and very violent struggles, and the period during which these achievements were robust is quite short, making their loss a genuine possibility.
“the sense of rights that people can enjoy, the sense of rights that people are entitled to um were products of very very divisive and very very um in some cases violent struggles. And that the period of time that we're talking about when this was true is pretty short.”
Jackson represented the interests of white Americans in the trans-Appalachian West seeking to expand population and settlements at the expense of Native peoples, and had strong support from southern states because he was a slave owner committed to maintenance of slavery.
“I think he saw himself as representing the interests of white Americans in the transalian West who themselves were in the process of trying to expand their population and settlements which would be at the expense of native people... he was the first president from the transalian west. uh he had strong support among white adults, white adult men uh from that area and also from the southern states because he was a slave owner and he was committed uh to the maintenance of slavery.”
Operation Wetback was President Dwight Eisenhower's 1950s initiative to deport Mexican immigrants and workers, preceded by the Bracero Program, which was government-sponsored labor migration; Operation Wetback expressed the contradictory nature of American economic development, which depended heavily on multiple groups of immigrants while also expressing hostility toward them.
“um we need to understand that in relationship to the Brero program, which was a sort of government sponsored program that was um meant to provide labor for um mostly for big agriculture, but not only for big agriculture. And so that um uh uh immigrants uh had the right to work and they usually were moving back and forth across the border. But um by the 1950s this was coming under attack and therefore operation was an attempt to sort of um push push that back uh across the Rio Grand and back into Mexico. But the idea was to basically deport people. And it kind of expressed, you know, one of the really complicated aspects of of American, you know, economic development policy, which is on the one hand it uh depended so heavily on so many different groups of immigrants and on the other hand there was hostility to them especially uh by that time to those of Mexico.”
Disfranchisement and segregation (Jim Crow) were widely accepted by white Americans and political leaders as 'perfectly reasonable, perfectly modern' ways of managing diversity and inequality, reflecting that illiberal movements fulfilled a real social need for community-building and belonging—not merely angry venting but substantive social organization.
“most uh white Americans and political leaders thought that this was a perfectly reasonable, perfectly modern way of choreographing the d great diversity and inequalities that existed in American society. So there's no question that um you know these right-wing groups really did fulfill a need but you know a sense of community building a sense of what belonging was.”
In late 19th-century East Texas, enslaved and formerly enslaved Black people formed a political coalition with insurgent white people for pragmatic reasons (shared grievances, inability to win without coalition); over time they learned about each other's needs, established a bi-racial republic, and even when populism nationally lost, they continued winning locally until they were gunned down—this is an example of meaningful cross-racial coalition-building.
“I sort of finish the book with an example of um this movement in in a county in East Texas in the late 19th century where um, you know, someone who was part of a community of enslavers and someone who was part of a community of enslaved came together for basically opportunistic reasons because they shared grievance with what was going on and they knew they couldn't win local office without forming some kind of coal ition. But little by little, they actually began to do it. Little by little, they learned a lot about each other. And in fact, over many years, they came to establish their own republic in the b-racial republic where the white people who were the insurgents learned a lot about the needs of the black community. And the black community was able to engage with what was 30 or 40% of the white community. And even then they called themselves populists in the 1890s. And even when the populace nationally lost, they were still winning.”
Members of immigrant groups who support Trump and illiberal exclusion of other migrants represent a long-term phenomenon where those who have achieved stability seek to exclude new arrivals by invoking threats to community stability, as also occurred during the Great Migration.
“one of the things we saw is that, you know, there were members of quote unquote immigrant groups who supported Trump. And this is part of a long-term um, uh, phenomenon whereby those who have arrived in a established stability. This is true during the great migration too where northern black communities were, you know, not all that comfortable with these rural black people who were coming up who didn't really know the ways and were potentially threatening the stability of their own communities.”
Japanese internment was possible because liberals, even those embracing admirable ideas, prioritize maintaining social order, accept cultural hierarchies, and were willing to identify internal enemies for repression—liberals played a key role in anticommunism and McCarthyism through figures like Arthur Schlesinger and Americans for Democratic Action, drawing boundaries around acceptable dissent.
“one of the challenges that liberals have had is that even though they may embrace a whole variety of ideas and relationships that we may find admirable that nonetheless I think they um are interested in maintaining social order. there is that in many of them they still do have um an acceptance of cultural hierarchies...the liberals played a very important role in you know the so-called McCarthyism they were the leaders Arthur Slesinger and um you know the establishment of Americans for democratic action and all of this was to try to sort of hive liberals off the left uh of American society. Not only that, but condemn the left as followers and people who really should be subject to deep suspicion.”
Most political regimes throughout US history have been conservative; the United States has had a long history of both general violence and specifically political violence, where liberal democracy and political violence were interconnected from the beginning, usually benefiting wealth and power while excluding large sections of the public from decision-making.
“most of the political regimes so to speak were regimes that were conservative. You know the United States have a very very not simply overall violent history but a politically violent history. You know it's not as if uh liberal democracy and political violence were separate or parallel threats. I mean they were interconnected you know from the beginning and usually uh to the benefit of people with wealth and power and people who wanted to exclude you know large sections of the American public from uh having decisionmaking power and authority.”
Societies historically organized around slavery and personal domination of enslaved people, and later 'authoritarian enclaves' in the South and elsewhere where hierarchies of power were long-standing and supported by people because they perceived benefits, demonstrate that illiberalism has genuine appeal beyond coercion.
“you think about um you know a world that was organized around slavery and the personal domination of people who were enslavers. You think about a variety of what one scholar has called authoritarian enclaves not only in the south but in other parts of the United States where there were hierarchies of power that were longexisting and that were supported by a lot of people because they they basically saw benefits that came from it.”
Illiberalism is a way of life that continues in prosaic ways until threatened, then erupts; understanding it requires recognizing not just the disruptions but the day-to-day lives and meaning that illiberal participation creates.
“I think one of the things we need to understand is that it's not simply ra those moments of rage that um we you know can identify and then ask why does that happen? It's a way of life that um c can go on in very prosaic ways until uh they're being threatened and then they erupt. But we need to understand the day-to-day lives that are created that are that bring people together that provide them with all sorts of meaning in their lives.”
During the McCarthy era, universities, workplaces, and other institutions mostly bent the knee to pressure, quickly identifying and expensing people regarded as threats; people lost jobs, were blacklisted, excluded from unions at a critical moment in labor organizing (CIO rising power)—this bending-the-knee response in face of seeming power is a worrisome precedent for current institutional choices.
“the response was mostly bending the knee I think that uh universities workplaces uh other institutions uh were very quick to try to uh identify uh people who could be regarded as threats and for the most part they were expensive held. Um people lost their jobs, they were blacklisted, um they were run out of important political positions...they were excluded from labor unions at a very critical point uh in our labor history in the late 1940s, early 1950s when organizations like the CIO were increasingly uh powerful. So I do think that bending the knee especially in the face of what seems to be um significant power is uh not uncommon and is a worrisome president.”
Political violence has been interconnected with liberal democracy in America from the beginning, usually benefiting people with wealth and power and serving to exclude large sections of the American public from decision-making authority.
“the United States have a very very not simply overall violent history but a politically violent history. You know, it's not as if uh liberal democracy and political violence were separate or parallel threats. I mean they were interconnected you know from the beginning and usually uh to the benefit of people with wealth and power and people who wanted to exclude you know large sections of the American public from uh having decisionmaking power and authority.”
The reconstituted Ku Klux Klan of the 1920s was the largest social movement of that decade, it fed off illiberal currents, admired fascist regimes, embraced paramilitarism and political violence, and enforced Prohibition as an attack on the lifeways of European immigrants and non-white-Christian populations.
“the Ku Klux Clan was in the process of reorganizing in this period...It was reestablished in uh during the teens, but it really exploded uh in the 1920s and it fed off a lot of these uh currents. It admired fascist regimes elsewhere. It admired the sort of political violence and paramilitarism that went into it. And it, you know, one of the things that they did was uh enforce prohibition which they regarded as an attack on the lifeways uh of European immigrants and others who were not white Christians.”
The Johnson-Reed Act of 1924 was the first major immigration law establishing ethnic quotas designed to prevent migration from culturally 'unassimilable' regions and slow population growth from foreign groups, was celebrated by major newspapers (New York Times, LA Times) as preserving 'an America we feel comfortable with,' remained law until 1965, and harmed Jews fleeing Nazi Germany and the Holocaust.
“the 1924 immigration act was organized in such a way that it really did try to undercut the migration of people from certain parts of the world who were regarded as culturally unassimilable as politically objectionable as people who were breeders and therefore threatened the population balances in the United States...when it was passed, I mean, in in you know, most major um journalistic venues, it was celebrated um the New York Times, the LA Times, everyone sort of saying, 'Yeah, this was the way in which we could preserve uh an America that we feel comfortable with.'...this was a uh law that was enforced until 1965. And uh not to mention that um you know Jews who were trying to flee uh Nazi Germany and then the Holocaust were themselves um harmed uh by this.”
Operation Wetback under Eisenhower (now invoked by Trump) was a deportation campaign emerging from prior Bracero guest-worker program, and it expressed the deep contradiction in American economic development: dependency on immigrant labor paired with hostility toward immigrants, particularly toward Mexicans by the 1950s.
“in the 1950s this was coming under attack and therefore operation was an attempt to sort of um push push that back uh across the Rio Grand and back into Mexico. But the idea was to basically deport people. And it kind of expressed, you know, one of the really complicated aspects of of American, you know, economic development policy, which is on the one hand it uh depended so heavily on so many different groups of immigrants and on the other hand there was hostility to them especially uh by that time to those of Mexico.”
The Palmer Raids of 1919-1920 were a federal government campaign to repress politically objectionable people—including isolationists, socialists, communists, and anarchists—based on the view that the United States should be 'a republic of white Christians,' resulting in prosecutions (Eugene Debs ran for president from jail) and expulsions of foreign-born radicals.
“political people who were regarded by pe those in power as politically objectionable uh could suffer all sorts of forms of repression including uh expulsions of various sorts. It included people who were uh isolationists but it's also included people who were on the left...people who were associated with uh the spread of communism were those who quite simply uh did not fit into their view of what the United States should be which is a republic of white Christians...whether it involved prosecuting them...or whether it had to do with expelling them not only communists and socialists but people who were accused of anarchism.”
Andrew Jackson's Indian Removal Act and forced expulsion of Native peoples east of the Mississippi was not an isolated policy but a central aspect of American society and political culture in the 1830s, part of a longer process beginning in the 17th century and complemented by parallel expulsion campaigns targeting free African-Americans (via colonization schemes), Catholics, Mormons, and abolitionists through mob violence.
“the expulsion of native peoples from their lands east of the Mississippi...this was the end of a process that had begun back in the 17th uh century that was directed toward removing uh expelling uh native people. But the thing that's important to recognize is that this was a central aspect of American society and political culture in that period. Free African-Americans were targeted for expulsion. It was called colonization...But there were mobs that were focused on driving out not only African-Americans in cities where they were free or had escaped from enslavement, Catholics, Mormons...abolitionists. The 1830s were a time of these, you know, anti-abolitionist riots in cities large and small”
Jackson justified Indian removal by arguing that Native peoples didn't belong, were dying out anyway, and that removal to distant territory was actually in their interest—a rationalization of expulsion as benevolent, which modern readers recognize as horrifying only because of subsequent knowledge of Native American history and the reality of long-term dispossession.
“Jackson uh thought like many uh white Americans thought is that native people were um they didn't belong, that they were in jeopardy of basically dying out and that what he was doing was actually in their interest by finding a territory outside of the centers of population where native people could in some ways be safe...he tried to dress it up as something that he was doing as as an alternative to their physical destruction and their dying out. But, you know, I think a modern reader by and large who knew anything about the history of the United States and of native people would recognize what he was really after.”
Eisenhower, despite his post-hoc liberal reputation, appointed Earl Warren to the Supreme Court and then called it his 'worst mistake ever'; Warren authored Brown v. Board of Education (1954), and when Eisenhower had to enforce it, he was reluctant, requiring a second Brown decision for enforcement—showing illiberal action even by moderate Republican figures.
“when the Warren Court came down with the Brown decision in 1954, uh his response was, you know, appointing Earl Warren to the court was the worst mistake he ever made and they had to, you know, go through a second Brown decision to provide some means of enforcement.”
After Trump's 2016 win, there was a fantasy that he was an aberration and that defeating him would return things to normal; but post-2020, it's clear that Trump proved this was false and illiberalism is not an anomaly that can be defeated once and for all.
“Well, you know, you use the word fantasy, and I think that's a very good one because in 2016, I think there was a sense, first of all, that there was a sense that he there was no way he was going to win. But even when he won, I think there was a sense that this was a um a very unusual, very toxic phenomenon that could um once you defeat him would be defeated. Now, obviously, we've learned that this is not the case.”
Elizabeth Hinton's From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime (1960s-early 1970s) is important for showing how illiberal sensibilities infuse major liberal projects and pave the way for mass incarceration.
“Elizabeth Hinton's book from the war on poverty to the war on crime which focuses on the 1960s into the early 1970s and is I think a very very interesting way of understanding how um illiberal sensibilities kind of infuse their way into what are major modern liberal projects and paved the way for mass mass incarceration, which I learned a lot from.”
Lawrence Powell's Troubled Memory: Anne Levy, the Holocaust, and David Duke's Louisiana documents how a Holocaust survivor outted David Duke's Nazi past and undermined his gubernatorial campaign—linking fascism on both sides of the Atlantic with an inspiring story of resistance.
“Lawrence Powell called Troubled Memory. Uh Annne Levy, the Holocaust, and David Dukes, Louisiana. It's an extraordinary story about a woman who was part of the only whole family to make it out of the lots ghetto and they end up in New Orleans. And when Duke runs uh for governor, she plays an incredibly important role in outing his Nazi past and helping to undermine uh his pretty, you know, his his claims to power. So, it kind of links fascism on both sides of the Atlantic with an incredibly inspiring uh and wellld story.”
Operating within the tension between liberal ideals and illiberal political realities, Democratic leaders have had to appease complicated constituencies and complicated pasts—for example, LBJ's famous remark when signing civil rights legislation that 'we've lost the South for a generation' proved accurate, showing the real cost of pushing against illiberal constituencies.
“it certainly the case with many uh liberals who have ascended to important leadership uh positions in American political life. Uh that it comes with the terrain of seeking office and dealing with complicated constituencies and our own complicated past. I mean obviously people in the Democratic party through the 1960s you know had the southern wing of the party that they had to appease and you know you can excuse it from today until tomorrow but u they did and uh you know Johnson famously said when he was signing either the civil rights or the voting rights you know we now we've lost the south for a generation and that was true.”
Eugene Debs ran for president from jail, and Sacco and Vanzetti became notorious examples of political expulsion during the Red Scare, with the federal government becoming involved in repression of leftist movements through prosecution and deportation.
“whether it involved prosecuting them. I mean Eugene Debs ran for president from jail or whether it had to do with expelling them not only communists and socialists but people who were accused of anarchism. Asak and Vanzetti, you know, became a very notorious uh example of of how that could happen.”
If what's sought is an egalitarian society where regardless of background people can pursue meaningful lives, then liberalism must confront what it has been inadequate to—really addressing power—not just rhetorically but actually.
“If what we're after is some of the things that liberals and liberalism at least say that they're interested in a more egalitarian society, a world in which um globally as well as um uh nationally and locally where it's possible for people regardless of their social, economic, racial, or ethnic background to pursue a life that is meaningful to them. If we're actually interested in that as opposed to rhetorically interested in that, then we have to face up to really what liberalism has has has um been inadequate.”
The host argues that one way to read the necessity of liberal leaders embodying contradictions is that such compromises with illiberalism, while regrettable, contained and drained power from explicitly illiberal movements, functioning as a pluralistic check on them.
“that that you know Bill Clinton in a very different way who's sort of a merger of unusual currents that that Barack Obama, who part of what his genius is is being able to speak to the white end black story and fears and anxieties in politics at the same time that much of what ends up getting remembered as disappointing about them, I think from a different perspective has been a pluralism that I think their defenders certainly would say kept some of these other currents in check because, you know, it sort of drained some of their opponents of of power.”
Mass incarceration is a continuation of the deportation and expulsion impulse: after 1960s urban unrest, decision-makers chose mass incarceration over military occupation, with bipartisan consensus on crime and racialized danger; incarcerated people are expelled from society and political power (no voting rights, limited legal recourse within prisons)—a more domesticated form of expulsion.
“after the enormous urban unrest in the 1960s that there was kind of this sense that well they could you know militarily occupy um big cities or they could find other ways of pacifying and repressing the populations. And I think part of what happens is that you know there is a um a bipartisan consensus on crime as a problem that's out of control. People of color as the those who are most threatening, most dangerous, and that um effectively deporting them from society and putting them in institutions where at least they were under, you know, direct surveillance and repressive control. And we have to again remember that, you know, what happens is they're not only expelled from, you know, communities, but they're effectively expelled from political society because not only don't they have, you know, political rights and they had a fight for whatever civil rights they, you know, do they have a right uh to sue, do they have a right uh to um, you know, challenge the um uh structures of power within um penitentiies.”
The threads composing Italian and German fascism were earliest evident not in Europe but in America during the Progressive Era: social engineering, eugenics, disfranchisement, segregation, overseas warfare justified in racialized terms, and advocacy by figures like Herbert Croly for government by trained experts rather than Jeffersonian democracy, which the Nazis admired and emulated in their own eugenics programs.
“illiberalism was modernized during what we call the progressive period. And there the idea of social engineering uh the use of eugenics...disfranchisement, segregation, warfare overseas uh that was justified in racialized terms...the idea that was advocated by people Herbert Crowley is a good example...He was very suspicious of what he called Jeffersonian democracy. He thought that many people in the United States didn't understand the national purpose and that therefore politics really should be conducted by those who were trained by those who were experts...don't Hitler praise American immigration...Nazis and American scientists uh were sharing a lot of uh of their work about eugenics.”
Liberalism as a coherent political tradition is a recent invention of the 1940s-1950s; de-centering liberalism means understanding that it is one tradition among others and that it emerged recently, not that it is transhistorical or inevitable.
“I was really trying to do in my book was what I would call desentering liberalism. Uh, the liberal tradition, as I try to argue, is really something that's kind of invented in the 1940s and 1950s and holds on in many remarkable uh ways.”
Hayes posits that much of what is remembered as disappointing about Obama was actually a form of pluralism that contained illiberal currents and prevented them from fully dominating, draining opponents of power.
“much of what ends up getting remembered as disappointing about them, I think from a different perspective has been a pluralism that I think their defenders certainly would say kept some of these other currents in check because, you know, it sort of drained some of their opponents of of power.”
Liberalism has been inadequate at dealing with power and has not been visionary; when push comes to shove, liberals abandon ship or create self-contradictory policies—true progress toward egalitarianism requires confronting power in ways liberalism hasn't adequately theorized or practiced.
“part of the problem with liberalism is that it never really dealt very well with the issues of power. And therefore when it comes when push comes to shove they abandon ship or they uh um sort of put together projects and policies that are not going to work uh or become self-contradictory. If what we're after is some of the things that liberals and liberalism at least say that they're interested in a more egalitarian society, a world in which um globally as well as um uh nationally and locally where it's possible for people regardless of their social, economic, racial, or ethnic background to pursue a life that is meaningful to them. If we're actually interested in that as opposed to rhetorically interested in that, then we have to face up to really what liberalism has has has um been inadequate.”
The threads composing Italian and German fascism emerged earliest not in Europe but in America during the 1920s-1930s, through modernization of illiberalism via social engineering, eugenics, disfranchisement, segregation, overseas warfare justified in racialized terms, and use of military experience from Indian wars, with figures like Herbert Croly advocating that 'politics should be conducted by those trained, those who are experts' rather than through democratic deliberation.
“recognizing that illiberalism is not one thing. It's not an unchanging static thing. It's a collection of ideas and notions of relationships or political power is to think about how illiberalism was modernized during what we call the progressive period. And there the idea of social engineering uh the use of eugenics which is often times not adequately um accounted for by historians of the period. uh disfranchisement, segregation, warfare overseas uh that was justified in racialized terms, the use of troops who basically got their experience in Indian wars uh in the trans Mississippi West and the idea that was advocated by people Herbert Crowley is a good example because he was one of the founders of the new republic. He was one of the advocates of Teddy Roosevelt's new nationalism. And yet he was very suspicious of what he called Jeffersonian democracy. He thought that many people in the United States didn't understand the national purpose and that therefore politics really should be conducted by those who were trained by those who were experts.”
Historically important moments where social movements gained power include abolitionism, particularly Black abolitionism, which took on the most intractable power in the United States (plantation slavery) and managed to dismantle a system that created the wealthiest people in the US with disproportionate power.
“uh historically I think there have been important moments in the past where social movements have even if they haven't entirely won or were able to gain political power as we under think about abolitionism which took on you know the the biggest uh the most intractable power in the United States and I think about abolitionism as black abolitionism. and about enslaved people who managed to take down uh a system that of plantation slavery that had uh created the wealthiest people in the United States and people who own disproportionate power.”
Andrew Jackson's expulsion of Native peoples from lands east of the Mississippi River to 'Indian territory' (which was not imagined as heading toward statehood) was the capstone of a process begun in the 17th century and represented a central, not marginal, aspect of American political culture in that era.
“the uh expulsion of native peoples from their lands east of the Mississippi to what was regarded as Indian territory, which was really the first territory in the United States that was not imagined as heading towards statehood. So, it's not entirely clear what it was. Um, this was the end of a process that had begun back in the 17th uh century that was directed toward removing uh expelling uh native people. But the thing that's important to recognize is that this was a central aspect of American society and political culture in that period.”
During the 1830s, free African-Americans were targeted for expulsion through colonization schemes (a policy reaching back to Thomas Jefferson); Catholic, Mormon, and abolitionist groups were driven out of cities through organized mobs; Joseph Smith was murdered in the 1840s near Springfield, Illinois; anti-abolitionist riots occurred in large and small cities because abolitionists were accused of promoting miscegenation.
“Free African-Americans were targeted for expulsion. It was called colonization. This goes back to the 18th century and even Thomas Jefferson who couldn't really imagine how white and black people could live together under conditions of freedom in some ways that Toqueville uh rearticulated. But there were mobs that were focused on driving out not only African-Americans in cities where they were free or had escaped from enslavement, Catholics, Mormons. You know, Joseph Smith is murdered in the 1840s, not far from Springfield, Illinois. Uh Lincoln's uh place. Uh abolitionists. The 1830s were a time of these, you know, anti-abolitionist riots in cities large and small because they were accused of promoting misogynation.”
The Palmer Raids (1919-1920) under Attorney General Mitchell Palmer targeted political groups deemed objectionable by those in power, including isolationists, socialists, communists, and people associated with anarchism, reflecting the desire to enforce a vision of the United States as 'a republic of white Christians' through expulsion of those who didn't fit.
“The Palmer raids are called the Palmer raids because the attorney general of the United States was a Mitchell Palmer. I think it was an example of how you know political people who were regarded by pe those in power as politically objectionable uh could suffer all sorts of forms of repression including uh expulsions of various sorts. It included people who were uh isolationists but it's also included people who were on the left uh first socialists who had a complicated uh history with that and then after the Russian revolution people who were associated with uh the spread of communism were those who quite simply uh did not fit into their view of what the United States should be which is a republic of white Christians.”
Disfranchisement, segregation, and Jim Crow had pushback only from African-Americans (not all of them) and most white Americans and political leaders thought these were perfectly reasonable, modern ways of managing diversity and inequality, indicating widespread social support for illiberal policies.
“disfranchisement and segregation Jim Crow as we call it um only had um push back coming from the you know African-Americans and not all of them um but most of them and most uh white Americans and political leaders thought that this was a perfectly reasonable, perfectly modern way of choreographing the d great diversity and inequalities that existed in American society.”
The Ku Klux Klan was reorganized in the early 20th century and exploded in the 1920s, feeding off Red Scare currents, admired fascist regimes elsewhere, and enforced Prohibition as an attack on the lifeways of European immigrants and non-white Christians, making it a vehicle for illiberal enforcement of cultural conformity.
“It's important to recognize that the Ku Klux Clan was in the process of reorganizing in this period. It was reestablished in uh during the teens, but it really exploded uh in the 1920s and it fed off a lot of these uh currents. It admired fascist regimes elsewhere. It admired the sort of political violence and paramilitarism that went into it. And it, you know, one of the things that they did was uh enforce prohibition which they regarded as an attack on the lifeways uh of European immigrants and others who were not white Christians.”
Jackson represented the interests of white Americans in the trans-Appalachian West who were expanding settlements at the expense of Native peoples, and had strong support from white adult men in that region and from southern states because he was a slaveholder committed to slavery's maintenance; at the same time, access to voting and office-holding was expanding for adult white men as property requirements were dropped.
“I think he saw himself as representing the interests of white Americans in the transalian West who themselves were in the process of trying to expand their population and settlements which would be at the expense of native people. And so in a sense what Jackson really represented was you know he was the first president from the transalian west. uh he had strong support among white adults, white adult men uh from that area and also from the southern states because he was a slave owner and he was committed uh to the maintenance of slavery. So, you know, at the same time, access to politics in the United States, in most states, in terms of voting and office holding, property holding requirements were being dropped. And so, uh, adult white men had more access than ever.”
The Johnson-Reed Act of 1924 established quotas on immigration for the first time, designed to undercut migration from parts of the world regarded as culturally unassimilable, politically objectionable, and as demographic threats to population balances; it was celebrated in major journalistic venues and enforced until 1965, harming Jews fleeing Nazi Germany and the Holocaust.
“the 1924 immigration act was different and it was organized in such a way that it really did try to undercut the migration of people from certain parts of the world who were regarded as culturally unassimilable as politically objectionable as people who were breeders and therefore threatened the population balances in the United States not simply by the numbers who arrived but by the population increase once they got to the United States. And you know, when it was passed, I mean, in in you know, most major um journalistic venues, it was celebrated um the New York Times, the LA Times, everyone sort of saying, "Yeah, this was the way in which we could preserve uh an America that we feel comfortable with." And um you know this was a uh law that was enforced until 1965. And uh not to mention that um you know Jews who were trying to flee uh Nazi Germany and then the Holocaust were themselves um harmed uh by this.”
Japanese internment during WWII is an example of how liberalism and illiberalism are braided together in the same people and institutions—FDR, a liberal hero, authorized the internment of over 100,000 citizens without due process or court review, showing that liberal commitment to individual rights does not prevent acceptance of exclusion when framed as social order.
“around this time we have Japanese internment and you have over a 100,000 people many many many of them citizens rounded up and put in camps no due process no ability to have a court you know decide if they were actually a threat to the country. And this is done by by liberal hero FDR.”
Tocqueville thought racism was more powerful in places where slavery had been abolished than where slavery still existed, suggesting that free Black Americans in northern cities faced organized campaigns of expulsion.
“In fact, he thought racism was more powerful where slavery had been abolished than where slavery still existed.”
Lawrence Powell's Troubled Memory tells the story of a woman from the Lodz Ghetto who escapes to New Orleans and plays an important role in outing David Duke's Nazi past and undermining his gubernatorial campaign, linking fascism on both sides of the Atlantic and providing an inspiring well-told story of resistance.
“And the the third book is a book by Lawrence Powell called Troubled Memory. Uh Annne Levy, the Holocaust, and David Dukes, Louisiana. It's an extraordinary story about a woman who was part of the only whole family to make it out of the lots ghetto and they end up in New Orleans. And when Duke runs uh for governor, she plays an incredibly important role in outing his Nazi past and helping to undermine uh his pretty, you know, his his claims to power. So, it kind of links fascism on both sides of the Atlantic with an incredibly inspiring uh and wellld story.”
Bill Clinton's defenders argue that by taking 'crime' and 'immigration' off the table as Democratic weaknesses through tough-on-crime and restrictive immigration policies, Clinton allowed Democrats to return to national power, whereas opponents see this as a terrible compromise with illiberalism.
“Bill Clinton's defenders often say to me, I had Rahm Emanuel on the show. He said this explicitly, look, this is the guy who took crime and immigration off the table as weaknesses and welfare for the Democratic party. And that's how Democrats came back to national power. And now it's looked back on as, you know, a terrible set of compromises.”
Political scientist Larry Battles describes the populist right as a 'reservoir' rather than a 'wave'—a permanent structural feature always available to tap into rather than a temporary surge—making it obvious that national leaders will have to embody some illiberal contradictions.
“The political scientist Larry Battles talks about the populist right as a reservoir not a wave but a reservoir that's always there to tap into Then it becomes more uh obvious in a way that the the national figures who can lead in this country will have to embody some of the contradictions.”
Thomas Jefferson believed that white and black people could not live together under conditions of freedom and advocated for African colonization (expulsion), providing intellectual justification for exclusionary policies.
“Thomas Jefferson who couldn't really imagine how white and black people could live together under conditions of freedom in some ways that Toqueville uh rearticulated.”
Joseph McCarthy represents a populist political style appealing to anti-elitism and anti-institutionalism; he is now getting new appreciation from the political right precisely because they view him as having had the courage to stand up to those threatening American values, though his constituency was not the same as 19th-century populists—it was more native-born, small business types.
“McCarthy is now, not surprisingly, uh, getting a new look by people on the political right precisely because they felt that he had the courage to stand up to those who were threatening uh, American values and American politics. And he did this, you know, at great in the end personal cost. But I mean uh you know Joseph McCarthy fit into a framework in which a lot of this was going on anyway...what historians have found is that actually the people who voted for populists in the past were not the people who voted for McCarthy...McCarthy was not a kind of new 19th century populism. Uh he was really appealing to a different kind of constituency. Obviously more nativeorn but not entirely nativeorn. Uh people who were sort of small business types.”
Many people in the 1920s and early 1930s, particularly in America, thought Mussolini was pointing to the future because he seemed strong, active, engaged, and recognized the limitations of the liberal state, without saying the U.S. was moving in a Nazi direction but noting that some ideas, connections, and the overall project of determining who should participate in politics had resonances.
“there were many people in the 20s and into the early 30s who thought that uh Mussolini was really uh pointing out the future that um the Euroatlantic world uh was headed because he seemed to be somebody who was uh active, engaged, strong and recognized the limitations of a kind of the liberal state that had really fallen into real question... without necessarily saying that this was Italian fascism or this was Nazi, uh he was really appealing to a different kind of constitu constituency... some of the ideas, some of the connections and the overall project, the sense of who really should be participating in this, who shouldn't be participating”
Mass incarceration is a continuation of the deportation and expulsion impulse under different policy forms; after urban unrest in the 1960s, there was a bipartisan consensus that crime and people of color were threats, and incarceration became a mechanism for 'deporting' people from communities while also expelling them from political society through disenfranchisement and lack of rights.
“after the enormous urban unrest in the 1960s that there was kind of this sense that well they could you know militarily occupy um big cities or they could find other ways of pacifying and repressing the populations. And I think part of what happens is that you know there is a um a bipartisan consensus on crime as a problem that's out of control. People of color as the those who are most threatening, most dangerous, and that um effectively deporting them from society and putting them in institutions where at least they were under, you know, direct surveillance and repressive control.”
Liberals have been interested in maintaining social order and accepting cultural hierarchies alongside their commitment to rights; liberals led McCarthyism through organizations like Americans for Democratic Action, established to 'hive off' liberals from the left and condemn leftists as suspicious and undeserving of institutional protection.
“I think one of the challenges that liberals have had is that even though they may embrace a whole variety of ideas and relationships that we may find admirable that nonetheless I think they um are interested in maintaining social order. there is that in many of them they still do have um an acceptance of cultural hierarchies. I mean look the liberals played a very important role in you know the so-called McCarthyism they were the leaders Arthur Slesinger and um you know the establishment of Americans for democratic action and all of this was to try to sort of hive liberals off the left uh of American society. Not only that, but condemn the left as followers and people who really should be subject to deep suspicion.”
Illiberalism is deeply embedded in American history not at the margins but at the center, characterized by the embrace of inherent inequality and hierarchies of nation, race, and gender; desire for cultural and religious uniformity; particularist rights (rights tied to place and status rather than universal); marking of internal and external enemies; use of exclusion and expulsion; and the will of the community over rule of law.
“I'm talking about a way of thinking about the world that has to do with the embrace of inequality, inherent inequalities, about hierarchies, uh, of nation and race and gender, uh, about a desire for cultural and andor religious uniformity, a particularist idea about rights, meaning you don't carry your rights with who you may have them where they are but you don't have them all the time. Uh an idea of marking internal as well as external enemies and the use of uh exclusion or expulsion as a way of dealing with this. um thinking about the access to and maintenance of power with the legitimacy of political violence and as much as anything really it's about the will of the community over the rule of law”
Liberalism is undergoing a reckoning: the primary cleavage is no longer moderate Republican vs. Democrat but liberal vs. illiberal, with much deeper historical roots than the 1990s-2000s party divide; this cleavage likely persists indefinitely rather than being resolved or suppressed into disappearance, requiring ongoing vigilance without hopes for final victory.
“one of the reckonings that liberalism is going through right now is a recognition that it doesn't go back. It's not like maybe Nikki Haley just wins and then we're just done with this whole era. That it's not the the sort of the more comfortable Republican Democratic cleavage that was around in, you know, the '9s or the 2000s to people. It's now this liberal illiberal cleavage which probably has much deeper roots and there's not going to be an approach to suppression that's going to work and there's also not going to be any final victory over it. Right? You're just in this fight for the foreseeable future till something you cannot predict changes in some way you cannot currently predict and maybe not in a way that you would like.”
Alexis de Tocqueville's Democracy in America, though normally read as a document establishing America's inevitable ascent into liberal democracy, actually contains extensive warnings about where America could be headed, particularly around slavery, racism, and the tyranny of the majority in local politics that could rapidly push the United States toward despotism where people would surrender rights to a strong man.
“I read it both in terms of his interest and admiration for what he saw as a robust individualism and equality, but I also read it as a series of warnings about where this could be headed. The largest section of his warnings had to do with his very long chapter on slavery and race, which he recognized infused the entire country...what worried him was what he called the tyranny of the majority, the narrowness of mind, the way in which associations on the ground uh tended to both um emphasize certain ideas about belonging but at the same time put those who didn't fit in into real jeopardy. He ended up arguing that he thought it was likely or is certainly possible that the United States could very very quickly move toward a despotism and where people would be willing to give up their rights in loyalty to a strong man.”
History phases in and out of periods of different political character; what seems unimaginable a decade before often becomes the political reality, yet this is not mechanical like a pendulum but rather moments when circumstances make possible developments moving in multiple directions, some more just and some less just.
“I mean, we talked about the Palmer raids. They lead in a sense to the founding of the ACLU. We're talking about Operation but it's just over a decade later that LBJ overturns the Johnson Reed Act and those sort of racist quotas dissolve, at least for that period of time. And so, how do you think about this question of the the the cycles of it? Is it is it a pendulum that one action creates a backlash? Is it much more contingent and unpredictable than than that?...I'm not somebody who thinks about pendulums. I don't think that history repeats itself, but I do think that there are moments when um circumstances uh make possible developments moving in any one of a number of directions.”
Suppression of illiberal thought (making ideas unsayable, illegal, unconstitutional, pushing them to margins) can work for periods, but when suppression fails, it fails all at once and reveals the suppressed tendency was much stronger than understood; there is no final victory over illiberalism, only ongoing contestation.
“You can make the things that are dominant in illiberal thought unsayable in plight society. You can make them illegal or unconstitutional. And that you can sort of push them to the margin. Having pushed to the margin, they don't really have a way back in and they'll sort of fade away and wither and that'll be the end of them. And I think something we're seeing with with Trump is that suppression can work, but then if it fails, it fails all at once. And it turns out the thing you were trying to suppress is much stronger than you understood it to be.”
Any successful large-scale political movement must accept that members will be imperfect and contradictory ('no eye-of-needle purity'), that power and change require broad appeal to people whose lives can actually improve, that there will be no final victories only ongoing struggle, and that vision and utopianism are necessary because people won't sacrifice without hope.
“I don't think there's any such thing as a pure movement. Uh as a friend of mine put it, you know, if you want to build a movement where everyone has to fit through the eye of a needle, forget it...if you're serious um and if power is actually what what you're interested in and change and using power for the point of change, that will be of appeal to large numbers of people who want change and whose lives can actually be better...recognizing that no one's going to be fully changed and that you're always going to be protesting this because there's no such thing as a victory...we have to find ways of reckoning our ideals and ambitions and visions and utopianism. People are not going to put themselves on the line for a world that they can't quite imagine.”
Liberals tend to view illiberal backlash as simple disruption, angry venting, or a backlash that can be suppressed and destroyed—but this is a serious mistake; illiberalism is a substantive current and field of force with its own logic, not mere reaction to liberalism.
“we have a tendency of looking at the um uh the disruptions of the liberal tradition as simply a backlash as angry people who are venting their fury. uh and which doesn't really have a lot of substance and things can go back to normal easily and I think that that's a serious mistake.”
What politicians and political movements offer only matters if there is demand from voters for those offerings; people are driven by anxieties about multiculturalism, power structure changes, and the wrong kinds of people voting, and this demand is not simply rage but reflects underlying political sensibilities.
“I think that's at least in an early way speaking to similar anxieties, speaking to similar views about belonging, speaking to similar fears about what will happen to a country if it becomes too multicultural or the power structure changes too much or the wrong kinds of people are voting. I I always think we make this mistake that we're so focused on what the politicians say that we forget that what they say only matters if it matches what the voters want.”
McCarthy's hunt for communists in institutions like Hollywood, universities, and government, combined with a broader conservative view that these institutions had been 'captured' by communists, became a method for breaking open and coercing institutional alignment with conservative power through state power, a pattern analogous to current efforts targeting DEI, anti-Semitism, and 'wokeness'.
“the hunt for communists which I've seen people analogizing now to the hunt for people who believe in DEI or anti-semites or wokeness also became a way to break open these institutions to use the power of the state to cow them and to force them to come back into some kind of alignment or at least stop opposing the alignment with what McCarthy represented and the political tendencies that he fought for.”
The federal state grew enormously from the 1930s-1950s, and McCarthy represented unease and suspicion about expansive bureaucratic institutions that were far from direct reach of many Americans experiencing urban change, housing shortages, and demographic migrations, to which McCarthy appealed as someone trying to hold onto a sense of community being overrun.
“the federal state um grew enormously from the 1930s through the 1940s into the 1950s. Um, you know, I think McCarthy was in part representing a certain unease and suspicions about that, about a world of people who were trained uh into these institutions, what expansive and bureaucratic institutions uh might involve. I there's no question I think that he directed attention and concern to institutions that really didn't have a deep history in the United States that were far from the direct reach uh of many Americans who were themselves experiencing enormous change whether it had to do in bigger cities. I mean, a lot of these struggles over housing, you know, people have this idea, well, it wasn't until the 1960s when the urban uprisings began, but actually it was much earlier as there were housing shortages, there were population, demographic uh migrations. And so I think he did appeal uh to those who were trying to hold on to a kind of sense of community that they saw in part being overrun.”
Rights people enjoy and are entitled to were products of very divisive and sometimes violent struggles, and the period when this was true is very short, suggesting rights are fragile and contingent.
“the sense of rights that people can enjoy, the sense of rights that people are entitled to um were products of very very divisive and very very um in some cases violent struggles. And that the period of time that we're talking about when this was true is pretty short.”
The common reaction to the previous episode framed Trump through historical analogies to Putin, Franco, Mussolini, and Hitler, but this approach obscures the fact that deportations, expulsions, and politically potent illiberalism have deep precedent within American history itself, not just in foreign contexts.
“One thing I've noticed is a tendency, an understandable one, one I've used too, to understand what Trump is doing here as best analogized to something that has happened somewhere else at another time in another place. Literally saying things straight out of Putin's playbook. Franco had used a version of that. Mussolini has used a version of that. Hitler has used a version of that...But one thing that looking at these other analogies for all of their uses can do is make it seem like what's happening here has no precedent here. But it does. Deportations, expulsions, a deep form of politically potent illiberalism has always been with America.”
Illiberalism is defined as a way of thinking about the world characterized by: embrace of inherent inequalities and hierarchies of nation, race, and gender; desire for cultural and religious uniformity; particularist rather than universal rights (rights contingent on location/membership rather than inherent to persons); marking of internal and external enemies; use of exclusion or expulsion to deal with threats; association of power with political violence; and prioritization of community will over rule of law.
“I'm talking about a way of thinking about the world that has to do with the embrace of inequality, inherent inequalities, about hierarchies, uh, of nation and race and gender, uh, about a desire for cultural and andor religious uniformity, a particularist idea about rights, meaning you don't carry your rights with who you may have them where they are but you don't have them all the time. Uh an idea of marking internal as well as external enemies and the use of uh exclusion or expulsion as a way of dealing with this. um thinking about the access to and maintenance of power with the legitimacy of political violence and as much as anything really it's about the will of the community over the rule of law”
Alexis de Tocqueville's Democracy in America, commonly read as a celebration of America's inevitable liberal-democratic ascent, actually contains extensive warnings about potential despotism, particularly centered on slavery, racism, the tyranny of the majority, and the possibility that Americans would quickly surrender rights to a strong man.
“I read it both in terms of his interest and admiration for what he saw as a robust individualism and equality, but I also read it as a series of warnings about where this could be headed. The largest section of his warnings had to do with his very long chapter on slavery and race...In fact, he thought racism was more powerful where slavery had been abolished than where slavery still existed. But I was especially interested in how he understood local democracy and local politics in general...And what worried him was what he called the tyranny of the majority...He ended up arguing that he thought it was likely or is certainly possible that the United States could very very quickly move toward a despotism and where people would be willing to give up their rights in loyalty to a strong man.”
Trump and his advisors (particularly Steve Bannon) explicitly model themselves on Jackson because they see in him: defiance of Supreme Court rulings (Jackson's response to the court on Native removal was 'let them enforce it'), the embodiment of executive power expansion, and the precedent for a strong leader willing to move in directions of his own choosing despite constitutional constraints.
“they could connect to, not least was his defiance of a Supreme Supreme Court rulings on uh the ex the potential expulsion of native people. You know, he said, 'Okay, that's fine. let them enforce it.'...I think they see him as quote unquote strong leader who was willing and able and interested in moving directions of his own choosing...I think they see him as you know an example of an early executive who was interested in expanding the powers of the presidency at a time when the president of the United States really had relatively few powers”
The 1920s Klan represented early American 'America First' sentiment, and the demand for illiberal politics emerges from similar anxieties, belonging concerns, and fears about multiculturalism and power structure change—the supply-side politics only matter if they match voter demand, which historians often overlook by focusing on what politicians offer rather than what voters want.
“the clan was the largest social movement in the 1920s and their ideas about what the United States would be. It was an early America firstism...I think that without necessarily saying that this was Italian fascism or this was Nazi...to say that some of the ideas, some of the connections and the overall project...There is a demand for something...speaking to similar anxieties, speaking to similar views about belonging, speaking to similar fears about what will happen to a country if it becomes too multicultural or the power structure changes too much...I think that's at least in an early way speaking to...we think about the supply side, not the demand...we think about what politicians and political movements are offering, but those offerings only matter if they meet or create demand.”
During Operation Wetback and other deportation campaigns, American citizens were deported in violation of rights they were assumed to have, establishing a precedent: rights have been systematically violated before, and citizenship itself has not guaranteed protection against expulsion despite the 14th Amendment—raising concern about current risks to established rights.
“during the um time of the Red Scare in the uh period of World War I that there were lots of immigrants uh who were also politically radical who were deported and whose uh rights were regarded in very very limited ways and whose deportation was generally um uh embraced accepted uh by the public. In some ways, it's because the advent of citizenship and the 14th amendment, as strong as it was in many respects, didn't really, you know, if you compare uh that to the Mexican Constitution in 1916 that laid out a whole series of rights that working people had, that women had. um and you compare it to a a sense of well what are the rights that are come with citizenship in the United States but I worry as as you may worry too that precisely because a lot of those rights are not clearly established and because there could be any one of a variety of loopholes uh whether in the language or whether in the way um citizenship and rights are conceived believed that we may be entering a period, you know, in some ways marked by like the dos dos decision of the really withdrawal of what of rights uh that we had come to believe that people have.”
Obama's election was followed immediately by the birther movement, which harked back to Reconstruction-era rejection of Black empowerment; the birther narrative expressed the core illiberal belief that certain groups shouldn't legitimately hold power and that hierarchies are essential—Trump rode birtherism into political prominence.
“Obama gets elected and everybody was talking about how we were now in a post-racial society and then two blinks, you know, the Tea Party is organized and uh, basically uh, Obama draws out a lot of deep racism in American society and senses that a black person like him is not should not legitimately hold the power he does. And therefore you have a birther movement which really harks back to reconstruction when you know southern whites recognized that slavery was over. But the idea of empowering former slaves was just inconceivable to them.”
Trump appears unprecedented at the national level due to his unprecedented cruelty and demeaning behavior toward institutions and enemies, but George Wallace provides a state/local precedent and might have won nationally if not assassinated in 1972; illiberalism at national level is less common but has recurrent local precedents.
“one of the things that makes him seem so quote distinctive and unprecedented is, you know, if we think about the national level where, you know, there's no question that it would be very difficult to find anybody who has ascended to the presidency and has behaved in the uh cruel and uh demeaning uh not only to people but to institutions, to his political enemies. Um, but I do think that if one is aware of what has gone on over the course of US history on the state and local levels and George Wallace Wall Wallace is certainly the case and he's somebody I think who's really important who did become a national figure and I don't know what would have happened if it wasn't for the assassin's bullet in you know 1972 which basically pushed him out of a race that he was in the process of maybe winning.”
Politics are volatile and people's political sensibilities don't fit neat boxes—Bernie Sanders attracted voters (some of whom voted for Trump) who were drawn to his anti-institutionalism; both Sanders and Trump are fundamentally anti-institutional, representing a deeper cleavage than traditional Republican-Democrat divisions.
“politics are very volatile. That people's political sensibilities do not fit into very neat boxes. You know, when Bernie Sanders was running in 2016, there were more than a few people who said that Bernie Sanders would be someone who would be very appealing and that, you know, they ended up voting for Trump. But you know somehow or other Sanders also you know touched uh them in ways that they found um you know very uh significant that he understood uh what they're both also fundamentally anti-institutional candidates right and very different in the way they're very different in some ways but I think we now understand this is a much more fundamental cleavage than we were than people were looking at it as then.”
Lincoln embodied contradictions about national family and inclusion; he grew and changed significantly, but this growth was incomplete and complicated—scholars should avoid simple vilification or valorization of Lincoln and instead examine his contradictions and limitations.
“you see somebody who grew and changed in very very significant ways, but at the same time, he kind of embodied a lot of the contradictions about what a national family is and who would be included in that.”
Illiberal and liberal phases cycle in and out, but this is not mechanical pendulum behavior; rather, circumstances create openings for multiple possible directions—Obama's election created conditions for Tea Party backlash and explicit racism (birther movement), but that backlash was not predetermined; historical moments are contingent and unpredictable.
“I I'm not somebody who thinks about pendulums. I don't think that history repeats itself, but I do think that there are moments when um circumstances uh make possible developments moving in any one of a number of directions...you know, even if you think about Obama and Trump, I think it follows perfectly. you know, uh, Obama gets elected and everybody was talking about how we were now in a post-racial society and then two blinks, you know, the Tea Party is organized and uh, basically uh, Obama draws out a lot of deep racism in American society”
Joseph McCarthy emerged from and appealed to a different social constituency than 19th-century populists—not rural agrarians but more urban, native-born, small-business types—and his anti-elitism and anti-institutionalism centered on the view that large federal institutions and cultural institutions (Hollywood, universities, government, military) had been captured by communists and needed to be broken open through state power.
“McCarthy was not a kind of new 19th century populism. Uh he was really appealing to a different kind of constitu constituency. Obviously more nativeorn but not entirely nativeorn. Uh people who were sort of small business types...one way I've heard McCarthy being brought up as a reference to what is happening now is look, he was on the hunt for communists...And he also had a broader view as did many others in conservatism at that time that the big institutions of American life had been captured and you know the culture had been captured in Hollywood and the universities were captured and maybe the even the government was captured too and the military and the military and the hunt for communists which I've seen people analogizing now to the hunt for people who believe in DEI or anti-semites or wokeness also became a way to break open these institutions to use the power of the state to cow them”
Because American citizenship rights are not clearly established and because there are legal loopholes in how citizenship and rights are conceived, we may be entering a period marked by withdrawal of rights people had come to believe they possess, similar to the Dred Scott decision's withdrawal of rights.
“I worry as as you may worry too that precisely because a lot of those rights are not clearly established and because there could be any one of a variety of loopholes uh whether in the language or whether in the way um citizenship and rights are conceived believed that we may be entering a period, you know, in some ways marked by like the dos dos decision of the really withdrawal of what of rights uh that we had come to believe that people have.”
Exclusionary sensibilities have been so much part of the national conversation for so long that it is easy to drum up support for exclusionary politics, making this a durable pattern that must be actively resisted and reimagined rather than assumed to be naturally declining.
“It's an easy thing to kind of drum up because it has been so much part of the conversation for so long. And um I do think that these are this is exactly what needs to be um uh resisted and re- imagined.”
Trump and his advisors like Steve Bannon lionize Andrew Jackson as a model for defiance of Supreme Court rulings on Native expulsion (referencing Jackson's 'let them enforce it' response), as a strong executive willing to expand presidential powers when the presidency had relatively few powers, and as a harbinger of executive overreach that Trump admires.
“Well, I think there are a number of things that they could connect to, not least was his defiance of a Supreme Supreme Court rulings on uh the ex the potential expulsion of native people. You know, he said, "Okay, that's fine. let them enforce it. Um, I think they see him as a quote unquote strong leader who was willing and able and interested in moving directions of his own choosing. uh obviously had a very complicated relationship with the federal government, but he he stood up very strongly because the nullification crisis uh in the 1830s...I think they see him as you know an example of an early executive who was interested in expanding the powers of the presidency at a time when the president of the United States really had relatively few powers”
Right-wing movements and groups fulfilled a need not just for exclusion but for community-building, a sense of belonging that included people one was comfortable with while creating non-belonging and subjecting those outside the group to resistance, expulsion, or repression.
“these right-wing groups really did fulfill a need but you know a sense of community building a sense of what belonging was. Belonging that not only included people you were comfortable with and you thought were part of the community. but uh non-belonging and the resistance or expulsion of those or or the repression of those who you saw as political threats.”
During the Red Scare (World War I period), immigrants who were politically radical were deported with very limited rights; during Operation Wetback, American citizens were deported in violation of rights they were assumed to have, showing that the US has repeatedly deported people, including citizens, in violations of rights assumed to have been established by the 14th Amendment.
“I think that's right. Uh certainly we know that uh during the um time of the Red Scare in the uh period of World War I that there were lots of immigrants uh who were also politically radical who were deported and whose uh rights were regarded in very very limited ways and whose deportation was generally um uh embraced accepted uh by the public. In some ways, it's because the advent of citizenship and the 14th amendment, as strong as it was in many respects, didn't really, you know, if you compare uh that to the Mexican Constitution in 1916 that laid out a whole series of rights that working people had, that women had. um and you compare it to a a sense of well what are the rights that are come with citizenship in the United States but I worry as as you may worry too that precisely because a lot of those rights are not clearly established and because there could be any one of a variety of loopholes uh whether in the language or whether in the way um citizenship and rights are conceived believed that we may be entering a period, you know, in some ways marked by like the dos dos decision of the really withdrawal of what of rights uh that we had come to believe that people have.”
Immigrant groups who have established stability have supported exclusionary politics (evidenced by some immigrant support for Trump), showing that those who have arrived in and established positions in a community often resist newcomers, a pattern also visible in the Great Migration when northern Black communities were uncomfortable with rural Black migrants.
“One of the things we saw is that, you know, there were members of quote unquote immigrant groups who supported Trump. And this is part of a long-term um, uh, phenomenon whereby those who have arrived in a established stability. This is true during the great migration too where northern black communities were, you know, not all that comfortable with these rural black people who were coming up who didn't really know the ways and were potentially threatening the stability of their own communities.”
Trump rode birtherism into leadership precisely by promoting a lie that, even after being debunked and shown to be absolutely false, was still believed by most Republicans due to underlying sensibilities about the illegitimacy of certain groups holding power and the need to break hierarchies that people thought were essential to stability.
“Trump rides birtherism to the forefront of Absolutely. I mean he found his way into leadership precisely in that even when it was debunked um even when it was absolutely clear that this was a lie. Nonetheless, most Republicans still believed it. It was this idea of the general illegitimacy of certain groups of people uh holding power and breaking the hierarchies that they thought were essential to stability and security in the United States.”
Political scientist Larry Bartels describes the populist right as a reservoir, not a wave, that's always there to tap into, which helps explain why national figures who can lead in America must embody some contradictions to absorb different currents.
“the political scientist Larry Battles talks about the populist right as a reservoir not a wave but a reservoir that's always there to tap into Then it becomes more uh obvious in a way that the the national figures who can lead in this country will have to embody some of the contradictions.”
Political sensibilities do not fit into neat boxes, and there can be overlap between appeals from different political movements (Bernie Sanders appealed to some who voted for Trump, both being anti-institutional), revealing more fundamental cleavages than traditional partisan ones.
“politics are very volatile. That people's political sensibilities do not fit into very neat boxes. You know, when Bernie Sanders was running in 2016, there were more than a few people who said that Bernie Sanders would be someone who would be very appealing and that, you know, they ended up voting for Trump. But you know somehow or other Sanders also you know touched uh them in ways that they found um you know very uh significant that he understood uh what they're both also fundamentally anti-institutional candidates right and very different in the way they're very different in some ways but I think we now understand this is a much more fundamental cleavage than we were than people were looking at it as then.”
Hahn worries that many people would accept expulsion of citizens deemed 'true enemies of the people' based on violence or racial/ethnic background—Trump has raised this explicitly, seeking confrontation with courts, and believing courts have limited power to stop him.
“I fear that a lot of people would be okay with expelling citizens uh who are deemed to be true enemies of the people because of their violence or because of their racial and ethnic background. I mean, Trump has raised this explicitly now. Explicitly. And um you know, whether it whatever the courts do, his um he's obviously looking for a confrontation. He's interested in provocation and he thinks basically there's nothing much they can do about it and that may prove to be the case.”
Bending the knee in the face of apparent significant power is not uncommon and is a worrisome precedent for current institutions facing pressure from executive power.
“I do think that bending the knee especially in the face of what seems to be um significant power is uh not uncommon and is a worrisome president.”
Jackson justified Indian removal by claiming that Native peoples didn't belong, were dying out anyway, and that finding territory outside population centers was actually in their interest for safety—a rationalization that modern readers can see through only because of what we've learned about the long-term history of Native expulsion, not because the justification itself reads as obviously false to ears of that era.
“Jackson uh thought like many uh white Americans thought is that native people were um they didn't belong, that they were in jeopardy of basically dying out and that what he was doing was actually in their interest by finding a territory outside of the centers of population where native people could in some ways be safe. You know, we only would read this in a horrifying way because of what we've learned about the history of native peoples, the really complicated history of native peoples, and how this has been a long-term process uh of expulsion.”
Trump appears distinctive and unprecedented at the national level for his cruelty and demeaning behavior toward people and institutions and political enemies, but at state and local levels this behavior has precedent in figures like George Wallace, who might have won a national race if not for an assassination attempt in 1972.
“I think one of the things that makes him seem so quote distinctive and unprecedented is, you know, if we think about the national level where, you know, there's no question that it would be very difficult to find anybody who has ascended to the presidency and has behaved in the uh cruel and uh demeaning uh not only to people but to institutions, to his political enemies. Um, but I do think that if one is aware of what has gone on over the course of US history on the state and local levels and George Wallace Wall Wallace is certainly the case and he's somebody I think who's really important who did become a national figure and I don't know what would have happened if it wasn't for the assassin's bullet in you know 1972 which basically pushed him out of a race that he was in the process of maybe winning.”
Post-2016, there was a fantasy that Trump was a temporary abnormality that could be defeated and overcome, leaving normal politics; now people understand the cleavage is permanent and there are no final victories, only ongoing protest and vigilance.
“Well, you know, you use the word fantasy, and I think that's a very good one because in 2016, I think there was a sense, first of all, that there was a sense that he there was no way he was going to win. But even when he won, I think there was a sense that this was a um a very unusual, very toxic phenomenon that could um once you defeat him would be defeated. Now, obviously, we've learned that this is not the case.”
Liberalism has felt exhausted and insecure over the past decade, with its great victories taken for granted, and critics on the left have felt it never achieved enough; now people are realizing that it's actually quite remarkable for people to have rights, due process, courts that check power, and for those courts to be listened to by the political system despite lacking enforcement mechanisms backed by force.
“over the past decade in particular, liberalism has felt very exhausted and very insecure and its great victories are taken for granted. Now, I mean, now we're I think realizing again that it's actually quite remarkable for people to have rights, for there to be due process, for there to be courts where things can be checked and for those courts to be listened to by the political system despite the fact that they don't force that uh judgment at the point of a gun.”
Tocqueville's Democracy in America should be read not as the iconic text establishing American exceptionalism (which was emphasized when it was republished during early Cold War) but as an external observer's analysis containing both admiration and reservations.
“Okay. Um, well, first of all, I think uh Toqueville's Democracy in America would be a good place to start. not going into it thinking of it as the iconic text, but going into it thinking about it as someone who is an observer from the outside looking in uh and who has, you know, both uh admiration and reservations.”
If you want to build a movement where everyone fits through the eye of a needle it won't work, and real social movements of consequence that use power for change and appeal to large numbers whose lives can actually improve require containing people with divergent views.
“if you want to build a movement where everyone has to fit through the eye of a needle, forget it. And you know, frankly, if you most social movements don't last very long, but if you're going to build a movement, which I think about in a large way of consequence, I think there's um if you're serious um and if power is actually what what you're interested in and change and using power for the point of change, that will be of appeal to large numbers of people who want change and whose lives can actually be better.”
Lincoln embodied contradictions about what a national family is and who would be included in it, growing and changing in significant ways but still containing these contradictions, and deserves nuanced understanding rather than simple dismissal as villain or hero.
“what I would do is I would I mean, what I was trying to do there was to talk about some of the limitations. And I don't I don't see putting Lincoln, you know, well, that he's just a racist because, you know, I I think that's not a useful way of understanding Lincoln. If anything, you know, you see somebody who grew and changed in very very significant ways, but at the same time, he kind of embodied a lot of the contradictions about what a national family is and who would be included in that.”
Bill Clinton's supporters argue he took crime, immigration, and welfare off the table as Democratic weaknesses, allowing Democrats to return to national power—a set of compromises that now appear terrible but were strategically necessary to prevent these issues from enabling illiberal victories.
“Bill Clinton's defenders often say to me, I had Rahm Emanuel on the show. He said this explicitly, look, this is the guy who took crime and immigration off the table as weaknesses and welfare for the Democratic party. And that's how Democrats came back to national power. And now it's looked back on as, you know, a terrible set of compromises. But that was, you know, the the alternative was losing to to these ideas.”
Liberals were not well equipped for social unravelings in the mid-20th century and began to abandon their project of reconciling rights with social order, suggesting that liberalism's internal contradictions (commitment to individual rights vs. commitment to social order) make it fragile when those contradictions become acute.
“I do think that liberals were not very well equipped for the sort of um uh unravelings that began to take place and that they kind of begin to abandon the whole project.”
The Mexican Constitution of 1916 established a broader series of rights for working people and women than US citizenship has established, suggesting that the protection of rights through constitutional language is not automatic and US citizenship rights are comparatively thin.
“if you compare uh that to the Mexican Constitution in 1916 that laid out a whole series of rights that working people had, that women had. um and you compare it to a a sense of well what are the rights that are come with citizenship in the United States”
Illiberalism operates as a way of life in prosaic daily ways until threatened, then erupts, so understanding it requires more than identifying rage—it requires understanding daily lived experience that provides meaning.
“It's a way of life that um c can go on in very prosaic ways until uh they're being threatened and then they erupt. But we need to understand the day-to-day lives that are created that are that bring people together that provide them with all sorts of meaning in their lives.”
Recognizing illiberalism as an important current and field of force challenges the tendency to view disruptions of liberal tradition as simply backlash or angry venting without substance, which is a serious mistake.
“one of the things that is important about recognizing say eliberalism as a important current and field of force is that we have a tendency of looking at the um uh the disruptions of the liberal tradition as simply a backlash as angry people who are venting their fury. uh and which doesn't really have a lot of substance and things can go back to normal easily and I think that that's a serious mistake.”
People will not risk their lives and safety for a vision they cannot imagine, so successful movements require utopianism—a vision of a better world—paired with realistic assessment of the need for ongoing struggle without final victory.
“People are not going to put themselves on the line for a world that they can't quite imagine. And I think that is a basis for something bigger.”
In late 19th-century East Texas, people from enslaved and enslaving communities formed a coalition for opportunistic reasons due to shared grievance, and over time came to learn about each other and establish a bi-racial republic where white insurgents learned about Black community needs; even when populism nationally lost, they continued winning locally until they were 'gunned down,' showing how meaningful coalitions can be forged across deep divisions.
“I sort of finish the book with an example of um this movement in in a county in East Texas in the late 19th century where um, you know, someone who was part of a community of enslavers and someone who was part of a community of enslaved came together for basically opportunistic reasons because they shared grievance with what was going on and they knew they couldn't win local office without forming some kind of coal ition. But little by little, they actually began to do it. Little by little, they learned a lot about each other. And in fact, over many years, they came to establish their own republic in the b-racial republic where the white people who were the insurgents learned a lot about the needs of the black community. And the black community was able to engage with what was 30 or 40% of the white community. And even then they called themselves populists in the 1890s. And even when the populace nationally lost, they were still winning. And you know, in the end they were gunned down”
Commonalities across historical eras of deportation and expulsion include invoking notion of communities under siege being threatened, and reconfiguring ideas and relationships about belonging, what communities have rights to exclude or expel, and how to punish.
“I I do think that what happens is that it's very easy to invoke a notion of communities under siege uh being threatened. Um, it reminded me of what um um ideas and relationships that could so quickly be reconfigured uh about, you know, belonging and what the um even even before the United States became the United States, but what um what it meant to be part of communities, what rights communities had to exclude or to expelled to punish.”
Trump has explicitly raised the idea of expelling citizens deemed to be true enemies of the people because of their violence or racial/ethnic background; this is not rhetorical flourish but represents a genuine expansion of the expulsion impulse from non-citizens to citizens, and Trump is looking for a confrontation with courts, believing there is 'nothing much they can do about it.'
“I fear that a lot of people would be okay with expelling citizens uh who are deemed to be true enemies of the people because of their violence or because of their racial and ethnic background. I mean, Trump has raised this explicitly now. Explicitly. And um you know, whether it whatever the courts do, his um he's obviously looking for a confrontation. He's interested in provocation and he thinks basically there's nothing much they can do about it and that may prove to be the case.”
Building national political power requires appealing to complicated constituencies with complicated histories; Democratic presidents through the 1960s had to manage a southern segregationist wing, and LBJ recognized he would 'lose the South for a generation' by signing civil rights legislation, yet the alternative to compromise with illiberal impulses was to cede power to those impulses entirely.
“it's um certainly the case with many uh liberals who have ascended to important leadership uh positions in American political life. Uh that it comes with the terrain of seeking office and dealing with complicated constituencies and our own complicated past. I mean obviously people in the Democratic party through the 1960s you know had the southern wing of the party that they had to appease and you know you can excuse it from today until tomorrow but u they did and uh you know Johnson famously said when he was signing either the civil rights or the voting rights you know we now we've lost the south for a generation and that was true.”
Obama's election drew out deep racism in American society; the Tea Party movement organized in response to his presidency on the basis that a Black person like him shouldn't legitimately hold the power he did, and the birther movement harked back to Reconstruction when southern whites found the idea of empowering former slaves inconceivable.
“Obama gets elected and everybody was talking about how we were now in a post-racial society and then two blinks, you know, the Tea Party is organized and uh, basically uh, Obama draws out a lot of deep racism in American society and senses that a black person like him is not should not legitimately hold the power he does. And therefore you have a birther movement which really harks back to reconstruction when you know southern whites recognized that slavery was over. But the idea of empowering former slaves was just inconceivable to them.”
Americans have had housing shortages, demographic migrations, and urban struggles over housing going back before the 1960s urban uprisings, showing that social pressures and demographic change created conditions for political backlash earlier than commonly noted.
“a lot of these struggles over housing, you know, people have this idea, well, it wasn't until the 1960s when the urban uprisings began, but actually it was much earlier as there were housing shortages, there were population, demographic uh migrations.”