What Everyone Gets Wrong about China Invading Taiwan

As industrialized countries experience economic growth, women enter the labor force, the opportunity cost of having children increases, and fertility rates decline, creating a pattern where China's fertility rate fell from 6.3 births per woman in 1968 to 1.18 in recent years.

“The people get rich, women start entering the labor force, the opportunity cost for having children goes up, and thus the number of babies born every year goes down. That is how you end up with fertility rates in 2022 like 1.67 in the United States, 1.57 in the United Kingdom, 1.33 in Canada, and 1.26 in Japan. Remember that quaint 6.3 fertility rate in China from 1968? Yeah, recently it dropped to 1.18.”

Males aged 18 to 40 comprise the potential soldier pool, and currently there are abundant PLA draftees available, but the population pyramid shows babies and toddlers are a rare breed on the mainland, roughly as many as people in their early 60s who were decimated by the Great Famine.

“Usually, we think of the potential soldier pool as males, ages 18 to 40 or so. Consequently, there are tons of available PLA draftees right now. But look down here. The babies and toddlers of the mainland are a rare breed—there are about as many of them as there are people in their early 60s—remember, that's the cohort that the Great Famine decimated.”

Washington is trying to thread the needle: deter Beijing from crossing the Strait while convincing Taipei not to do anything provocative like declare independence, maintaining strategic ambiguity as a tool to prevent war on both sides.

“Simultaneously, the United States often acts like it wants to defend Taiwan. In essence, Washington is trying to thread the needle: deter Beijing from crossing the Strait while also convincing Taipei not to do anything provocative like declare independence.”

The main source of the power shift is faltering demographics on the mainland, and that makes life difficult; getting Beijing to increase fertility rates is essentially impossible since the government is already begging for more pregnancies and it still is not working.

“The main source of the power shift is faltering demographics over on the mainland, and that makes life difficult. For a comparison, let's go back to the nukes for a second... In contrast, it would be much harder for me to travel to mainland and start telling the locals to have more babies. That ship has sailed. Heck, the government is already begging for more pregnancies, and it still is not working.”

Japan experienced an economic rise in the 1980s that made some in the United States uneasy about the end of American dominance, but Japan hit a demographic problem similar to China's, leading to economic stagnation without military consequence because Japan subscribed to the liberal world order and rising/falling military capacity mattered less.

“In the 1980s, Japan's roaring economic growth was supposed to propel it to the top of the world's fiscal food chain. Indeed, there was an unease in the United States that this would be the end of the American century … until Japan hit an almost identical demographic problem... This all happened without military consequence because Japan subscribes to the liberal world order, and so rising or falling compared to others hardly mattered when the United States would guarantee the status quo.”

Economic interdependence can also cause war when states gamble on how much their opponents care about the issues at stake—citing Russia and Germany's relationship with Ukraine; it is also possible that American dependency on Chinese trade could dissuade Washington from intervening, opening the door to easier invasion.

“I will also throw out there that economic interdependence can cause war when states gamble on how much their opponents care about the issues at stake—see Russia and Germany as it relates to Ukraine. It is also possible that American dependency on Chinese trade would dissuade Washington from intervening, which in turn opens the door to an easier path toward an invasion.”

Taiwan's social identity has shifted dramatically, with 61.7% of citizens identifying as strictly Taiwanese by 2023 versus just 2.4% identifying as strictly Chinese, compared to 1992 when 25.5% identified as Chinese and only 17.6% as Taiwanese.

“by 2023 61.7% of citizens identified themselves as strictly Taiwanese. And those who identified themselves as strictly Chinese? Just 2.4%. Rewind the clock back to just 1992, and it was 25.5% Chinese and 17.6% Taiwanese.”

Chip production is a six-step global supply chain including Electronic Design Automation software (concentrated in US), raw materials like industrial chemicals (concentrated in Japan), fab manufacturing (ASML from Netherlands), chip design (multiple countries), chip manufacturing (TSMC in Taiwan), and assembly (mainland can do this), and until China controls all six steps, militarily capturing just the manufacturing step means little.

“Producing semiconductors is a six-step process, with a complicated global supply chain... First, you need Electronic Design Automation software... These companies tend to be concentrated in the United States. Second, you need the raw ingredients... These tend to be concentrated in Japan. Third, you need a company that manufactures the fabs. This is where ASML comes in. Fourth, you need to design the chips... Fifth, you need to manufacture the chips. Ah, finally something that capturing TSMC might actually help with. And lastly, you need assemble the chips... until China figure out a solution to control all six steps, militarily capturing just this one means little.”

Taiwan's geography provides substantial defensive advantages: mountain ranges peaking at nearly 4,000 meters dominate the island, the western coast has extensive shallow waters preventing larger landing ships from approaching, the eastern coast has steep cliffs unsuitable for amphibious landing, and even if Taiwan's government fell, the mountainous terrain would be ideal for insurgent resistance.

“the eastern coastal cliffs from earlier hint at the vast mountain range that sit behind them, which despite the island's small size still somehow peak at almost 4000 meters. That matters—anyone paying attention to Afghanistan over the years knows that mountain ranges are the perfect place to stage an insurgency.”

The Obama Administration lacked a simple solution to the China challenge and was constrained by the legacies of Afghanistan and Iraq, so the official reorientation to China within the U.S. government had to wait until the Trump administration.

“However, Washington lacked a simple solution at the time. You see, the Obama Administration was still beholden to the legacies of Afghanistan and Iraq, so the official reorientation to China within the U.S. government had to wait.”

If the PLA attempts an air bridge invasion (using aircraft rather than naval transport), history from the Battle of Hostomel Airport at the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine shows that defenders can sabotage runways, invalidating the entire strategy and allowing the country to survive without falling to invaders.

“there is some chance that the PLA will dispense with the idea of a sea-based invasion and try to build an air bridge instead, but we have seen the difficulty of accomplishing that with the Battle of Hostomel Airport at the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine—the defender can sabotage the runway and invalidate the entire strategy.”

Headlines about war plans coinciding with auspicious dates (like 2025 or 2027) should be skeptical; generals like to prepare soldiers for war (their job description), and real military planners care more about actually winning wars than having them align with calendar dates or anniversaries.

“Those headlines about war plans and expectations? It turns out that generals like to tell their soldiers 'you should prepare for war'—that is kind of in their job description. Also, the whole thing about creating war plans to coincide with auspicious dates? It turns out that real military planners are more concerned about, you know, actually winning a war rather than having it align with some circle on a calendar.”

There's always something that could be viewed as auspicious, so if specific dates like 2025 or Xi's 75th birthday in 2028 are truly predictive, why weren't earlier anniversaries (like the 100th anniversary of the CCP in 2021) or other dates chosen instead, suggesting date-based predictions are post-hoc rationalizations.

“there is always something that could be auspicious. For instance, why wasn't the invasion date instead back in 2021, coinciding with the 100th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party? Or why not wait until 2028 to celebrate Xi's 75th birthday? The point is, talk is cheap.”

The Three Gorges Dam holds back a ridiculous amount of water such that destroying it would be orders of magnitude worse than the Kakhovka Dam breach in Ukraine from 2023, but discussions of this often ignore how Taiwan would send missiles across all of that distance unmolested by mainland defenses and how gravity dams resist missile strikes.

“Well, it is true that the dam is holding back a ridiculous amount of water. And all in all, it would be a situation orders of magnitude worse than the Kakhovka Dam breech in Ukraine from 2023. But those discussions tend to gloss over how exactly Taiwan would send missiles all the way over to here unmolested by mainland defenses. It also ignores how gravity dams around the world work by just being gigantic slabs of concrete that are resistant to missile strikes.”

Taiwan will mostly have to defend itself, with the United States playing a support role, as it is up to Taiwan to hold against invasion, making Taiwan self-sufficiency critical.

“It will therefore up to Taiwan to mostly defend itself, with the United States playing the support role. Suffice it to say that the United States is capable of causing great headaches to Beijing, but a whole-hearted effort would require the biggest shift in domestic priorities since World War II.”

An Asian power preemptively attacking the United States to reduce U.S. naval assets is reminiscent of historical patterns (specifically WWII and Pearl Harbor).

“Hmm. An Asian power preemptively attacking the United States to reduce U.S. naval assets, which could otherwise starve the attacker of its oil. Where have I heard that one before?”

Just because two states have nuclear weapons does not mean they will use them when shooting starts; the U.S. Navy is preparing for a drawn-out conflict, not for war to be decided by quick nuclear exchange.

“But just because two states have nuclear weapons does not mean that they will use them when the shooting starts. Now, that does not mean that I can guarantee there will be nuclear peace. But it is telling that the U.S. Navy is preparing for a drawn-out conflict, and not for the fight to be decided in short order following a nuclear exchange.”

Nuclear weapons are best for limiting the scope of conflict; few doubt the U.S. would use nuclear weapons if opposing troops began marching on Washington Mall, at which point facing nuclear retaliation or international condemnation would not matter since the country would cease to exist anyway.

“Instead, nuclear weapons are best for limiting the scope of a conflict. Few doubt that the United States would be willing to use nuclear weapons if opposing troops began marching on Washington Mall. At that point, facing a nuclear response or even just all sorts of international condemnation would not matter After all, the country would be on the verge of ceasing to exist anyway.”

The Kargil War in 1999 saw Indian and Pakistani troops fight for almost three months over Kashmir, with no nuclear weapons escalation because Kargil is not Islamabad or New Delhi; if the war had escalated to capital cities, nuclear weapons would have come into play.

“This is how something like the Kargil War can happen. In 1999, Indian and Pakistani troops fought for almost three months over a portion of Kashmir. At no point did nuclear weapons come into play. You see, Kargil is here. It is not Islamabad. Nor is it New Delhi. If the war had escalated to either of those locations, then we would be looking at a different story.”

The cost of war reflects not only fallen soldiers and destroyed property, but also covers the benefits normally accrued during peacetime that disappear during wartime—specifically the gains from trade, which are larger when there is high economic interdependence and make war costlier, increasing the likelihood of stable settlement.

“Remember: the cost of war reflects not only fallen soldiers and destroyed property. It also covers the benefits normally accrued during peacetime that disappear come wartime. Specifically here, I am thinking about the gains from trade. The larger that they are, the costlier war is, and the more likely a stable settlement can exist.”

Semiconductor fabrication is an extremely sensitive process where one misstep ruins the entire operation; examples include Renesas losing production for days/weeks from earthquakes, lightning, fires, and even a foil balloon deflating into factory equipment, showing how fragile the process is.

“Semiconductor fabrication is a very sensitive process. One misstep and the whole thing is ruined. As a case study, take the poor plight of Renesas, a major semiconductor manufacturer in Japan. 7.3 earthquake? Halt everything for a few days. Lightning strike on its facility? Shut it down for a week. Fire in the clean room? Four weeks offline. At least it is not as embarrassing as a foil balloon costing a German fab to lose 24 hours.”

The Carter administration later terminated the Eisenhower-era mutual defense pact with Taiwan, replacing it with the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, which uses language like 'governing authorities on Taiwan' and 'people on Taiwan' rather than 'Republic of China,' deliberately avoiding language that would suggest Taiwan is a polity or state.

“the Carter administration later terminated that Eisenhower-era defense pact with Taiwan. In its place came the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, which since then has dictated how the United States handles diplomatic affairs with the island. Notably, the text no longer uses the phrase 'Republic of China' but now prefers the term 'governing authorities on Taiwan' and the 'people on Taiwan' Not 'of'. 'On.' 'Of' would suggest that Taiwan itself was a polity, if not a state. 'On' means that 'Taiwan' in this case is referring to the island.”

An invasion of Taiwan by China would threaten to put the Russia-Ukraine war to shame, making it look like a trivial regional conflict and turning the entire world into an economic wasteland.

“a Chinese invasion of Taiwan would threaten to put all of that to shame, making Ukraine versus Russia look like a trivial regional conflict as it turns the entire world into an economic wasteland”

Vietnam and India are not facing the same level of demographic crisis that the PRC is, meaning it will become more difficult for Beijing to storm Taiwan's beaches and balance other issues in the future compared to if rivals were also experiencing fertility declines.

“Places like Vietnam and India are not facing the same level of demographic crisis that the PRC is—meaning that it will become more difficult for Beijing to storm the beaches of Taiwan and balance the other issues in the future.”

Russia's invasion of Ukraine may have been motivated by Russia's own dwindling birth rate; as Russia's population fell and pension payments became more burdensome, invading Ukraine (always on the Kremlin's wish list) became increasingly necessary to prevent long-term relative decline.

“One explanation for why the Kremlin chose to invade Ukraine is because of Russia's own dwindling birth rate. You see, control over Ukraine was always something on the Kremlin's wish list. But as Russia's population fell off and pension payments became more burdensome, threatening to invade Kyiv became increasingly less practical.”

During the Obama years, a rising China was a central concern in Washington, with worry that China might one day use its power to reshape the world, leading to questions about what needed to be done in the present to stop it.

“the truth is that when they were not joking around about basketball, a rising China was a central concern during the Obama years. More explicitly, the worry was that China one day may decide to use its power to reshape the world, leading to questions of what might need to be done in the contemporary present to stop it.”

China was not blessed with a post-WWII baby boom; instead, the country was cursed with the continuation of its civil war, which meant more casualties and loss of life before any demographic recovery could begin.

“Many of them were blessed with baby booms thereafter. China … was not one of those. Rather, the country was cursed with the aforementioned continuation of its civil war. And that meant more pain. The follow-on fight did not finish for another four years and not until at least a couple million more were lost.”

Beijing has invested ungodly amounts of money trying to move toward chip independence but has stumbled at almost every step along the way, leaving China hawks to describe Taiwan's semiconductor industry as a modern-day vault full of bars of gold to be taken once Beijing reintegrates Taiwan.

“Across the Strait, Beijing has invested ungodly amounts of money into trying to move toward chip independence but has stumbled at almost every step along the way. Consequently, China hawks often describe Taiwan's semiconductor industry as a modern day vault full of bars of gold—that is, it is a prize to be taken once Beijing reintegrates the renegade island.”

While Beijing could theoretically reroute oil through alternative straits along Indonesia or take a long path around Australia, Australia would likely patrol waters near its continent to support a blockade, and the longer journey still leaves China with the earlier problem in reverse—how to penetrate the first island chain.

“There are indeed a bunch of other options along Indonesia, but they are also narrow and easily blockaded. That leaves the long path, which involves going around Australia... Australia would not be thrilled about the prospects of China splashing its weight around and is liable to patrol the waters near its continent in support of a blockade. Okay, so China finally does get navigate the outback. What now? Well, after that long journey, the ships ultimately end up here. But that leaves China with the earlier problem in reverse”

Russia has had major military plans coinciding with its May 9 Victory Day celebrations for years, with rumors of imminent military action, yet these rumors have consistently gone nowhere year after year.

“this is why we keep hearing things about Russia having major plans for its May 9 Victory Day celebrations… only for rumors to go nowhere year after year.”

China is a developing, upper-middle income country with gross national income per capita ranking between Bulgaria and Russia, still with significant room for economic growth and worker productivity improvements even as population declines.

“the PRC is still rising. It is a developing, upper middle income country, with gross national income per capita ranking between Bulgaria and Russia. In other words, there is still plenty of room for the CCP to observe further growth. Moreover, it is possible for an economy to still grow while the population declines so long as workers are becoming sufficiently more productive.”

The days of 10%-plus annual GDP growth in China are over; much of the mainland's boom came from infrastructure building which stimulates larger returns, but this phase of Chinese growth is approaching its end, especially with population now in decline.

“The days of 10%-plus annual GDP growth, when fears in Washington of a rising China were strongest, are over. Much of the mainland's boom came from building infrastructure, which itself stimulates larger returns. That phase of Chinese growth is approaching its end, though, especially with the population now in decline.”

The U.S. is not protecting Taiwan primarily to save the chip industry; historically, when U.S.-Taiwan ties were strongest, semiconductors were not yet a thing there—the industry arrived in Taiwan in 1974 and TSMC was not founded until 1987, yet the U.S. was committed to defending Taiwan long before this.

“the United States never saw the chip industry as a prerequisite for intervention. Indeed, back when formal ties between the two were strongest, semiconductors were not yet a thing there: the industry only came to the island in 1974, and TSMC was not founded until 1987.”

The World War II strategic comparison provides a helpful segue to what might happen in the long run of a China-Taiwan war; the United States has begun spinning up factories that have spent decades working below capacity to produce ammunition (155mm shells) to assist Ukraine, but American manufacturing capacity is not currently positioned to produce enough metal to win a long war.

“As part of its efforts to assist Ukraine, the United States has begun spinning up factories that have otherwise spent decades working below capacity. You may have heard of this in regard to the all-important 155 millimeter artillery shells. The problem is that, even with such updates, American manufacturing is not currently in a position to produce enough metal to win a long war.”

Taiwan should play the long game and relax, making minor policy accommodations in the short run while power dynamics favor Taiwan in the long run; every day that passes when Taiwan's future position improves is a small victory.

“Taiwan to relax and play the long game. When the balance of power favors you in the long run, then every day that passes by is a small victory... Better to make minor policy accommodations in the short run and get closer to your ideal outcome in the long run than face economic ruin right now.”

Very few countries officially recognize Taiwan as a government; the lack of diplomatic recognition reflects a grand bargain intended to dissuade Beijing from invading by making unification less appealing if few nations officially support Taiwan's independence.

“None of these countries officially recognize the Taiwanese government. In fact, very few do... the lack of diplomatic recognition does not reflect the true underlying preferences of China's neighbors. Rather, it is a part of a grand bargain, one intended to dissuade the PRC from invading—there is less incentive for Beijing to try to make Taiwan its own if few officially say otherwise.”

The Strait of Malacca narrows to less than three kilometers at its narrowest point, making it a prime location for staging a blockade, and the U.S. Navy regularly patrols these waters, making blockade credible.

“because the Strait goes down to less than three kilometers at its narrowest, it is a prime place to stage a blockade. Good luck to the PLA Navy trying to fight that blockade while also deploying ships to fight Taiwan.”

The Soviet Union and China had six months of border skirmishes in 1969 with no nuclear escalation because clashes occurred over border rivers and islands in Manchuria and lakes in Kazakhstan, not in Beijing or Moscow.

“Likewise, the Soviet Union and China had six months of border skirmishes in 1969. Again, this did not amount to a nuclear confrontation because the clashes occurred over a river-bound island in Manchuria and a lake in Kazakhstan next to Xinjiang (there it is again), and not in Beijing, or Moscow.”

Vietnam is the missing link for containing the PRC along another vector; disputes over Spratly Islands in South China Sea exist, and there is no love lost between Beijing and Hanoi from their 1979 war—notably the last time PLA troops had major combat experience.

“At stake today is the disputed Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. And going back further, there is no love lost between Beijing and Hanoi from their 1979 war—which, notably, was the last time PLA troops had major combat experience.”

China has the third most nuclear weapons in the world at 500, while the United States has about 5,000, and a single Chinese Dong Feng 5 ICBM with nuclear warhead sent to New York City would kill about 324,584 people, while a U.S. W-87 warhead on an ICBM dropped on Beijing would kill about 708,860 people.

“China has the third most nuclear weapons in the world at 500, while the United States ranks second at about 5000... If we take a single Dong Feng 5 missile... then send it express to New York City, we get about 324,584 dead. Oh, wait, I missed a zero. Oopsy. Meanwhile, a single W-87 warhead also strapped to an ICBM but now dropped on the center of Beijing would yield about 708,860 dead.”

The idea of wars being fought to forestall power shifts is not new; Thucydides documented how the Peloponnesian War was inevitable because Athenian power growth caused fear in Sparta, going back 2,500 years in human history.

“The idea of wars being fought to forestall power shifts is not a new idea... We now find ourselves reading from Thucydides and his tale of how the Peloponnesian War was inevitable because of the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta.”

The Trump administration formalized a China-focused strategy through the 2018 National Defense Strategy, with Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Elbridge Colby as the chief architect, and the Biden administration's policy regarding China did not substantively change despite returning attention to Russia.

“There was indeed a Trump-era shift. This was formalized by the 2018 National Defense Strategy, of which Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Elbridge Colby was the chief architect. Now, fast forward again to the Biden administration. Public and proximate attention shifted back to Russia for obvious reasons, but Biden's policy regarding China did not change much. China is still the long-term main event that occupies much of the foreign policy establishment's time, even if we do not hear much about it.”

In response to rapid post-WWII population growth, the CCP launched the 'Later, Longer, Fewer' campaign in the early 1970s, promoting later marriage, longer times between children, and fewer children overall, which ultimately proved insufficient to control growth and gave way to the One-Child Policy by decade's end.

“Thus began the early 1970s 'Later, Longer, Fewer' campaign: later entrance into marriage, longer times between children, and fewer children overall. But this was like trying to use a Band Aid to stop a corotate artery from bleeding. It … does not work like that. By the end of the decade, 'Later, Longer, Fewer' gave way to the better-known One-Child Policy”

The discussion of preventive war has become more focused within U.S. policymaking circles, with a leaked memo from Air Force General Mike Minihan in January 2023 warning that his gut told him there would be war with China by 2025, and other reports focusing on 2027 as the 100th anniversary of the founding of the People's Liberation Army.

“The biggest media splash came in January 2023, when a leaked memo from Air Force General Mike Minihan warned that his gut told him that there would be a war with China come 2025. Other reports focus on 2027—the 100th anniversary of the founding of the People's Liberation Army.”

The PRC's two biggest export customers are the European Union and the United States, each accounting for 14.8% of total exports, and neither would be pleased to see the PLA invade Taiwan, meaning those bilateral trade relationships would be at risk of vanishing overnight in response to invasion.

“Beijing's two biggest customers are the European Union and the United States, each accounting for 14.8% of total exports. Neither would be pleased to see the PLA invade Taiwan, and thus those numbers would be at risk of vanishing overnight.”

During the Sino-Soviet Split in the 1960s, the Nixon administration saw an opportunity to pressure the Soviet Union by normalizing relations with Beijing, but this came at the expense of ties with Taiwan, leading to the adoption of the One China Policy in 1972.

“By the middle of the 1960s, though, the Sino-Soviet Split was in full swing, with Moscow and Beijing getting into disputes over the application of Marxist philosophy. The Nixon administration saw an opportunity to put more pressure on the Soviet Union by normalizing relations with Beijing. But that came at the expense of ties with Taiwan. In 1972, the United States adopted the aforementioned One China Policy.”

China's borders are far from settled, with disputed territories including the South China Sea islands (claimed by Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam), the Senkaku Islands (also claimed by Japan), disputed land borders with India and Bhutan, and potential for rebellion in Tibet, Xinjiang, and Hong Kong, forcing Beijing to hold back troops to manage these other issues.

“For Beijing, the problem is that China's borders are far from settled. The most well-known of these issues are the various islands and zones of economic rights in the South China Sea... Then just north of Taiwan there are also the Senkaku Islands... India has all sorts of disputes with the PRC over their shared land border, including one that also brings in Bhutan... potential for rebellion in Tibet, the home of the Uyghurs, Xinjiang, and Hong Kong. All told, this will force Beijing to hold back some of its troops to keep the other countries and localities honest.”

Unlike historical conquests where enslaving defeated populations could extract value through forced labor, modern high-technology industries like semiconductors cannot be reliably operated under coercion because workers can quietly sabotage production, and occupiers cannot easily identify who is responsible, making semiconductor enslavement impractical.

“By comparison, once upon a time, a conquering power could effectively enslave the loser's population to extract long-term rents... In contrast, point a weapon at an employee in the semiconductor industry, and good luck figuring out whether they are doing anything right at all. It is just too easy to quietly break something in the process, leaving the occupier with no clear understanding of who is responsible.”

The expected outcome of a Taiwan-China war can be represented on a 'sovereignty scale' ranging from complete Taiwanese autonomy to zero Taiwanese sovereignty (full PRC control), and a war is costly for both parties such that they would prefer to negotiate a compromise settlement within a bargaining range rather than fight.

“The One China debate is essentially a manifestation of coercive bargaining with Beijing on one side and Taipei plus its allies on the other side, all fighting over Taiwanese sovereignty. Thus, we must abandon the lines on territorial maps that we have come to know and love in Ukraine, and instead think about the more amorphous 'lines on a sovereignty scale' over with Taiwan. Taipei, of course, would like to be completely unencumbered by the CCP's influence. In contrast, Beijing would prefer if the island had no sovereignty at all—that is, it become a province of the People's Republic.”

General trade restrictions on China are a riskier proposition than chip-specific controls, as every dollar heading east to China is another reason for Beijing to keep the peace, and trade at $462 billion in 2016 has been volatile, reaching new lows in 2023 with 2024 not trending better.

“But general trade restrictions on China are a riskier proposition... every dollar that heads east is another reason to keep the peace. But now some caveats. Part of the PRC's plan to onshore production is to use the chips to improve its military... In 2016, it was $462 billion... then suffering further during the pandemic. Then there was a brief revitalization during Biden's first two years, but 2023 brought a new low, and 2024 is not trending any better.”

From 1959 to 1961, China experienced the Great Famine, primarily caused by the Great Leap Forward campaign launched in the previous year, which replaced effective agricultural methods with ineffective ones and led to an estimated 15 to 55 million deaths from starvation and malnutrition.

“From 1959 to 1961, China experienced the Great Famine. Its cause? Principally, and ironically, the Great Leap Forward campaign launched the previous year... that said, it basically replaced effective agricultural methods with ineffective ones... Add another 15 to 55 million dead to the total.”

In 1981, Chinese citizens living in extreme poverty (under $2.15 per day) accounted for almost 92% of the population; by the end of the millennium, that figure had dropped to 46%; and by 2017, it had descended to almost nothing.

“In 1981, Chinese citizens living in the extreme poverty of under $2.15 per day accounted for almost 92% of its population. By the end of the millennium, that figure had dropped to 46%. Leap forward to the critical year of 2017, it had descended to almost nothing.”

In 1981, the United States accounted for more than 21% of global GDP in terms of purchasing power parity, while China was only a fraction over 2%; by 2017, they had flip-flopped, with China becoming the world's largest economy.

“Back in 1981, the United States accounted for more than 21% of global GDP, in terms of purchasing power parity. China, in contrast, was only a fraction over 2%. Head back to the critical year of 2017, though, and they had flip-flopped. China had become the world's largest economy.”

Taiwan has a population of 23 million, while China has a population of 1.4 billion, but despite China's overwhelming numerical advantage, successfully capturing Taiwan would require one of the world's largest military mobilizations in history.

“Taiwan has a population of 23 million. Meanwhile, China has a population of 1.4 billion. It is David versus Goliath... successfully capturing it would require one of the world's largest mobilizations in history—in other words, the PRC would need a whole mess of humanity to be successful.”

The Taiwan Strait ranges between 140 and 220 kilometers wide and is infamous for being one of the worst places to navigate in the world, with winter high winds and rough seas, summer fog and monsoon seasons, limiting PLA invasion planners to only April or October for reliable operations.

“a whole Taiwan Strait stands in the way. Now, it may seem like a basic waterway that ranges between 140 and 220 kilometers wide, but the reality is more complicated... the Taiwan Strait is infamous for being one of the worst places to navigate in the world. During the winter, it is high winds and rough seas, and later fog. During the summer, these apparently pristine waters give way to a monsoon season. Combined together, PLA strategists can only reliably plan an invasion for April or October each year”

Taiwan will rain fire from the skies on incoming naval vessels, which is why the PRC has invested heavily in its ballistic missile program to target Taiwan's land-based anti-ship batteries so that PRC ships can reach shore safely, and corruption in the PRC's rocket force could undermine this critical capability.

“Taiwan will rain fire from the skies on them. This is why the PRC has invested so much in its ballistic missile program—to target Taiwan's land-based anti-ship batteries, so that PRC ships can reach shore safely. It is also why the corruption scandal involving the PRC's rocket force became a such big deal.”

Taiwan has spent heavily on modern U.S. military equipment including Switchblade 300s, MQ-9 Reapers, M136 Volcano mine layers, Harpoon missiles, Stinger air-defense systems, F-16Vs, M1 Abrams tanks, and HIMARS with ATACMS rockets that have enough range to fly across the Taiwan Strait.

“During the Biden administration alone, Taiwan placed $5.4B in arms orders... include: Switchblade 300s, MQ-9 Reapers, M136 Volcano mine layers, Harpoon missile defense systems, Stinger man-portable air-defense systems, F-16Vs, M1 Abrams tanks, and of course HIMARS... coming with ATACMS rockets, which have more than enough range to fly across the Taiwan Strait.”

For a decapitation operation against Taiwan's central government to work, the PRC would first need to penetrate into Taipei, but various mountain ranges make the number of plausible entries into the city very few, limiting this strategy's feasibility.

“The PRC would like to end things early before any of that mattered, say via one of those decapitation operations its forces have been practicing. But that would first require penetrating into Taipei, and it just so happens that various mountains ranges make the number of plausible entries into the city very few.”

The PLA invasion force will remain more than 100 kilometers away across the Taiwan Strait's choppy waters, complicating supply lines and making logistics extraordinarily difficult, compared to Russia's invasion of Ukraine where supplies only need to cross a border.

“the Chinese mainland will remain more than 100 kilometers away—specifically, across the Strait's choppy waters—complicating how the PLA invasion force will sustain its operations. Consider for a moment all of the logistical difficulties that Russia has encountered during its invasion of Ukraine. And by comparison, simply getting things into Ukraine is as difficult as driving across the border.”

Taiwan is one of the most highly developed countries and produces some of the most advanced technology in the world, while China still has relatively easy catching up to do that is not available to Taiwan, which is why the IMF projects 4.6% GDP growth for China in 2024 versus 2.6% for Taiwan.

“Taiwan is one of the most highly developed countries and produces some of the most advanced technology in the world... The PRC still has some relatively easy catching up to do that is not available to Taiwan. That is partly why the IMF projects for 2024 4.6% GDP growth for the PRC compared to 2.6% for the island.”

A large portion of China's funding model has been revealed to be a real estate bubble, with significant questioning of China's long-term economic trajectory, particularly the property developer Evergrande's collapse.

“There is also the slight problem that a large portion of the funding model revealed itself to be a real estate bubble, which is further calling into question China's long-term trajectory. Actually, it is interesting how some Western observers cheered property developer Evergrande's collapse with a certain morbid glee.”

Taiwan accounts for 60% of the world's semiconductor production and 90% of advanced semiconductor production, with Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) producing 40% of the world's computing power.

“Taiwan accounts for 60% of the world's semiconductor production, and 90% of advanced semiconductor production. At the top of that food chain is the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, with an astounding $71.3 billion in revenue in 2023. It is therefore not surprising that TSMC produces 40% of the world's computing power”

The United States shared a close military relationship with Taiwan from 1954 onwards, formalized by a Mutual Defense Treaty (like a two-member NATO with Article 5 provisions), with the U.S. stationing more than 19,000 troops there with nuclear weapons for much of that time during the Cold War era.

“the United States shared a close military relationship with Taiwan. This was formalized by the Mutual Defense Treaty between the countries beginning in 1954 think of it as NATO but if NATO only had two members. Even Article 5 was still Article 5! U.S. presidents might also visit the island and have parades thrown in their honor. In fact, the United States at one point stationed more than 19,000 troops there, armed with nuclear weapons for a good portion of the time.”

In recent decades, Washington's relationship with Taipei has been dominated by 'strategic ambiguity,' where there is no official alliance relationship with Taiwan, no equivalent to NATO's Article 5 provision to trigger intervention upon invasion, and the U.S. response to questions about what it would do under invasion has been 'well I dunno' until the Biden administration.

“In more recent decades, Washington's relationship with Taipei has been dominated by something called 'strategic ambiguity.' There no longer is an official alliance relationship between the United States and Taiwan... Likewise, there no longer is an equivalent to NATO's Article 5 provision to trigger an intervention should Beijing initiate an invasion. And up until the Biden administration, the basic response to basic questions about what exactly the United States would do under those circumstances could be summarized as 'well I dunno.'”

The Strait of Malacca is one of the world's major naval chokepoints (like Suez Canal, Panama Canal, Strait of Hormuz), and for China it is a lifeline: the PRC imports 11.3 million barrels of oil per day primarily from Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq, with 80% visiting the Strait of Malacca.

“It is one of the world's major naval chokepoints, up there with the Suez Canal, the Panama Canal, and the Strait of Hormuz. But for the PRC, Malacca is a lifeline... the PRC imports 11.3 million barrels of oil per day, with Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq as its chief exporters... 80% of oil imported to mainland China first visits these waters.”

China has been taking actions to mitigate energy vulnerability including green energy initiatives, working on land-borne pipelines from Kazakhstan along the Caspian Sea to Xinjiang, or waiting for the Arctic Ocean to melt for Russian oil delivery—but currently maintains only 40-50 days of strategic petroleum reserves.

“Beijing has been working on land-borne pipelines that are blockade-proof, especially one that runs from the Kazak coastline along the Caspian Sea to … oh, look at that, we are back in Xinjiang again. Or Beijing could just wait until the Arctic Ocean melts... For now, the mainland has a strategic petroleum reserve. The size of it is unknown, but the best guess is that it contains 40 to 50 days of oil.”

Russia's plan for Ukraine was also a three-day special military operation intended to achieve quick victory before the international community could respond, but Moscow went with half measures and the result is a years-long conflict.

“That, incidentally, was Russia's plan for a three-day special military operation in Ukraine. But Moscow went with a half measure, and so here we are today.”

The United States took critical measures on October 7, 2022 and October 17, 2023 consisting of export controls aimed to prevent China from obtaining precursor technology to construct advanced semiconductor fabs on the mainland, including prohibiting anyone with a U.S. passport or green card from working with Chinese firms on the technology.

“The United States quietly took a pair of critical measures in that regard on October 7, 2022 and October 17, 2023. These were a series of export controls, aimed to prevent the PRC from obtaining the precursor technology to construct advanced semiconductor fabs on the mainland. Beyond the more basic banning of the physical transport of goods, the measures also prohibited anyone with a U.S. passport or green card from working with Chinese firms on the technology.”

While U.S.-Vietnamese relations come with significant historical baggage from the Vietnam War, Hanoi views Beijing as the bigger threat today, and the U.S. has an active effort to improve relations with Vietnam, including visits from successive administrations geared toward nudging the country westward.

“And though U.S.-Vietnamese relations come with its own baggage—okay, a lot of baggage—Hanoi views Beijing as the bigger threat today. But whether it is Japan, Vietnam, or otherwise, the United States has an active effort to improve relations with Vietnam, with visits from successive administrations geared toward nudging the country westward.”

Taiwan's incoming naval vessels must navigate seaborne minefields running kilometers deep, which Taiwan will have months to lay given that the PRC may take more than a month to stage the invasion, allowing Taiwan time to prepare extensive defenses.

“Whatever ships that do survive the initial barrage will then have to get lucky navigating seaborne minefields. These will run kilometers deep—and Taiwan will have plenty of time to lay them given that it might take more than a month for the PRC to stage the invasion.”

Alliance prevention is a common explanation for the 2008 war between Georgia and Russia; NATO began looking into Georgia joining the alliance at its annual summit, with the summit declaration stating Georgia would become a member, though no clear timetable was given.

“To substantively ground that idea, alliance prevention is a common explanation for the 2008 war between Georgia and Russia. A few months before the war, at its annual summit, NATO had begun looking into Georgia joining the alliance. Indeed, the summit's final declaration stated that Georgia would become a member, though no clear timetable was given.”

The Kremlin invaded Georgia in 2008 when Russian troops went into South Ossetia and Abkhazia to maintain territorial disputes, and the Kremlin has provided political support ever since to keep those regions messy and prevent NATO membership.

“And that is exactly what happened in 2008, when Russian troops went into those areas. The Kremlin has provided political support ever since.”

If war is the result of Beijing's waning military power and economic growth is a counterbalance to demographic troubles, then Evergrande's failure constituted a force for peace and its collapse is a cause for concern regarding war prevention.

“But if war will be the result of Beijing's waning military power, and economic growth is a counterbalance to its demographic troubles, then Evergrande was a force for peace, and its failure is a cause for concern.”

Whether it is Japan, Vietnam, or otherwise, the timing of enhanced relationships with potential coalition partners matters critically: if partners suddenly join or strengthen commitment once Taiwan threat emerges, expectations about outcomes today versus later get squeezed together; if Beijing anticipates relationships won't fully form until years later, preventive war incentives reemerge.

“But whether it is Japan, Vietnam, or otherwise, the timing of the enhanced relationship matters. If partners suddenly join up or strengthen their commitment, once again expectations about outcomes today versus later get squeezed. But if Beijing starts anticipating that the relationships will not fully form until years down the line, then we are back to the preventive war incentives.”

During World War II, U.S. GIs showed up to Iwo Jima and Okinawa, examined Taiwan, and said 'hard pass,' illustrating how even the world's dominant military power at the time would have struggled with an amphibious invasion of Taiwan.

“It is for all of those reasons that when the United States was island hopping during World War II, GIs showed up to Iwo Jima and Okinawa and then took one look at Taiwan and said hard pass.”

Taiwan technically declared itself the 'core of China's core interest' during a 2023 meeting with the EU, but there is a distinction between 'core' and CORE; no place is vital to 'core' identity if it has been outside capital control for three quarters of a century and the mainland government continues functioning without it.

“Breaking news! Leaders lie! Yes, Taiwan is relatively more central to inter-Strait relations... However, political claims to the contrary notwithstanding, no place is vital to 'core' identity if it somehow skirts capital control for three quarters of a century and yet the mainland government continues to function without it.”

At some point it became fashionable to pretend that we have not learned anything about preventive wars over 2,500 years, suggesting that policymakers are repeating historical patterns rather than learning from them.

“Somewhere along the line, it became fashionable to pretend that we have not learned anything about preventive wars over the last 2500 years. [Sigh.] This headline says it all.”

The PRC is not willing to sacrifice Beijing or Shanghai just because the United States is erecting barriers to invading Taiwan, making nuclear escalation extremely unlikely over the Taiwan issue.

“The PRC is not willing to sacrifice Beijing or Shanghai just because the United States is erecting barriers to invading Taiwan.”

The mainland's military capacity is still on the rise, but its trajectory is not good: its power will peak soon and then begin to fall off, creating an incentive to use military force now rather than later when power is declining.

“What we are left with is the reverse of the concerns during the Obama years. The mainland's military capacity is still on the rise, but its trajectory is not looking good: Its power will peak soon and then begin to fall off. Thus, a war now may be expected to hold Taiwan down to, say, here, but eventually the expected outcome will jump up to, say, here. Even the costs of war might not be able to save the parties from a cataclysm.”

There are three clear solutions to preventing a China-Taiwan war: economic interdependence between China and Taiwan/US, military preparation to mitigate expected power shifts, and coalition-building to preserve Taiwan's long-term advantages.

“But there are three clear solutions to the problem, and they call back the earlier chapter with the sanity check. Let's start with economic interdependence.”

The US would likely evacuate TSMC staff and equipment during invasion (since US needs semiconductors for military purposes), and ASML (the Dutch fab manufacturer) could restart production elsewhere (like Phoenix), meaning the semiconductor supply chain would not be permanently disrupted even if Taiwan fell.

“The United States will need semiconductors to militarily counter China, and so evacuating the staff of fabrication plants to safer grounds is critical... Fortunately, the company that builds the fabs that TSMC operates is ASML, and if you will forgive the alphabet soup that I am creating, ASML is Dutch, so it is feasible-ish to reset things in, say, Phoenix.”

If the PRC cannot produce its own semiconductors and cannot expropriate semiconductor fabs through invasion, it is left purchasing them from Taiwan—and in the long run perhaps more from the United States too—meaning the restriction dissuades an invasion.

“Anyway, the point is that if the PRC cannot produce its own semiconductors, and it cannot expropriate semiconductor fabs through an invasion, it is left purchasing them from Taiwan—and in the long run perhaps more from the United States too. Either way, the restriction dissuades an invasion.”