Michael Sandel: How the Left Paved the Way for Trump | The Agenda

For most of the neoliberal era, there was no serious debate about whether free trade agreements, deregulation of finance, and insistence on free capital flows across borders actually served the public good; these arrangements were presented as inevitable forces of nature rather than political choices subject to democratic deliberation.

“so people felt not only that inequality was deepening but that they really their voices didn't matter they weren't really being consulted we weren't debating whether this new set of economic arrangements and the deregulation of the financial industry whether that really served the public good”

JD Vance's statement to Joe Rogan about the East Palestine train disaster—arguing that railroads privatize rewards but socialize costs by having taxpayers and local residents absorb disaster expenses while receiving only minor fines—represents a genuinely populist economic critique that could have come from Bernie Sanders.

“think of all the cost of that disaster think of the health care costs the welfare cost from people who lost their jobs the declining home values in that Community just all of the costs absorbed by that community and the railroads are paying slap on the hand fines and it sort of occurred to me that the reason they're not more serious about these train disasters is because they're privatizing their rewards but when a a major train disaster happens who who picks up the tab it's the local residents and it's the American taxpayer and that's something that fundamentally has to change”

Kamala Harris's campaign generated temporary enthusiasm after Biden's poor debate performance, but that energy was not rooted in fundamental Democratic rethinking of economic policy or working-class appeal, making it an unsustainable morale boost rather than evidence of genuine party revival.

“well it's true she did energize the campaign after Biden's disastrous debate performance revealed the uh the advancing age and its infirmities but that energy proved shortlived because while it was a morale booster for a time it wasn't based on any fundamental rethinking of what the Democratic party had to offer especially the workingclass voters who had faced nearly five Decades of wage stagnation and a sense that Elites were looking down on them”

Trump's first term achieved one major policy: a massive tax cut that went mainly to the wealthy and to big corporations—which is 'plutocratic populism': populist rhetoric without populist governance.

“what Trump did in his first term his only real achievement was a massive tax cut that went mainly to the wealthy and to Big corporations so that's plutocratic populism”

Trump's inauguration tableau—with billionaires and tech moguls including Elon Musk, Mark Zuckerberg, and Jeff Bezos seated prominently—contradicts a genuine populist commitment; real populists would seek to challenge and hold these tech companies and their founders democratically accountable, not celebrate their centrality to power.

“and the inaugural Tableau did you see yes up Se behind him right among his family no less were the titans of big Tech from Elon Musk to Mark Zuckerberg and Jeff Bezos this is not a populist Tableau these are the big tech companies and Moguls that real populists want to challenge and hold a democratic account”

The deepening class inequalities have resulted in increasing class segregation and sorting, with wealthy people opting out of public institutions by moving to private spaces (private health clubs, private schools, private boxes at stadiums) rather than participating in class-mixing civic institutions, eroding the shared democratic experience.

“one of the most corrosive effects of the deepening inequalities has been that we increasingly live separate lives a kind of class segregation almost that tracks education to some degree”

The gains from economic growth during the neoliberal era were not fairly distributed: while the system did produce growth, almost all of it went to the top 10-20 percent, while the bottom half of the United States experienced stagnant wages in real terms for nearly five decades.

“the system did produce economic growth that much of the promise it did achieve problem is almost all of the growth of that period went to the top 10% or 20% the bottom half in the United States at least experienced in real terms stagnant wages for nearly five decades”

The Democratic Party and center-left parties embraced market-driven neoliberalism, deregulation, and free trade agreements while never challenging the fundamental premise that market mechanisms are the primary instruments for defining and achieving the public good, leading to globalization presented as inevitable rather than subject to democratic deliberation.

“the Democratic Party by embracing and this goes back to the to the 19 1990s I mean it it began the the maret triumphalist faith as a governing philosophy began with Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher who argued explicitly that government is the problem and markets are the solution but even after they were succeeded on the political scene by Center left parties Bill Clinton in the United States and the new Democrats Tony Blair in Britain ghard schroer in Germany with these Center left successors to the Reagan Era did was they softened the harsh edges of a pure Les a fair system but they never challenge the fundamental premise of the market Faith the idea that market mechanisms are the primary instruments for defining and achieving the public good”

Progressive politics should reframe around honoring and renewing the dignity of work, making life better, and recognizing everyone who contributes to the common good through their work, families, and community service—regardless of whether they possess prestigious credentials.

“I would shift the terms of political argument toward what does it mean to honor and renew the Dignity of work to make life better and to honor and recognize everyone who contributes to the common good through the work they do the families they raise the communities they serve whether or not they have prestigious credentials”

The political center-left is exhausted not only politically but ideologically and in need of fundamental rethinking of its mission and purpose, representing a broader crisis of center-left parties globally.

“a moment of danger for democracy and also a moment when the center left seems exhausted politically but also ideologically in need of rethinking its Mission and purpose”

The hyper-globalization of the neoliberal era essentially discredited national community and disempowered nation-states, which are the primary vehicles through which citizens can make their voices heard and exercise democratic agency.

“what those free trade agreements of the neoliberal era were mainly about we not reducing tariffs which were already pretty low by that time they were mainly about enforcing um intellectual certain you know property rights intellectual property rights regime so that Disney could continue to patent Mickey Mouse long into the future uh pharmaceutical patents that would be expended uh extended to prevent generic the generic manufacturer of drugs there were all kinds of things built into those pre- trade agreements so the mistake was the kind of hyper globalization that we had that essentially uh discredit Ed National community and disempowered nation states which are the primary vehicle for enabling citizens to make their voices heard”

Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher explicitly argued that 'government is the problem and markets are the solution,' and while Clinton, Blair, and Schröder offered Center-left alternatives, they never challenged the fundamental premise of market faith—they only softened the harsh edges of pure laissez-faire.

“this goes back to the to the 19 1990s I mean it it began the the maret triumphalist faith as a governing philosophy began with Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher who argued explicitly that government is the problem and markets are the solution but even after they were succeeded on the political scene by Center left parties Bill Clinton in the United States and the new Democrats Tony Blair in Britain ghard schroer in Germany with these Center left successors to the Reagan Era did was they softened the harsh edges of a pure Les a fair system but they never challenge the fundamental premise of the market Faith”

Almost every incumbent center-left government worldwide lost or saw its vote share significantly reduced, indicating a global pattern of center-left electoral collapse beyond the U.S.

“almost every incumbent Democratic small D democratic government in the world either lost or certainly saw its vote share reduced”

The meritocratic hubris of successful people constitutes a distinct and toxically polarizing divide: winners of globalization not only claimed their wealth but also claimed that their success was their own doing and the measure of their merit, creating resentment distinct from (though related to) wealth inequality—this meritocratic divide between winners and losers is what poisons politics.

“the resentment of against against Elites is not against Elites who are in business or wealthy As Trump is wealthy it's resentment against credential elit against meritocratic Elites who many people feel uh look down on them and so um one way of summing it up is that the market driven version of hyper globalization deepened The Divide between rich and poor but the meritocratic hubris of the successful during that same period is what created the Divide between winners and losers that's the Divide that's toxic to our politics that polarizes us”

The Democratic Party enabled Trump's rise by losing its energy, sense of mission, and most critically by alienating working-class voters—who once constituted their primary base—through its embrace of market-driven neoliberal globalization and deregulation over the past three decades.

“part of what enabled Donald Trump to win a second term in the White House is that the Democratic party I think had lost its energy its sense of mission and purpose and in particular U it's alienated working people the working class of Voters who once constituted the primary base of their support”

The in-coate discontent of the 1990s has hardened into anger and resentment, driven largely by the way market-driven neoliberal globalization was executed, which created growing inequalities and a deepening divide between winners and losers; and the financial crash and bank bailout crystallized this anger into permanent political alienation.

“now we awaken to a world in which those in coate sources of discontent have hardened into anger and resentment having in large part I to do I think with the way the market driven or neoliberal version of globalization was played out and the growing inequalities it created and the deepening divide between winners and losers over recent decades”

The implicit identity message of globalization was that national borders matter less and national identity/patriotism are backward, but this discredited the legitimate aspiration of people to belong, to feel situated in community, and to share citizenship and mutual obligations—which Democrats mistakenly ceded to the right rather than reinterpreting for a progressive politics.

“the flow of immigrants across borders we don't really want to get into that because we we sort of believe now that borders don't matter and by implication if borders don't matter neither do National identities but what about shared citizenship so here's where economics and identity are intertwined they go together and I I think the Democrats missed that and and they they embraced a certain view of identity that discredited people's uh aspiration to belong to be situated in their world to feel a sense that citizenship matters that we have mutual obligations for one another and so I think it was a mistake for Democrats to seed Patriot ISM sense of community to the right rather than to reinterpret the meaning of patriotism community and solidarity to inform a progressive politics”

Identity politics and economic issues are not separable; all politics involves competing conceptions of identity and citizenship. The globalization debate carried implicit identity messages: the 'open/closed' framing meant that challenging deregulation and capital flows was framed as closed-minded, parochial, or bigoted, while supporting them was 'open' and cosmopolitan.

“here's why all of politics almost all of politics Steve involves competing conceptions of identity ultimately what does it mean to be a citizen what are our mutual obligations to one another and so identity and economics are bound up together”

A woman from Iowa said to Sandel 'we can read in Iowa,' communicating that Coastal Elites hold disdainful views of rural Americans' intelligence; this exemplifies that resentment of elites is not primarily directed at wealthy business people (like Trump) but at credentialed, meritocratic elites whom working people feel look down on them.

“she asked me where are you from I said uh I said Boston and she said uh well I'm from Iowa and you know we can read in Iowa I I didn't know where that came from I hadn't said I'm from Harvard I hadn't said I'm professor all I said was Boston and then as she uh as she got out of the elevator over her shoulder she said we don't much like people on the coasts”

Beneath the 1990s peace and prosperity and the triumphalism about democratic capitalism lay rumbling sources of discontent: a growing sense of disempowerment and loss of control over forces governing one's life, and a sense that the moral fabric of community from family to neighborhood to nation was unraveling.

“beneath the peace and prosperity of the 1990s and amidst the the hubris that our version of democratic capitalism had won won the day the Berlin Wall had fallen the Soviet Union had given way beneath that optimism and I would say also hubris were rumbling sources of discontent having to do partly with a sense that people were less and less in control of the forces that governed their lives a growing sense of disempowerment a worry about the project of self-government that was one source of worry the other was a sense that the moral fabric of community from family to Neighborhood to nation was unraveling around us”

The MAGA movement faces a critical open question: whether it will develop a genuine strand of populist critique that challenges concentrated corporate power or whether it will use populist rhetoric at election time while governing in a plutocratic way (favoring the wealthy and corporations), as Trump's first term demonstrated through its main achievement being a massive tax cut benefiting the wealthy and corporations.

“so the real open question here uh for the M movement is whether it will develop this strand of populist critique of concentrated economic power or whether it will simply use populist rhetoric at election time but govern in a kind of plutocratic populist way which is what Trump did in his first term his only real achievement was a massive tax cut that went mainly to the wealthy and to Big corporations”

The 2024 Trump election win, combined with incumbent democratic governments globally either losing or seeing vote share reduced, signals not a one-off fluke but potentially the opening of a new era in politics—one that may be remembered as the age of Trump, with Biden's presidency possibly retrospectively viewed as an interregnum rather than a restoration.

“we will remember in 2016 Donald Trump winning his first term and a lot of people at the time said well this is just a one-off it's a fluke...well clearly that was not the case CU he's back so do you think we have entered what I guess historians will look back at as a new era in politics yes”

A starting point for restoring democratic health and dignity is to shift political rhetoric and policy away from the assumption that the solution to inequality is individual self-improvement (getting a college degree), since two-thirds of Americans lack four-year degrees and it is folly to make a degree a necessary condition for dignified work.

“I think we need to begin by Shifting the political rhetoric but also the political project away from saying the solution to inequality and wage stagnation is for you to improve yourself if you're struggling by going and getting a college degree about about 2third of Americans do not have four-year degree so it's Folly to create an economy that makes uh a necessary condition of dignified work in a decent life a four-year degree that most people don't have”

The Democratic Party and center-left parties globally need to figure out what the source of discontent, anger, and resentment is and how to speak to it, rather than dismissing it or hoping it will disappear.

“the Democrats Steve haven't figured out a way to speak to the sense of grievance the discontent with democracy I dare say this is true of Center left parties in many democracies around the world the sense of discontent even the anger and resentment that Trump is able to exploit Democrats and Center left parties need to figure out what's the source of it and how to speak to it”

Americans and Democrats in recent politics have understood freedom too narrowly and individualistically—primarily as freedom of individual choice, especially regarding abortion—rather than as the broader civic freedom of deliberating together as fellow citizens about self-government, community purposes, and economic arrangements hospitable to self-government.

“Freedom was but Freedom understood too narrowly too individualistically I would say by Freedom Americans generally and the Democrats especially in this campaign really mean the freedom to choose now in the context of the debate about abortion restrictions that's understandable and that was a potent and legitimate issue”

The resentment against elites is not primarily directed at elites who are wealthy or in business, but at credentialed elites and meritocratic winners—those who not only won under globalization but insisted that their winnings were deserved and due to their own merit rather than luck or systemic advantage.

“this was not really about this was not about woke identity this was about the that many people have many working people many people who live in rural areas or in the middle of the country that Coastal Elites credentialed Elites well-educated Elites look down on them and this this is what I've called the tyranny of Merit the way in which uh the sense among many of the those the winners of globalization have not been content only with the winning but also want to uh claim that their winnings are their due that their success is their own doing the measure of their Merit”

A key step in democratic renewal is to rebuild civic infrastructure and class-mixing institutions—public places and common spaces that gather people from different walks of life, class backgrounds, and ethnicities together in the ordinary course of life, so they learn to negotiate differences and develop care for the common good.

“democracy does not require perfect equality but what it does require is that people from different walks of life different class backgrounds different ethnic backgrounds encounter one another in the ordinary course of the day because this is how we learn to negotiate and to abide our differences and this is how we come to care for the common good and so we need to rebuild those class mixing institutions the public places and common spaces that gather us together even inadvertently well to speak of our shared love of baseball in a stadium in a sports Stadium or in a library or in public transit or in a public park where our kids go to play rather than U opting out seceding from public places by going to the Private health Club”

The divide created by meritocratic hubris—where winners claim their success proves their merit—is the divide toxic to politics and polarizing; the market-driven version of hyper-globalization deepened the divide between rich and poor, but the meritocratic hubris of the successful created the divide between winners and losers that is most toxic.

“one way of summing it up is that the market driven version of hyper globalization deepened The Divide between rich and poor but the meritocratic hubris of the successful during that same period is what created the Divide between winners and losers that's the Divide that's toxic to our politics that polarizes us”

Trump's 2025 inauguration tableau—with Elon Musk, Mark Zuckerberg, Jeff Bezos, and other big tech moguls seated prominently—contradicts populist rhetoric and suggests plutocratic rather than genuinely populist governance, as real populists would challenge and hold these tech companies democratically accountable.

“the inaugural Tableau did you see yes up SE behind him right among his family no less were the titans of big Tech from Elon Musk to Mark Zuckerberg and Jeff Bezos this is not a populist Tableau these are the big tech companies and Moguls that real populists want to challenge and hold a democratic account”

The erosion of class-mixing public institutions like baseball stadiums is evident in the shift from 50 years ago when rich and poor sat together in stadium stands, to today when the rich sit in private boxes while lower-income people cannot afford tickets at all (e.g., $75 for outfield seats).

“if you look at any home movies from Fenway Park from 50 years ago the rich and the poor were sitting together in the states in the standing in the stands and nowadays you know the rich are up in their private boxes and the lower income people aren't going to the games anymore at all because even to sit in the Outfield is 75 bucks which is certainly well beyond uh the ability of most”

A conversation between Sandel and a woman from Iowa in a Florida elevator revealed a key resentment: she said 'we don't much like people on the coasts' in response to his saying he was from Boston, illustrating the working class's sense that coastal credentialed elites look down on them.

“she asked me where are you from I said uh I said Boston and she said uh well I'm from Iowa and you know we can read in Iowa I I didn't know where that came from I hadn't said I'm from Harvard I hadn't said I'm professor all I said was Boston and then as she uh as she got out of the elevator over her shoulder she said we don't much like people on the coasts”

Democratic optimism about Harris re-energizing the campaign after Biden's exit was misplaced because the energy was not grounded in any fundamental rethinking of economic policy or the party's offer to working people; thus surface enthusiasm proved shortlived.

“well it's true she did energize the campaign after Biden's disastrous debate performance revealed the uh the advancing age and its infirmities but that energy proved shortlived because while it was a morale booster for a time it wasn't based on any fundamental rethinking of what the Democratic party had to offer especially the workingclass voters who had faced nearly five Decades of wage stagnation”