Mick Ryan: This Is What The Next Great Power Conflict Will Look Like
What this covers
➡️ PATREON: https://www.patreon.com/DecodingGeopolitics
Support this podcast on Patreon, help me make more episodes and get bonus content, early access and ask questions to the upcoming guests.
This is a conversation with General Mick Ryan. Mick is a former high commanding officer in the Australian Army and today works mostly on the topic of the future of war. He wrote two excellent books - War Transformed in which he explains how technology will shape future conflicts and White Sun War - a fictional account of war over Taiwan in which he brings these ideas to life and shows how devastating a superpower conflict would look like. In this interview we talk about all of that and much more.
Enjoy the conversation.
0:00 - Intro 01:12 - The Changing Character of War 05:58 - Ukraine and the Future of War 17:28 - Quantity over Quality in War 19:40 - Why We Always Prepare for the Wrong Wars 22:03 - Information War 27:05 - How Western Militaries Need to Change 33:28 - What Will War With China Look Like
Source description (no synthesized summary yet).
General Mick Ryan argues that future great power conflicts will be shaped by three transformative technologies (signature battle, democratized digital command and control, and ubiquitous uncrewed systems), but success will ultimately depend less on technology than on organizational innovation, adaptive warfighting doctrine, and prioritizing people over machines.
- Ukraine demonstrates that meshing civil and military intelligence sensors with AI creates decision-making pressure that favors defense and makes force concentration nearly impossible without detection
- The integration of old and new technologies (trenches with drones, Soviet tanks with AI) is a constant institutional battle; getting this balance wrong in peacetime wastes money, in war wastes lives
- Democracies' strategic advantage lies not in technological superiority but in their ability to listen to diverse ideas and adapt faster than centralized authoritarian militaries
This asset isn't compiled yet
You're seeing its claims, ranked. Compile it to build the argument threads, weight them, and check each claim against your library — the full view.
The meshing of civil and military intelligence sources with government and commercial analytical capabilities driven by AI and big data analytics is fundamentally changing how much time military commanders have to make decisions on the battlefield.
“the meshing of civil and Military senses on the battlefield and in strategic spaces what used to be known as open source intelligence um you know has a really important role mesed with military intelligence and and information from other other government sources but overlay that is a range of government and Commercial analytical capabilities some of them driven by AI some by big data analytics that is very much changing how we see the battle space and it's changing uh how much time we have to make decisions”
Despite risk aversion in democracies regarding military operations, people remain the foundation of every military organization; investing in training, educating, and building people who can learn and adapt at all levels faster than an adversary are critical strategic advantages in the 21st century.
“the foundation of every military organization is people so investing in techn technology is important but investing in people building uh training uh educating people um being able to learn and adapt at all levels better and more quickly than an adversary are critical strategic advantages in the 21st century it's been vital for Ukraine it's one of the ways that kept ahead of Russia is not through technology but through how they've been able to learn and adapt through different experiences at different level of the institution throughout this war”
People must remain at the center of military systems despite technological advancement; investing in technology is important but must be balanced by investment in people—training, education, and capability to learn and adapt faster than adversaries are critical strategic advantages.
“the foundation of every military organization is people so investing in techn technology is important but investing in people building uh training uh educating people um being able to learn and adapt at all levels better and more quickly than an adversary are critical strategic advantages in the 21st century it's been vital for Ukraine it's one of the ways that kept ahead of Russia is not through technology but through how they've been able to learn and adapt through different experiences at different level of the institution throughout this war”
Currently, warfare heavily favors defense over offense because ubiquitous sensors make force concentration suicidal, but this is not permanent; historically, new technologies outpace existing organizational and doctrinal constructs, and eventually new warfighting approaches emerge that restore offensive advantage.
“mean these things go through phases we've seen this before where the introduction of new technologies outpaces the organization and doctrinal constructs of of existing military institutions we saw it during the first world war we we've seen it in other parts of History so uh this is a result of new technologies um so what's going to change the current situation is not technology what will change the current situation is the work on different organizational constructs and more importantly new war fighting constructs that use people and Technology differently and more creatively um it took a long time to work through the stalemate that emerged at the end of 1914 to come up with the tactics and approaches that saw the large breakthroughs that the Allies were able to make in 1918”
There is no historical evidence for 'wonder weapons' or silver bullet solutions; over-relying on single systems is both intellectually lazy and morally perilous; success comes from integration of many technologies with many ideas and organizations led by well-trained, educated humans.
“there is no wonder weapon uh I think too many people every time a new weapon is given to Ukraine it's seen as some form of Silver Bullet there is no historical evidence that such a thing exists it just doesn't uh it is the integration of many different Technologies with many different ideas and many different organizations in uh military institutions that are well-led by well trained and educated humans that give you the best chance of success and trying to over rely on one system is both intellectually uh lazy but morally very perilous”
There is no paradox in drones and trenches coexisting; trenches predate the First World War by centuries and go back to medieval siege warfare, and militaries must keep what makes them effective while also adopting new capabilities.
“there's there's no Paradox in in drones and trenches coexisting I mean in war um you know we don't throw out old ideas uh the idea of trench warfare predates the first world war it predates the US Civil War you know uh the use of trenches and warfare goes all the way back to the sapping that used to take place in the sieges of enemy Forts and castles a thousand years ago um so you know this is a very old idea but so is good leadership and we're not saying that is outdated so what militaries must do is try and ensure they keep things that uh make them effective that keep as many of their soldiers alive as possible whilst also ensuring they're able to win battles and it's this merger of old and new that is a constant battle in every military institution in peace and War”
Military institutions engage in a constant internal battle between old and new ideas even in peacetime; the difference between peace and war is that if you get it wrong in peace you waste money, but if you get it wrong in war you waste lives.
“there's a constant battle for the soul of a military institution between old and new ideas even in peace time we saw this in Ukraine and Russia in the decade before this War I mean both Russia and Ukraine had Fairly significant military transformation programs where there's a a battle between old and new ideas and that's what we're seeing on the battle field the difference between peace and war is if you get it wrong in the peace you waste money if you get it wrong in war you waste lives”
Despite hundreds of fictional works predicting future warfare (particularly before WWI), history shows poor predictive accuracy; however, some predictions proved accurate (Bernardi predicted tanks, H.G. Wells predicted chemical/biological weapons and mass mobilization), demonstrating that informed attempts to forecast warfare remain worthwhile, especially during periods of peace when the next adversary may be unclear.
“the the the uh finding in in Lor's book is that despite the huge amount of work particularly done before World War I there was something like 400 fictional works the vast majority were unable to predict a lot of what happened now some Works did you know uh Bernardi from Prussia uh did you know predict athletes um which didn't really happen in world one but certainly happened in World War II I mean HG wells's book The War of the Worlds predicted large scale use of chemical and biological weapons as well as mass mobilization of populations and industry”
Falsehoods and lies spread more quickly through the internet and social media than truth, according to MIT research, and authoritarian governments can spread misinformation freely while democratic governments that tell the truth face a structural disadvantage in information space.
“authoritarians can say whatever they want and we know from studies in places like Massachusetts Institute of Technology that uh falsehoods and lies spread more quickly through the internet and social media that they've done the research they know that this happens um and the real problem we have is that democratically elected governments at least in theory avoid telling lies they try and tell the truth to a range of audiences”
Information warfare is not new to the 21st century; it dates to antiquity with methods like espionage, whispering campaigns, and misinformation, but the novelty is in new technologies (social media, big data, AI, high-performance computing) that enable targeting populations, developing messages, testing, and assessing impacts at scales previously inconceivable.
“this idea that infowar is something new for the 21st century is uh 100% wrong uh people all the way back to Antiquity engaged in information Warfare they just had very different tools you know in the days of Alexander uh the Greek city states the Romans engaged in information Warfare it was then using spies um you know Whispering campaigns misinformation these kind of things so it's always been part of War what is very different in the current ERA is that the Technologies of things like social media Big Data data Sciences high performance Computing artificial intelligence allows us to identify Target population develop messages test and wargame those messages uh run them out and then uh assess the impact of that messaging in a way that was inconceivable uh you know a couple of decades ago”
The closing of the time between target detection and destruction has been reduced to a couple of minutes in Ukraine, a dramatic decrease from the beginning of the war, representing a practical manifestation of the convergence of sensor networks.
“one of the most widespread manifestation of this n sensor network is the closing of the time between when a Target is detected and when it's destroyed you know it's been brought down to a couple of minutes now that was not the case at the beginning of the war”
Both Ukrainian and Russian forces now face severe problems in massing troops and creating meaningful tactical or operational breakthroughs on the battlefield because the enemy picks up any force concentration quickly, making it almost impossible to generate battlefield surprise.
“another manifestation was the problems that both sides are now having in massing troops and creating meaningful uh tactical or operational breakthroughs on the battlefield I think the Ukrainian counter offensive was an example of this that it's just very difficult to concentrate forces without the enemy picking it up which means it's almost impossible to generate Battlefield surprise”
Wars create existential pressures that enable technology adoption at speeds previously unimaginable, as demonstrated by WWI-to-WWII transition from biplanes to jet fighters, suggesting US-China war would drive unprecedented technological adaptation rates.
“remember during World War II we went from uh by planes to jet planes um so you know Wars tend to have uh a driving force there's an existential nature that allows things to happen at speeds that were previously unimaginable and I think a war between the US and China would see both sides adapting at speeds that would probably be historically unprecedented”
There is no historical evidence for the existence of a 'wonder weapon' or 'silver bullet' in warfare; relying on a single weapon system is both intellectually lazy and morally perilous, as success requires integration of multiple technologies, ideas, and organizations under well-led, well-trained, educated humans.
“there is no wonder weapon uh I think too many people every time a new weapon is given to Ukraine it's seen as some form of Silver Bullet there is no historical evidence that such a thing exists it just doesn't uh it is the integration of many different Technologies with many different ideas and many different organizations in uh military institutions that are well-led by well trained and educated humans that give you the best chance of success and trying to over rely on one system is both intellectually uh lazy but morally very perilous”
The difference between peacetime military innovation and wartime military innovation is that getting the mix of old and new wrong in peace wastes money, but getting it wrong in war wastes lives.
“the difference between peace and war is if you get it wrong in the peace you waste money if you get it wrong in war you waste lives and that's what we're seeing in Ukraine at the moment is we're struggling with how to resolve some of the challenges we have and how to mix new and old Technologies with new ideas”
Despite humans being subject to huge uncertainty about future behavior even when known intimately for decades, attempting to predict future warfare through informed bets is valuable, particularly during long periods of peace when the next adversary may be unclear.
“there's absolutely no certainty about what they'll do next even if you know someone perfectly for for decades um and you know the the the the uh finding in in Lor's book is that despite the huge amount of work particularly done before World War I there was something like 400 fictional works the vast majority were unable to predict a lot of what happened... that doesn't mean we shouldn't uh at least try you've got to make some informed bets particularly in long periods of Peace where the next adversary may not be very clear”
In a large conflict between the PLA and US military, both sides would evolve and change from day one based on interactions, fighting, battles, and campaigns, illustrating that the army you start with is not the army you win with—same principle as in Ukraine.
“I think too you are seeing you know you'll see the same kind of Trends play out that we're seeing in Ukraine... I also think you'd see adaptation from both sides uh from day one you know the rule about the the Army you start with is not the Army you win with would be exactly the same in a large conflict between the PLA and the US military both of them would evolve and change based on the interactions between them based on the fighting the battles the campaigns they undertake”
Wars get out of control quickly as emotions rise, and there is no certainty in the trajectory of any war, particularly one of such magnitude between two nations with so much at stake, compounded by ideological clash.
“the thing with Wars is they get out of control pretty quickly emotions get up uh and there is no certainty in the trajectory of any War particularly one that's so large between two Nations that would have so much at stake in what would not just be a military battle but a massive Clash of ideology”
A war between the US and China over Taiwan would be distinct from all conflicts since 1945 because it would be the first major war between two nuclear-armed peer powers, introducing an unprecedented strategic unknown regarding nuclear weapons use.
“it would be very similar to what we saw in the second world war with some obvious differences uh clearly we've never had a major war between two nuclear powers that we haven't seen that before we've seen proxy wars between them might have been Vietnam or Korea and these kind of things uh and since August 1945 we haven't recrossed that Rubicon and I think everyone would like to hope that we never have to recross that Rubicon in the use of nuclear weapons so that is a significant uh strategic unknown in that kind of conflict”
Despite massive predictive efforts including approximately 400 fictional works written before World War I, most were unable to predict what actually happened in the war, though some predictions like Bernardi's prediction of aircraft and H.G. Wells' predictions of chemical/biological weapons and mass mobilization proved accurate.
“there was something like 400 fictional works the vast majority were unable to predict a lot of what happened now some Works did you know uh Bernardi from Prussia uh did you know predict athletes um which didn't really happen in world one but certainly happened in World War II I mean HG wells's book The War of the Worlds predicted large scale use of chemical and biological weapons as well as mass mobilization of populations and industry”
A near-peer or peer conflict between military superpowers (e.g., US-China over Taiwan) would resemble World War II but with the unprecedented factor that we have never seen a major war between two nuclear powers, creating a significant strategic unknown.
“would be very similar to what we saw in the second world war with some obvious differences uh clearly we've never had a major war between two nuclear powers that we haven't seen that before we've seen proxy wars between them might have been Vietnam or Korea and these kind of things uh and since August 1945 we haven't recrossed that Rubicon and I think everyone would like to hope that we never have to recross that Rubicon in the use of nuclear weapons so that is a significant uh strategic unknown in that kind of conflict”
The Russian Army of 2024 is not the same as the Russian Army that existed in 2022; in long wars, the army you start with is not the army you win with, requiring adaptation and evolution based on interactions and fighting.
“the Russian army of 2024 is not the same Russian army that existed in 2022 and most of long Wars like this the Army you start with is not the Army you win with”
The war in Ukraine is the most geostrategically consequential event in Europe since 1945; if Russia wins, it will threaten other neighbors, and if Russia succeeds, it will embolden other authoritarian regimes globally to prey on democratic neighbors, heralding a dark era where authoritarians dominate.
“the war in Ukraine is the most geostrategic consequential event in Europe since the second world war there is no doubt about that nothing since 1945 has been more consequential uh not just for European security but Global Security that's because if Russia wins one they will threaten other neighbors and if I was in the baltics OR Scandinavia or Poland I'd be deeply concerned uh and we don't have to Inuit this the thing with authoritarians is they love telling us what they're going to do Putin told us what he was going to do in Putin in uh Ukraine he and medv and the rest of those criminals have been telling Europeans what they're going to do to the baltics to Finland to Sweden to Norway to Poland and a range of other countries so we we don't have to guess at their future intentions and uh president X of China is doing exactly the same with Taiwan and other countries so the real and so the the reason why Ukraine is consequential is not just because we want the Ukrainian people to have a free prosperous and sovereign country country not just because we want Europe to be stable secure and prosperous because it's an engine of global growth and development but because if Russia wins it will embolden other authoritarians to do exactly the same it will Herald a new dark era in the 21st century where authoritarian Predators will pre on their Democratic neighbors”
Information warfare is not new; it dates back to antiquity, when Alexander, Greek city states, and Romans used spies, whispering campaigns, and misinformation, but what is new is the use of social media, big data, AI, and high-performance computing to identify target populations, develop messages, test them, and assess their impact at unprecedented speed and scale.
“violence and influence are two sides of the same coin when it comes to Warfare um this idea that infowar is something new for the 21st century is uh 100% wrong uh people all the way back to Antiquity engaged in information Warfare they just had very different tools you know in the days of Alexander uh the Greek city states the Romans engaged in information Warfare it was then using spies um you know Whispering campaigns misinformation these kind of things so it's always been part of War what is very different in the current ERA is that the Technologies of things like social media Big Data data Sciences high performance Computing artificial intelligence allows us to identify Target population develop messages test and wargame those messages uh run them out and then uh assess the impact of that messaging in a way that was inconceivable uh you know a couple of decades ago”
The advantage of democracies over autocracies in information space lies in their ability to listen to and leverage all voices and ideas from society, something Putin or Xi cannot allow without threatening regime survival.
“the superpower of democracies is that we can at least theoretically um listen to all voices and all ideas from all elements of society which is something that uh Putin or president she can never allow in their societies they just they cannot allow that and have their regimes survive so you know democracies just need to ReDiscover this superpower of the diversity of ideas that exists within and um really invest and leverage in all the different ideas that are inherent in Democratic systems”
The fundamental advantage of democracies over autocracies is that democracies can theoretically listen to all voices and ideas from all elements of society, which is something autocracies like Putin's Russia or China cannot allow and survive.
“the superpower of democracies is that we can at least theoretically um listen to all voices and all ideas from all elements of society which is something that uh Putin or president she can never allow in their societies they just they cannot allow that and have their regimes survive”
Modern warfare currently favors defense due to sensor networks and difficulty in achieving force concentration, but this is not a permanent state—new organizational constructs and doctrinal innovations rather than new technology will shift advantage back to offense, just as organizational changes between 1914 and 1918 broke the WWI stalemate.
“I mean these things go through phases we've seen this before where the introduction of new technologies outpaces the organization and doctrinal constructs of of existing military institutions we saw it during the first world war... so what's going to change the current situation is not technology what will change the current situation is the work on different organizational constructs and more importantly new war fighting constructs that use people and Technology differently and more creatively um it took a long time to work through the stalemate that emerged at the end of 1914 to come up with the tactics and approaches that saw the large breakthroughs that the Allies were able to make in 1918”
The meshing of civil and military sensors on the battlefield, including open-source intelligence combined with government and commercial analytical capabilities driven by AI and big data analytics, is fundamentally changing how military forces see the battle space and drastically reducing decision-making time.
“one is what I call the signature battle that is the Battle of signatures and that's being really hastened Along by the meshing of civil and Military senses on the battlefield and in strategic spaces what used to be known as open source intelligence um you know has a really important role mesed with military intelligence and and information from other other government sources but overlay that is a range of government and Commercial analytical capabilities some of them driven by AI some by big data analytics that is very much changing how we see the battle space and it's changing uh how much time we have to make decisions”
Ubiquitous uncrewed systems have undergone a combinatorial explosion since Russia's large-scale invasion of Ukraine, expanding from aerial systems into the maritime domain where Ukrainians have pioneered broad-range unmanned maritime strike systems that have proven highly successful against Russian naval vessels.
“the third one is ubiquitous uncr systems now for much of the last 80 years or so and this did begin in the second world war this has been aerial vehicles... we've seen a cambon explosion of uncrewed systems uh since the Russian large scale invasion of Ukraine right on two years ago and it's broadened from just the aerial domain into the maritime domain indeed the ukrainians probably lead the world in the development of a broad range of un crude Maritime strike systems that have proven very successful in targeting Russian naval vessels”
Strategic interdiction at maritime choke points would be a likely component of a US-China war, including the destruction of all Chinese shipping within a few thousand miles of the Chinese coast by the US and its allies as part of a logical campaign strategy.
“I'd also see strategic indiction at Maritime choke points you know I would imagine us and its allies destroying all Chinese shipping wherever it is uh within a few thousand miles of the Chinese Coastline I think that would be um part of a a logical campaign”
China prefers to incorporate Taiwan without an invasion and would rather win without fighting, but this does not mean invasion is off the table—it remains a live option that Xi has told the PLA to prepare for.
“China would rather uh incorporate Taiwan into the People's Republic without an invasion clearly it would rather win without fighting to put it in their words the most recent tan white paper is very clear about that but at the same time it does not take that off the table it is a live option that is on the table that g has told them to be prepared with”
Ubiquitous uncrewed systems have exploded since the Russian large-scale invasion of Ukraine two years ago, expanding from the aerial domain into the maritime domain, with Ukrainians leading the world in developing a broad range of uncrewed maritime strike systems proven effective against Russian naval vessels.
“ubiquitous uncr systems now for much of the last 80 years or so and this did begin in the second world war this has been aerial vehicles I mean it really started with uh the Germans and the Americans doing trials with remote controlled aircraft in the second world war all the way through Vietnam War and um Iraq Wars uh but we've seen a cambon explosion of uncrewed systems uh since the Russian large scale invasion of Ukraine right on two years ago and it's broadened from just the aerial domain into the maritime domain indeed the ukrainians probably lead the world in the development of a broad range of un crude Maritime strike systems that have proven very successful in targeting Russian naval vessels um and you know they've evolved their tactics and these kind of things”
Authoritarian leaders explicitly tell us their intentions (Putin regarding Ukraine, Baltic states, Finland, Sweden, Poland; Xi regarding Taiwan); we don't have to speculate about future intentions because they publicly announce them.
“the thing with authoritarians is they love telling us what they're going to do Putin told us what he was going to do in Putin in uh Ukraine he and medv and the rest of those criminals have been telling Europeans what they're going to do to the baltics to Finland to Sweden to Norway to Poland and a range of other countries so we we don't have to guess at their future intentions and uh president X of China is doing exactly the same with Taiwan and other countries”
The US has proven that when going to war, a whole lot of things become possible that were unimaginable a couple of years before, implying that many capabilities and innovations cannot be predicted in advance.
“I think the Americans have proven before that when they go to war a whole lot of things become possible that were unimaginable a couple years beforeand”
Governing tempo (the ability to control the speed of operations and sometimes deliberately slow things down) is more important than simply maximizing speed, and humans cannot sustain high-tempo operations continuously because of inherent human capacity limits.
“speed matters sometimes uh what's more important is to be able to govern Tempo because sometimes you might want to slow things down uh so been able to govern Tempo rather than just do everything quickly uh I think is more important and you can't do everything quickly all the time I mean humans only have so much capacity”
Authoritarian regimes have structural advantage in information warfare because they can lie freely and research shows falsehoods spread faster on social media than truth, while democracies are constrained by norms against deception and must maintain legitimacy through truthfulness.
“authoritarians can say whatever they want and we know from studies in places like Massachusetts Institute of Technology that uh falsehoods and lies spread more quickly through the internet and social media that they've done the research they know that this happens um and the real problem we have is that democratically elected governments at least in theory avoid telling lies they try and tell the truth to a range of audiences um and as Tom rid says in his most recent book which is a great case study at Russ misinformation over the last century there's a line in there where he says misinformation and democracy can't coexist”
The primary response to authoritarian information warfare should be transparency—bringing transparency to both friendly and adversary behavior so people can make informed judgments about truth claims and actions, rather than attempting to out-lie autocrats at their own game.
“I think one of the most important things we can do is bring transparency to what we're doing and to what they're doing so uh some of it is in messaging but a lot of it is in shining a light on all aspects of friendly and enemy Behaviour so people can make an informed judgment about what they're saying and what they're saying is going on whether it's true or not”
A war over Taiwan would be difficult to restrict to Taiwan and its region; it would likely see horizontal escalation throughout Southeast Asia, into Japan, and other countries very quickly, within weeks or months.
“finally I think it would be very difficult to imagine it being just restricted to Taiwan and its region I think you would see a horizontal ex escalation throughout southeast Asia uh into Japan into other countries uh very quickly within weeks or or months of some kind of War over Taiwan um it's hard to imagine that not occurring because they're both large capable actors that are able to generate multiple campaigns across a region are concurrently”
Russian information and strategic influence campaigns have demonstrated unprecedented success against the United States Congress, a capability that has caused distress to Ukrainian government and soldiers on the front line, reflecting Russia's strategic adaptation beyond military technology into information operations.
“they have continued to adapt their misinformation and strategic influence campaigns which I think has had a very significant impact on certain members of the US Congress uh to the you know to the distress of many of us in the west and the greater distress of the Ukrainian government and Soldiers on the front line”
The coexistence of trench warfare and thousands of drones in Ukraine is not paradoxical because old ideas like trenches (used since medieval sieges) persist in warfare because they keep soldiers alive and remain effective, and militaries must constantly balance old and new ideas.
“there's there's no Paradox in in drones and trenches coexisting I mean in war um you know we don't throw out old ideas uh the idea of trench warfare predates the first world war it predates the US Civil War you know uh the use of trenches and warfare goes all the way back to the sapping that used to take place in the sieges of enemy Forts and castles a thousand years ago um so you know this is a very old idea but so is good leadership and we're not saying that is outdated so what militaries must do is try and ensure they keep things that uh make them effective that keep as many of their soldiers alive as possible whilst also ensuring they're able to win battles and it's this merger of old and new that is a constant battle in every military institution in peace and War”
Tom Rid argues in his recent book on Russian misinformation that 'misinformation and democracy can't coexist,' presenting a fundamental incompatibility between democratic governance and the success of disinformation campaigns.
“as Tom rid says in his most recent book which is a great case study at Russ misinformation over the last century there's a line in there where he says misinformation and democracy can't coexist”
Strategic interdiction at maritime choke points would likely occur in a US-China conflict, with the US and allies destroying all Chinese shipping within a few thousand miles of the Chinese coastline as part of a logical campaign.
“I'd also see strategic indiction at Maritime choke points you know I would imagine us and its allies destroying all Chinese shipping wherever it is uh within a few thousand miles of the Chinese Coastline I think that would be um part of a a logical campaign”
China would prefer to incorporate Taiwan into the People's Republic without military invasion and prefers to win without fighting (in Chinese strategic terms), but an invasion remains a live military option that China's leadership has told the PLA to prepare for.
“China would rather uh incorporate Taiwan into the People's Republic without an invasion clearly it would rather win without fighting to put it in their words the most recent tan white paper is very clear about that but at the same time it does not take that off the table it is a live option that is on the table that g has told them to be prepared with”
Both sides in Ukraine now face extreme difficulty in massing troops and creating meaningful tactical or operational breakthroughs because the enemy can detect concentrations of forces, making it almost impossible to generate battlefield surprise.
“another manifestation was the problems that both sides are now having in massing troops and creating meaningful uh tactical or operational breakthroughs on the battlefield I think the Ukrainian counter offensive was an example of this that it's just very difficult to concentrate forces without the enemy picking it up which means it's almost impossible to generate Battlefield surprise”
Russian tactical adaptation to Ukrainian innovations has been slower than Ukrainian tactical adaptation, but Russian strategic adaptation at the personnel, defense industry, and supply-chain levels has been significant, including successful adaptation to ensure fire superiority over Ukraine at the two-year mark of the war.
“the Russians are adapting now in some cases they're adapting much slower than Ukrainian Battlefield forces there's a few different reasons for that I mean there's a very clear difference in the Tactical cultures of the ukrainians and the Russians ukrainians are more Innovative and they can uh make changes more quickly whereas the Russians have a more centralized command and are less Keen to report failure that said they still have learned and been I wouldn't say fast followers but followers of Ukrainian Innovation... I think where UK Russia probably has done best is at the strategic level so you know tactical adaptation is about winning battles strategic adaptation is about winning wars and I think you've seen the Russians adapt their strategic Personnel construct they did that back in 2022 with mobilization they adapted their defense industry... they have adapted uh their sources of Supply to ensure they have a fire superiority over Ukraine at the twoyear mark of this war”
Both the Chinese and Americans have conducted large-scale experimentation with ground-based autonomous systems (lethal and non-lethal) and are rolling them out; within a few years, given battlefield imperative and continued development, autonomous ground vehicles capable of lethal force could be fielded in a Taiwan war scenario by 2028.
“both the Chinese and the Americans have done large scale experimentation and are rolling out groundbased autonomous systems lethal and non-lethal and you know I think in this kind of fight you would see fairly significant human casualties there would be a huge imperative to wherever possible put robotss there instead of humans so I think you know given the state-of-the-art at the moment a few years more development I made some assumptions about battery life and these kind of things um but also the battlefield imperative to replace humans with machines I I think this is very possible”
A third major unsolved problem is determining the optimal integration of old and new technologies (tanks, artillery, radios, and electronic warfare merged with data sciences and autonomous systems), rather than accepting initial ad-hoc mergers of these systems.
“so they're just two of the problems that we're we're seeing at the moment there are others you know what is the best way to merge old and new technologies I mean uh we're seeing a lot of old Technologies tanks artillery uh radios ew merg with new technologies uh data Sciences uh autonomous systems and these kind of things uh what we seeing at the moment the optimal merger of them or just initial mergers of them”
Richard Hackett's book (implied: 'The Third World War') and Mick Ryan's 'White Sun War' are similar in identifying potential future threats and are a call to military and government institutions to invest now in deterrence, with the goal that through reading these books, policy makers might increase military investment to prevent having to spend orders of magnitude more fighting the wars described.
“I think there's close parallels in in what we're trying to do is identifying a potential and likely future threat and both books are kind of a a cry to Military and government institutions to invest now to deter uh uh the kind of things that happen in the book now ultimately both Richard and I I'm pretty sure would believe that uh you know you'd rather not fight if you can deter it that's always better the old Stitch and time saves nine and if through reading these book policy makers might think that well if we uh invest a little bit more in the military uh will prevent us having to spend an ordered magnitude more in fighting them at some point in the future”
A US-China war over Taiwan would require sustained mobilization of people and industry in both countries despite their size, and magazine depth (munitions stockpiles) would always be a constraint requiring expanded production capacity due to the huge expenditure of precision munitions in modern warfare.
“you'll see the same kind of Trends play out that we're seeing in Ukraine the need for ongoing sustained mobilization of people and Industry in both countries um no matter how big they are magazine depth is always a thing and you would have to expand production capacity just because of the huge expenditure of precision Munitions and and other weapons in Modern morphe”
Australia would side with Taiwan and the United States in a Taiwan war because it is in Australia's strategic interest to do so, as it is not in Australia's interest for a large authoritarian predator to take over another democracy.
“Australia would side with Taiwan and the United States and Japan because it would be in our interest to do so it is not in our interest for a large authoritarian Predator to take over another democracy”
Europe has been very slow to understand the profound threat Russia poses but it is not too late; Europe should increase defense production, expand military capability and size, and flood support to Ukraine to help them beat Russia.
“I think Europe has has been very slow to understand the profound threat that it faces with Russia and I think the way I would term it is they are very late to understanding the threat but it's not too late it's not too late for them to step up defense production expand the size and capability of their military and most importantly flood support into Ukraine to help them not just defend themselves but to beat Russia”
Australia would side with Taiwan and the United States (and Japan) in a Taiwan war because it is in Australia's strategic interest to do so, as it is not in Australia's interest for a large authoritarian predator to take over another democracy.
“Australia would side with Taiwan and the United States and Japan because it would be in our interest to do so it is not in our interest for a large authoritarian Predator to take over another democracy”
The key strategic question for deterrence is whether allied military capacity can be built quickly enough to deter China from making a catastrophic mistake regarding Taiwan.
“the the key will be can we do it quick enough to deter the Chinese from making a catastrophic mistake AK because that is what it would be it would be a catastrophic mistake for them for the Taiwanese people and for many others throughout the Western Pacific”
The West currently has the advantage of knowing exactly who its next adversaries likely are—Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea (the 'authoritarian quad')—with approximately 99% probability that the next major war will be with one of these powers.
“the West has at the moment is we know exactly who our adversary is and is likely to be uh there's four of them what I call the authoritarian quad Russia China Iran and North Korea and is probably a 99 % chance that the next major war will be with one of those”
Russian strategic adaptation has successfully extended to misinformation and strategic influence campaigns, which have had significant impact on certain members of the US Congress, causing distress to NATO allies and Ukrainian leadership.
“they have adapted uh their sources of Supply to ensure they have a fire superiority over Ukraine at the twoyear mark of this war and they've continued to adapt their misinformation and strategic influence campaigns which I think has had a very significant impact on certain members of the US Congress uh to the you know to the distress of many of us in the west and the greater distress of the Ukrainian government and Soldiers on the front line”
The West currently has a luxury regarding future adversaries: we know exactly who our adversaries are and will likely be—the 'authoritarian quad' of Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea—with approximately 99% certainty that the next major war will be with one of them.
“one of the few luxuries the West has at the moment is we know exactly who our adversary is and is likely to be uh there's four of them what I call the authoritarian quad Russia China Iran and North Korea and is probably a 99 % chance that the next major war will be with one of those”
The war in Ukraine is the most geostrategically consequential event in Europe since World War II, and nothing since 1945 has been more consequential for both European and global security.
“the war in Ukraine is the most geostrategic consequential event in Europe since the second world war there is no doubt about that nothing since 1945 has been more consequential uh not just for European security but Global Security”
If Russia wins the war in Ukraine, it will threaten other neighbors, and countries in the Baltics, Scandinavia, and Poland should be deeply concerned because Russian and Belarusian leadership have been explicitly stating their intentions to target these countries.
“because if Russia wins one they will threaten other neighbors and if I was in the baltics OR Scandinavia or Poland I'd be deeply concerned uh and we don't have to Inuit this the thing with authoritarians is they love telling us what they're going to do Putin told us what he was going to do in Putin in uh Ukraine he and medv and the rest of those criminals have been telling Europeans what they're going to do to the baltics to Finland to Sweden to Norway to Poland and a range of other countries”
Democracies are learning to respond harder and more decisively to authoritarian aggression, but Europe has been very slow to understand the profound threat it faces from Russia and is late but not too late to step up defense production, expand military capability, and flood support into Ukraine.
“I think too the democracies are still learning to smack back just as hard I think Europe has has been very slow to understand the profound threat that it faces with Russia and I think the way I would term it is they are very late to understanding the threat but it's not too late it's not too late for them to step up defense production expand the size and capability of their military and most importantly flood support into Ukraine”
The critical question for deterrence is whether Western capacity can be built quickly enough to deter China from making a catastrophic strategic mistake regarding Taiwan, which would be catastrophic for China, the Taiwanese people, and many others throughout the Western Pacific.
“but these things are happening the the key will be can we do it quick enough to deter the Chinese from making a catastrophic mistake AK because that is what it would be it would be a catastrophic mistake for them for the Taiwanese people and for many others throughout the Western Pacific”
The scenario depicted in 'White Sun War' is set in 2028 (four years from the time of the podcast recording) and assumes technological capability development, battery improvements, and battlefield imperative for autonomous systems that appear futuristic but are plausible given ongoing US and Chinese development and deployment of ground-based autonomous systems.
“I think we'd be very close I mean uh it might be four years away but both the Chinese and the Americans have done large scale experimentation and are rolling out groundbased autonomous systems lethal and non-lethal and you know I think in this kind of fight you would see fairly significant human casualties there would be a huge imperative to wherever possible put robotss there instead of humans so I think you know given the state-of-the-art at the moment a few years more development I made some assumptions about battery life and these kind of things um but also the battlefield imperative to replace humans with machines I I think this is very possible”
Western Pacific deterrence of China involves a mesh of frameworks including Japan's evolving and expanding military capacity with new counterstrike capability, Australia's defense investments (occurring too slowly according to Ryan), and American strategic coordination, but successive Indo-Pacific commanders have requested more funding, faster ship building, and quicker deployment of long-range missiles and bombers than Congress has provided.
“in the Western Pacific you have a I guess a mesh of different deterrence Frameworks from the Japanese and their evolving and expanding military capacity and their new Counterstrike capability all the way down to new Australia which is uh way too slowly investing in its deterrent capability the Americans are coordinating the Strategic response clearly um they have done a lot but clearly successive commanders of Indo paycom based in Hawaii would like to done more but they just haven't seen the funding for some of their indac strategies from Congress that they would like to have have they haven't seen the speed of ship building that they would like to have seen they haven't seen the deployment of long range missiles and long range bombers that the pace they would like to see”
Deterrence of China currently involves overlapping frameworks from Japan (expanding military and developing counterstrike capability), Australia (investing in deterrent capability, though too slowly), and coordinated US strategy, but US Indo-Pacific commanders have not received the funding or speed of deployment for missiles, ships, and bombers they desire.
“in the Western Pacific you have a I guess a mesh of different deterrence Frameworks from the Japanese and their evolving and expanding military capacity and their new Counterstrike capability all the way down to new Australia which is uh way too slowly investing in its deterrent capability the Americans are coordinating the Strategic response clearly um they have done a lot but clearly successive commanders of Indo paycom based in Hawaii would like to done more but they just haven't seen the funding for some of their indac strategies from Congress that they would like to have have they haven't seen the speed of ship building that they would like to have seen they haven't seen the deployment of long range missiles and long range bombers that the pace they would like to see but these things are happening”
The main operational problems militaries must solve to restore offensive capability in modern warfare are: (1) how to cross tactical/operational spaces to engage the enemy in a survivable way and achieve breakthrough, and (2) how to break through and exploit when the enemy has a deep defensive zone with obstacles and mines.
“there's a couple of problems the first one is how do you cross tactical or operational spaces to engage the enemy in a survivable way and then be able to break through another problem is how do you breakr how do you sorry how do you map uh breakthrough and then exploit uh when the enemy has a deep defensive Zone with obstacles and mines and these kind of things”
Western militaries need to rediscover the superpower of diversity of ideas inherent in democratic systems and invest in leveraging all different kinds of voices from all elements of society, though many obstacles currently prevent this.
“so you know democracies just need to ReDiscover this superpower of the diversity of ideas that exists within and um really invest and leverage in all the different ideas that are inherent in Democratic systems um there are many things that prevent that at the moment um and I think we need to look at the the obstacles to uh discovering and using lots and lots of different kinds of voices”
The merger of old and new technologies (tanks, artillery, radios, EW merged with data sciences, autonomous systems) is an ongoing challenge; we do not yet know if current mergers represent the optimal integration or merely initial attempts.
“what is the best way to merge old and new technologies I mean uh we're seeing a lot of old Technologies tanks artillery uh radios ew merg with new technologies uh data Sciences uh autonomous systems and these kind of things uh what we seeing at the moment the optimal merger of them or just initial mergers of them”
The solution for democracies facing information warfare is to bring transparency to what both friendly and enemy actors are doing, shining light on all aspects of behavior so people can make informed judgments about truth claims.
“I think one of the most important things we can do is bring transparency to what we're doing and to what they're doing so uh some of it is in messaging but a lot of it is in shining a light on all aspects of friendly and enemy Behaviour so people can make an informed judgment about what they're saying and what they're saying is going on whether it's true or not”
Two critical operational problems Western militaries must solve to succeed in modern warfare are: (1) how to cross tactical or operational spaces to engage the enemy in a survivable way and achieve breakthrough, and (2) how to break through, map, and exploit an enemy's deep defensive zone with obstacles and mines while under constant sensor and fire pressure.
“the first one is how do you cross tactical or operational spaces to engage the enemy in a survivable way and then be able to break through another problem is how do you breakr how do you sorry how do you map uh breakthrough and then exploit uh when the enemy has a deep defensive Zone with obstacles and mines and these kind of things”
Russians are adapting slower than Ukrainian battlefield forces at the tactical level because there is a clear difference in tactical cultures: Ukrainians are more innovative and can make changes quickly, while Russians have more centralized command and are less keen to report failure.
“there's a very clear difference in the Tactical cultures of the ukrainians and the Russians ukrainians are more Innovative and they can uh make changes more quickly whereas the Russians have a more centralized command and are less Keen to report failure”
China is doing exactly the same as Russia—President Xi and Chinese leadership are explicitly telling the world what they intend to do regarding Taiwan and other countries, so future intentions need not be inferred.
“and uh president X of China is doing exactly the same with Taiwan and other countries”
Speed matters in warfare, but more important is the ability to govern tempo—sometimes you want to slow things down; humans have limited capacity and we are not going to hand off everything to machines.
“mean speed matters sometimes uh what's more important is to be able to govern Tempo because sometimes you might want to slow things down uh so been able to govern Tempo rather than just do everything quickly uh I think is more important and you can't do everything quickly all the time I mean humans only have so much capacity and we're not going to hand off everything to machines”
Tom Rid's most recent book, a case study of Russian misinformation over the last century, contains the idea that 'misinformation and democracy can't coexist,' which represents an important strategic dilemma for democracies.
“and as Tom rid says in his most recent book which is a great case study at Russ misinformation over the last century there's a line in there where he says misinformation and democracy can't coexist and it's a it's a really important idea”
Richard Carver's book (on Russian strategy) and Mick Ryan's White Sun War (on Taiwan scenario) serve similar purposes: both identify potential and likely future threats and constitute a call to military and government institutions to invest now to deter these conflicts rather than spending an order of magnitude more on fighting them later.
“I think there's close parallels in in what we're trying to do is identifying a potential and likely future threat and both books are kind of a a cry to Military and government institutions to invest now to deter uh uh the kind of things that happen in the book now ultimately both Richard and I I'm pretty sure would believe that uh you know you'd rather not fight if you can deter it that's always better the old Stitch and time saves nine and if through reading these book policy makers might think that well if we uh invest a little bit more in the military uh will prevent us having to spend an ordered magnitude more in fighting them at some point in the future”
Front-line Ukrainian soldiers now use civilian intelligence reports and daily reports from institutions like the Institute for the Study of War alongside military intelligence sources, demonstrating practical integration of open-source and military intelligence.
“you're also seeing Frontline units using civilian intelligence reports I mean you talk to Ukrainian soldiers some of them use uh intelligence reports from inside the system as well as the daily reports from the institute for the study of War so that's how we we see that as well”
General Mick Ryan's book 'War Transformed' was published nine days before the Russian large-scale invasion of Ukraine.
“when my book War transform came out nine days before the Russian large scale Invasion”
Lawrence Freedman's book 'The Future of War' is the interviewer's favorite of all Freedman's books and presents a history of humanity's failure to predict future warfare.
“I wonder if you've read of if you know um a book from Lawrence fredman called the future of War it's a terrific book like all his books are but it's a terrific book it is I yeah it's it's my favorite of all his books”
Richard Haass was kind enough to make a connection (likely between Ukraine and Taiwan/China threats) on the podcast a couple weeks before this conversation.
“I had a chance I'd like to connect the two and a couple weeks ago I had a chance to talk on this podcast with Richard cherev H who was kind enough to make this uh connection”