Which Way, America? Condoleezza Rice on America’s Foreign Policy Challenges | Uncommon Knowledge

The U.S. engagement strategy with China was based on the assumption that economic liberalization would lead to political liberalization and democratization, as happened in South Korea and Taiwan, but Xi Jinping's regime reversed this by taking political control, shutting down private enterprises like educational startups that it could not control, and using Western investment in technology through civil-military fusion to strengthen the People's Liberation Army for regional domination.

“we had a narrative of a belief in integrating China fully into the international economy... that integration created... the supply chains that ran through China... China was the place to manufacture it was the place to assemble there was was so much that was to be beneficial about China's integration into the International System... something happened which is that... xishan Ping's regime has been different than the regimes before it... you cannot have both economic liberalization and political control right and for a while China was moving to private Enterprise the big uh companies like Alibaba and tensent and and uh you were manufacturing there it was it seemed to be working and then xishan ping comes in and he says thank you very much I think I'll take political control and now it's a very different China”

During the Cold War, after the Berlin Crisis and Cuban Missile Crisis, the U.S. and Soviet Union lived in a 'cold peace' for roughly 30 years with no real territorial conflict, and both sides had created shared understanding of nuclear deterrence and accidental war; by contrast, China has many military and non-military options against Taiwan beyond amphibious invasion—blockade, seizure of small islands, cutting undersea cables, cyber attacks—requiring constant attention and imagination comparable to defending all of Western Europe during the Cold War.

“we did not have real territorial conflict between us after the Berlin crisis and certainly after the Cuban Missile Crisis so for roughly almost 30 years uh with the Soviet Union we lived in this kind of cold peace as it's been called right we could finish each other's sentences about uh nuclear deterrence we had created a whole way of thinking about accidental nuclear war”

In the 1970s the U.S. faced economic stagnation and one small defeat after another (Soviet expansion in Afghanistan, Iranian hostage crisis), giving the Soviets initiative while America was on the defensive; in the 1980s, American economic renewal and restoration of national morale led to such a regeneration that in just 10 years (1979-1989) the Soviet Union collapsed and the Berlin Wall fell.

“the 1970s in this country were a period of economic stagnation right a period of one small defeat after another as against the Soviets they expanded their Navy they took over countries in Russia and you add all these small defeats together and over the course of that decade they have the initiative and we're on the defensive and then in the 1980s we get economic renewal we get uh restoration of national morale... in 1989 just 10 years later which is not that long in the life of a human being let alone of a Nation the United States has and our allies have undergone such a renewal that the Soviet Union folds up the Berlin Wall Falls”

After World War II, the U.S. created order in chaos (the Marshall Plan, NATO, etc.); today the same task awaits—to create sense out of current chaos through mobilization of American power, just as it was done after WWII.

“that's what we did after World War II we made sense out of the chaos”

Stephen Kotkin, a Soviet historian, would argue that the fundamental finding of studying Soviet archives is that communist leaders genuinely believed in communism and had permanent aims against the West, suggesting ideology mattered fundamentally to Soviet behavior.

“our Hoover colleague Stephen kotkin if you ask him what's the signal finding of a lifetime that you stepen have spent in the Soviet archives if you could reduce it to a sentence but and he would he he always answers they were Communists they really believed it and that meant they had permanent aims against us”

George Kennan's famous Cold War strategy was to deny the Soviet Union 'the easy course of expansion until the day that they have to turn to deal with their own internal contradictions'; the U.S. applied this successfully during the 1989-1991 period when the Soviet Union, held in check by American power, had to turn to deal with internal contradictions and ultimately collapsed.

“George Kennan in his famous telegram said we have to deny them the easy course of expansion until the day of external expansion until the day that they have to turn to deal with their own internal contradictions February 1946”

George H.W. Bush was the right leader at the right time to manage German unification; he was humble, put himself in the background, and never wanted to embarrass Gorbachev, thereby helping to deliver Soviet collapse without humiliating Russian leadership.

“I worked for George HW Bush and I always felt that he was exactly the right person at the time to put the Germans in the lead on German unification he was a a hum humble person who put himself in the background and never wanted to embarrass gorbachov and therefore I think really delivered at the end of the Cold War”

Authoritarians know that the 'Ceausescu moment' is ultimately coming for them: their fear-based control will eventually reverse when the people cease to be afraid, as happened in Romania in 1989 when crowds shouted down Ceausescu, at which point 'the fear is gone and now he's just face to face with the anger of his people'.

“we were in I was with President Bush in Romania which Bush are we George George W bush W bush right uh in 2005 Romania had become a member of NATO we were there uh to celebrate and there was a a square that they took us into and they said um this Square was filled with 250,000 people when chesu the the communist leader of Romania came into the square and he was exhorting you know you'd had Revolutions in Czechoslovakia and Poland and Hungary and he was exhorting the people for what he'd done for them and all of a sudden one old lady yelled liar wow and then 10 people yelled liar and then 100 100 people and then a thousand people and now a 100,000 people are yelling liar and all of a sudden chesu knows that the fear that he has held over his people has reversed it's gone the fear is gone and now he's just face to face with the anger of his people”

The alliance of China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea (the 'three plus one') has internal contradictions: Russia is xenophobic and unnerved by Chinese dominance of Central Asia (which was formerly Soviet territory); Russia is unnerved by Iranian proxies' activities in the Middle East; and nobody trusts North Korea, suggesting this coalition is fragile.

“I look at this this Alliance of the the three plus one I call it because the North Koreans nobody really trusts very much China Russia Iran and North Korea North Korea on a good day all right and I say to myself first of all uh they have a lot of Contra they can do a lot of damage right but they have a lot of contradictions among them too you really think those xenophobes and Russia are thrilled to see the Chinese dominating Central Asia which used to be a part of the Soviet Union you think they aren't a little unnerved by what's happening to Iran and its proxies in the Middle East”

The United States was a confident country after World War II with 'unbridled optimism about the future,' but today the United States is exhausted by eight decades of international leadership, some successful and appreciated, some dismissed as failure, which has created political pressure to withdraw from global leadership.

“after World War II the United States was a confident country with unbridled optimism about the future the United States is a different country now... exhausted by eight Decades of International Leadership some of it successful and appreciated and some dismissed as failure”

Ronald Reagan called the Soviet Union and communism 'a sad experiment on a hapless people' and predicted 'Marxism-Leninism will end up on the ash of history,' which was seen as undiplomatic but which called out the truth; contemporary leaders need to both call out American challenges and American strengths.

“when Ron Ronald Reagan called it uh called the Soviet Union uh and communism a sad experiment uh on a hapless people and talked about uh you know the the fact that they they wouldn't survive in that famous British uh British Westminster uh Marxism leninism will end up on the ash as history and I remember thinking well that's a kind of undiplomatic thing for the president of the United States to say but you know what it was calling out the truth”

America is safer when there are more democracies in the world because 'political scientists have actually shown democracies don't fight one another'—they don't send child soldiers to war, don't terrorize other people, and don't invade their neighbors.

“so that we are safer when there are more of us in the world who believe in democracy you know Pol political scientists have actually shown democracies don't fight one another right and that really that old s really is true true they don't uh send child soldiers into uh War they don't terrorize other people they don't invade their neighbors”

The 1996 Hoover Institution prediction by Harry Rowan that 'China will become a democracy around the year 2015' was not considered crazy when published but turned out to be wrong, suggesting that the assumption that economic growth necessarily leads to democratization—while true for South Korea and Taiwan—failed for China.

“our late Hoover colle Harry Rowan writing in 1996 quote when will China become a democracy the answer is around the year 2015 yeah and nobody laughed at that when Harry published it in 1996 okay it didn't happen”

Gorbachev was a 'true believer' in communism who believed that removing lies and coercion would allow Soviet citizens to naturally become good Soviet citizens; he did not understand that communism is propped up by lies and coercion, and once those are removed, the system collapses.

“he believed he was a kind of True Believer I knew gorbachov pretty well he really did believe that if you took away the lies if you took away the coercion uh people would kind of naturally become good Soviet citizens what he didn't realize is that communism is in fact propped up by lies and by coercion and once you start to to pull those pillars it's going to fear is gone it's over once fear is gone it's it's over”

Taiwan has developed a distinct Taiwanese identity separate from Chinese identity; a recent poll showed 70% of Taiwanese do not think of themselves as Chinese but rather as Taiwanese, which is a fundamental difference from Hong Kong's situation.

“they did a a poll not too long ago and uh 70% of Taiwanese do not think of themselves as Chinese they think of themselves as Taiwanese that's a very basic and that's a very different uh way of relating to the mainland”

The military capacity for fighting simultaneous wars has declined from 2.5 wars (when Rice served under George HW Bush) to 2 wars (by the time she was Secretary of State) to 1.5 wars (today), reflecting real military atrophy and strategic retrenchment.

“now you talk about you know the 2 and a half it was 2 and a half Wars when I was in it was down to two and a half by then down to one and a half but it's it's really interesting that everybody talks about having to fight a war here or fighting a war there”

China, Russia, and Iran are 'fundamentally weak' regimes ultimately—not today or tomorrow, but structurally—despite their current capabilities; the U.S. should not 'scare ourselves to death' about their power but rather ensure they cannot expand, push American power out, or win technological arms races, allowing time for internal contradictions to emerge.

“these regimes are ultimately fundamentally weak ultimately not today not tomorrow China is not the Soviet Union let's not scare ourselves to death let's not scare let's make sure that they can't expand let's make sure that they can't push American power out let's make sure that they can't win the technological arms r”

The United States has considerable remaining strengths: an economy still the envy of the world, technological capability and innovation that continues despite everything, and an energy bounty that if not mishandled will be able to restructure the landscape for national and international growth.

“we have of course an economy that is still the Envy of the world we have technological and capability and Innovation that just keeps despite everything else and I just want to make one other point we have an energy Bounty that if we don't mess it up we will be able to restructure the landscape for one of the most important elements of National growth and international growth which is the energy picture”

Americans hold two contradictory thoughts: (1) 'Can't somebody else do this for goodness sakes? We defeated the Soviet Union, we unified Germany, we defeated Al Qaeda—can't somebody else step up?' and (2) 'A larger country just wants to extinguish smaller neighbors. We can't let that happen. We can't let people be beheaded on television. We can't do that.'

“Americans carry two contradictory thoughts one is can't somebody else do this for goodness sakes we defeated the Soviet Union we unified Germany we defeated Al-Qaeda can't somebody else step up but then Americans also carrying their heads you mean a larger country just wants to extinguish at smaller neighbors we can't let that we can't let that happen we can't let people be beheaded on television are you we can't do that so if nobody else will maybe we should”

When Hong Kong was returned to China by Britain, the promise was 'one country, two systems,' but what actually occurred was 'one country, one system,' with the Hong Kong business establishment (except Jimmy Lai and Martin Lee, now imprisoned or under arrest) cutting deals with Beijing.

“everybody talked about one country two systems when uh Hong Kong was uh was given back to China by the British well it became one country one system and so what the Chinese would do I think for Taiwan is to try to put so much pressure that you have a very Pro Chinese government in Taiwan and then just slowly but surely it erodes Chinese Independence taiwan's Independence again correct me if I'm wrong about this but my observation my observation on Hong Kong a few hundred, people left when the Chinese got rough on Hong Kong but the business establishment as far as I can count it I'm not an expert you are Jimmy lie is in prison and Martin Lee is under house arrest that is two members of the Hong Kong business establishment that stood up to Beijing and everybody else in effect cut a deal”

Ronald Reagan understood the essence of America as an idea, not just territory, and understood that US security improves when there are more democracies in the world—democracies don't fight one another—so the universality of the American idea requires helping others access that idea for both ideological and practical security reasons.

“what Ronald Reagan understood was kind of the essence of America right...the essence of America is that we're an idea we're not just territory we're an idea and if we really believe in the universality of that idea then we have to give others access to that idea so that we are safer when there are more of us in the world who believe in democracy...political scientists have actually shown democracies don't fight one another right and that really that old s really is true”

China's strategy toward Taiwan is not to conquer it militarily but to change Taiwan's politics until it resembles Hong Kong, using pressure and coercion to create a pro-Chinese government that slowly erodes Taiwan's independence—analogous to how 'one country, two systems' became 'one country, one system' in Hong Kong.

“it's almost as if the thinking uh in the Pentagon and in Washington is just such blunt thinking it's going to be an amphibious landing on the military people will tell you that looks like D-Day times 100 right China has many many other options Visa Taiwan because they don't have to occupy Taiwan they just have to change the politics in Taiwan till it looks like Hong Kong and so that you know everybody talked about one country two systems when uh Hong Kong was uh was given back to China by the British well it became one country one system and so what the Chinese would do I think for Taiwan is to try to put so much pressure that you have a very Pro Chinese government in Taiwan and then just slowly but surely it erodes Chinese Independence taiwan's Independence”

The U.S. should deter Iran by making clear 'we know where you live and we know what you've got, don't even think about trying to make it a usable nuclear weapon' rather than focusing on Iran being close to fuel or bomb design, which is a different and more actionable deterrent posture.

“I think one thing you could say to the Iranians is all right we know where you live and we know what you've got don't even think about trying to make it a usable nuclear weapon and that's a little bit different than saying oh they're so close to the fuel they're so close to the bomb design they're so close there's still a step that they have to take to be an actual nuclear power and it may be given their weaknesses that you want to um do that”

During the Reagan era, the largest seven economies in the world (G7) were all democracies; the question of whether capitalism can coexist with communism—tested by China's integration into the global economy—is now being answered: the answer appears to be 'no.'

“when when Ronald Reagan when you would have been in the White House when Ronald Reagan and George Schultz started the G7 right the largest economies in the world they were all democracies and so this question of whether capitalism can really coexist with Communism I think uh the answer that we're getting is no that it can't”

Democratic societies have extraordinary institutional resilience, demonstrated across 240+ years of American history; the ability to bring people from all over the world together and have them belong regardless of where they came from is distinctively American and reflects extraordinary institutional capacity.

“the extraordinary resilience of American institutions throughout our now 240 plus year history the extraordinary notion that you can bring people from all over the world and they can some somehow find that they belong in a place where it doesn't matter where you came from it matters where you're going the extraordinary creativity and Innovation that we have”

Many of the problems constraining America—debt, defense industrial capacity, regional inequality, polarization—are correctable through human effort, not inevitable; solutions include revitalizing defense industries, educating and training people left behind by globalization, and reorganizing Pentagon spending to leverage Silicon Valley innovation rather than buying the same systems repeatedly.

“it isn't beyond the uh possibility of humans to correct many of these problems...we don't have to just do it by buying all the same things we've been buying there are companies right here in the Silicon Valley that have important answers to some of our most dire military uh needs uh we've talked about drones uh we've talked about new technologies if we could just get the Pentagon to organize to spend the $800 billion do better that would be a a really important step forward”