A History of Philosophy | 64 American Pragmatism
What this covers
A History of Philosophy | 64 American Pragmatism
Connect with Wheaton: http://www.wheaton.edu http://www.facebook.com/wheatoncollege.il http://www.twitter.com/wheatoncollege http://www.instagram.com/wheatoncollegeil
Source description (no synthesized summary yet).
American pragmatism, particularly in Peirce, James, and Dewey, represents a methodological revolution that replaces Cartesian foundationalism and abstract theorizing with concrete experiential verification, organic relationality, and the universalization of scientific method as the basis for fixing beliefs and determining truth.
- Peirce critiques Descartes' universal doubt and private introspection as impossible, advocating instead for public, self-corrective scientific method within a community of observers
- James reframes truth not as abstract correspondence but as psychological workability and 'cash value'—whether a belief produces experienced satisfaction
- All three pragmatists reject atomistic experience and external relations in favor of organic interconnectedness and the primacy of concrete lived experience over abstract theory
This asset isn't compiled yet
You're seeing its claims, ranked. Compile it to build the argument threads, weight them, and check each claim against your library — the full view.
James shifts pragmatist focus from abstract belief-fixation to psychological experience: rather than asking 'what do you think,' pragmatism asks 'how are you feeling'—examining inner tensions, satisfaction, and affective dimensions of experience.
“but with James concrete experience is always psychological experience it's not a question of what are you thinking but how are you feeling it not what you think but how are you feeling it and notice how different those are in common ways of talking yes a by and large in class I I say to you well what do you think what's on your mind as if the experience you are having is one of thinking ideas thinking theories but James is talking of experience not in that sense which is the objective izing sense he's talking of experience rather in how do you feel about this how do you feel about it do you feel some inner tensions in you in your experience do you feel inner tensions or do you feel satisfied”
Whitehead's process philosophy replaces the classical metaphysics of enduring substance with a model based on events and processes, where there is no enduring identity through time but rather enduring strains within long extended events.
“instead of substance some enduring identity of a substance being the ultimate reality it's process and the ingredients are events which come and go so there's no enduring identity through extensive periods of time though there are enduring strains in long extended events”
James's initial education was in medicine with emphasis on physiology; he learned experimental laboratory methods in 19th-century German physiological psychology before psychology was established as a separate science, which shaped his approach to philosophical questions.
“the fact of the matter is as you likely have read as if you've been reading on Stumpf for this week that James is initial education was medicine emphasis physiology he got into psychology by studying for a while and the forced experimental cycle abs in Germany in the 19th century late 19th century physiological psychology experimentally kept the scientific method background now that was before psychology was thought of as a separate science I think it was until nineteen was at 1910 1911 the Journal of philosophy was called the journal of philosophy psychology scientific method etcetera”
Peirce argues that we cannot think without signs; therefore, anything unthinkable (that for which we have no signs) is inconceivable to us, and we cannot speak meaningfully of unknowable things.
“a repeats some things written in opposition to cartesianism saying we have no power of introspection we have no power of intuition we have no power of thinking without signs so we have no conception of what absolutely incorrigible that to see if we can't think without signs and you don't have any signs for what's not thinkable then you can't think of the unthinkable I suspect that last sentence has reference to British philosopher around the same period Herbert Spencer who divided all he wanted to write about into the knowable and the unknowable”
Peirce identifies four methods of fixing beliefs: (1) method of tenacity (refusing to change one's mind), (2) method of authority (deferring to authority), (3) method of tradition (following convention), and (4) scientific method (seeking confirmation through public evidence and self-correction).
“if you want a belief to be fixed with confidence there are various ways that you might go about it he rejects three of the ways and advocates the fourth the first is the method of tenacity which says in effect I'm not gonna change my mind whatever you silly don't face me with effect I've got my made-up method of tenacity and he's point obviously that is that that is no way of ascertaining the truth it may be a way of fixing a belief in your mind but not a way of ensuring truth the second is the method the method of authority the problem there is that there are conflicting authorities so how do you judge between conflicting authorities and what they say the third is the method of tradition whose tradition whose convention of course that's very much like the method of authority so what he advocates is scientific method”
The shift from mechanistic to organic model reflects 19th-century developments in science: developmental biology replacing mechanistic explanations of life, and relativity and quantum physics breaking down the solidity of matter.
“the change is of course from the 18th century mechanist model to the organic model if you are thinking of this business with model 1 model - model 3 so it is the development of new science in the 19th century developmental biology something other than mechanistic explanations of life and relativity physics and logistic physics breaking down the solidity of matter”
Peirce believed in objective reals—universal laws of nature—that can be known through scientific method, making him a realist despite working on the coastal survey and doing empirical observation.
“purse was a realist he believed there are universal laws of nature there are objective what he called reals not our AEL but our e-a-l he wasn't just fishing even though he was in the coastal survey objective realities that can be known”
Whitehead maintains quantitative pluralism (many events, endless processes) but qualitative monism (all events and processes share the same fundamental description), which conflates God with creation and persons with natural phenomena, insufficiently distinguishing qualitative differences.
“Whitehead remains a quantitative pluralist that is to say in terms of how many events are there obviously many many many many events how many processes are there oh endless processes he's a qualitative florist numerically but in terms of the nature of those events and processes they're all fundamentally the same qualitative monism so the same description of an event applies to God and to a particular sense perception we have so qualitative monism it seems to me that that's the source of some of these problems that he gives insufficient weight to qualitative distinctions between God and creation”
Whitehead's subject-object continuum replaces mechanistic objectivity with a model where both subject and object contribute in every knowing situation: antecedent events contribute their given content, and the new event's decision among possibilities contributes the subjective aspect.
“by the time you get to whitehead subject object continuum that is the same in every knowing the situation I'm tripping over this code here in every knowing situation there is already what is contributed by antecedent events before the new data come in and in addition to that there's the decision that's made in terms of the eternal possibilities that are offered in the new event so the subjective as well as the object of contributing in this case”
Whitehead's account of personal identity through continuity of experience maintained by memory provides only 'slim' identity and fails to ground personal responsibility and accountability across time, since successive events without a continuous agent cannot justify holding someone accountable for past actions.
“all he could do for person is to say that you and I as persons have continuity in terms of some strain carried by memory which maintain certain qualities in this stream of experience through the years which is you personal identity carried by the stream of experience and that's a slim sort of identity in fact articles have been written saying that whiteheads ethic really doesn't provide a basis for holding anybody accountable simply because of the successive events without one continuous agent who can today be held accountable for yesteryear”
Pragmatism follows the Hegelian tradition of viewing human experience through the lens of self-consciousness, finding the dialectic unfolding in human experience and projecting that dialectic onto all of reality.
“that's the hug alien tradition because what Hegel was trying to do you see was to look through the lens of self-consciousness of human experience and finding the dialectic unfolding and human experience of anything projecting that under the whole of reality so very much in the Galleon tradition in dewey you'll find that especially in as much as do his early years he was part of the American Neal Hegelian tradition”
Peirce's critique of Cartesianism represents a methodological revolution in philosophy, following previous revolutions from scholasticism to Descartes (rationalism) to Bacon (inductivism) to Kant (transcendentalism), now advancing to experimental method.
“notice that this has the marks of what should we say another methodological revolution you see Descartes represents some methodological revolution in philosophy from Scholastic method bacon methodological revolution to inductive method can't methodological revolution to transcendental method trying to get at the subjective preconditions of the possibility of and now another methodological revolution to experimental methods scientific method universalized”
While Whitehead's criticism of the mechanistic model and fact-value separation is helpful, his universalization of the organic model to all phenomena is problematic; the mechanistic model may apply to some genuinely mechanical things, and a more personalistic model is needed for understanding human persons.
“my complaint is about his universalization of the organic model the way he describes it it seems to me that just as for most in this tradition they'll say that the organic model no take it back the mechanistic model may apply to some things that do indeed operate quite mechanically and the organic model alright may be an overarching sort of thing with regards to mechanistic phenomena there seems to be the need for something else a more personal istic model”
Personalistic existentialists like Kierkegaard and Martin Buber emphasize the category of person as distinct from anything else, in contrast to Whitehead who can only account for personal identity through memory-sustained streams of experience.
“I think that's the sort of thing that you find in some of the personalistic existentialism people like Kierkegaard Martin Buber so forth trying to emphasize the category of person as distinct from anything else all he could do for person is to say that you and I as persons have continuity in terms of some strain carried by memory which maintain certain qualities in this stream of experience through the years”
In classical mechanistic metaphysics, relations between entities are external (the causal interaction of Descartes' mind-body dualism), whereas in Whitehead's organic model, relations are internal to the nature of the terms themselves.
“the mechanist model of course had External Relations as in the causal interaction of de cartes mind-body dualism the organic model the relations are internal are of the very nature of the terms of the relationship internal relations because of the external relations the 18th century was able to seek and claim complete objectivity of knowledge”
Pragmatism's third major characteristic is philosophical naturalism, used in two distinct senses: methodological naturalism (universalizing scientific method to all inquiry) and metaphysical naturalism (claiming that only natural processes exist, amenable to evolutionary explanation).
“the third characteristic philosophical naturalism philosophical naturalism naturalism is used to the term naturalism is used in two senses one a methodological methodological naturalism and the second metaphysical methodological naturalism is course referring to the methodology of the Natural Sciences so the methodological naturalist universalize is the use of scientific method scientific method is applied to every kind of inquiry”
William James is a theist of sorts—he believes in a finite, limited God—whereas Dewey is explicitly a metaphysical naturalist who denies the existence of anything beyond natural processes.
“metaphysical naturalism methodological naturalism in all of them metaphysical naturalism I think very explicitly oops very explicitly in doing not in James James is a theist of sorts or it's a finite God that James seems to have God limited in power but he's a theist of sorts but Dewey is very explicitly a metaphysical naturalist”
Charles Sanders Peirce distinguished himself from other pragmatists by insisting on the objectivity of truth and ethics; he believed in objective right and wrong and rejected relativism, despite calling his philosophy 'pragmaticism' rather than 'pragmatism.'
“if pragmatism means to you if the term means to you relativism a relativistic theory of truth then pers is not a pragmatist in fact to disassociate himself from the other two I've listed opposed preferred to call himself a pragmatist a pragmatist the point being that pers did believe in the objectivity of trucks the objectivity of right and wrong he was in fact a practicing scientists worked with the United States coastal survey and was simply sold on scientific method as the way of knowing”
Peirce's two most influential articles, 'The Fixation of Belief' (1877) and 'How to Make Our Ideas Clear' (1878), both answer the same fundamental pragmatist question: look at the practical consequences of a belief or theory to understand its meaning and truth.
“his two most influential articles appeared in popular science monthly which isn't exactly the police who go for philosophical edification these days but in 1877 he published an article called the fixation of belief and in 1878 another one called how to make our ideas clear now plainly the first of these is dealing with the question of ensuring troops the second is dealing with the question of meaning how do we get at the meaning of something how to make our ideas clear and really in both regards the answer is the same look at the practical consequences look at the practical consequences”
Pragmatists object to 'intellectualism'—the pursuit of logical theory for theory's sake—and to 'spectator empiricism'—Locke's reduction of experience to passive observation rather than active involvement.
“you find pragmatists objecting to intellectualism James uses that phrase for wanting logical theory for theories sake or spectator empiricism which is do is label for Locke Spectator empiricism you know the epithets that some people cast spectator sports like let's say football where you have a handful of people getting as they say too much exercise and several tens of thousands getting too little spectator sports do his point is that experience is reduced to a spectator sport by John Locke rather than an active involvement”
Pragmatism rejects the Cartesian 'quest for certainty' as a misguided goal; all that is needed is practical confidence sufficient to act, not absolute certainty.
“the quest for certainty in the Descartes tradition John Locke tradition as far as we can do he has a book by that title the quest for certainty in which he disparages the quest for certainty for pragmatic purposes who need certainty the quest for certainty is a misguided quest all you need is practical certainty practical confidence sufficient to act on”
Pragmatists refuse dualism of mind and body and dualism of fact and value because of their commitment to organic relationality; values emerge in the context of experience and in relationship to future experience.
“it's for that reason that they refuse any dualisms of mind and body there's an interrelatedness of the physical and the mental they refused any dualism of fact and valiant separation of fact and value values emerge in the context of experience than in relationship to future experience so the interconnectedness of things”
Peirce's critique of Descartes is that Descartes incorrectly assumes we can begin with universal doubt, but we cannot because we are always unaware of some of our own assumptions and beliefs.
“at least and his response follows on point one we cannot begin with Universal with complete doubt why not well we always miss something then we haven't thought to doubt because we weren't aware of our own assumptions not always aware of your own beliefs yeah beliefs you may not be aware of your own beliefs that is to say you say oh yeah I guess I do believe that when somebody points it out to you because you're taking it for granted so we cannot begin with complete doubt in practical terms it's not possible”
Peirce rejects the Cartesian criterion of clarity and distinctness (whatever I am clearly convinced of is true) because conviction is subjective and variable; clarity and distinctness are criteria of meaningfulness rather than truth.
“the same formalism appears in the Cartesian criterion which amounts to this whatever I'm clearly convinced of it's true well obviously the quest becomes moot because if everybody was convinced the question and there's a great deal of difference between being convinced had a friend who used to say when somebody said to him well that's perfectly self-evident my friend would say well it may be to you it isn't to me you know and by implication even if it were to me and everybody else so what his point is that clarity and distinctness of criteria of meaningfulness rather than truth to say it's clear and distinct means oh I see what you mean rather than necessarily it's true though sometimes truth rides piggyback on meeting”
Peirce advocates that philosophy imitate successful sciences by trusting the 'multitude and variety' of arguments rather than the conclusiveness of a single mathematical proof, since experimental method is far more significant than mathematics.
“philosophy ought to imitate the successful sciences in its methods and to trust the multitude and variety of those arguments rather than the conclusiveness of anyone that's like saying Descartes put too much stock in mathematical method which of course in continental science in his day was the method of continental science dominantly optics and mechanics but in later experimental science mathematics is not the method it's just one experimental method is far more significant then”
James can redefine truth as workability because of pragmatism's foundational thesis that experience is our reality; the reality we experience is one of hope or no hope, and that experienced reality is what we mean by truth.
“so from the psychological kiss cash value of a belief he backs up to a redefinition of truth and he can do this because of this pragmatic view that experience is our reality so the reality we experience is the reality of Hope or no hope and it's that which is referred to when we speak of truth”
American pragmatism's first major characteristic is the assertion of the primacy of the practical over the theoretical, or equivalently, the primacy of concrete lived experience over abstract conceptualization.
“first of all some general characteristics and the first is as you might gain from the term pragmatic it asserts the primacy of the practical over the theoretical the primacy of the practical over the theoretical or if you like the primacy of concrete experience over abstraction so Janelle that should please you to the primacy of the concrete over abstraction”
William James's concept of 'stream of consciousness' exemplifies pragmatist organic relationality: consciousness is not discrete units but an interrelated continuum.
“news to boot James speaks of the stream of consciousness yeah a stream of consciousness and interrelated thing organic relationships within the whole stream of consciousness”
In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, philosophy was an intellectual inquiry accessible to educated persons generally (not yet highly technical and specialized as it became after World War II), which is why Peirce could publish influential articles in Popular Science Monthly and why academic philosophers could write on broad topics like varieties of religious experience.
“it wasn't until after World War Two that philosophy really started becoming highly technical highly specialized the particularly back then it was sort of the the intellectual inquiry that any educated person could read that's why pearls could publish in popular science monthly and make an influence you try doing that now”
Philosophers continue to be interested in religious experience and religious pluralism (not just theologians), as exemplified by lectures on these topics in the previous year, showing the enduring philosophical relevance of religion.
“so with with that you find James for instance writing a book on varieties of religious experience psychology and religion now admittedly philosophers are still are are still interested in religious experience and the argument from religious experience some of you may remember Randall's lecture on that last year they're interested in religious pluralism not just theologians as this week but philosophers are interested if religious pluralism as well and Yandel gave a lecture on that last year”