What this covers
National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan discusses U.S.-China relations and the Biden administration’s policy priorities for the relationship going forward.
This event is co-organized by the 21st Century China Center at UC San Diego’s School of Global Policy and Strategy, as part of its annual China Forum.
Speaker Jake Sullivan Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Presider Stephen J. Hadley Principal, Rice, Hadley, Gates & Manuel LLC; Former Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (2005–2009); Member, Board of Directors, Council on Foreign Relations; Co-Chair, China Forum, UC San Diego
Introductory Remarks Michael Froman President, Council on Foreign Relations
Subscribe to our channel: https://goo.gl/WCYsH7 The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher. Visit the CFR website: http://www.cfr.org Follow CFR on Twitter: http://www.twitter.com/cfr_org Follow CFR on Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/councilonforeignrelations/
Source description (no synthesized summary yet).
Sullivan argues the Biden administration has successfully implemented a three-part China strategy—invest domestically, align with allies, compete strategically—that creates conditions for both advancing U.S. interests and managing competition without inevitable conflict, requiring intensive sustained diplomacy rather than accepting fatalistic confrontation.
- The strategy rests on holding multiple truths simultaneously: structural competition exists but conflict is not predetermined; choices in both capitals matter
- 2023 diplomatic intensity (Vienna, Beijing, Malta, Bangkok meetings) demonstrates the strategy works through sustained engagement to reduce misperception while maintaining national security measures
- Domestic investment in chips, infrastructure, and clean energy, combined with allied coordination, creates the foundation for competition from strength without decoupling
This asset isn't compiled yet
You're seeing its claims, ranked. Compile it to build the argument threads, weight them, and check each claim against your library — the full view.
None of the work to manage competition will be easy, and there will be times of tension and surprises along the way, as competition is not going to resolve in a neat and decisive end state.
“Let me conclude by noting that none of this will be easy, and there will be times of tension. That's inevitable in a competition like this that is simply not going to resolve in a neat and decisive end state. And as I noted, one thing is certain. There will be surprises along the way.”
De-risking the U.S. economy has three elements: investing in America's industrial and innovation capacity, diversifying supply chains to avoid single points of failure, and tailoring measures to protect American technology without broader decoupling.
“I basically has three elements. First, investing in America's industrial and innovation capacity. A big way to de-risk is to have more capacity ourselves to be able to, you know, operate at the technological innovation edge. The second is to diversify supply chains so that we're not dependent on any single point of failure. And that's not all about China. That's a lesson we learned from COVID. But the PRC is a part of that. And the third is to have a series of tailored measures so that American technology cannot be used to undermine the security of the United States and our allies and in this category we have been transparent, that we've taken a series of steps already and we will take further steps as we go forward, all according to the basic principle that we are going to tailor them and target them in a way that they really are aimed at our national security concerns and not at a broader effort to decouple our technological ecosystems or our economies.”
Large-scale investments in semiconductor and clean energy production in the United States are up twenty-fold since 2019, and construction spending on new manufacturing projects has already doubled.
“Large-scale investments in semiconductor and clean energy production in the United States are up twenty-fold since 2019. Construction spending on new manufacturing projects has already doubled.”
Beijing believed the United States was in terminal decline, with its industrial base hollowed out, commitment to allies undercut, struggling to manage a once-in-a-century pandemic, with many openly proclaiming 'the East was rising and the West was falling.'
“the PRC believed the United States was in terminal decline, that our industrial base had been hollowed out, that our commitment to our allies and partners had been undercut, that the United States was struggling to manage a once in a century pandemic, and that many in Beijing were openly proclaiming that, quote, 'the East was rising and the West was falling.'”
Regional allies and partners have announced almost $200 billion of investments into the United States since the start of the Biden administration, demonstrating they are betting on American economic vitality.
“Our regional allies and partners, for their part, are betting on American economic vitality. They've announced almost $200 billion of investments into the United States since the start of the administration.”
The Woodside summit announced a new dialogue aimed at managing the risks of artificial intelligence, to start in spring 2024.
“And third, the Woodside summit saw our leaders announce a new dialogue aimed at managing the risks of artificial intelligence, which will start in the spring.”
The administration set out to stabilize the U.S.-China relationship without sacrificing capacity to strengthen alliances, compete vigorously, and defend U.S. interests, beginning in May 2023 with intensive all-hands-on-deck diplomacy across the Cabinet.
“We set out to stabilize the relationship without sacrificing our capacity to strengthen our alliances, compete vigorously, and defend our interests. Beginning in May of last year, we launched a period of intensive diplomacy. It was an all-hands-on-deck effort across the Cabinet, spanning the full range of our relationship with the PRC.”
The PRC is the only state with both the intent to reshape the international order and the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it.
“We determined that the PRC was the only state with both the intent to reshape the international order and the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it.”
The administration launched AUKUS, elevated the Quad, upgraded relationships with Vietnam, the Philippines, India, Indonesia, and others, and launched a historic trilateral with Japan and Korea that culminated in a historic summit at Camp David.
“We launched AUKUS. We elevated the Quad. We upgrade our relationship with Vietnam and the Philippines, India, Indonesia, and others. We launched a historic trilateral with Japan and the Republic of Korea, that culminated in a historic summit that President Biden hosted at Camp David.”
The administration implemented carefully tailored export restrictions on key technologies focused on advanced semiconductor manufacturing tools, supercomputing capabilities, and the most advanced chips critical to military modernization, without broader decoupling.
“We implemented carefully tailored export restrictions on key technologies, focused on advanced semiconductor manufacturing tools—a topic, by the way, that was central to one of the earlier UCSD forums, when I first really got immersed in this question of semiconductor manufacturing equipment—supercomputing capabilities, and the most advanced chips, critical to military modernization.”
The most significant risk would be a crisis in the Taiwan Strait, especially given Beijing's increased military activity in and around its air and waters.
“The most significant risk would be a crisis in the Taiwan Strait, especially given Beijing's increased miliary activity in and around its air and waters.”
In 2019, Sullivan and Kurt Campbell wrote in Foreign Affairs calling for the U.S. to establish 'favorable terms of coexistence' with Beijing across military, economic, and political issues, rejecting transformation-based approaches.
“Back in 2019, Jake wrote a piece with Kurt Campbell for a little magazine called Foreign Affairs. He warned against trying to transform China, and instead called for the U.S. to establish, quote, 'favorable terms of coexistence' with Beijing across military, economic, and political issues.”
The trilateral security dimension with Japan and South Korea is critical, manifesting in closer intelligence coordination, defense cooperation, exercises, and joint deterrence, particularly regarding the Korean Peninsula.
“I think it's important to recognize that the security dimension of that trilateral relationship is critical. It has been a source of propulsion for pulling the three countries together. And it manifests in closer intelligence coordination, closer defense cooperation, exercises, joint deterrence, particularly when it comes to the Korean Peninsula.”
The trilateral partnership extends beyond security to include joint support for Ukraine, discussions of technology and national security intersection, innovation, and economic investment, showing it is not anti-China but for a shared values and vision.
“But I would also point out that the trilateral partnership expands well beyond that. First, it expands beyond the region. If you look at support for Ukraine, Japan and Korea have both stepped up in significant ways to stand with a fellow democracy in Europe. And the Japanese prime minister has been particularly articulate in explaining that what happens in Ukraine matters in the Indo-Pacific, and President Yoon has reinforced that. And then, finally, the relationship extends to economic coercion, the intersection of technology and national security, innovation, economic investment and vitality, all areas where the three countries have a huge amount of complementary capacity to support and lift one another up.”
The U.S. has taken a series of actions over the past three years on human rights issues including Uyghur forced labor through bipartisan legislation with Congress, implementing the Uyghur Forced Labor Protection Act.
“And so that means not just that we speak out on these issues, but that we take actions. And we have taken a series of actions over the course of the past three years in each of the areas you mentioned. And to a considerable extent, we have done that in partnership with the Congress on a bipartisan basis, including laws that have been passed under our administration that we are now implementing on issues like forced labor, the Uyghur Forced Labor Protection Act.”
The spectrum of expert opinion on China's economic trajectory is quite broad even among incredibly informed people, making it difficult for Sullivan to characterize the likely future trajectory with confidence.
“And the spectrum of opinion on whether China's economy among incredibly informed, like, right-thinking people is quite broad and so I'm humble enough to not really be able to characterize the likely future trajectory of that economy because I think if you had asked people that question two years ago they might have a different answer than they have today.”
The U.S. has put forward voluntary standards that major AI players have signed up to and issued an executive order reflecting core values and principles around AI governance and protection of fundamental rights.
“And we've put forward voluntary standards, that we've gotten some of the biggest AI players in the world to sign up to. We've issued an executive order that reflects many of the core values and principles that are at the heart of your question.”
A failure to connect competitive means to clear ends in China policy will allow U.S. policy to drift towards competition for competition's sake and fall into a dangerous cycle of confrontation.
“As Jake warned in that 2019 article, a failure to connect competitive means to clear ends will allow U.S. policy to drift towards competition for competition's sake and then fall into a dangerous cycle of confrontation.”
The administration rejects the conventional wisdom of inexorable U.S. decline and Chinese rise, asserting that choices matter in both Beijing and Washington.
“And we kind of reject the—what I believe was a kind of common view that somehow, you know, it was a story of inexorable rise on the one side and inexorable decline on the other side. Choices matter in both Beijing and Washington. We're trying to make the right choices and, of course, it's up to Beijing how they choose to make choices on their side.”
A sustainable China policy requires holding multiple truths at the same time: clear-eyed about competitive structural dynamics, but also aware that the U.S. and PRC are economically interdependent and share interests in addressing transnational problems and reducing conflict risk.
“A sustainable China policy is about holding in one's head multiple truths at the same time, and working iteratively to reconcile them. We are clear-eyed about the competitive structural dynamics in our relationship with the PRC. But we are also keenly aware that the United States and the PRC are economically interdependent, and share interests in addressing transnational problems, and reducing the risk of conflict.”
The U.S. has worked closely with the World Bank head Ajay Banja and through the G-7's Project on Global Infrastructure Investment to expand capacity for capital mobilization in developing countries.
“And we have worked very closely with the new head of the World Bank—who President Biden, you know, played an active role in helping get into the job, Ajay Banja—in trying to expand the World Bank's capacity to do this. We've worked with the G-7 through PGI, the Project on Global Infrastructure Investment, to do this.”
The PRC sought to 'catch up and surpass' the United States in high technology, pursued the largest peacetime military buildup in history, and became more repressive at home and more assertive abroad including in the South and East China Seas and Taiwan Strait.
“the PRC sought to, quote, 'catch up and surpass' the United States in high technology, that it was pursuing the largest peacetime military buildup in history, and that it was more repressive at home and more assertive abroad including in the South and East China Seas as well as the Taiwan Strait.”
Over the next decade, the administration is estimating $3.5 trillion in new public and private investment, unlocked by historic legislation on infrastructure, chips and science, and clean energy.
“looking out over the next decade, we're estimating $3.5 trillion in new public and private investment, unlocked by the investments made in the—in the historic legislation I just referenced.”
For years, economists were predicting the PRC would overtake the United States in GDP either in this decade or the next, but those projections are now moving further and further out, with some saying the moment may never come.
“For years, economists were predicting that the PRC would overtake the United States in GDP either in this decade, or the next. Now, those projections are moving further and further out. And with the PRC facing its own set of challenges, some say that moment may never come.”
Sullivan spent two days with Director Wang Yi in Vienna in May 2023 to help restore normalcy to the relationship and reached consensus on a roadmap for high-level engagement to carry out the Bali summit agenda, hoping to culminate in a leader-level meeting at APEC in San Francisco.
“In May I spent two days with Director Wang Yi in Vienna to help restore some normalcy to the relationship. In Vienna we reached consensus on a rough roadmap for high-level engagement to carry out the agenda that President Biden and President Xi had set forward in Bali, one both sides hoped at that time would ultimately culminate in a leader-level meeting in San Francisco at APEC later in the year.”
Beijing has taken initial steps to stem the flow of precursor chemicals used to make fentanyl, and the first Interagency Counternarcotics Working Group between the U.S. and PRC met in Beijing, with the aim to open law-enforcement cooperation.
“Since then we've seen Beijing take initial steps to stem the flow of precursor chemicals used to make fentanyl, progress that we hope and need to see continue. The first Interagency Counternarcotics Working Group between the U.S. and the PRC met today in Beijing, and our aim is to open up law-enforcement cooperation on fighting this terrible drug.”
The chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff has spoken with his Chinese counterpart since the Woodside summit, and critical operator-level military mechanisms have been restored.
“The chairman of our Joint Chiefs of Staff has now spoken with his counterpart, and we've restored a number of critical operator-level mechanisms.”
PRC provided Russia with non-lethal support in the form of equipment like heavy-duty trucks and helped Russia reconstitute its defense industrial base, which the U.S. views as supporting an imperial war of conquest in Europe and a fundamental national security threat.
“the war in Ukraine has been a through line in my conversations with my Chinese counterparts going back to before Wang Yi, with Yang Jiechi, in the early months, you know, where we sent a clear message about our concern that China might provide lethal aid for use against civilians in Ukraine. We have not seen the provision of lethal aid, but as I said in my remarks and as you noted in your question, we have seen support from Chinese companies to help Russia reconstitute its defense industrial base.”
China, as a permanent UN Security Council member, has an obligation to use its influence with Tehran to get Tehran to use influence with Houthis to push back against Red Sea shipping disruptions that harm China-Europe trade.
“made the case that, you know, China, as a responsible player, as a U.N. Security Council member, has an obligation to use the influence it has in Tehran to get those in Tehran to use the influence they have with the Houthis to push back against this kind of behavior. And I won't, you know, characterize the response because I'll leave that to Wang Yi to do for himself, but I will just say that was a detailed and substantive conversation because it is a matter where we believe that countries, particularly permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, have unique responsibilities and should step up to those responsibilities.”
President Biden and President Xi should speak by telephone relatively soon, with both sides agreeing this is necessary because there is no substitute for leader-to-leader conversation in effective stewardship of U.S.-China policy.
“We agreed that President Biden and President Xi should speak, and should speak by telephone relatively soon. And I think the acknowledgement coming out of Woodside that there really is no substitute for leader-to-leader conversation, I mean, it became so apparent over the course of that meeting at Woodside how central that ingredient has to be to an effective stewardship of U.S.-China policy.”
Export controls on semiconductors were updated in October 2023 after the first round in October 2022, and this updating will continue as technology evolves while underlying standards remain constant.
“One more thing I will say is in October of 2022 we did a first round of export controls on advanced semiconductors and semiconductor manufacturing equipment. In October of 2023 we updated them. I think the world can expect that will be part of the process, going forward, because as the technology evolves our controls have to evolve. It doesn't mean the standards underlying our controls evolve. Those remain constant. But they have to be applied to technology as it advances and that will require updates to existing controls even as we add, you know, targeted tailored controls in other areas as well.”
The United States has decades of experience talking to and even working with competitors when national interests call for it, and the Biden administration is calling on that historical experience.
“the United States has decades of experience talking to and even working with our competitors when our interests call for it. Over the last year, we've called on that experience.”
Taiwan's vibrant democratic character is viewed positively by the U.S., and U.S. policy remains constant through changes: 'One China' policy, Taiwan Relations Act, Six Assurances.
“And otherwise, from the United States' perspective Taiwan exhibiting this vibrant democratic character is a positive thing and our policy remains constant through it. As it was before it will be going forward—the 'One China' policy, the Taiwan Relations Act, the Six Assurances, and all of the issues the people in this room know so well.”
President Biden has been clear and direct in conversations with President Xi about fundamental U.S. responsibility to speak out on human rights abuses—Uyghurs, Tibetans, Christian minorities—because it is core to who Americans are, not to weaponize the issue.
“the president, as he has said publicly, has been very clear and direct in his conversations in the two summits that he's had about the kind of fundamental responsibility and obligation of an American president to speak out on these issues because it's core to who we are. That's not about trying to weaponize the issue; it's about living out our values.”
The year 2023 began with U.S.-China relations at a historic low point due to the Chinese spy balloon crossing the U.S., concerns about PRC providing Russia lethal aid, and unprecedented military exercises around Taiwan in August 2022.
“The year began with the relationship at a historic low point. A year ago this week, a Chinese spy balloon traveled across the United States. We were and remain deeply concerned about the PRC providing Russia with lethal aid in its invasion of Ukraine. And after historic and unprecedented—and not historic in a positive sense—PRC military exercises in August of 2022, it seemed a series of cross-strait crises loomed over the horizon.”
High-level communication with China halted, along with military-to-military ties and cooperation on counternarcotics and climate, all of which the PRC had frozen.
“High-level communication halted, to say nothing of military-to-military ties or cooperation on counternarcotics or climate, all of which the PRC had frozen.”
The strongest post-pandemic recovery and among the lowest inflation of any leading economy in the world provided evidence that America was not in terminal decline, contrary to Beijing's assumptions.
“Now, the backdrop to these actions was the strongest post-pandemic recovery, and among the lowest inflation of any leading economy in the world.”
Sullivan does not see upside in the National Security Advisor presenting himself as an armchair analyst on China's economy, and instead emphasizes the need for multidirectional strategy that works if assumptions about the Chinese economy turn out to be wrong.
“I will now, for the second time, try and dodge laying out exactly what they are, because I just don't see a huge amount of upside in the U.S. national security advisor kind of holding forth as an armchair analyst on China's economy. But—(laughter)—but I would say that we also need a multidirectional strategy that can apply if our assumptions turn out to be wrong.”
The U.S. should not treat the rest of the world as proxy battlegrounds in competition with China, as occurred during the Cold War with the Soviet Union, but instead offer a better value proposition.
“One thing that Kurt and I wrote in our Foreign Affairs piece in 2019, that I have felt, like, really important to keep us disciplined in this, is that we cannot treat the rest of the world as proxy battlegrounds, the way that, I think, the U.S. and the Soviet Union too often did during the Cold War. So, looking at Africa, our question should not be, how do we gain relative advantage over China in this country, because that becomes a warping and distorting factor, that frankly, in a way, can also undermine our overall position. So, the question we pose instead is, how do we offer a better value proposition?”
The administration is not planning to recreate outdated structures and mechanisms from an earlier period in the bilateral relationship and is not interested in dialogue just for dialogue's sake, but does see value in launching and shepherding a select number of working-level consultations in discrete, carefully chosen areas.
“We're not planning to recreate the now-outdated structures and mechanisms from an earlier period in the bilateral relationship. And we're definitely not interested in dialogue just for dialogue's sake. But we do see value in launching and shepherding a select number of working-level consultations in discrete, carefully chosen areas to advance our interests and achieve results.”
Having direct diplomacy and intensive management of the relationship is not inconsistent with standing up for and taking material action on human rights issues.
“And from our perspective, having direct diplomacy and intensive management of the relationship is not inconsistent with standing up for speaking out on and taking material action on issues relating to the protection of human rights.”
The U.S. and China have different visions of AI governance: the U.S. vision is rooted in protection of fundamental rights and empowerment of people, lifting them up rather than holding them down, in contrast to the PRC's approach.
“So, we have been very actively engaged in the negotiations over the treaty at the Council of Europe, because our basic vision for the governance of AI is rooted in the idea of the protection of fundamental rights, and the empowerment of people, lifting them up, rather than holding them down. And we do have a very different vision of AI governments than the PRC does, which is why our dialogue with them will really vector in on our kind of responsibility, as significant countries and major AI players, to manage the risks of AI as we go forward.”
Critics said at the time that the travel was one-sided, but the strategy was to use those meetings to open up a two-way flow of exchanges, and that is exactly what happened.
“Critics said at the time that this travel was one-sided. But our strategy was to use those meetings to open up a two-way flow of exchanges, and that's exactly what happened.”
The question now is whether military-to-military communication will continue even in the face of future turbulence, and the U.S. will continue to make the case that military-to-military communication is critical at all times, especially in times of tension.
“The question now is whether that will continue even in the face of future turbulence. We, for our part, will continue to make the case that military-to-military communication is critical at all times, but especially in times of tension.”
The implementation of the strategy involves day-to-day hard work by an incredible team across the entire U.S. government, both career and appointed, supported by bipartisan advice from the private sector, public sector, and various walks of life.
“today my goal was simply to walk you through how we've tried to execute that in practice so we can get beyond the—you know, the kind of broad slogans and down to the actual day-to-day hard work that an incredible team of people across the entire U.S. government, both career and appointed, have been working. And we've done so, I must say looking around this room, with the support and advice of a huge number of people here from both parties, from the private sector and the public sector, and across a range of walks of life.”
The administration was direct about differences in meetings, including PRC's support for Russia's war against Ukraine and cross-strait issues, while continuing to implement national-security measures like restrictions on outbound investment and export controls.
“This intensive diplomacy was about managing tough issues rather than patching up the relationship. We were direct about our differences, including PRC's support for Russia's war against Ukraine and cross-strait issues. We did not pull back from national-security-focused measures like restrictions on outbound investment and updates to our export controls.”
Efforts, implied or explicit, to shape or change the PRC over several decades did not succeed, so the United States must accept that the PRC will be a major player on the world stage for the foreseeable future and find ways to live alongside it.
“We realize that efforts—implied or explicit—to shape or change the PRC over several decades did not succeed. We expect that the PRC will be a major player on the world stage for the foreseeable future. That means that even as we compete, we have to find ways to live alongside one another.”
The Taiwan Strait situation was expected to grow more tense after August 2022 military exercises, but improved by 2024—an outcome few anticipated but one that remains fragile with continued risk.
“That is an outcome that few may have foreseen in August of 2022, when most expected the cross-strait situation to grow more tense, not less. But it's no guarantee of future trends, and the risk remains real.”
The previous administration updated the diagnosis of the scope and nature of the China challenge but did not adequately develop the strategy and tools to address it, and that approach was at times more confrontational than competitive and undervalued the allies and partners critical to sustaining an effective China strategy.
“When we came into office we inherited an approach from the previous administration that had updated the diagnosis of the scope and nature of the China challenge but did not adequately develop the strategy and tools to address it. That approach was at times more confrontational than competitive and too often undervalued the allies and partners critical to sustaining an effective China strategy.”
America is once more showing its capacity for resilience and reinvention in its economic and technological competitiveness.
“And this brings me to a critical point: America, in this moment, is once more showing its capacity for resilience and reinvention.”
Sullivan and Wang Yi had their third extended round of conversations in Bangkok, with each successive round setting aside talking points and having increasingly strategic conversations.
“You know, this is my third extended round of conversations with Wang Yi—the first in Vienna, the second in Malta, and then—and then this on in Bangkok. And with each successive round, I think we have increasingly gotten to the point of setting aside the talking points and really having strategic conversations.”
If PRC provocations continue in the South and East China Seas and the Taiwan Strait, the U.S. will work closely with allies and partners to push back and speak out about the risks to peace and stability.
“If PRC provocations continue in the South and East China Seas and the Taiwan Strait, we'll work closely with allies and partners to push back and speak out about the risks to peace and stability in the world's most important waterways.”
The U.S. will continue to uphold freedom of navigation in the Indo-Pacific region by flying, sailing, and operating wherever international law allows.
“We'll continue to uphold freedom of navigation in the region by flying, sailing, and operating wherever international law allows.”
The approach Sullivan is describing is rooted in counternarcotics cooperation as an example of an area where the U.S. and China work together in the present moment rather than in nostalgia of the past.
“That's the approach we use today on counternarcotics, an approach rooted in the here and now rather than in the nostalgia of the past.”
The U.S. grades itself as incomplete in competition with China in developing countries and has work to begin in the administration that will require Congress to unlock resources necessary to match capital mobilization.
“And I think I would grade us as incomplete on this. It's work that we have begun to do quite actively in this administration, and we have a lot more work to do. That's going to require Congress working with us to unlock some of these resources that in turn, can unlock a much larger share of resources from the private sector to deliver the value proposition we want to deliver.”
Taiwan held historic elections recently without any major cross-strait incident, in part because Washington, Beijing, and Taipei worked to reduce miscommunication and misperception about their respective intentions.
“Just a few weeks ago, Taiwan held historic elections without any major cross-strait incident, in part because all sides—Washington, Beijing, and Taipei—worked to reduce miscommunication and misperception about their respective intentions.”
Sullivan stated he has remained committed to the 'One China' policy and was clear on that commitment with Wang Yi during their Bangkok meeting.
“And President Biden has been clear that, you know, we've remained committed to the "One China" policy and I was clear on that with Wang Yi as well.”
Steve Hadley is one of Jake Sullivan's predecessors as National Security Advisor and has spent much of his life wrestling with U.S.-China policy questions.
“one of Jake's predecessors as national security adviser who has spent much of his life wrestling with these and other difficult questions?”