Nick Lawson & Ben Finegold: The Uranium Squeeze & How To Play It
What this covers
Uranium is on the edge of a once-in-a-generation supply shock, and prices could spike faster than in 2007.
Ocean Wall CEO Nick Lawson and Director Ben Finegold tell Trey Reik why the market is set up for a parabolic move. From the “Putinization of uranium” (Russia’s stranglehold on enrichment) to AI-hungry data centers that can only run on nuclear baseload, the squeeze is building fast.
What we cover - The 500 % surge in enrichment prices, and why oxide hasn’t followed yet - Hedge funds cornering supply (shades of 2006-07) - How utilities are panic-buying enrichment first, uranium later - Critical price thresholds: miners need $90-$120/lb to restart production - Nick & Ben’s highest-conviction tickers, from UEC to ASPI Isotopes
Energy security, national defence, and the next tech wave all point to one metal: Uranium!
Get Wealthion’s and SCP Resource Finance’s free report on Uranium and investment opportunities in the space, here: https://wealthion.com/uranium-investment-opportunities/
Chapters: 0:26 – Inside Ocean Wall 4:45 – From $150 to $18: What Crushed Uranium Last Time? 7:14 – The Last Uranium Mania: Lessons from the 2007 Spike 8:24 – Why Uranium Prices Stayed Frozen for a Decade 9:41 – The Uranium Awakening: What Changed After 2020 13:15 – Did Sprott Light the Fuse on the Uranium Rally? 16:02 – War, Sanctions & Supply Shocks: Was the Panic Real? 18:12 – The Putin Factor: How Geopolitics Weaponized Uranium 21:02 – Who’s Driving Prices: Wall Street or Nuclear Utilities? 26:52 – Uranium 101: The Fuel Cycle Every Investor Must Know 31:40 – How to Invest in Uranium: Funds, Stocks, and More 37:14 – Mining Trouble Ahead? The Looming Supply Crunch 38:28 – Why Canadian Uranium Miners Could Be at Risk 39:47 – Are We Still Early? Timing the Uranium Opportunity 43:15 – Explosive Growth Ahead? The Case for a Price Surge 45:05 – Long-Term Bull Case: Why Uranium’s Run Is Just Starting
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Uranium has crossed an irreversible inflection point driven by global nuclear expansion, geopolitical consolidation of the fuel cycle under Russia and China, and AI/data center power demands; the market is severely undersupplied with a multi-year lag to production response, creating a generational asymmetric upside opportunity despite near-term volatility.
- Global nuclear capacity commitments (31 countries pledging to triple by 2050, China building 150GW in a decade) have eliminated policy risk while supply remains stuck in a structural deficit since 2018
- Russia controls 60% of conversion/enrichment capacity; the fuel cycle bottleneck—not raw uranium—now sets prices, with conversion/enrichment prices up 500% since Ukraine invasion while oxide prices doubled, signaling repricing cascade downstream
- Uranium mining requires 2-3 years minimum lead time with break-even costs of $90/lb (current spot $70), creating a 3-5 year supply vacuum before new production can materialize
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Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 was the most significant event in the last decade for nuclear because it revealed that conversion and enrichment processes are completely dominated by Russia, creating a strategic vulnerability for Western nuclear fleets.
“In February 2022, probably the most significant event in the last decade in nuclear occurred, which was Russia's invasion of Ukraine...A process which is completely dominated by Russia.”
Uranium exhibits non-linear price elasticity because nuclear utilities have no substitution option—they will pay 'anything' for fuel because a reactor shutdown costs $1 million per month in lost output and creates risk of societal unrest if one in four western seaboard US households lose power.
“fuel buyers will pay anything for the fuel because the input cost of uranium in a nuclear power plant is between 3 and 5%. So as a variable cost, it's actually very very small. But really Trey, the price is infinite because if you don't have the nuclear fuel, you have to shutter your reactor and that means that your plant could be offline for 12 months to a year. It will cost you a million dollars. But the bigger issue, and we know this now with uh uh nuclear as a base load supplier, one in four households on the western seabboard in the US take their power from nuclear.”
Nuclear power has become an irreversible policy commitment globally, with 31 countries at COP 28 pledging to triple nuclear capacity by 2050 and China committing to build more nuclear reactors in the next 10 years than have been built globally in the last 35 years, eliminating policy risk from the uranium investment thesis.
“You were seeing the most anti-traditionally anti-nuclear jurisdictions in the world pivoting back towards nuclear power. You were seeing China double down on their commitments to build out 150 gawatts in the next decade to build more nuclear reactors in the next 10 years than had been built globally in the last 35. You had 31 countries in uh at COP 28 pledging to triple nuclear capacity from today's levels by 2050.”
The Spot Physical Uranium Trust entered the market in 2022 and procured 40 million pounds of uranium in a single year—approximately one-third of global annual primary supply—locking up inventory for the foreseeable future and acting as a second black swan event (after policy-driven demand acceleration) that removed a large supply cushion from the market.
“the trust is now a $6 billion now at today's prices, $5.5 billion now. So that was the second sort of black swan event was this this idea that you had a procurement investment vehicle that was just locking up pounds for the foreseeable future.”
Prior to 2019, Kazakhstan, the world's largest uranium producer (42% of global supply), had no price discipline and sold all production at market price regardless of scarcity signals; after the 2019 tenge devaluation, Kazakhstan adopted price discipline and began holding back production, signaling a shift toward producer control of supply.
“The Kazuks who are the cheapest and the biggest producer of uranium had no sort of discipline or price discipline up until 2019. Whatever they produced, they would sell. And it took the Tangi devaluation around the time of COVID for them to actually start thinking, well, hold on, we're crazy. We're the biggest producer. Let's start holding back some pounds.”
Mobile inventory—uranium pounds held in unaccounted, non-transparent pockets throughout the market—created uncertainty about true supply levels and acted as a suspected overhang, preventing price recovery even after initial supply constraints emerged.
“it's such an opaque industry. There's this concept of in mobile what we call mobile inventory. The mobile inventory is pounds. You can't account for everything you see in uranium. It's not like trading uh copper or oil or wheat or any other commodity where there's a proper exchange. What you have is you have pockets of uh of inventory that either creates an overhang or a suspected seller of pounds.”
Russia intentionally invested in Rosatom (state nuclear company) to build nuclear power plants in strategically important countries (Venezuela, parts of Africa, Central Asia) as part of a long-term energy leverage strategy analogous to Gazprom's oil/gas pipeline strategy in Europe.
“Matam is building nuclear power plants in every poor country um on their near and beyond strategy.”
Global support for nuclear energy has been unanimous and unexpected in scope, with traditionally anti-nuclear jurisdictions pivoting toward nuclear, China planning 150 gigawatts of new reactors in the next decade (more than was built globally in the last 35 years), and 31 countries at COP28 pledging to triple nuclear capacity by 2050.
“I don't think that even we as nuclear bulls could appreciate just how unanimous global perspective would become on nuclear energy. So I think that was the first turning point which was you were seeing the most anti-traditionally anti-nuclear jurisdictions in the world pivoting back towards nuclear power. You were seeing China double down on their commitments to build out 150 gawatts in the next decade to build more nuclear reactors in the next 10 years than had been built globally in the last 35.”
Critical materials face supply constraints from geopolitical fragmentation and strategic hoarding; helium (used in rocketry and semiconductor fabrication) loses half its volume to evaporation after 45 days at -260C, making long-term storage impossible; this applies across critical minerals including uranium where bad actors are now racing to accumulate supply.
“for a lot of critical materials the uh process is controlled by a few countries and those countries are now being to be bad actors and what the uh the the western world has to understand is there has been a drive to accumulate those materials but also to give you an example something like helium helium has what's called purge as in it loses a lot of it when it's shipped which is a liquid at -260° C. It loses after 45 days half its liquid into gas and becomes useless.”
Russia controls enrichment and conversion capacity—the critical bottleneck in the nuclear fuel cycle—with over 60% global share; conversion and enrichment prices have risen 500% since the Ukraine invasion while uranium oxide prices doubled, revealing that the conversion/enrichment constraint, not raw uranium supply, is now the binding constraint on global nuclear capacity.
“Russia developed gaseous diffusion back in the 1960s. They have stolen a march on the ability to as Ben said take the uranium as a gas run it through the centrifuges and to enrich it to go into the fuel rods. This is hasn't been done by any other country uh in the kind of scale that's required. So America only has one uh enrichment plant which is uh in New Mexico and it's run by Uranco.”
The term 'Putinization of uranium' comes from Maren Katusa's 2015 book 'The Cold War', which predicted Putin would use uranium and energy as a weapon, and this thesis is being validated: 42% of global uranium comes from Kazakhstan (Russia-aligned), Canada produces 12%, Namibia is China-controlled, Niger is under coup and Russia-aligned, and Uzbekistan is a Russian apparatus.
“Putinization. And it actually comes from a book written in 2015 uh called uh the Cold War by Marusa which actually said that then back in 2015 buying uranium one. Putin understood the the ability to use energy as a weapon... if you look at the world's biggest producers of uranium, 42% is Kazakhstan. Well, that's completely aligned to Russia. Now the next one is Canada at 12%. And then you've got Namibia, Wasbekiststan, Australia, Australia, you know, then they're all in the percents. Now nijair is under um uh coup d'etar and that's aligned itself to Russia. It was Beckistan as an apparatic of Russia. So you know and Namibia is controlled by China.”
The uranium fuel cycle conversion, enrichment, and fabrication processes are only performed by six countries globally (China, US, UK/Netherlands/Germany via Urenco, Canada via Cameco, France via Orano), creating an impenetrable moat around these businesses due to radioactive material handling regulations and safety protocols.
“the fuel cycle conversion, enrichment and fabrication, these are only really done by six countries globally. China, the US, a a a sort of coalition of of the UK, Netherlands and Germany at Ureno um and then um also in Canada via via Kamako and France via Orano. So there's very very few companies that do this. There's a huge moat around this around these businesses. Now, that that comes down to the fact that you're dealing with a radioactive material. It's incredibly highly regulated, safety protocols, etc.”
Nick Lawson began his investment career at Deutsche Bank, where he specialized in deep value investments + catalyst identification; this approach shaped his entire philosophy—finding undervalued assets paired with identifiable catalysts that will drive repricing.
“My journey uh goes back to uh I started at Deutsche Bank um uh and quickly took on uh special situations at a time when there were a lot of sort of distressed assets in the early 2000s and uh my interest was peaked in the idea of sort of undervalued assets plus catalyst.”
The 2006-2007 uranium price spike from $30 to $150 was driven by hedge fund front-running of utilities' precautionary buying (utilities feared supply shortages due to long fuel cycle lead times), creating an everincreasing vortex of bidding; the subsequent leverage in the system was liquidated during the 2008 financial crisis, collapsing prices, not Fukushima—Fukushima occurred afterward and further depressed prices.
“what happened was the apex predator, the hedge fund, got in front of the fuel buyers and drove the price in even higher, creating this sort of like um this sort of everinccreasing vortex of people bidding each other up. But it was led by 2007 we're talking about 2006 2007. So it went from October 06 to around May 07 May 07 and then like all banks we got greedy. We're at Deutschbank at the time. We created a a derivative contract on Comx. Everyone got involved.”
Lightbridge Corporation is a NASDAQ-listed company with a unique fabrication technology that can improve thermal efficiency and extend the lifespan of uranium fuel pellets within fuel rods; this reduces uranium consumption per unit of energy generated and creates new investment exposure to the fuel cycle.
“Lightbridge effectively can improve the uh thermal efficiency, the ability to uh extract and extend the uh life of the uranium pellet within the fuel rod, which were absolutely crucial as the world begins to start losing uranium reserves, extending the life of the fuel rod. Uh that's a NASDAQ stock.”
Uranium mining discovery requires geologists to identify radioactive boulders via Geiger counters on low-altitude flights, triangulate back to ice-age glacial sources, drill 150 meters down, and then extract via in-situ recovery or hard rock mining—a process that takes multi-year timescales because of nonconformity.
“To find uranium is incredibly hard. So you have to go back to the uh the uh it's an alien material. So you have these radioactive seams that run through uh for example the aabaska basin. And to find it, you have to start by having geologists that can find boulders that have traces of of of of radioactivity. And they're normally found by very simply strapping a guided counter to a plane that flies over tree level. Once you find it, you have to triangulate it back to the thoring of the last last ice age 10,000 years ago as to where the boulders came from. Then you have to drill down 150 m.”
The speakers have not been 'too nervous' over the last 5 years because they have been 'utterly convicted in their thesis' and have 'never been too heavily positioned where we can't sleep at night,' advocating for patient, conviction-based investing rather than leverage-driven speculation.
“we haven't been that nervous the last 5 years because we've been utterly convicted in our thesis and we've never been too heavily positioned where we can't sleep at night. And I think that is the most important thing for any investor.”
The US down-blended nuclear weapons to supply the uranium energy industry over the last couple of years, demonstrating that even strategic military stockpiles are being tapped to meet civilian nuclear fuel demand.
“we have seen in the last couple of years the idea of down blending of of US nuclear weapons to actually fuel the uh nuclear energy industry.”
The uranium market has been in sustained deficit since 2018, with primary supply failing to meet primary demand, creating structural undersupply independent of price signals.
“fundamentally the uranium market's been in a state of sustained deficit since 2018. If you look at primary supply versus primary demand”
Russia has achieved a strategic monopoly on uranium enrichment capability through 1960s-era gaseous diffusion technology and centrifuge mastery; no other country has deployed enrichment at the required scale, making the US dependent on Russia despite having one enrichment plant in New Mexico.
“Russia developed gaseous diffusion back in the 1960s. They have stolen a march on the ability to as Ben said take the uranium as a gas run it through the centrifuges and to enrich it to go into the fuel rods. This hasn't been done by any other country uh in the kind of scale that's required. So America only has one uh enrichment plant which is uh in New Mexico and it's run by Uranco.”
Global uranium market capitalization is only $60 billion total—less than one-tenth of Exxon Mobil's enterprise value—which means the uranium market is tiny relative to energy demand it must support, amplifying leverage of any major buyer like hedge funds.
“the total global market cap of uranium is only 60 billion. So to put that in context, it's less than onetenth of the enterprise value of Exxon Mobile.”
Fukushima and the Megatons to Megawatts program (1993, converting Russian weapons-grade uranium) flooded the market with inventory, and Germany's Energiewende policy added further oversupply, keeping uranium prices between $16-$20 for a decade.
“there has been a sort of surfit of pounds on the market really going back to 1993 which was when Yeltson and Bush signed the megat tons to megawatt program which effectively saw the down blending of Russian weapons grade uranium but then obviously we had Fukushima and that meant an end to the Japanese nuclear fleet. So pounds flooded the market then and then we had the Germans going vault fast on nuclear roughly the same time. So for a decade the uh price of uranium was trading between $16 and $20”
Utilities maintain inventory levels in excess of 24 months to hedge supply risk, and with a 2-3 year fuel cycle, they are now buying uranium for 2025-2027 delivery at today's prices, creating forward demand pressure that drives spot prices higher.
“utilities will try and keep inventory levels in excess of 24 months. Now what happens is if you're buying now, you're buying in 25 for 27 delivery. Then what people were doing was they were thinking, 'Oh my god, we're not going to be able to get pounds for the next couple of years. We'll start bidding up pounds now.'”
Uranium spot physical trust (SRUCC) and Yellow Cake offer delta-one exposure to uranium oxide prices; SRUCC is the dominant institutional procurement vehicle, now worth $5.5-6 billion, though both trade at discounts to Net Asset Value due to structural lack of arbitrage.
“There is a way to play the ETFs. The ETFs on uranium uh are probably the the biggest one being spot that we've talked about the physical uranium trust and obviously yellow cake that would be your delta one i.e. that would track the oxide price directly and it hasn't done they have a bit of a discount to nav. No one really arves it.”
The Spot Physical Uranium Trust acquired 40 million pounds of uranium in a single year (roughly one-third of global annual primary supply) as a 'black swan' event, locking up uranium for the foreseeable future and creating an 800-pound gorilla the market didn't anticipate.
“The spot physical uranium trust. I was just going to ask you about that whether you thought that was a little aggressive the amount that they acquired. I mean they came into the market and were procuring pounds at a rate that a sovereign would procure pounds. They were buying more pounds that year than the Chinese were. Um it was I think 40 million pounds in a single year. To put that into perspective for your listeners, that's about a third of global annual primary supply at the time.”
The US has downblended and is dowblending weapons-grade uranium to fuel the commercial nuclear energy industry, a sign of the desperation of the fuel supply situation.
“we have seen in the last couple of years the idea of down blending of of US nuclear weapons to actually fuel the uh nuclear energy industry.”
There is virtually no spot uranium market; instead, uranium trading is fragmented between an opaque over-the-counter spot market and a bilateral contract market between utilities and producers; this lack of centralized exchange creates massive inefficiencies, prevents price discovery, and means new institutional capital entering the market cannot trade efficiently.
“you've got a spot market which is very very um opaque and then you've got a contract market which is mainly between utilities and producers.”
Yellow Cake is a London-listed company with an offtake agreement to purchase 100 million pounds of uranium annually from Kazakhstan; combined with the Spot Physical Uranium Trust's 40 million pounds per year, these two vehicles alone are accumulating 140 million pounds annually, creating a structural drain on available supply.
“We already had Yellow Cake listed in London. They had an offtake with the Kazaks for hund00 million of uranium per year.”
Geiger Counter is a London Stock Exchange-listed investment trust that holds a diversified portfolio of uranium producers (including UEC, NextGen) and provides ETF-style exposure to uranium mining with single-stock upside; it offers geographic diversification to North American producers with provenance advantage.
“there's a company which uh is listed on the London Stock Exchange called Geiger Counter. Um it's uh an amazing collection uh in an investment trust format of the most exciting uranium companies producers. It has some UEC in um has some nextg next gen they really own the North American jurisdiction miners where we think there has to be a premium for those pounds”
High Assay Low Enriched Uranium (HALEU) is uranium enriched to ~5–20% (higher than standard reactor fuel but lower than weapons-grade) needed for small modular reactors; demand for HALEU is growing as SMRs become commercial.
“There's a real demand now to be able to produce a kind of fuel that goes into um small mod reactors and that's a slightly more enriched fuel called high assay lowenrich uranium halu”
Uranium mining discoveries in the Athabasca Basin took the form of the Vision Uranium discovery in 2011; the project was purchased by Paladin Resources and is not expected to produce uranium until 2032—a 21-year development timeline illustrating the glacial pace of uranium project development even after discovery.
“We we were broke up to vision uranium before they got bought by Paladin. They discovered uranium in the Aabaska basin in 2011. When can they get it out? 2032.”
Cigar Lake mine in Saskatchewan was flooded in October 2006 before opening, causing uranium prices to spike 700% (7x) in six months, establishing uranium as a commodity with parabolic supply response.
“in October of 2006, uh, Cigar Lake, the uh, yet to be opened mine uh, run by Kamako in the Aabaska basin was flooded and the price of uranium went up seven times in six months.”
The uranium market has been in a sustained structural deficit since 2018, with primary supply falling short of primary demand, and this deficit persists despite a tripling of prices from $20 to $60+ because production lead times are 2-3 years minimum and no new supply has come online in response.
“the uranium market's been in a state of sustained deficit since 2018. If you look at primary supply versus primary demand”
The UK experienced a power price spike to £6,000 per megawatt hour in January 2024, driven by inability to supply household demand with domestic power generation and reliance on imports; building 5 gigawatt AI data centers is logistically and infrastructure-wise infeasible without massive new nuclear capacity, which does not currently exist and cannot be built quickly.
“in the UK in January, we had a spike to £6,000 per megawatt hour. You know, we are utterly dependent on import. So the idea of being able to have a 5 gawatt data center is just lunacy, you know.”
Global uranium demand is approximately 200 million pounds per year, equivalent in volume to a six-story office building (2,500 sq ft), making it a surprisingly small physical quantity but incredibly difficult to find and extract due to nonconformity (scattered distribution like a pearl necklace).
“Uranium exhibits nonconformity, which is it's a bit like a pearl necklace with lots of different size pearls on it. Some are small, some are big, and it's almost impossible to be able to vector in”
Uranium has energy density vastly superior to crude oil or coal; the global demand for uranium is 200 million pounds annually, which would fit in a single six-story office building of approximately 2,500 square feet, illustrating that uranium is extraordinarily concentrated energy.
“The energy density of uranium through the file process is obviously is is vastly superior to to the jewels emitted from crude or coal or anything else. But let me give you an analogy. The world's global demand for uranium is 200 million pounds of uranium. Now that would be the equivalent if I had to give a description of that of in size a uh sixstory building um probably about 2 and a half thousand square ft.”
Russia's technology is not easily replicable; gaseous diffusion and centrifuge enrichment were perfected in Russia over decades through state funding; the US has only one enrichment plant (in New Mexico, operated by Urenco); Western countries cannot rapidly deploy enrichment capacity even with infinite capex due to technological, regulatory, and time constraints.
“Russia developed gaseous diffusion back in the 1960s. They have stolen a march on the ability to as Ben said take the uranium as a gas run it through the centrifuges and to enrich it to go into the fuel rods. This is hasn't been done by any other country uh in the kind of scale that's required. So America only has one uh enrichment plant which is uh in New Mexico and it's run by Uranco.”
Once uranium is extracted and milled into yellow cake, it cannot be substituted or replaced as a fuel input; utilities will literally pay any price to secure it rather than suffer a reactor shutdown lasting 12-18 months and costing $1 million+ daily in lost power generation and societal risk.
“There is no substitutional effect in a nuclear fuel rod than enriched uranium product. And so as a consequence, nuclear power plants will pay anything they can for it.”
Uranium exhibits nonconformity—irregular, dispersed deposits with high variability in size and grade—making vectoring and extraction extremely difficult and slow; unlike oil or large gold deposits, uranium cannot be found systematically, and once found, extraction timelines remain long regardless of price because the geology itself is the constraint, not mining technology.
“Uranium exhibits nonconformity, which is it's a bit like a pearl necklace with lots of different size pearls on it. Some are small, some are big, and it's almost impossible to be able to vector in, but once you do, it takes a huge amount of time to get it out of the ground.”
The energy density of uranium is vastly superior to crude oil and coal on a Joules basis, making nuclear the foundational energy source for the future.
“The energy density of uranium through the file process is obviously is is vastly superior to to the jewels emitted from crude or coal or anything else.”
The uranium sector total global market cap is only ~$60 billion, less than one-tenth the enterprise value of ExxonMobil (~$600B), making it a baby version of other commodity markets with room for dramatic relative revaluation.
“I mean the total global market cap of uranium is only 60 billion. So to put that in context, it's less than onetenth of the enterprise value of Exxon Mobile.”
Microsoft's Stargate 5 GW reactor will draw power equivalent to five New York boroughs' consumption 24/7, supporting a single 5 GW data center, illustrating the massive power demands of AI infrastructure and why nuclear is the only baseload solution.
“the Microsoft Stargate 5 gawatt reactor that will draw down the power of five New York burrows 24/7 five New York burrows and one 5 gawatt data center so The demand for AI now is going to be the only way in which you can get the latencies via nuclear as a base load supplier.”
Sizewell C, a UK nuclear plant, was initially budgeted at £10 billion, then increased to £20 billion, and now projected at £30 billion; meanwhile, China can build equivalent 1 GW reactors at a fraction of the cost through command economy and state planning, creating a Western cost disadvantage that will persist.
“we have a a nuclear power plant in the UK size C that you know was meant to be 10 billion it's now 20 billion to build it probably be 30 billion you know the Chinese are in a position now where they can build scale 1 gawatt reactors at an absolute fraction of the cost through a command economy”
Shipping uranium from Kazakhstan via Russia to Western ports (St. Petersburg → Port Hope Ontario / Illinois) is no longer viable post-invasion; uranium must now be shipped via circuitous routes (Caspian Sea → Black Sea → Bosphorus), which is inefficient and capacity-constrained for radioactive Class 7 transport.
“When the war started, the issue was is shipping uranium ships normally through Russia. It goes up through Kazakhstan and through Russia to St. Petersburg. Then it goes out to the ports of um uh uh Port Hope, Ontario and Illinois. Now that uranium cannot go up through St. Petersburg. So it has to go through a circuitous route that takes in the Caspian, the Black, the Bosphorus Sea. It doesn't work. It doesn't work.”
Uranium oxide (natural uranium) contains U-235 at 0.71% enrichment and is not radioactive in a dangerous sense; conversion to UF6 gas and centrifuge enrichment to 3-5% creates weapons-usable material and serviceable nuclear fuel through cascading centrifuge separation of isotopes.
“You can pull uranium out the ground, you can lick it, you can give it to your kids, they're not going to turn to the Incredible Hulk. That's because it's not very radioactive. To be a bit more scientific about that, it's enriched in the file isotope uh to the degree of 0.71%. not very radioactive.”
The most important investment principle is investing in critical materials on a funded basis without leverage, allowing investors to tolerate market volatility, geopolitical disruption, interest rate changes, and tariffs without being forced to liquidate.
“if you do it and you do it on a funded basis where you're not using using leather, you're not spending money you can't afford to lose, you can wear the vicissitudes of the market, you can wear a Trump tariff tantrum, you can wear a war or whatever interest rate rise.”
In-situ recovery uranium mining involves injecting sulfuric acid into underground uranium deposits via boreholes and extracting uranium via a central repository, used extensively by Kazakhstan and US operators like UEC.
“In situ recovery is you locate an underground deposit of uranium and you essentially inject bore holes into that deposit and you put sulfuric acid down those bore holes and you collect uranium via a central repository. That's what the likes of Kazakhstan do. Um it's what the likes of UEC do in in the United States as well.”
In situ recovery (ISR) is a method of uranium extraction where sulfuric acid is injected into boreholes into underground uranium deposits, uranium is dissolved and collected via central repository, and is commonly used in Kazakhstan and the US; it contrasts with traditional hard rock open-pit mining.
“In situ recovery is you locate an underground deposit of uranium and you essentially inject bore holes into that deposit and you put sulfuric acid down those bore holes and you collect uranium via a central repository. That's what the likes of Kazakhstan do. Um it's what the likes of UEC do in in the United States as well.”
The uranium fuel cycle consists of seven stages: mining/extraction, milling (crushing to yellow cake), conversion (to UF6 gas), enrichment (cascading centrifuges raising U-235 from 0.71% to 3-5%), fabrication (into pellets and fuel rods), and use in reactors; each stage is dominated by a small number of countries with high regulatory barriers.
“the fuel cycle conversion, enrichment and fabrication, these are only really done by six countries globally. China, the US, a a a sort of coalition of of the UK, Netherlands and Germany at Ureno um and then um also in Canada via via Kamako and France via Orano. So there's very very few companies that do this. There's a huge moat around this around these businesses.”
Microsoft's Stargate 5-gigawatt reactor project draws power equivalent to five New York boroughs operating 24/7, highlighting the massive power demands of AI and the necessity of nuclear as the only viable baseload power source.
“the Microsoft Stargate 5 gawatt reactor that will draw down the power of five New York burrows 24/7 five New York burrows and one 5 gawatt data center”
The 'Cassandra problem' in uranium investment: Ocean Wall can see the enrichment price crisis unfolding (500% increases) and can trace the logical chain to future uranium repricing (like foreseeing water scarcity and thus understanding water prices), but the market ignores the signal because it is not immediately obvious.
“we often give ourselves the know it's analogist to Cassandra on the walls of Troy we can see the Greek ships but no one's listening”
China has built a strategic uranium warehouse on its border with Kazakhstan called Alashtak, which serves as a physical buffer and procurement hub to buy and store as much uranium as Kazakhstan can ship, securing supply regardless of Western competition.
“The Chinese have built a a a warehouse on their border at China and Kazakhstan called Alashshank which will buy and store as much uranium as the Kazaks can ship to them.”
The long-term uranium investment thesis is essentially 100% dependent on nuclear energy demand, with weapons demand as a secondary factor.
“Is it nuclear energy like 90%. I'd say it's a probably 100% isn't it? Apart from weapons as well.”
Lawson and Fineold worry that governments may eventually invoke force majeure/martial law to seize and sequester uranium supplies, suggesting uranium could become so strategically critical that governments nationalize it.
“I always laugh with Ben. I don't laugh. I worry that you know we don't want to be on the front page of business week looking like the villains who've you know sequested all the uranium but there may be an issue where the governments have to invoke force measure around uranium and seize it because it will be you know it has such a critical need”
Enrichment and conversion prices have risen 500% since the start of the Russia-Ukraine war, while uranium oxide prices have only risen approximately 100% (doubled), creating a price-cascade lag where raw uranium will eventually catch up to enrichment prices.
“as Ben said, you know, the crystal ball effect is the price of enriched uranium products gone up 500% since the start of the war. You know what we're saying on the analogy of the glass of water is I'm showing you what next Friday's price is like with no water and you can buy as much water as you want today at a pound because the oxide price has not had the same move”
Putin and Xi have deliberately accumulated uranium and enrichment capacity as part of long-term state planning (10-50 year horizons), using command economies to build nuclear power plants at lower costs than Western competitors and using energy as a geopolitical weapon.
“when you have you know 10 20 50 year state planning around things you understand that you can get stuff through quite cheaply. I mean we have a a nuclear power plant in the UK size C that you know was meant to be 10 billion it's now 20 billion to build it probably be 30 billion you know the Chinese are in a position now where they can build scale 1 gawatt reactors at an absolute fraction of the cost through a command economy but also what they've understood is it needs to be fueled by uranium”
Kazakhstan produces 42% of global uranium and is completely aligned with Russia; Canada produces 12%; and the remaining producers (Namibia, Uzbekistan, Australia, Niger) are either controlled by China or aligned with Russia, creating a bifurcation where ~80% of Kazakhstan's exports now flow to China and Russia instead of the West.
“if you look at the world's biggest producers of uranium, 42% is Kazakhstan. Well, that's completely aligned to Russia. Now the next one is Canada at 12%. And then you've got Namibia, Wasbekiststan, Australia, Australia, you know, then they're all in the percents. Now nijair is under um uh coup d'etar and that's aligned itself to Russia. It was Beckistan as an apparatic of Russia. So you know and Namibia is controlled by China.”
Utilities that were procuring uranium in traditional sequence (oxide → conversion → enrichment) have shifted to reverse procurement (enrichment → conversion → oxide) due to enrichment scarcity, creating an unprecedented supply-chain reversal.
“A utility normally they'll go and buy their uranium out the ground first, then they'll get their conversion, then they'll get their enrichment. That's how things used to work. Now imagine you're a utility and you are completely reliant on Russia for conversion enrichment. That process flips around and you now have to go and procure your enrichment first your conversion and then you kind of forget about your uranium because the near-term squeeze is here.”
The uranium futures-spot contango is significant (82-83 for term contracts vs 70 spot), but it does not get arbitraged away because the spot and contract markets are structurally fragmented and impossible to trade between, unlike typical commodity markets where contango attracts arbitrage.
“There's a huge contango. So term trades at 82 83 spots at 70. So you've got contango in that market as well. And it doesn't get arbed away because the markets are impossible to trade between.”
China has built a warehouse at Alashshank on its border with Kazakhstan that will buy and store as much uranium as Kazakhstan can ship, representing state-level strategic uranium sequestration by China.
“The Chinese have built a a a warehouse on their border at China and Kazakhstan called Alashshank which will buy and store as much uranium as the Kazaks can ship to them.”
A divergence is visible between perception of rare earth supply constriction and actual rare earth prices, which are currently soft/down despite front-page news coverage; this suggests a timing mismatch between media narrative and commodity price cycle, relevant to uranium timing assessment.
“Rarers were on the front page of the New York Times I think four or five days in a row a few weeks ago and everybody's looking at rarers. But just because rarers are getting a lot of attention and they're on the front page does not necessarily mean that we're in a part of the rarer cycle uh that makes sense for commitment. For example, uh the International Energy Association released its 2025 report yesterday and even though rare earths are there is this perception of a constriction of supply and demand, rare earth prices were down and in fact uh a lot of them are fairly soft right now.”
Governments may eventually be forced to invoke 'force measure' and seize uranium supplies due to critical national needs for power generation and AI infrastructure, representing an existential policy option if shortage becomes severe.
“there may be an issue where the governments have to invoke force measure around uranium and seize it because it will be you know it has such a critical need”
Investing in uranium requires patience and conviction; investors must be able to wear market volatility from interest rate moves, trade wars, geopolitical shocks, and tariff policy changes without capitulating; this is a multi-year thesis that will play out but requires psychological fortitude and position sizing that allows for calm holding.
“you can wear the vicissitudes of the market, you can wear a Trump tariff tantrum, you can wear a war or whatever interest rate rise. But I think what I would advise at the moment is I think we're going into probably one of the most exciting times in uh world history where you're having this confluence of technology and demand for energy at the same time as a fragmented global picture and business trades will play out.”
Nuclear energy has crossed an irreversible tipping point; it's too late to go back, and the trade has been derisked as a foundational investment thesis.
“We've now crossed the Rubicon, the Roman River. We've crossed it. It's too late to go back. Nuclear's here to stay. The trade's been derisked.”
Mobile inventory in uranium refers to undocumented, unaccounted-for pounds that create suspected supply overhang or underhang, making uranium markets uniquely opaque compared to properly-exchanged commodities like copper, oil, or wheat.
“it's such an opaque industry. There's this concept of in mobile what we call mobile inventory. The mobile inventory is pounds. You can't account for everything you see in uranium. It's not like trading uh copper or oil or wheat or any other commodity where there's a proper exchange.”
The uranium opportunity has potentially seismic magnitude comparable to the 2007-2008 ABS crisis, silver in the 1970s, or the tech rally of 1997-1998, without the bubble consequences—it is a generational trade built on fundamental supply/demand dynamics rather than speculation.
“you're going to find that this this this will play out at every level. But, you know, as I say, it'll be it's a generational trade. This is about, you know, for for for your investors being able to to be in something which could be as seismic as the '07 ABS tray or or silver in the 70s or or or the tech rally in 9798. You know, I think it has that that that capacity without the bubble consequences.”
Mapletree Investments (Macquarie-affiliated) recently took nuclear executives to visit Kazakhstan's President Tokayev, and Putin visited the following week to meet with Tokayev, demonstrating high-level geopolitical competition for uranium supply control.
“we saw this recently that mapp you know took all the nuclear executives over to see president took of Kazakhstan last November you know the head of Ramatone and the head of Verano because they have to secure pounds from Kazakhstan. Who turned up the following week? Putin.”
Small modular reactor (SMR) economics have deteriorated dramatically: Bill Gates modeled SMRs at $6,000/kg for enriched uranium; that price is now $32,000/kg, causing SMR IRRs to fall from 14% to zero, creating urgency to secure cheap enrichment capacity.
“when Bill Gates was modeling what a small modular reactor would look like, he was modeling a price for this enrichy radium of about $6,000 a kilogram. that price is now $32,000 a kilogram. So his IRRa has gone from 14 down to zero.”
Ocean Wall and Lawson sit on the European ambition institute (government/NGO examining power and AI), and grid officials have stated they cannot develop an AI policy because they cannot even guarantee baseline household power supply, indicating fundamental energy crisis.
“Ben and I both sit on the uh European ambition institute which is a government an NGO which looks at the idea of power and AI and on it are government officials politicians but also the grid and the grid said we can't even have an AI policy because we can't supply our households with power.”
The 2007 uranium price spike from $20 to $150 was driven by utilities bidding forward inventory, then hedge funds and banks amplified it via derivative contracts on COMEX, and leverage in the financial system (not supply shortage) caused the price crash during the 2008 financial crisis.
“what happened was the apex predator, the hedge fund, got in front of the fuel buyers and drove the price in even higher, creating this sort of like um this sort of everinccreasing vortex of people bidding each other up. But it was led by 2007 we're talking about 2006 2007. So it went from October 06 to around May 07 May 07 and then like all banks we got greedy. We're at Deutschbank at the time. We created a a derivative contract on Comx. Everyone got involved. There was um a consolation energy bid for NUCO.”
Investors should avoid Kazatomprom (one of the world's largest uranium producers) due to geopolitical alignment with Russia and the risk of sanctions or confiscation.
“So we wouldn't own anything to do with Kazakhstan. So, Kazaten Prom is one of the biggest companies in the space, but we wouldn't own um Kazatam Prom.”
The uranium thesis is a generational trade comparable in scale to the 2007 ABS trade, silver in the 1970s, or the tech rally of 1997-1998, but without the bubble consequences because it rests on structural supply-demand, not speculative excess.
“you're going to find that this this this will play out at every level. But, you know, as I say, it'll be it's a generational trade. This is about, you know, for for for your investors being able to to be in something which could be as seismic as the '07 ABS tray or or silver in the 70s or or or the tech rally in 9798. You know, I think it has that that that capacity without the bubble consequences.”
The UK government cannot implement an AI policy because the national grid cannot supply sufficient power; electricity prices spiked to £6,000 per megawatt hour in January, and the UK is utterly dependent on imports.
“the grid said we can't even have an AI policy because we can't supply our households with power. And in the UK in January, we had a spike to £6,000 per megawatt hour. You know, we are utterly dependent on import.”
Kazakhstan had no price discipline for uranium sales until ~2019 (Tenge devaluation around COVID); they produced and sold whatever they could; adoption of price discipline via a sequestration vehicle (later abandoned) marked shift from price-taker to price-conscious producer.
“The Kazuks who are the cheapest and the biggest producer of uranium had no sort of discipline or price discipline up until 2019. Whatever they produced, they would sell. And it took the Tangi devaluation around the time of COVID for them to actually start thinking, well, hold on, we're crazy. We're the biggest producer. Let's start holding back some pounds.”
ASP Isotopes in South Africa is positioned to enrich uranium from depleted uranium tails and produce high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) for small modular reactors and data centers, and may be the most important company for humanity in the future.
“we have a company in South Africa again we own the shares in it it's called ASP isotopes is it public it's a public company does it public yeah public company it's listed on NASDAQ $600 million market cap. We think that would be could be the most important company for humanity in the future. They can enrich from Tales and they can enrich to the level of of uh Halo that these these companies need.”
The current time is 'probably one of the most exciting times in uh world history where you're having this confluence of technology and demand for energy at the same time as a fragmented global picture,' creating a multi-year to generational opportunity in uranium.
“I think we're going into probably one of the most exciting times in uh world history where you're having this confluence of technology and demand for energy at the same time as a fragmented global picture and business trades will play out.”
There is virtually no listed equity exposure to conversion and enrichment services despite their criticality as the fuel cycle bottleneck; the primary listed vehicle is ASP Isotopes (South Africa), a NASDAQ-listed company with $600 million market cap that can produce high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) and enrich from tails, making it potentially the most important company for SMR and AI power demands.
“There's very very few ways you can get exposure to that. We we've identified a business in South Africa called ASP isotopes, which is our highest conviction idea um or at least in the enrichment space.”
Critical materials like helium have specific physical attributes (loses half its mass as gas every 45 days when shipped at -260°C) that create structural scarcity independent of price, and governments are beginning to understand and accumulate these materials strategically.
“something like helium helium has what's called purge as in it loses a lot of it when it's shipped which is a liquid at -260° C. It loses after 45 days half its liquid into gas and becomes useless. Now helium's used in rocketry. It's used in semi-production.”
The break-even cost of uranium extraction is approximately $90 per pound; uranium currently trades at $70, so producers require visibility to long-term prices of $110-$120 before committing to reopen closed mines in Wyoming, Utah, and other US locations.
“the break even cost of extraction is $90 and we currently trade at 70. So, you've got to imagine that a producers's got to have line of sight on 110 120 long-term prices before they'll look to commit to reopening a mine.”
Bill Gates' TerraPower estimated small modular reactor economics at $6,000 per kilogram of enriched uranium, but HALEU prices have risen to $32,000 per kilogram, collapsing the IRR from 14% to zero and forcing Gates to secure cheaper enrichment to restore project economics.
“when Bill Gates was modeling what a small modular reactor would look like, he was modeling a price for this enrichy radium of about $6,000 a kilogram. that price is now $32,000 a kilogram. So his IRRa has gone from 14 down to zero.”
Uranium Energy Corp (UEC) is the purest US play on strategic uranium reserves and offers 'sleep at night' exposure due to US provenance, avoiding geopolitical risk associated with Russian or Kazakh-origin uranium.
“The most exciting stock and this is stocks that we're advisers to and we own shares in is UEC uranium energy core which is based in the US 3 and a half billion. It's the best play on the by America patriotic uh US nuclear strategic reserve. superb management in Amin Adani and Scott Melby pounds for sale if they need to but that's the the purest because one of the issues we talk about is provenence you don't want to be owning Russian or Kazak pounds if something goes wrong or Trump decides to mandate it but that's your sleep at night producer”
Trading firms are beginning to develop capability to trade the spot-term uranium contango, which will be hugely additive to market efficiency and price discovery once arbitrage bridges the spread.
“we spoke to a lot of trading firms that want to fill in the gap of of the curve and start trading and I think that will happen and it will be hugely additive to the industry”
Lightbridge is developing advanced fabrication technology that improves thermal efficiency and extends the operational life of uranium pellets within fuel rods, reducing uranium consumption and addressing reserve scarcity.
“light bridge effectively can improve the uh thermal efficiency, the ability to uh extract and extend the uh life of the uranium pellet within the fuel rod, which were absolutely crucial as the world begins to start losing uranium reserves, extending the life of the fuel rod. Uh that's a NASDAQ stock.”
Trading firms and hedge funds are beginning to step in to fill the arb gap in uranium curve trading (filling the spot-term contango spread), which will be highly additive to market efficiency and price discovery.
“we spent to spoke to a lot of trading firms that want to fill in the gap of of the curve and start trading and I think that will happen and that will be hugely additive to the industry”
Negative survivorship bias in uranium (unlike gold) may emerge if utilities begin consolidating uranium supply by acquiring producers and sequestration vehicles, creating M&A consolidation dynamics rather than traditional organic growth.
“I think you're going to start seeing the utilities buying the uranium sequesters. I think you're going to start seeing downstream upstream um uh I think we'll see a raft of M&A, but it will be the unlikely suspects will be the acquirers. I think it will be the utilities.”
Uranium trade has bifurcated: Q4 2024 saw approximately 80% of all uranium exports from Kazakhstan flow to China and Russia (inverse of the pattern 4 years ago), indicating a structural shift in uranium supply flows away from Western markets and toward China/Russia allies.
“We study trade data that comes out of Kazakhstan and we don't have the data for Q1 this year but Q4 last year saw almost 80% of all uranium exports go to China and Russia but that's the inverse of where it was 4 years ago. So we are seeing a bifocation of uranium from east to west.”
Uranium cannot be shipped via the traditional Russia-St. Petersburg-Port Hope/Illinois route post-invasion; it must instead traverse the Caspian, Black, and Bosphorus Seas, a circuitous route that doesn't work logistically and is classified as Class 7 radioactive transit requiring extensive time and regulatory compliance.
“Now when the war started, the issue was is shipping uranium ships normally through Russia. It goes up through Kazakhstan and through Russia to St. Petersburg. Then it goes out to the ports of um uh uh Port Hope, Ontario and Illinois. Now that uranium cannot go up through St. Petersburg. So it has to go through a circuitous route that takes in the Caspian, the Black, the Bosphorus Sea. It doesn't work. It doesn't work.”
Uranium Energy Corp (UEC), a US-based producer with $3.5 billion market cap, represents the purest play on the 'Buy America' patriotic US nuclear strategic reserve narrative; this is valuable because investors should prefer Western-sourced uranium supply due to geopolitical risk (Russian/Kazakh control), and UEC management (Amin Adani, Scott Melby) is described as superb.
“The most exciting stock and this is stocks that we're advisers to and we own shares in is UEC uranium energy core which is based in the US 3 and a half billion. It's the best play on the by America patriotic uh US nuclear strategic reserve. superb management in Amin Adani and Scott Melby”
Sky Harbor Resources owns 36 exploration properties in the Athabasca Basin (the highest-grade uranium jurisdiction globally) and represents the third-largest land package in the basin, providing ETF-style exposure with single-stock upside.
“Sky Harbor Resources, they've got what we would describe as 36 shots on gold. They own 36. They have the third largest land package um in the Aabaster Basin, the highest grade uranium jurisdiction in the world. You basically get ETF style exposure, but um you get single stock upside.”
Ocean Wall's investment approach is to find deep value assets with identifiable catalysts, allowing them to invest across uncorrelated assets (Venezuelan credit, lithium, geothermal, uranium) that share the structure of undervalued+catalyst.
“my interest was peaked in the idea of sort of undervalued assets plus catalyst. So everything I do in life has the denominator of finding deep value but also being able to find either myself or people around me to be in a position to be the catalyst.”
Geiger Counter is a London Stock Exchange-listed investment trust holding a diversified collection of uranium producers including UEC and NextGen, providing exposure to the highest-conviction uranium companies with geographic diversification.
“there's a company which uh is listed on the London Stock Exchange called Geiger Counter. Um it's uh an amazing collection uh in an investment trust format of the most exciting uranium companies producers. It has some UEC in um has some nextg next gen they really own the North American jurisdiction miners where we think there has to be a premium for those pounds”
Fabrication facilities convert enriched uranium into fuel pellets roughly 3-5% enriched, which are fabricated into fuel rods about the size of a pinky finger in diameter and a few meters tall; fuel rods are assembled into fuel cores arranged in square patterns.
“And then at the end what you get is a 3 to 5% enriched product that then has to be fabricated into nuclear fuel pellets by a fabrication facility. Again there's very very few of those in the world. They get fabricated into these fuel rods. Fuel rods are about the size of your pinky finger in terms of width and they're a few meters tall. And when you look at a nuclear reactor's fuel core, you'll see kind of like a square with lots of little holes in it. Those are filled with fuel rods.”
Trey Wright is a gold specialist who has worked in the precious metals sector for 25 years; he hosts the 'Wealthy On Show' and frequently interviews mining and commodity investment experts; his Bitcoin Gold Group presumably serves as a platform for alternative asset commentary.
“I've been a gold guy for a quarter a century and I've watched a few of Nick's presentations and I can tell you I have never met anyone with deeper knowledge and more enthusiasm for the uranium space.”
Ocean Wall entered lithium at the start of COVID when lithium assets sold off sharply, anticipating that COVID demand destruction would prove temporary while lithium-ion battery demand remained structurally strong.
“lithium was because at the start of COVID, lithium assets massively sold off. We understood the demand in lithium-ion batteries and”
Trey Wright is a gold industry expert with 25 years of experience ('been a gold guy for a quarter a century') and has watched Nick's presentations, finding them notably insightful on uranium.
“I've been a gold guy for a quarter a century and I've watched a few of Nick's presentations and I can tell you I have never met anyone with deeper knowledge and more enthusiasm for the uranium space.”
Trey Wright emphasizes that uranium investors, like gold investors, should first establish physical asset exposure before moving to equities, creating a foundational understanding and allocation.
“I've always told people if you're going to have gold exposure, buy your gold first. If you get 40 50% of your exposure, then you can start moving on to gold equities and that type of thing.”
Camo (Kazatoprom's offtake buyer) and Western House are less pure uranium plays than UEC due to diversification; Camo's acquisition of Western House diluted uranium exposure.
“The most exciting stock and this is stocks that we're advisers to and we own shares in is UEC uranium energy core... We like Camo I mean but Camo bought Western House so it's a slightly less sort of pure play on uranium.”
Ben Fineold has been working with Nick at Ocean Wall for 4-5 years conducting proprietary research on uranium, spending significant time in Kazakhstan meeting with producers, and understanding geology, chemistry, physics, and geopolitics of uranium.
“I've been very fortunate that Ben joined me four and a half years ago I'm going to spend a lot of time either in Kazakhstan sitting in boardrooms like this with maps of trade routes going out through St. Pete's or meeting with producers.”
Ocean Wall bought Venezuelan sovereign credit at 5 cents on the dollar when Lebanon traded at 11 cents; this was a deep value plus catalyst trade (currency depreciation was the catalyst).
“Venezuela was because we were buying Venezuelan sovereign credit at 5 cents in the dollar. At a time when Lebanon was trading at 11 cents”