The Secret To Maintaining Dollar Dominance | Joseph Wang & Austin Campbell LIVE @ DAS

If stablecoin legislation (the Genius Act) passes and larger financial institutions like Fidelity, BlackRock, and JP Morgan are permitted to issue stablecoins, the combination of institutional trust and blockchain distribution could fundamentally restructure global currency hierarchies by enabling citizens to opt out of local currencies at scale, potentially destroying all but G7/G8 currencies within 30 years.

“if we pass stable coin legislation in the United States, you have larger and more sophisticated financial institutions that are able to issue these. Cuz, look, whether you trust Tether or not, most people probably trust, I don't know, Fidelity, right, BlackRock, JP Morgan to manage these things well. And that means, whether other countries like it or not, which is kind of an important point on its own, we can now sell Treasuries directly to citizens in other countries and let them opt out of their local system and local currency into US dollars at size.”

The Federal Reserve is committed to being reactive and late in its monetary policy response because of simultaneous uncertainty around fiscal policy, immigration enforcement, regulatory changes, and trade policy, with two rate cuts priced in for 2025 despite potential for more aggressive cuts if economic data deteriorates.

“the Fed is basically committed uh to be reactive, committed to be basically be late no matter what happens...the market is only pricing in two cuts this year, which is also what the Fed guided towards at their dot plot”

The House has had bipartisan support for stablecoin legislation for a long time; the limiting factor was Senate Democrats (specifically Elizabeth Warren and Sherrod Brown chairing Senate banking), who were absolute blockers; with Republicans now controlling the Senate and these blockers out of the way, the Genius Act could have approximately 70 votes in the Senate.

“I think there's been bipartisan support for stable coin legislation in the House for a long time...The change is the Senate flipping Republican because there's nobody in this country who hates changes to the financial system more than Elizabeth Warren...when the Democrats and the specific Democrats, so this is not Democrats writ large, it's literally Elizabeth Warren and Sherrod Brown, were in charge of Senate banking, they were an absolute blocker on legislation. The fact that they are out of the way means that if they put the Genius Act to a vote today in the Senate and it could actually get to the floor now, I think there's 70-ish votes for it.”

The administration's trade policy goals—domestic manufacturing and industrial capacity rebuilding for security reasons—have been successfully executed by restrictive-trade countries like China, which lifted hundreds of millions out of poverty, suggesting a viable path for improving US economic position compared to current state.

“if you look across the world, other countries that have very restrictive trade policies, like China, for example, have been able to build a very successful manufacturing economy, right? Literally lifting hundreds of millions of people out of poverty. So, there is a path towards this that could be leave leave the United States in a much better position than it is today.”

The EM boom-bust cycle is occurring in the United States now: foreign capital rushes into the US to harvest high interest rates, and one day they all rush out (as is happening with repatriation into Europe for rearmament and China for tech), causing US financial markets to tank—exactly the EM dynamic.

“you have these tremendous uh boom and bust cycles where as you have, let's say, high interest rates in an emerging market, foreign capital rushes in, harvest those higher returns, and then, you know, one day they all rush out...So, this past month you have uh a huge amount of repatriation of foreign flows moving out of the US into places like Europe because of uh rearmament. Uh maybe to China where there's been a lot of interest in the tech sector there. So, you kind of see uh the US financial markets tanking because foreign capital leaving”

Addressing federal government fraud (estimated at $500B annually by GAO under Biden administration) and reallocating misallocated resources through market discipline would improve long-term growth; restrictive trade policies (like China's) have successfully rebuilt manufacturing and lifted hundreds of millions out of poverty, suggesting a path forward for the US if properly executed.

“the Government Accountability Office under the Biden administration gave an estimate that there could be as much as $500 a year in fraud in in the federal government, right? So, if we were to have that to be better distributed, you know, that's a good thing. And, of course, having a recession, we move some resources from where they're poorly used to where they could be better used, that's better for long-term growth, right?”

In 2018, US equity markets sold off 20% from peak to trough with daily selling pressure and real panic, but markets began pricing in significant rate cuts due to recession fears, creating a flight-to-safety bid that put downward pressure on the entire yield curve.

“in 2018 uh the markets were probably down 20% from from peak to trough. Basically sold every single day into December and there was some real panic uh everywhere. But um at that time the markets began to price in a lot more rate cuts because they were afraid of recession or or something worse”

Joseph Wang notes that the administration has stated a policy of charging a fee or imposing sanctions on any country attempting to use an alternative to the US dollar (reference to BRICS currency), though he questions the effectiveness of this approach.

“All the president has said, BRICS, if you want to use a new currency, we're just going to charge you a fee or sanction you 100% so that you'll never be able to do that again. So, I don't know how effective that would be.”

The Government Accountability Office under the Biden administration estimated $500 billion per year in federal government fraud; better distribution of these resources and allowing resource reallocation via recession would improve long-term growth prospects.

“the Government Accountability Office under the Biden administration gave an estimate that there could be as much as $500 a year in fraud in in the federal government, right? So, if we were to have that to be better distributed, you know, that's a good thing. And, of course, having a recession, we move some resources from where they're poorly used to where they could be better used, that's better for long-term growth, right?”

Austin Campbell argues that the single most important legislation Congress could pass over the past 10 years and next 10 years is a stable coin bill, potentially marking the moment when the US destroyed all but G8 currencies 30 years forward.

“There is a very significant chance that the single most important thing Congress will do over the past 10 years and next 10 years is pass the stable coin bill. And we could be looking at this 30 years forward as, oh, well, that's the moment where they destroyed all but the G8 currencies, right? Everything else just got completely run over by this being generally available.”

Joseph Wang explains that if the US hits a debt ceiling, bills come due but the government cannot issue more debt, creating a disruption unless payment prioritization is used to ensure debt service (principal and interest) is paid before other obligations.

“So, what happens if we hit a debt ceiling? Then, bills come due, but we can't issue more debt to to uh to to pay to finance that. Uh in that case, so there is actually the House subpoenaed documents from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and they were gaming it out what they could do. Uh what they could do is something called payment prioritization. So, the United States, again, all this tax revenue and all this expenditures, you got to pay, you know, military, you got to pay, you know, grants and stuff like that, you know, uh every everywhere. What they would do, the the amount of inflows from taxes is more than enough to cover uh principal and interest for Treasuries.”

The shift from LIBOR (unsecured lending standard) to SOFR (secured lending standard tied to Treasuries and repo) strengthens dollar hegemony because secured systems reduce counterparty risk, and stablecoins backed by Treasuries further extend this secured framework globally.

“the standard has moved from an unsecured to a secured system. Uh the reason for that is that one of the things we learned from the Great Financial Crisis is that, you know, unsecured can be very risky... If we have a secured system and it all sounds like the stablecoins are going to be backed by very sound collateral, so maybe they could be perceived to be secured as well, right? T-bills and and other aspects. So, having a secured standard is something that could further strengthens, I think, the the role and asset's role as a reserve currency and and widespread use.”

Banks currently extract an implicit subsidy from savers by paying zero yield on deposits while lending that money at profitable rates; stablecoins will force banks to compete for deposits at fair market rates, redistributing the subsidy from borrowers back to savers and reducing indebtedness.

“the banks have decided, okay, well, we're going to offer the following deal to consumers. We pay you zero on your deposits. We're going to go lend that money to other people, often quite risky, and when that works, we make a ton of money and pay ourselves huge bonuses. And when it doesn't work, well, you're going to lose your money on the deposits. That's not fundamentally a great economic arrangement for people who want to use the system for payments, but they're stuck with it cuz you've only got banks.”

Joseph Wang notes that the US traditionally does not have sovereign wealth funds like Norway because the US lacks trade surpluses or natural resource windfalls that accumulate foreign currency, making a sovereign wealth fund structurally unusual for the US.

“Uh so, I guess I'll on the US sovereign wealth fund, you know, at first blush, it sounds like a very strange proposition, right? Usually, countries that have sovereign wealth funds uh have tremendous trade surpluses or some kind of windfall from their natural resources, like Norway, for example. Uh they have all sorts of oil and gas. They earn a lot of hard currency that they deploy for the benefit of their citizens. But, in the US, obviously, that's that's not the situation here.”

The Mar-a-Lago Accord (described in Stephen Miran's paper and implemented as White House policy) proposes the US offer security guarantees to allied countries in exchange for those countries purchasing US debt, addressing demand for duration.

“The Mar-a-Lago Accord comes from a paper written by Stephen Miran, who is now the chairman of the White House Council of economists, also a former guest on Former Guest Guidance. And in that paper, he discusses one of the solutions that the US could deploy to try to create demand for its debt. And that is to say, we go around the world and say, 'Hey, we protect you. Protecting you is very, very expensive. So, how about you share the burden and maybe buy some of our debt?'”

The predictor of support vs opposition to stablecoin legislation is not political party but age; younger politicians across both parties support stablecoins, while older politicians (75+) who believe PayPal is 50/50 likely to be a scam oppose them.

“if you look at people who are opposed to stable coins versus in favor of stable coins, the number one predictor is not political party, it's age. Right, like, Ritchie Torres was on Unchained and talked about this and literally said the problem is the gerontocracy that we have on top of the Democratic Party. Right, cuz if you're 75 years old and still think it's 50/50 that PayPal is a scam, then certainly you're not going to be cool with stable coins.”

The US is shifting policy away from sanctions (which confiscate assets) toward tariffs (which act as tolls/taxes on system access) to maintain dollar hegemony while reducing the risk that countries will abandon the dollar due to asset confiscation fears.

“the way that they're trying to do this is to move away from the sanctions and towards things like tariffs. So, sanctions are different from tariffs in that, let's say, back in the Russia-Ukraine war, you could just confiscate someone's assets, right? If you're if you have if you are sovereign or if you are foreign national, you could you could potentially lose everything. That's very different risk than saying that you'd have to pay an extra 10 or 20% to to use a dollar or to use the US financial system. So, if the US were to shift away from that standard of sanctions trying to basically take someone else's money if we if we don't like you, then you know, moving away from that towards something that's kind of more of a toll, more of a tax, I think that is that is positive for maintaining the dollar's hegemony as a global reserve currency.”

Stablecoins will enable unbundling of banking services—moving away from the dense, integrated modern bank (deposits + mortgages + payments + asset management) toward modular services, improving consumer choice and forcing banks to compete fairly for deposits.

“my personal view is where these things will move is to realign sort of the framework of the financial system and that the current modern bank is actually an incredibly dense entity that didn't really exist like 50 years ago, where your bank would be the one who held your deposits and gave you your mortgage, but like that's it. It wasn't also the biggest source of all your electronic payments and managing all of your assets and like handling all sorts of other stuff. These are incredibly dense entities and one of the things stablecoins will allow for is the unbundling of the banking services, which is not to say the big banks will get smaller, but at least you'll have a better choice of the services that you take from them.”

Joseph Wang describes stablecoins as potentially a more efficient form of money market fund, and if widely adopted, could become more liquid than actual money market fund shares—functioning as a shadow bank more liquid than the traditional shadow banking system.

“So, from what I hear, the description of a stablecoin is basically like a like it's basically like a shadow bank, right? It's like a money market fund. It's it's a maybe a potentially more efficient form of money market fund that, depending on how the adoption is for these stablecoins, could be more liquid than actual money market fund shares.”

A US sovereign wealth fund makes sense if structured to capture upside from companies receiving government subsidies (tax incentives, grants) by taking equity positions or warrants in exchange, allowing the public to benefit from investments they fund; however, execution risk is high.

“the goal of that is to maybe capture some upside on on companies that the US invests in. For example, let's say that the US offers tax incentives or grants to certain companies or certain sectors, maybe they maybe in exchange for these benefits, these companies could offer the sovereign wealth fund some warrants or shares so that, you know, maybe the US is able to benefit for some of the uh subsidies they offer certain sectors or industries. So, in that in that sense, that sounds like a reasonable idea. It will all come down to execution.”

If the US hits the debt ceiling and cannot issue new debt, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York has conducted contingency planning showing the Treasury can use payment prioritization to ensure debt holders (principal and interest) are paid before other obligations, preventing a technical default.

“so there is actually the House subpoenaed documents from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and they were gaming it out what they could do. Uh what they could do is something called payment prioritization. So, the United States, again, all this tax revenue and all this expenditures, you got to pay, you know, military, you got to pay, you know, grants and stuff like that, you know, uh every everywhere. What they would do, the the amount of inflows from taxes is more than enough to cover uh principal and interest for Treasuries. So, they would prioritize payments to make sure that the debt holders received their interest payments, received their principal”

The primary requirement for global adoption of stablecoins is internet access and something of value to exchange; Tether's global reach demonstrates that North Korea is the only country where stablecoin adoption is prevented by lack of internet access, while every other country has significant stablecoin usage.

“there's two criteria, right, for you to get your hands on that. One is that you've got the internet, and the other one is that you have something of value to exchange for it. So, like, when I was at Paxos and running BUSD, the only country in the world where I was relatively certain no citizens owned our stable coin was North Korea because it fails that first test of people having access to the internet. Everywhere else they were using it.”

The US administration is shifting from sanctions-based coercion (which can confiscate assets and creates existential financial risk) to tariff-based taxation (which imposes a percentage cost) to maintain dollar hegemony; this shift reduces the financial existential risk of holding dollar assets while preserving the cost of avoiding the US financial system.

“the way that they're trying to do this is to move away from the sanctions and towards things like tariffs. So, sanctions are different from tariffs in that, let's say, back in the Russia-Ukraine war, you could just confiscate someone's assets, right? If you're if you are sovereign or if you are foreign national, you could you could potentially lose everything. That's very different risk than saying that you'd have to pay an extra 10 or 20% to to use a dollar or to use the US financial system.”

Cryptocurrency markets are speed-running the history of traditional financial products; crypto projects like Terraform Labs (which failed due to self-referential collateral structures) are not unique—the same failure modes already occurred in traditional finance with French quant strategies, indicating crypto should import financial risk management rather than reinvent lessons.

“crypto, like in another parallel, is just speed-running the history of traditional financial products. Like I I was having a conversation with somebody about Terraform Labs, and he's like, "Isn't it weird that we like we built this unique thing and it failed?" And I'm like, "It's not unique." Right? This is self-referential equity note. There's nothing in crypto I haven't already seen a French quant blow up”

Bitcoin and meme coins have distinct roles in crypto markets: Bitcoin is behaving like digital gold (predictable based on inflation/debasement dynamics), while meme coins function structurally like the art market—their primary economic purpose is money laundering.

“how you can see like the different asset classes in crypto starting to mimic the actual behavior of asset classes in traditional finance. Right? And one that I would say to people, like back to the Bitcoin analogy, it is actually starting to behave like digital gold, which is how you can predict the thing. But, I'll say my most fun analogy that I hit somebody with earlier today is one of the greatest parallels is actually between the art market and the meme coin market because the primary purpose of both is actually still just money laundering.”

Campbell argues that the right approach is to implement sound fiscal and monetary policies based on first principles without regard to whether they produce recessions or growth scares, with the only caveat being to avoid letting consequences get so severe they collapse government institutions.

“I would suggest that I don't think it's a good idea to be thinking about exactly when to catch this thing. I think the right thing to do is think from a first principles basis about what is good fiscal and monetary policy, period, full stop, and just do that, consequences be damned, with the caveat that there is, of course, some level of consequences that is too severe and people start, like, oh, I don't know, collapsing your government and things like that. Don't let it get that far. But the barometer should not be recession or no recession or growth scare or no growth scare. Those things are fine. Right, the thing should be are we putting the country on a long-term like sound set of fiscal and monetary policies that when we look back 20, 30, 40, 50 years forward, we will say laid a foundation for sustainable growth.”

The collision between crypto and traditional finance is valuable because crypto brings technological innovation to banking (blockchain, instant settlement) while banking brings risk management discipline to crypto; neither field alone can achieve both, but integration could.

“the crypto people actually bringing technological innovation to banking at the same time the banking people can bring like, oh, I don't know, risk management to crypto because it would be really nice to have a system that has both instead of neither.”

Austin Campbell argues that moving an implicit subsidy from borrowers to savers (through stable coin competition) is positive for the macro picture of a country with significant levels of indebtedness, as it reduces incentives for excessive borrowing and credit expansion.

“And again, if we're thinking about a country that in general has significant levels of indebtedness and trying to figure out why, this sort of market shift is probably not the worst idea.”

Until confidence returns that the US federal deficit will not reach 200% of GDP, market behavior will continue to resemble emerging markets rather than developed markets.

“until people have confidence that the deficit will not be like 200% of GDP, then all of this behavior gets much more like you would expect from EM countries than the US.”

The Fed is in a no-win position: if it cuts rates, it loses control of the long end (yields rise); if it raises rates, it craters the economy but may stabilize the long end. This is the core constraint imposed by fiscal dominance.

“And that's why they're very reactive because if you cut, you're going to control the short end and lose control of the long end. If you raise rates, you're going to crater the economy, but maybe the long end looks a little better.”

The Mar-a-Lago Accord strategy would work for some countries but probably not many, as most countries are not highly dependent on US security guarantees, and some would argue the US itself is their greatest security threat; only highly dependent allies like Japan might sign such agreements.

“I think is a strategy that could work for some countries, but probably not very many. If you look across the world, a lot of countries simply aren't very dependent upon the US security umbrella. And I think some of them would actually say that the US is the greatest threat to to their security. But there are countries that are highly dependent upon US security. For example, Japan always been a very good ally of the US, very close military ties. Maybe a country like Japan would be willing to sign up for something like that, a Mar-a-Lago Accord. But, you know, I I think the amount of juice we could squeeze out of this probably isn't that much.”

A US sovereign wealth fund might make sense as a mechanism for the US to capture upside on companies where it provides tax incentives or grants, by requiring those companies to issue warrants or shares to the fund in exchange for subsidies.

“from from what I hear from, say, Secretary Lew, Nick, the the goal of that is to maybe capture some upside on on companies that the US invests in. For example, let's say that the US offers tax incentives or grants to certain companies or certain sectors, maybe they maybe in exchange for these benefits, these companies could offer the sovereign wealth fund some warrants or shares so that, you know, maybe the US is able to benefit for some of the uh subsidies they offer certain sectors or industries. So, in that in that sense, that sounds like a reasonable idea.”

Joseph Wang forecasts a base case scenario that mimics 2018, where a significant market correction triggers expectations of aggressive Fed rate cuts due to recession fears, leading to downward pressure across the yield curve, though he expects longer-dated yields to eventually rise due to EM-ification dynamics.

“my base case what would happen this year is a replay of 2018. Now, the US is uh the US is still I think has a lot of things going for it... But in the event that we do have a significant risk-off event like we did in 2018... the markets began to price in a lot more rate cuts because they were afraid of recession or or something worse. And so, I think that's going to replay right now.”

Bipartisan support for stablecoin legislation in Congress increased not due to ideological shift but because Elizabeth Warren and Sherrod Brown, who blocked legislation when Democrats controlled Senate Banking Committee, were removed from power; the primary predictor of stablecoin opposition is age, not political party.

“the House I think has had the votes for a long time. The change is the Senate flipping Republican because there's nobody in this country who hates changes to the financial system more than Elizabeth Warren.”

A strategic Bitcoin reserve at the federal level while running a fiscal deficit is economically counterproductive because the US is already spending beyond its means; a Bitcoin reserve makes sense only at the state level, in a surplus situation, or not at all because the primary driver of Bitcoin appreciation is continued fiscal spending—creating circular reasoning.

“I am on record of having said in the current environment, I think the Bitcoin strategic reserve is an absolutely pants-on-head stupid idea.”

Wang argues that when the Fed is active in money markets, it creates greater stability and makes anyone operating in money markets safer, and if stablecoin assets are in T-bills and repo, the Fed's backstop makes stablecoin liabilities safer.

“Now, I think these two are related because when the Fed is active in the money markets, that creates greater stability and that actually makes anyone who's in the money markets a bit safer. So, if you are a fund and your assets are in T-bills and repo, you know, you have the Fed there basically backstopping this entire market. That makes on the liability side your stablecoins safer.”

Campbell argues that the discipline of finance, while imperfect, has learned lessons over hundreds or thousands of years, and attempting to reinvent financial products from first principles when existing solutions exist (like looking at a Toyota) is a bad idea in the modern world.

“Um but the idea here, and what I think is important to move the industry forward in a meaningful way, is that the discipline of finance is certainly not perfect, and there's a lot of dumb things that happened there. But, that doesn't mean over the many hundreds of years, thousands of years, that we've been doing it, we haven't learned any lessons. And trying to reinvent a car from first principles when you can just walk outside and look at a Toyota is probably a bad idea right? In the modern world.”

Stablecoin legislation is 'a very significant source of funding for the US Treasury if we do that properly,' suggesting that stablecoin adoption directly translates to increased Treasury demand and financing capacity.

“Obviously, that is a very large source of funding for the US Treasury if we do that properly.”

A properly constructed stablecoin can only collapse disorderly if 'the US Treasury itself is the problem' (given it holds only Treasury collateral), which is unlikely given the Fed's ability to provide liquidity against Treasury collateral.

“you can build these things correctly to the point that the only way you're going to have a stablecoin collapse in disorderly fashion, unlike say banks, which actually fail way more often, is if the US Treasury itself is the problem given the collateral, which is where the Fed providing liquidity is effective because the collateral is collateral you can provide liquidity against.”

Until people have confidence that the deficit will not reach 200% of GDP, all the unusual US financial market behavior (EM-like dynamics, inverse spreads, Fed reactivity) will persist, and this confidence problem drives the entire framework for understanding current macro.

“And all of this comes down to until people have confidence that the deficit will not be like 200% of GDP, then all of this behavior gets much more like you would expect from EM countries than the US.”

A productive future for crypto/blockchain involves banking bringing risk management discipline to crypto while crypto brings technological innovation to banking, creating a system with both rather than neither.

“the other thing that I'm actually hopeful for that we continue to have a collision on is the crypto people actually bringing technological innovation to banking at the same time the banking people can bring like, oh, I don't know, risk management to crypto because it would be really nice to have a system that has both instead of neither.”

Campbell rhetorically asks: 'How about instead of starting a reserve, we just... have we considered spending less money?' as a sarcastic suggestion that the actual solution is fiscal discipline, not asset purchases.

“How about instead of starting a reserve, we just Okay, I know this is going to be shocking. Have we considered spending less money? Right? So, I I think this is sort of the classic, you know, it's like the alcoholic trying not to admit they have a problem about drinking behavior. Like we really just need to get to the core of the problem here, guys.”

Tether is currently the seventh-largest buyer of US Treasuries globally and growing, demonstrating that stablecoins are already functioning as significant Treasury purchasers and marginal buyers of duration.

“Tether is probably the I think I saw the stat today, the seventh largest buyer of Treasuries globally now and growing.”

Campbell cites Ritchie Torres saying the problem is 'the gerontocracy that we have on top of the Democratic Party,' noting that older members who still think PayPal might be a scam are naturally skeptical of stablecoins.

“Ritchie Torres was on Unchained and talked about this and literally said the problem is the gerontocracy that we have on top of the Democratic Party. Right, cuz if you're 75 years old and still think it's 50/50 that PayPal is a scam, then certainly you're not going to be cool with stable coins.”

The Mar-a-Lago Accord, a strategy proposed in a paper by Stephen Miran (now chairman of the White House Council of Economists), would have the US offer military security in exchange for other countries purchasing US Treasury debt; however, this approach has limited applicability because few countries are heavily dependent on US security guarantees.

“The Mar-a-Lago Accord comes from a paper written by Stephen Miran, who is now the chairman of the White House Council of economists... And in that paper, he discusses one of the solutions that the US could deploy to try to create demand for its debt. And that is to say, we go around the world and say, "Hey, we protect you. Protecting you is very, very expensive. So, how about you share the burden and maybe buy some of our debt?"”

A US strategic Bitcoin reserve in the current environment where the US is already spending too much money would be solving the problem by spending even more to buy lottery tickets, which is financially incoherent and not a good idea.

“I am on record of having said in the current environment, I think the Bitcoin strategic reserve is an absolutely pants-on-head stupid idea. Um so, I'll just lay that one out there. And the reason is, let me walk you through the logic, okay? We're spending too much money. And so, the way we're going to solve that is by spending even more money to go buy some lottery tickets. Okay? Any financial advisor would tell you, for the love of God, don't do this.”

Austin Campbell argues that the correct approach to fiscal and monetary policy should be determined from first principles about what is good policy rather than trying to optimize for recession avoidance, with the caveat that policy should not be allowed to reach severity levels causing government collapse.

“I think the right thing to do is think from a first principles basis about what is good fiscal and monetary policy, period, full stop, and just do that, consequences be damned, with the caveat that there is, of course, some level of consequences that is too severe and people start, like, oh, I don't know, collapsing your government and things like that. Don't let it get that far.”

Campbell forecasts that if the Genius Act were put to a vote in the Senate today, it would receive approximately 70 votes, which tells him something important about Democratic positions since there are only about 50 Republicans, meaning ~20 Democrats would vote for it.

“The fact that they are out of the way means that if they put the Genius Act to a vote today in the Senate and it could actually get to the floor now, I think there's 70-ish votes for it. And you'll notice there's only about 50 Republicans, so what does that tell you about the Democrats? Right, I I think it's just the blockers being moved out of the way and the regressive party leadership on technology being pushed aside is giving the younger Democrats a chance to voice their real opinion.”

Large amounts of foreign capital are currently leaving the US and flowing into Europe (due to rearmament) and China (due to tech sector interest), creating a financial market correction by replicating EM boom-and-bust capital flow dynamics.

“you have uh a huge amount of repatriation of foreign flows moving out of the US into places like Europe because of uh rearmament. Uh maybe to China where there's been a lot of interest in the tech sector there. So, you kind of see uh the US financial markets tanking because foreign capital leaving.”