“They’re Not Like Us”: Michael McFaul on Autocrats vs. Democrats and the Fight for the 21st Century
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Michael McFaul, former U.S. ambassador to Russia, sits with Peter Robinson to argue that the West has fundamentally misread its autocratic rivals—particularly Putin, whom McFaul characterizes not as a pragmatic deal-maker willing to negotiate, but as an ideologically driven imperialist seeking imperial restoration in the mold of Peter the Great or Catherine the Great. The core claim is structural: Russia and China operate on a different logic than democratic states, their leaders motivated by civilizational narratives and territorial ambition rather than cost-benefit calculation. McFaul uses sustained casualties in Ukraine—hundreds of thousands killed or wounded for marginal gains—as evidence of this ideological commitment, then extends the argument to show how weakness displayed in one theater (Ukraine) directly emboldens aggression in another (Taiwan). The remedy he proposes reaches back to Cold War instruments: renewed military investment, economic outperformance, soft-power organs like USAID and Voice of America, and alliance cohesion—all of which McFaul argues the United States is currently neglecting or dismantling.
The discussion spans the mechanics of how Putin maintains domestic control through media suppression, opposition imprisonment, and selective military recruitment, then pivots to McFaul's evolution on a contentious claim: whether Russian culture carries a durable proclivity toward autocracy—a proposition he once rejected but now takes more seriously after witnessing Ukrainian atrocities. Substantial ground is given to the interconnection thesis: that Taiwan and Ukraine are not separate crises but linked tests of whether strength deters or invites autocratic risk. McFaul contests the NATO-expansion narrative as retrospective justification, disputes the idea that a reset with Russia was strategically naive, and takes direct aim at how recent U.S. leadership has handled diplomatic engagement with Putin, arguing that signaling weakness by accepting his demands first leads him to pocket concessions and escalate demands rather than settle. Throughout, the argument hinges on democratic example as the true threat to authoritarianism—not military might alone, but the lived practice of free elections and capitalism in neighboring Ukraine that undermines Putin's narrative of civilizational difference.
McFaul argues that U.S. power advantage over Russia and China rests not on population or territory but on superior education, GDP per capita, alliances, and democratic governance; the critical failure was not NATO expansion but failing to integrate Russia after 1991, and the current threat comes from authoritarian leaders driven by imperial ideology rather than transactional interests, requiring sustained investment in military, alliances, and democratic ideals to maintain peace.
- Putin is an ideologue motivated by imperial ambition, not a transactional dealmaker, making military strength and deterrence essential rather than negotiation sufficient
- The connectivity between Ukraine and Taiwan means weakness in one theater encourages autocrats in another, requiring integrated strategy across both regions
- Democratic ideals and soft power instruments (USAID, Voice of America, NED) were central to Cold War victory and remain America's comparative advantage in great power competition
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Boris Nemtsov was an elected governor in the middle of Russia during the 1990s economic depression, had a PhD in physics, was Jewish, and was elected twice despite being from a minority group—demonstrating that Russia could have had democratic leadership; he was a charismatic political figure who came to Moscow in 1996-97 as first deputy prime minister with Yeltsin's backing as successor; he was assassinated in 2015, representing a tragic alternative historical path.
“So this was this guy, Boris Nemtsov. He was a governor in the middle of uh Russia uh elected twice uh during a major economic depression in the 1990s. That's a very important part of this story. Um and uh PhD in physics by the way, Jewish by the way, and still elected one of the most charismatic guys I've ever met in my life. He comes to Moscow in '96, '97, becomes the first deputy prime minister. Yeltsin anoints him as his successor.”
The old joke about NATO's original purpose was 'to keep the Soviets out, the Americans in, and the Germans down'; the U.S. had to overcome historical reluctance to have Germany militarily involved abroad, but this is now necessary and positive—Germany building a 5,000-troop base in Lithuania is the model for future European military contribution.
“Um let's first remember that the old joke about NATO, its purpose, was to keep the Soviets out, the Americans in, and the Germans down. Down. Exactly. Cuz people forget that we didn't There was a time when we didn't want the the Germans to be involved in sending their soldiers abroad. Right. Uh for very good reason. We had to get over that. And now that the Germans are building a base in Lithuania, 5,000 soldiers there, that's a sign of what we need for the future.”
The biggest non-event of the Cold War was the war that the U.S. did not fight with the Soviet Union over Taiwan, which was achieved through a mix of coercion and diplomacy and is the model for contemporary Taiwan security strategy; preventing war with China over Taiwan should be the paramount national security interest for the United States today.
“I think the biggest non-event of the Cold War was the war that we didn't fight over Taiwan. And that was brilliant, and that was a mix of coercion and diplomacy, uh, and that needs to be, as I write in my book, it's the paramount national security interest for the United States today.”
In 1998, an exogenous shock—the financial collapse that started in Asia and reached Russia—disrupted the trajectory toward democracy; liberals and free-market advocates like Nemtsov were pushed aside, communists came in, and when people panicked that communists would take over, they selected Putin as the 'strong guy' to prevent communist restoration, but this choice led to a very different historical path.
“But then there's what we call in political science an exogenous shock. 1998 financial collapse all over the world starts by the way in Asia but reaches Russia and it's still a quasi-democracy then. So, the liberals, we would call them conservatives in America, but the the people that believe in free markets like Nemtsov, they're pushed aside, the communists come in uh and then they have a panic. Oh my god, the communists are going to take back over and that's when they say we better go with this strong guy, Putin. And they annoy him, he runs and Putin, it's important to remember, for a while he believed in markets, for a while he even believed in a relationship with the West especially after September 11th, never believed in democracy but over time he becomes much more anti-Western, uh anti-market and that leads I think, you know, one to this very bellicose imperial Russia that we have today, but two, Russia could have been so much richer, so much more prosperous and respected had my friend Boris Nemtsov been elected.”
Russia experienced mass mobilization and street protests in 2011 in response to a falsified election with only 7-8% fraud (which McFaul notes was normal for Russian elections), but this time the protesters were the educated middle class and creative class—people who owned businesses—who used the slogan 'No taxation without representation,' signaling that they wanted representation for their wealth, not traditional revolutionary demands; Putin blamed the West and McFaul personally for fomenting a revolution, which marked the end of the Reset policy.
“there was mass mobilization in Russia in response to a falsified election in 2011. I'm going to tell you honestly, we didn't think much of it. 7-8% falsification. That's a normal Russian election, right? What's the big deal? But this time, Peter, these are what we would call the middle class. Uh they call them the creative class. These are people that own things now, right? And they said, 'You can't take You can't steal [snorts] our money, that's called taxes, and not give us representation.'”
NATO expansion is not the primary cause of U.S.-Russia tensions because Putin initially wanted to join NATO (2000), said Ukraine should join NATO without objection, and as recently as 2010 at the Lisbon NATO summit, President Medvedev said 'All of our animosity with NATO is over.' The real threat Putin fears is democratic expansion, not NATO expansion, because democracy in Ukraine demonstrates to Russians that they could have elected leaders rather than autocrats, which undermines Putin's domestic narrative that Russia is a separate civilization fundamentally different from the decadent West.
“So, Putin, when he comes to power, he says, 'I want to join NATO.' 2000. It's on the record. He said it. Um he said back then, 'Ukraine should join NATO. No big deal. I don't care.'”
Culture is a real and sticky factor in explaining Russia's persistent autocracy, though McFaul initially rejected cultural arguments (which he saw applied to Germans, Japanese, and Catholics), he now acknowledges culture's role while maintaining that Germany and Japan overcame negative cultural narratives through post-WWII institutional change and modernization that Russia did not experience after 1991.
“In this structure versus agency debate, culture is hard, isn't it? But culture is sticky. It doesn't It doesn't fade away. And and two things I would say about the Russia case. One, they didn't have the heartbreak in 1991 with their Soviet history. So, the Germans through tragedy but necessity, they had the heartbreak and we had Nuremberg trials and we said Nazis are not going to be part of the future. They didn't do that in '91. They were afraid. Yeltsin was afraid.”
George Shultz came to the Reagan administration in 1982 after a period where there was little interaction with the Soviets, and his strategy was to initiate dialogue with the Soviet Union on shared interests (nuclear weapons, regional security) before Gorbachev came to power, making engagement with the Soviets easier once Gorbachev took office.
“When George comes in in 1982, he's not in the Reagan administration in the beginning. And And in that period, there's not much interaction with the Soviets at all. Right. And he comes in and he says, 'This is crazy. We have to talk to these guys. We have' And it was about nuclear weapons and regional security stuff. 'We have to have some dialogue with them.' Um and he laid out a different strategy. This is before Gorbachev, by the way. Yes, yes. Of course. Gorbachev comes along and it's a lot easier.”
Irving Kristol (1983) and Sir Alex Younger (2023) both recognized that Europe was 'infantilized' by U.S. security guarantees and failed to develop military capabilities; McFaul agrees that this is a real problem requiring correction through burden-sharing, not alliance abandonment.
“Irving Kristol... writes an essay in the New York Times titled What's Wrong with NATO?... to the degree that Europe has been dependent on the United States, the European will has been corrupted and European political vitality has been diminished... 1983... Sir Alex Younger... former head of Britain's MI6... we've been infantilized... we should recognize that we haven't had to develop a set of really important life skills, the most important of which I would describe as the creation and exercise of hard power... I 100% and and I want to go farther than that.”
Public diplomacy—giving big speeches directly to the people of adversary nations to inspire them about democratic values—was a core Cold War success factor; Ronald Reagan's 1988 Moscow State University speech and his Spaso House dinner with Soviet dissidents exemplified the strategy of bypassing communist leadership to speak to ordinary Russians about freedom and democracy.
“And then he comes over to the ambassador's residence, Spaso House. That I later... And in the room are all the Jewish dissidents, the religious activists, the NGO Samizdat people, all the the society that the the Soviet Union was trying to crush. And Reagan was very clear. He's like, 'You are part of this country too. I acknowledge you, and we are going to engage with you.'”
Putin initially believed in markets and had a willing relationship with the West (especially after September 11th when Russia cooperated on terrorism), but over time evolved into a much more anti-Western, anti-market, and bellicose imperial leader, suggesting his ideological orientation hardened rather than was determined at the start.
“and Putin, it's important to remember, for a while he believed in markets, for a while he even believed in a relationship with the West especially after September 11th, never believed in democracy but over time he becomes much more anti-Western, uh anti-market and that leads I think, you know, one to this very bellicose imperial Russia that we have today”
Being ready for invasion does not mean invading; Xi Jinping's 2027 readiness instruction could be a capability target without commitment to actually invade, and the U.S. should keep investing in military strength as the best deterrent, because if Xi sees the U.S. performing difficult military operations successfully (like recent Venezuela and Iran operations), he may decide to delay or practice more before attempting invasion.
“Well, one, I would say to be ready for invasion does not mean to invade. So, there's a key difference. Um number two, we should keep investing in our military, and be the best in the world because that's how you keep the peace. Okay.”
While American power has declined in relative terms since its peak in the 1990s, the US remains the most powerful country in the world and is likely to maintain that position for the foreseeable future because of superior education, especially higher education, higher GDP per capita, best universities, and when combined with allied democracies, greater collective military and economic power than autocratic states—nine of the ten largest economies in the world are democracies with only China as exception.
“if you measure in terms of education, especially higher education, you measure GDP per capita, we're way ahead of in of those countries. Uh, I other proxies I use, best universities in the world, we're at one of them. Um, we're ahead of them.”
Winston Churchill correctly observed that 'democracy's a horrible system of government but except for all the others tried,' and most people around the world agree with Churchill—they would rather elect their leaders than have them chosen by communists, mullahs, colonels, or thugs like Putin.
“It turns out that Winston Churchill was right when he said democracy's a horrible system of government but except for all the others tried. And you know what? Most people around the world agree with Churchill. That they would rather elect their leaders than have the Communist Party or a bunch of mullahs or a colonel or a thug like Putin decide it for them.”
The biggest mistake the US made in the 1990s was not actively rebuilding Russia into the community of states after the Cold War, in contrast to what was done after World War II when the US brought Germany, Italy, and Japan into its alliance system, which was only possible because of the menacing threat from the East (the Soviet Union); instead, the US assumed integration would happen organically without active effort.
“The biggest mistake we made was in the '90s when we thought the Cold War was over, we won, was the end of history. That's what Frank Fukuyama wrote that famous essay and we did nothing to help rebuild Russia in our community of states. The exact opposite of what we did in World War II. After World War II, we won and we brought Germany and Italy and Japan in and that's because there was this menacing threat to the east.”
The lack of a reckoning with the KGB and Soviet history in 1991 (unlike Nuremberg trials after WWII) allowed Putin, a KGB officer, to rehabilitate Soviet narratives and blame the West for Russia's difficulties, preventing a clean institutional break from authoritarianism.
“they didn't have the heartbreak in 1991 with their Soviet history... we had Nuremberg trials and we said Nazis are not going to be part of the future. They didn't do that in '91. They were afraid... if we went too fast and too hard against the KGB, that might spur a counter-revolution. As a result of that, a guy like Putin can come along from the KGB... and can use part of that history to say... blame it all on the west and then back to our roots.”
Trump administration's strategy toward Putin—listening to his demands and making concessions hoping to end the war—has backfired because Putin interprets concessions as weakness and simply pockets them while demanding more, such as demanding that the U.S. pressure Ukraine to cede Donbas despite Putin's failure to conquer it since 2014; effective diplomacy requires both carrots and sticks, with a greater emphasis on coercive measures.
“Where I think he has misread Putin, although I'm still optimistic he might get on the right track is he and his special envoy, Mr. Witkoff thought that I'll just listen to Putin, I'll hear what he needs, and then I'll tell the Ukrainians to do it, and we'll end the war. And what happened instead, Putin saw that as weakness. And he just pocketed their concessions, and then he asked for more. And the biggest ask was he said, 'I can't conquer Donbas.' That's a part of Eastern Ukraine. He's been trying since 2014. He's failed. Think about that. So, then he said, 'Mr. President, I need you to put pressure on Zelenskyy to give me Donbas.'”
Putin is not a transactional dealmaker like Trump and his advisors believe, but rather an ideologue motivated by imperial ideas and the desire to be remembered as a great expansionist leader like Peter the Great and Catherine the Great; he would not sustain a million Russian casualties for modest territorial gains if he were engaged in cost-benefit analysis, which proves his motivation is ideological not rational economic calculation.
“when I was in the government and and before I was in the government and after, there are so many leaders, Democrats and Republicans, uh that said, 'Putin's just a deal maker. He's a transactional guy. Oh, he's a transactional guy. We can do a deal with him, right? All he wants is money.' And the deal and he he wants money. He That's what he does. And I think and maybe even I had that reading of him 20 years ago. I I don't I don't want to check myself, but I know for sure that he's not just looking for a deal. He's an ideologue. He is motivated by his ideas, his ideas, his imperial ideas.”
The connectivity between the war in Ukraine and the threat to Taiwan is direct: if Putin wins in Ukraine and conquers territory while the U.S. looks weak, it will encourage Xi Jinping to use military force to take Taiwan; conversely, if the West demonstrates strength in Ukraine, it deters Xi from military adventure, and Taiwanese government officials themselves understand and display this connection through Ukrainian flags in their offices.
“Where I don't agree with him is that somehow he doesn't see the connectivity between the war in Ukraine and the war in Taiwan, whereas I do. If if Putin, God forbid, wins in Ukraine, gets to conquer Donetsk, gets to take what he wants, and we look weak there, that will encourage Xi Jinping to use military force to take the island of Taiwan.”
Russia has a history of approximately one thousand years of autocratic governance with only two brief democratic 'blips': Tsar Alexander II freeing the serfs (before his assassination 20 years later) and Nicholas II permitting the establishment of a Duma in 1905 (before World War I and the communist takeover).
“You've got a couple of periods. Alexander the second frees the serfs and then a 20 years later he's assassinated. Nicholas the second permits the establishment of a Duma in 1905. You've got to have the Prime Minister Stolypin or something I think I'm not entirely sure how to Stolypin.”
Russia has suffered at least 200,000 to 700,000 casualties (deaths and wounded) in the 2022 Ukraine invasion, and despite these losses, the Russian military machine is now more powerful than it was before the war, suggesting Putin has managed to sustain the war effort through control of independent media, targeting recruitment from poor rural regions and ethnic republics rather than Moscow and St. Petersburg, offering extraordinary payouts to families of killed soldiers, and financing the war through continued oil and gas sales to China and other countries despite Western sanctions.
“you write of the casualties that the Russians suffered since the 2022 invasion. And you cite 700,000. And I looked it up to see if it needed to be updated. And it turns out, of course nobody trusts the well nobody knows exactly cuz the Russians aren't going to be telling the truth about it. But the lowest figure for casualties that I could find, the lowest figure was 200,000. So Putin has somehow or other been able to push 200,000 Russian men to their deaths.”
The Reset policy with Russia under Obama did work for a time and produced several significant achievements: negotiation of a new START treaty that reduced nuclear weapons by 30% (2010), opening a new supply route through Russia to Afghanistan to pursue Osama bin Laden, and securing Russian participation in the first multinational sanctions agreement on Iran (UN Security Council Resolution 1929), but it fell apart after the 2011 protests when Putin blamed the West for fomenting revolution.
“One, it worked for a while. Oh, did it? And yes, in my view it did. Mhm. And you know where that whole that paragraph comes from? Comes from George Shultz's memoirs. Uh I'm pretty sure it's chapter 29 or 27, one of the two. Um it's called Reengaging the Soviets.”
There are historical periods when Democrats (advocates of democracy) faced severe challenges: the 1930s was a pretty bad time for democrats facing fascism, and the 1960s-70s was difficult when communism seemed to be taking over everywhere, but the U.S. came back from both periods, suggesting Americans can achieve renewal if they work at it.
“1930s was a pretty bad time for Democrats. 1960s and 70s not a great time for small d Democrats, right? Seemed like the communists were taking over all over the place, but we came back from both of those periods of of difficult times and I still believe we can um both cuz I think the data is on our side and the ideas are on our side, but we have to work at it.”
U.S. policy should focus on the principle that 'America still matters' and national sovereignty still matters; McFaul's book is a mission to convince Americans that engaging in the world, maintaining alliances, and supporting ideas of freedom, democracy, and liberty are in America's long-term national interest, and he is touring red states to make this argument because the 'Davos man' mentality created a disconnect between foreign policy elites and ordinary Americans.
“Oh, that's easy for me. Of course, America still matters. Our country still matters. Sovereignty still matters. I think that Davos man metaphor that Sam wrote about created a lot of trouble for us. And we foreign policy elites, Democrats and Republicans alike, a lot of Republicans go to Davos, not just Democrats. They just thought it didn't matter what the American people thought. We know how to We know what's good for America. We're going to do it this way. And that created this huge disconnect between the way Americans where I grew up thought about the outside world and the way Davos man and woman think about it. And that led to some really bad policies.”
USAID (U.S. Agency for International Development) was created in 1961 by John F. Kennedy not as a 'give-away' program but as a strategic instrument to compete with the Soviet Union's economic assistance program in the Third World during the Cold War, similar to the U.S. decision to go to the moon; it was broken and atrophied over time but should be reformed, not dismantled, because China is investing in similar soft power instruments.
“So USAID, US Agency for International Development. There's a common notion that it was just us giving money away to poor countries in corrupt ways. But it was created in 1961 by John F. Kennedy. Now, I I've only read about Kennedy. Maybe he just was some woke guy that just wanted to give away money for free, but that's not my reading. 1961 was the height of the Cold War. We created USAID to compete with the Soviet economic assistance program around what back then we called the Third World, right? We created We created USAID for the same reason that we went to the moon. Yes. To compete with the Soviets.”
The National Endowment for Democracy (NED), created by Ronald Reagan in 1982 following his Westminster speech about the fight of ideas, has produced 'fantastic results for freedom' by funding civil society and independent media worldwide, but is now 'on a lifeline' under Trump administration cuts; Voice of America and Radio Liberty kept Soviet dissidents alive during the Cold War—some told McFaul 'Thank you for Radio Liberty. It kept me alive, cuz you were the beacon of freedom'—and these instruments cannot be disarmed while China actively invests in them.
“National Endowment for Democracy, same thing. Thankfully, National Endowment for Democracy, President Reagan maybe wrote the speech too, 1982. You didn't write that one? Another really brilliant speech. Uh he goes to brilliant? Maybe I did write it right now. [laughter] He goes to England, Westminster. He gives a speech about how we got to fight in the in the fight of ideas. Yeah, he's 100% right.”
The U.S. overestimated Soviet military power during the Cold War (though some intelligence agencies like the CIA assessed it more accurately), and there is a risk of making similar overestimation errors about Chinese military power; however, on specific military capabilities like ship-killing missiles and deep-water navy capacity, China has achieved genuine superiority that has pushed U.S. aircraft carriers back to the second island chain, requiring greater investment in smarter weapons, theater missiles, and sea drones.
“US leaders and society overestimated Soviet military power. Um So, and Okay, so there's that. And there's a long and complicated debate. I mean, honestly, Mike, my feeling was there were a lot of people who thought we were overestimating the Soviet Union except the CIA. It was our intel I mean, there were you could point to specific points that That's very fair. That's very fair.”
Xi Jinping has recently purged five of the six members of China's military council (aside from himself), including sacking his top general, suggesting his military command structure may not be fully ready for military operations.
“And Frank Dikötter, our colleague at the Hoover Institution, Frank Dikötter, said that the the military council is Xi Jinping and six other members, and Xi Jinping has now purged five of those six.”
The Trump administration has achieved good things: increased military spending and strong economic performance, both of which were critical to Cold War victory; however, McFaul is nervous about two areas: (1) dismantling soft power instruments (USAID, Voice of America, Radio Liberty, National Endowment for Democracy) that were crucial to Cold War success, and (2) weakening alliances, which were fundamental to American advantage over the Soviet bloc.
“to start with the good news. So, um when I go through my lessons of success from the Cold War for today, uh we're doing two things really, really well. Uh one, we're spending on the military. And two, our economy is performing well. And those actually. Yes, and and I'm not an economist, so you have others that can talk about that, but I can tell you from lessons from the Cold War that those were two incredibly important things that helped us win the Cold War.”
The NATO alliance is not 'dead' despite recent tensions; there is a history of dramatic disputes in NATO (French withdrawal, Pershing missile debates in the 1980s, Suez 1956) that the alliance weathered, and the current disagreements do not prove structural failure; the alternative—middle powers without U.S. leadership against China and Russia—would be worse for everyone, making alliance continuation despite friction preferable to its dissolution.
“There's two There's way too much declarations about the liberal international order is dead going on as we speak, right? That's like There's no replacement. Well, well, A, it was never liberal and international and orderly in the first place. People forget, you know, they're not the first time we had fights with our NATO allies, right? People forget the the we you know, the the French left for a while. We had a big fight over Pershing missiles in the '80s. We've had dramas before, Suez 1956. Seems like people have forgotten that. But, the the other piece is they're saying this proves it didn't work. I look at it and say, 'No, we had we had a rough meeting, and but we're still together.' Right.”
The U.S. should not make territorial demands on allies (like annexing Greenland or threatening to invade them) as leverage for increased defense spending, even if the goal of getting allies to bear greater burden is correct; specific examples include that Greenland is important for U.S. missile defense and could be secured through cooperation with Poland and Romania, which already host U.S. missile defense systems, without annexation.
“Right. But, we don't need to threaten to invade our allies. That's where I get off of that. Right. And that it we don't You know, I know a lot about Greenland, and it's it's very important for our security and our missile defenses. But, we have a great missile defense base in Poland, and we have another one in Romania with missiles and radars that will help our security, and we didn't need to annex those territories.”
American domestic political unity is essential because if Americans remain divided fighting among themselves, the U.S. will lose the 21st-century competition with China; the real enemies are in Beijing and Moscow, not inside the United States, so partisan enemies should not be treated as existential threats in the way that geopolitical rivals should be.
“and that's another thing we got to be united. Like we can't keep fighting among ourselves. We are not the enemy. That's another piece where I do we just got to shut this stuff down because the real enemies are has their leadership in Beijing and Moscow not inside the United States.”
The alliance system cannot be replaced with ad hoc coalitions of middle powers cooperating without US participation; if the US withdraws from alliances, China and Russia would be incentivized to aggress without a counterbalancing force, making the world 'a very unsafe world for us' with economic decline and reduced US influence comparable to post-imperial European powers like Portugal or Spain.
“so, I'm not ready to declare the end of it because of what you just said 30 seconds ago. What will replace it? When you keep saying this is the end, and we got to go this different way, and middle powers have to cooperate together, like, really? You want to take on China without us? You want to leave with Russia without us? That is not a good world for anyone.”
Taiwan spends only about 3% of its GDP on defense, which is insufficient given the threat environment; Taiwan should spend closer to Israel's level of approximately 9% of GDP on defense, and the U.S. should compel Taiwan to do this through cooperative incentives—if Taiwan increases defense spending, the U.S. will provide other forms of support—rather than through threats.
“So, um two small countries that border hostile neighbors, Israel devotes almost 9% of its GDP to defense. Right. Taiwan spends only about 3% of GDP on defense. Why Not enough. Why isn't Taiwan okay? Not enough. I they need to be closer to Israel. I write that in the book. They are and we need to compel them to do that and we need to compel them to do that in a way that's cooperative, right? If you do this, we'll do these other things.”
Russian culture may have a sticky proclivity toward autocracy, a hypothesis McFaul once flatly rejected (as he rejected analogous claims about Germans, Japanese, and Catholics) but now takes more seriously after witnessing Russian atrocities in Ukraine, suggesting cultural factors are more durable and explanatory than his earlier emphasis on agency and institutions allowed.
“I used to flatly reject those kind of arguments... But since Putin launched his full-scale invasion of Ukraine 2022... I am... more skeptical about my own arguments about agency and institutions because I see the atrocities”
McFaul strongly opposes Biden administration's decision to avoid negotiations with Russia during the war; he applauds Trump's stated goal of ending the war and even supports the decision to talk directly with Russia and negotiate, which Robinson notes is a lonely position for someone appearing on MSNBC.
“Uh I applaud President Trump for saying, 'I want to end this war.' The previous administration did no negotiations try to end the war. I even support him and and here I'm I'm more lonely uh when he said, 'We have to talk to the Russians to negotiate.' Like, how are you going to end the war if you're just talking to Ukrainians? Uh I think those were bold moves that had to be done.”
CIA Director William Burns reported in 2023 that U.S. intelligence shows Xi Jinping had instructed the People's Liberation Army to be ready by 2027 to conduct a successful invasion of Taiwan.
“CIA Director William Burns in 2023, US intelligence shows, he's arguing at this point, Xi Jinping had quote instructed the People's Liberation Army to be ready by 2027 to conduct a successful invasion, close quote. Now, that's next year.”
Samuel Huntington's concept of 'Davos man'—a class of elites with no use for national boundaries, national currencies, or immigration rules who seek inexpensive labor and view the nation-state as obsolete—accurately describes the worldview of tech and business elites in Northern California and Silicon Valley, which has created a dangerous disconnect between foreign policy elites and ordinary Americans.
“And Samuel Huntington made the point in this famous essay that for the first time in its history, the United States of America had produced a class that had no use for the United States itself. And he was he called it Davos man because he seemed he believed that you could see them on display at the World Economic Forum. Right. And that they had no use for national boundaries. They had very little use for national currencies. Right. That if you're and and this that uh immigration rules, they wanted inexpensive workers.”
Putin told McFaul and Vice President Biden at a 2011 table in Russia, while discussing Libyan intervention, 'You know what your problem is? You look at us. Because we look like you. We look like you. You think that we think like you. But we don't. We are different from you. We and I and we drugaya [different],' signaling Putin's self-conscious awareness that Russians think fundamentally differently from Westerners.
“uh I would traveled with Vice President Biden in 2011. We were there, by the way, to get the Russians to agree with us to use force to stop the slaughter in Benghazi in Libya. And they abstained on that. So, people forget cooperative time, right? All right. Use of force UN Security Council resolution doesn't happen much. But they're arguing at a table kind of like this. And at one point Putin leaned in. So, you're going to be Biden. I'm not sure who you voted for and I'm not going to ask. I'm going to be Putin. So, I'm I'm really going out on a limb. And he leaned in. And he said He doesn't blink, by the way. He said, 'You know what your problem is? You look at us. Because we look like you.' And then he went like this and he leaned back. He Everything he does very dramatically. 'We look like you. You think that we think like you. But we don't. We are different from you. We and I and we drugaya.' He said it and I was like, 'Whoa.' And we were like He wanted us to know, we don't think like you.”
McFaul grew up in Butte, Montana, where his father was a country western musician and school teacher who went on the road for 30 years; when the family moved to Bozeman, Montana in McFaul's junior year of high school, his father was fired in December, which changed McFaul's life in two ways: first, he took a debate class to get an easy A in English, and the topic was U.S. trade policy with the Soviet Union, which sparked his interest in Soviet affairs; second, Stanford recruited him for diversity reasons and his SAT scores were 150 points below average when admitted.
“Um I mean, the the story is I I grew up in Butte mostly. My dad was a country western musician. He was a school teacher, then he went on the road, and he was on the road for 30 years. I do not recommend that for any of your children. It's a really difficult way to make a living. He thought he had a permanent job in a town called Bozeman, which is just a few miles away. So, we moved the whole family to Bozeman. Montana State University is there. He thought, I can sub help my kids go to school by giving them a place to live. So, we all moved my junior year, uh and then in December he gets fired. And he never works in Bozeman ever again. But that changed my life.”
Putin sustains a war that has killed or wounded roughly 700,000 (with deaths in the hundreds of thousands) by controlling independent media, killing or jailing opposition figures like Navalny, deliberately recruiting soldiers from poor rural and ethnic-minority regions (where battle deaths bring large payouts and cultural honor) rather than Moscow and St. Petersburg, and financing the war through oil and gas sales to China and even some European buyers.
“he has been... smart about taking these soldiers primarily from rural places, the ethnic republics, not Moscow and St. Petersburg... the payout, if your son or daughter... is killed is extraordinary.”
Samuel Huntington's 'Davos man' framework—a cosmopolitan elite class with no use for national boundaries, currencies, or the nation itself—described and helped produce a damaging disconnect, as foreign-policy elites of both parties assumed they knew what was good for America regardless of ordinary Americans' views, leading to bad policies; winning the argument for engagement requires appealing to American national interest and unity.
“they just thought it didn't matter what the American people thought... And that created this huge disconnect... And that led to some really bad policies.”
Taiwan's business community and society may be prone to capitulation due to anxiety about war and belief that they can 'get along' with China through deals, similar to how wealthy Hong Kong business figures cut deals with China after its violation of British handover agreements, with only activists like Jimmy Lai resisting; this capitulation mindset is 'deeply, deeply dangerous' because unintended and unanticipated consequences of Chinese coercion could produce outcomes disastrous for U.S. security interests.
“The Chinese reabsorbed Hong Kong Yeah. in violation of promises to the British when the British handed Hong Kong over. Right. And as best I can tell there are a lot of rich people in Hong Kong, and money presents a certain amount of power. And a lot of them left. Yeah. And a lot of them cut deals. Right. And as best I can tell, only Jimmy Lai, who is now in a Chinese prison Yeah. and one or two others of this business community of rich, powerful people stood up to the Chinese.”
America's greatest comparative advantage in 21st-century great-power competition is its ideas—democracy and freedom—because, as Churchill said, democracy is the worst system except for all the others, and most people worldwide would rather elect their leaders than be ruled by a communist party, mullahs, a colonel, or a thug like Putin.
“our greatest weapon, our greatest comparative advantage is our ideas... most people around the world... would rather elect their leaders than have the Communist Party or a bunch of mullahs or a colonel or a thug like Putin decide it for them.”
McFaul's chief concern about Putin is based on a conversation with President Zelensky's chief of staff Andriy Yermak after the invasion, in which Yermak played him a recording of a Russian soldier who had committed atrocities in Bucha, calling his girlfriend in Barcelona who was shopping, discussing the atrocities with pride; the girlfriend was applauding him, indicating that ordinary Russians are not just victims of propaganda but active participants and supporters of the war crimes.
“And we're talking I have a lot of connectivity with the Ukrainians. We've been doing our leadership program here at Stanford for 20 years of Ukrainians. It's about 250 Ukrainians have gone through this program. So I know a lot of these people. I brought President Zelensky here in 2021 in fact. Nobody remembers cuz nobody knew who he was back then. A year later a year later he he would have have been much bigger crowds. But we're kind of arguing about this and is there any hope with the Democratic opposition the Russians and he played for me this tape of a soldier who had just committed these atrocities in a suburb of Kiev called Bucha. A Russian Russian soldier. And it was a phone call to his girlfriend, I think in like Barcelona who was shopping. And we were arguing about sanctions, right? And and the question was should a whole society for what Putin is doing? And the opposition says that's not fair. And Andre was saying cuz I was involved in writing papers about this. He says, 'Listen to this tape.' And he was proud of the atrocities. And he's like, Mike, should you have people with girl And the girlfriend was applauding him. I'm not going to go into the details of his horrors. It's it's not proper for your television show. Um but it was just awful.”
The reset ended when the 2011 falsified Russian election triggered unprecedented middle-class ('creative class') protests demanding 'no taxation without representation'; Putin, frightened of losing control, blamed the West and McFaul personally for fomenting revolution.
“this time, Peter, these are what we would call the middle class... You can't steal our money, that's called taxes, and not give us representation.”
Contrary to Elbridge Colby, the wars in Ukraine and Taiwan are interconnected: if Putin wins in Ukraine and the US looks weak, it will embolden Xi Jinping to take Taiwan by force; conversely, a Western win in Ukraine deters China—an application of 'peace through strength' in which looking weak in one theater invites autocratic risk-taking in another.
“If if Putin, God forbid, wins in Ukraine... and we look weak there, that will encourage Xi Jinping to use military force to take the island of Taiwan.”
The most important strategic success of the Cold War was a 'non-event'—the war over Taiwan that never happened—achieved through a mix of coercion and diplomacy, and avoiding war with China remains the paramount US national security interest because such a war could collapse the global economy with unpredictable, dire outcomes.
“I think the biggest non-event of the Cold War was the war that we didn't fight over Taiwan. And that was brilliant, and that was a mix of coercion and diplomacy”
Cold War victory rested on instruments beyond hard military and economic power—soft-power tools like USAID, Voice of America, Radio Liberty, and the National Endowment for Democracy that advanced ideas of freedom—and the Trump administration's dismantling of these (rather than reforming them) amounts to disarming in the idea-competition with China, which keeps investing in such tools.
“those instruments of power to support ideas, ideas of freedom, ideas of liberty, ideas of democracy, also helped us win the Cold War. And what we're doing now... we just blew up”
The thesis that NATO expansion poisoned US-Russia relations is wrong; NATO never threatened to invade Russia, Putin himself initially expressed willingness to join NATO and was indifferent to Ukrainian membership around 2000, so NATO expansion is a convenient retrospective justification rather than the real cause of tension.
“NATO has never threatened to invade Russia or the Soviet Union. That's important to remember. The real threat is not NATO expansion. The real threat is democratic expansion.”
Russia's return to dictatorship after 1991 was driven primarily by the contingency of leadership: had Boris Nemtsov (a charismatic, market-believing reformer Yeltsin had anointed as successor) become president instead of Putin—who never believed in democracy and grew increasingly anti-Western and anti-market—Russia could have been far richer, more prosperous, and integrated with the West.
“the biggest variable and I write about this in the book is leaders and Putin. Had there been a different president that came to power in 2000”
Russia avoided a post-1991 reckoning with its Soviet past (no equivalent of the Nuremberg trials or de-Nazification) because Yeltsin feared that moving too fast against the KGB would spur a counter-revolution; this failure allowed a KGB figure like Putin to later resurrect imperial narratives and blame the West.
“they didn't have the heartbreak in 1991 with their Soviet history. So, the Germans through tragedy but necessity, they had the heartbreak and we had Nuremberg trials”
USAID was created by JFK in 1961 not as woke charity but as a Cold War instrument to compete with Soviet economic assistance in the Third World—analogous to the moon program—so blowing it up rather than reforming it cedes ground in great-power competition.
“1961 was the height of the Cold War. We created USAID to compete with the Soviet economic assistance program around what back then we called the Third World”
Reagan-era public diplomacy talked past communist leadership directly to the people, as in Reagan's 1988 Moscow State University and Spaso House speeches addressing Soviet youth and dissidents about democracy rather than gloating about victory.
“in the room are all the Jewish dissidents, the religious activists, the NGO Samizdat people... And Reagan was very clear... 'You are part of this country too. I acknowledge you'”
McFaul had the privilege of talking to small-d democrats (advocates of democratic governance) all over the world—Russians, Belarusians, Venezuelans, Iranians—and they want America to be the beacon of freedom and are yearning for America to return to that role, even though direct communication with people in Russia, Iran, and Venezuela is harder now.
“And the other thing I would say because I have the privilege of talking to small d Democrats all over the world, right? Russians, Belarusians, Venezuelans, Iranians. They want us to be that. They they're yearning for that America again. And to to talk directly to the people of Iran right now or Venezuela or Russia's harder but we still have to do that.”
The Trump administration's call for a 50% increase in the defense budget (bringing it to approximately 1.5 trillion dollars) is useful as an 'anchoring' tactic where an ambitious ask becomes a useful negotiating position; even if not fully achieved, it pushes Washington to ask the useful question of how to significantly increase defense spending, and defense spending should return to Cold War levels of the 1980s.
“So on on on the Trump administration he just called for an increase of 50% in the defense budget. Yes. To give us a defense budget of about 1 and 1/2 trillion dollars. Now this is only a few days old or at least the press taking it seriously is only a few days old. I think he's used the number a couple of times a few weeks ago. And my own reading is oh this is Trump doing his usual anchoring that you reach for a number that you couldn't possibly get politically.”
America can experience renewal and avoid post-imperial decline if it makes correct strategic choices; the outcome is not determined, but American power, economic performance, and ideological appeal provide the raw materials for renewal if political will exists.
“the last chapter of my book is don't bet against America yet. That's the way I conclude my book cuz I think we have the power for renewal, but I also think if we don't do it, then we're going to become a kind of post-imperial, maybe nice place for some, and that's that's a very unsafe world for us... there are choices we can make to renew our place in the world. We've been here before, right? 1930s was a pretty bad time for Democrats. 1960s and 70s not a great time for small d Democrats... but we came back from both of those periods”
America is not in inevitable decline: it has the power for renewal (the data and ideas are on its side) and has recovered from earlier bleak periods (the 1930s, the 1960s-70s), but if it fails to invest in its strengths and stays disunited it risks becoming a post-imperial nation in economic decline—an unsafe world both for the next generation and for itself.
“The last chapter of my book is don't bet against America yet... I think we have the power for renewal, but I also think if we don't do it, then we're going to become a kind of post-imperial”
George Shultz's memoirs, specifically Chapter 27 or 29 titled 'Reengaging the Soviets,' was the basis for the Obama administration's Reset policy with Russia, and McFaul had that book on his desk while working in the White House; Shultz's principles included recognizing areas of shared interest (like controlling nuclear weapons), not abandoning American values while negotiating, and pursuing 'dual-track diplomacy' that combined official state-to-state negotiation with engagement with civil society.
“And you know where that whole that paragraph comes from? Comes from George Shultz's memoirs. Uh I'm pretty sure it's chapter 29 or 27, one of the two. Um it's called Reengaging the Soviets. Uh and George, you know, I've seen you perform with him when he was here. He's a great mentor of mine. That chapter was the basis for what we were trying to do. And there are a lot of really important principles.”
The Obama 'reset' with Russia worked for a period, producing the New START treaty (a 30% reduction in nuclear weapons), a supply route through Russia to Afghanistan, and Russian participation in multinational Iran sanctions (UN Security Council Resolution 1929), modeled on George Shultz's dual-track diplomacy from the Reagan era.
“We got a new START treaty, reduced by 30% the number of nuclear weapons. That's 2010. We opened up a new pathway to supply our troops in Afghanistan through Russia”
The 1998 financial collapse functioned as an exogenous shock that, in a quasi-democratic Russia, pushed aside the free-market liberals and triggered a panic about communist resurgence, leading the elite to anoint Putin as a 'strong guy' successor.
“1998 financial collapse all over the world starts by the way in Asia but reaches Russia and it's still a quasi-democracy then. So, the liberals... they're pushed aside, the communists come in”
Trump correctly pursued ending the Ukraine war and talking directly to Russia, but Witkoff and Trump misread Putin: by listening to his demands first and pressuring Ukraine to comply, they signaled weakness, leading Putin to pocket concessions and demand more—most notably pressing the US to force Zelensky to cede the Donbas Putin has failed to conquer militarily since 2014.
“Putin saw that as weakness. And he just pocketed their concessions, and then he asked for more.”
The US is genuinely behind China in the relevant military domain for a Taiwan conflict—China's anti-ship missiles now force US aircraft carriers to stay roughly 1,000 miles from the action—so America must spend more on smarter, theater-launched missiles and sea drones (an area where Ukraine has world-leading technology).
“we are behind on this fight, and we need to spend more, and we got to spend on smarter weapons and on missiles that can be launched from the theater... we need to be investing in sea drones.”
McFaul's biggest applause lines when giving book talks are when he discusses why America can renew its position and compete successfully with China and Russia, suggesting that Americans respond positively to patriotic messages about renewal rather than fatalistic messages about American decline.
“I think there's a My biggest applause lines are when I talk about America and why we can do this renewal. Uh but, we got to work at it.”
Getting tough on European allies to spend more on their own defense is plausible and even necessary—decades of US security provision 'infantilized' Europe (per Irving Kristol in 1983 and Alex Younger), letting them fund welfare over defense at American taxpayers' expense—but threatening to invade or annex allied territory (e.g., Greenland) is unnecessary since basing arrangements like missile defense in Poland and Romania already serve US security without annexation.
“It was too easy. They get to spend stuff on welfare and not on defense and at the expense of American taxpayers. We have to have a new deal with our [allies]”
Declarations that the liberal international order is dead are premature: it was never fully liberal, international, or orderly (recall the French withdrawal, the Pershing missile fights, Suez 1956), and despite recent scratchiness the alliance still holds, with no viable replacement—middle powers cannot take on China or Russia without the US.
“it was never liberal and international and orderly in the first place... we had a rough meeting, and but we're still together.”
Domestic disunity is itself a strategic vulnerability: Americans must stop calling fellow Americans enemies, because the real enemies are leadership in Beijing and Moscow, and disunity risks losing the 21st century to China.
“we can't keep calling fellow Americans enemies. That's not patriotism... we got to be united, cuz if we're not, we lose the 21st century. We lose the 21st century to China.”
What truly threatens Putin is not NATO expansion but democratic expansion—specifically Ukrainians practicing democracy and capitalism—because it undermines his domestic narrative that Russia is a separate civilization from the decadent liberal West while also being kindred to Ukrainians ('Russians with accents').
“What scares Putin the most... is when Ukrainians are practicing democracy. That threatens him because back home he tells the Russian people, 'We're not part of this liberal decadent West.'”
Putin is not a transactional deal-maker who only wants money, but an ideologue motivated by imperial ideas—wanting to be remembered like Peter the Great or Catherine the Great—which is why he tolerates a million casualties for marginal territory, behavior that is irrational under cost-benefit analysis.
“If it was just cost-benefit analysis, he wouldn't let a million Russians be killed or wounded on the battlefield. That's pretty irrational for inches of territory.”
Although American power has declined in relative terms since its 1990s peak, the US remains the most powerful country in the world and is likely to maintain that position because power measured by education, GDP per capita, top universities, and the combined military and economic strength of the free world (nine of the ten largest economies are democracies) far exceeds that of the autocratic bloc.
“When you add up economic power of all the democracies, nine of the 10 largest economies in the world are democracies. Only China makes that list.”
The 'Davos man' phenomenon is visible in the tech sector, which since the 2000s derives more revenue from abroad than domestically (Facebook/Meta, Google, Apple), yet in recent years a fumbling new patriotism is emerging independent of Trump, with figures like Elon Musk and David Sacks asserting US indispensability or volunteering for government.
“it's in the 2000s when for the first moment more of their revenues come from abroad than from here.”
Russia's poor military performance in Ukraine—failing to take Kyiv quickly despite having the world's second- or third-largest army—is a cautionary lesson for Xi Jinping, whose large but untested army and navy may perform similarly poorly.
“Russia had the second or third largest army in the world and people we all thought... they were going to walk to Kiev in 2 or 3 weeks. That turned out not to be true. I hope Xi Jinping is studying that”
Taiwan spends only about 3% of GDP on defense versus Israel's nearly 9%, which is insufficient given its more dangerous neighborhood; the US should cooperatively compel Taiwan to spend more like Israel, extend military service, and build civil defense, because correctly executed deterrence is the best way to avoid war.
“Taiwan spends only about 3% of GDP on defense... Not enough. I they need to be closer to Israel. I write that in the book.”
Richer countries tend to become more democratic—500 years ago the whole world was autocratic, but today the wealthiest countries are where freedom is also found.
“Countries that get rich tend to become more democratic... 500 years ago the whole world was autocratic. Now that's not true. Richest countries where you also see freedom.”
Taiwan's underinvestment in defense may reflect a dangerous societal expectation that it can ultimately cut a deal with China—mirroring how most of Hong Kong's wealthy elite cut deals or left rather than resist (only Jimmy Lai and a few stood up)—a capitulation mindset McFaul senses and considers deeply dangerous.
“There's certainly a view that we can get along with these folks if we have to, and that I think is deeply, deeply dangerous.”
Recent US military demonstrations—the operation in Venezuela and taking out the Iranian nuclear program—signal American capability to do hard military things, the opposite of Russia's failure in Ukraine, and likely make Xi Jinping hesitate before invading Taiwan, which is a desirable deterrent effect.
“if I were Xi Jinping watching what we just did, I would be think maybe we got to practice a little harder... before we try to invade this island.”
Putin is self-consciously aware that Westerners err by assuming Russians think like them; he personally told a US delegation 'we look like you but we don't think like you,' illustrating the recurring American mistake of hoping adversaries like Putin and Xi share Western mental models when they do not.
“He said, 'You know what your problem is? You look at us. Because we look like you... You think that we think like you. But we don't.'”
Robinson and McFaul discussed that there is a live debate about whether tech companies and entrepreneurs care about the United States itself; Elon Musk needs to sell Teslas in China but states the indispensability of the United States, and entrepreneurs like David Sacks are volunteering time in the Trump administration, suggesting a fumbling move toward a new patriotism among tech figures.
“And yet at the same time in very recent years you could connect it with Trump or I think you could actually disconnect it from Trump. It's a thing that's happening independently of him. There's at least a fumbling towards some kind of new patriotism. Elon Musk needs to sell Teslas in China. But Elon Musk will say things about the indispensability of the United States. Yeah. And we have again, you may approve or disapprove of various aspects, but we've got David Sacks, who's a big-time entrepreneur and he's volunteering time in the Yeah. Trump administration and on and on it goes.”
George Shultz modified his Cold War negotiating approach by changing the Reagan-era phrase 'Trust, but verify' to 'Don't trust, just verify' when dealing with the Russians.
“Just so you know, Peter, cuz you I worked for President Reagan, I also had a magnifying glass from George Shultz, which on it said, 'Trust, but verify.' And I used to change that. I said, 'Don't trust, just verify.'”
McFaul grew up in Butte, Montana, got into debate class to earn an easy A, which led to his interest in the Soviet Union, and got into Stanford partly through geographic diversity admissions despite SAT scores 150 points below average.
“I took debate class uh to get my easy A. And that topic that year was to improve US trade policy... we ran a case about trade with the Soviet Union. So that's how I got interested in the Soviet Union.”
We live in a great country.
“Uh we live in a great country, don't we?”