“They’re Not Like Us”: Michael McFaul on Autocrats vs. Democrats and the Fight for the 21st Century
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Michael McFaul, former U.S. ambassador to Russia, sits with Peter Robinson to argue that the West has fundamentally misread its autocratic rivals—particularly Putin, whom McFaul characterizes not as a pragmatic deal-maker willing to negotiate, but as an ideologically driven imperialist seeking imperial restoration in the mold of Peter the Great or Catherine the Great. The core claim is structural: Russia and China operate on a different logic than democratic states, their leaders motivated by civilizational narratives and territorial ambition rather than cost-benefit calculation. McFaul uses sustained casualties in Ukraine—hundreds of thousands killed or wounded for marginal gains—as evidence of this ideological commitment, then extends the argument to show how weakness displayed in one theater (Ukraine) directly emboldens aggression in another (Taiwan). The remedy he proposes reaches back to Cold War instruments: renewed military investment, economic outperformance, soft-power organs like USAID and Voice of America, and alliance cohesion—all of which McFaul argues the United States is currently neglecting or dismantling.
The discussion spans the mechanics of how Putin maintains domestic control through media suppression, opposition imprisonment, and selective military recruitment, then pivots to McFaul's evolution on a contentious claim: whether Russian culture carries a durable proclivity toward autocracy—a proposition he once rejected but now takes more seriously after witnessing Ukrainian atrocities. Substantial ground is given to the interconnection thesis: that Taiwan and Ukraine are not separate crises but linked tests of whether strength deters or invites autocratic risk. McFaul contests the NATO-expansion narrative as retrospective justification, disputes the idea that a reset with Russia was strategically naive, and takes direct aim at how recent U.S. leadership has handled diplomatic engagement with Putin, arguing that signaling weakness by accepting his demands first leads him to pocket concessions and escalate demands rather than settle. Throughout, the argument hinges on democratic example as the true threat to authoritarianism—not military might alone, but the lived practice of free elections and capitalism in neighboring Ukraine that undermines Putin's narrative of civilizational difference.
McFaul argues that Putin is an ideologically-driven imperialist (not a transactional deal-maker) and that the autocratic threat from Russia and China is interconnected, so American renewal requires re-investing in military, economic, soft-power, and alliance instruments while staying domestically united.
- Putin's willingness to absorb massive casualties for marginal territory shows he is an ideologue seeking imperial glory, not cost-benefit gains
- The wars in Ukraine and Taiwan are linked: weakness in one emboldens autocrats in the other
- Cold War victory relied on military spending, economic outperformance, soft-power instruments (USAID, NED, VOA), and strong alliances—tools the US is now neglecting
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Russian culture may have a sticky proclivity toward autocracy, a hypothesis McFaul once flatly rejected (as he rejected analogous claims about Germans, Japanese, and Catholics) but now takes more seriously after witnessing Russian atrocities in Ukraine, suggesting cultural factors are more durable and explanatory than his earlier emphasis on agency and institutions allowed.
“I used to flatly reject those kind of arguments... But since Putin launched his full-scale invasion of Ukraine 2022... I am... more skeptical about my own arguments about agency and institutions because I see the atrocities”
Putin sustains a war that has killed or wounded roughly 700,000 (with deaths in the hundreds of thousands) by controlling independent media, killing or jailing opposition figures like Navalny, deliberately recruiting soldiers from poor rural and ethnic-minority regions (where battle deaths bring large payouts and cultural honor) rather than Moscow and St. Petersburg, and financing the war through oil and gas sales to China and even some European buyers.
“he has been... smart about taking these soldiers primarily from rural places, the ethnic republics, not Moscow and St. Petersburg... the payout, if your son or daughter... is killed is extraordinary.”
Samuel Huntington's 'Davos man' framework—a cosmopolitan elite class with no use for national boundaries, currencies, or the nation itself—described and helped produce a damaging disconnect, as foreign-policy elites of both parties assumed they knew what was good for America regardless of ordinary Americans' views, leading to bad policies; winning the argument for engagement requires appealing to American national interest and unity.
“they just thought it didn't matter what the American people thought... And that created this huge disconnect... And that led to some really bad policies.”
America's greatest comparative advantage in 21st-century great-power competition is its ideas—democracy and freedom—because, as Churchill said, democracy is the worst system except for all the others, and most people worldwide would rather elect their leaders than be ruled by a communist party, mullahs, a colonel, or a thug like Putin.
“our greatest weapon, our greatest comparative advantage is our ideas... most people around the world... would rather elect their leaders than have the Communist Party or a bunch of mullahs or a colonel or a thug like Putin decide it for them.”
The reset ended when the 2011 falsified Russian election triggered unprecedented middle-class ('creative class') protests demanding 'no taxation without representation'; Putin, frightened of losing control, blamed the West and McFaul personally for fomenting revolution.
“this time, Peter, these are what we would call the middle class... You can't steal our money, that's called taxes, and not give us representation.”
Contrary to Elbridge Colby, the wars in Ukraine and Taiwan are interconnected: if Putin wins in Ukraine and the US looks weak, it will embolden Xi Jinping to take Taiwan by force; conversely, a Western win in Ukraine deters China—an application of 'peace through strength' in which looking weak in one theater invites autocratic risk-taking in another.
“If if Putin, God forbid, wins in Ukraine... and we look weak there, that will encourage Xi Jinping to use military force to take the island of Taiwan.”
The most important strategic success of the Cold War was a 'non-event'—the war over Taiwan that never happened—achieved through a mix of coercion and diplomacy, and avoiding war with China remains the paramount US national security interest because such a war could collapse the global economy with unpredictable, dire outcomes.
“I think the biggest non-event of the Cold War was the war that we didn't fight over Taiwan. And that was brilliant, and that was a mix of coercion and diplomacy”
Cold War victory rested on instruments beyond hard military and economic power—soft-power tools like USAID, Voice of America, Radio Liberty, and the National Endowment for Democracy that advanced ideas of freedom—and the Trump administration's dismantling of these (rather than reforming them) amounts to disarming in the idea-competition with China, which keeps investing in such tools.
“those instruments of power to support ideas, ideas of freedom, ideas of liberty, ideas of democracy, also helped us win the Cold War. And what we're doing now... we just blew up”
The thesis that NATO expansion poisoned US-Russia relations is wrong; NATO never threatened to invade Russia, Putin himself initially expressed willingness to join NATO and was indifferent to Ukrainian membership around 2000, so NATO expansion is a convenient retrospective justification rather than the real cause of tension.
“NATO has never threatened to invade Russia or the Soviet Union. That's important to remember. The real threat is not NATO expansion. The real threat is democratic expansion.”
Russia's return to dictatorship after 1991 was driven primarily by the contingency of leadership: had Boris Nemtsov (a charismatic, market-believing reformer Yeltsin had anointed as successor) become president instead of Putin—who never believed in democracy and grew increasingly anti-Western and anti-market—Russia could have been far richer, more prosperous, and integrated with the West.
“the biggest variable and I write about this in the book is leaders and Putin. Had there been a different president that came to power in 2000”
Russia avoided a post-1991 reckoning with its Soviet past (no equivalent of the Nuremberg trials or de-Nazification) because Yeltsin feared that moving too fast against the KGB would spur a counter-revolution; this failure allowed a KGB figure like Putin to later resurrect imperial narratives and blame the West.
“they didn't have the heartbreak in 1991 with their Soviet history. So, the Germans through tragedy but necessity, they had the heartbreak and we had Nuremberg trials”
USAID was created by JFK in 1961 not as woke charity but as a Cold War instrument to compete with Soviet economic assistance in the Third World—analogous to the moon program—so blowing it up rather than reforming it cedes ground in great-power competition.
“1961 was the height of the Cold War. We created USAID to compete with the Soviet economic assistance program around what back then we called the Third World”
Reagan-era public diplomacy talked past communist leadership directly to the people, as in Reagan's 1988 Moscow State University and Spaso House speeches addressing Soviet youth and dissidents about democracy rather than gloating about victory.
“in the room are all the Jewish dissidents, the religious activists, the NGO Samizdat people... And Reagan was very clear... 'You are part of this country too. I acknowledge you'”
America is not in inevitable decline: it has the power for renewal (the data and ideas are on its side) and has recovered from earlier bleak periods (the 1930s, the 1960s-70s), but if it fails to invest in its strengths and stays disunited it risks becoming a post-imperial nation in economic decline—an unsafe world both for the next generation and for itself.
“The last chapter of my book is don't bet against America yet... I think we have the power for renewal, but I also think if we don't do it, then we're going to become a kind of post-imperial”
The Obama 'reset' with Russia worked for a period, producing the New START treaty (a 30% reduction in nuclear weapons), a supply route through Russia to Afghanistan, and Russian participation in multinational Iran sanctions (UN Security Council Resolution 1929), modeled on George Shultz's dual-track diplomacy from the Reagan era.
“We got a new START treaty, reduced by 30% the number of nuclear weapons. That's 2010. We opened up a new pathway to supply our troops in Afghanistan through Russia”
The 1998 financial collapse functioned as an exogenous shock that, in a quasi-democratic Russia, pushed aside the free-market liberals and triggered a panic about communist resurgence, leading the elite to anoint Putin as a 'strong guy' successor.
“1998 financial collapse all over the world starts by the way in Asia but reaches Russia and it's still a quasi-democracy then. So, the liberals... they're pushed aside, the communists come in”
Trump correctly pursued ending the Ukraine war and talking directly to Russia, but Witkoff and Trump misread Putin: by listening to his demands first and pressuring Ukraine to comply, they signaled weakness, leading Putin to pocket concessions and demand more—most notably pressing the US to force Zelensky to cede the Donbas Putin has failed to conquer militarily since 2014.
“Putin saw that as weakness. And he just pocketed their concessions, and then he asked for more.”
The US is genuinely behind China in the relevant military domain for a Taiwan conflict—China's anti-ship missiles now force US aircraft carriers to stay roughly 1,000 miles from the action—so America must spend more on smarter, theater-launched missiles and sea drones (an area where Ukraine has world-leading technology).
“we are behind on this fight, and we need to spend more, and we got to spend on smarter weapons and on missiles that can be launched from the theater... we need to be investing in sea drones.”
Getting tough on European allies to spend more on their own defense is plausible and even necessary—decades of US security provision 'infantilized' Europe (per Irving Kristol in 1983 and Alex Younger), letting them fund welfare over defense at American taxpayers' expense—but threatening to invade or annex allied territory (e.g., Greenland) is unnecessary since basing arrangements like missile defense in Poland and Romania already serve US security without annexation.
“It was too easy. They get to spend stuff on welfare and not on defense and at the expense of American taxpayers. We have to have a new deal with our [allies]”
Declarations that the liberal international order is dead are premature: it was never fully liberal, international, or orderly (recall the French withdrawal, the Pershing missile fights, Suez 1956), and despite recent scratchiness the alliance still holds, with no viable replacement—middle powers cannot take on China or Russia without the US.
“it was never liberal and international and orderly in the first place... we had a rough meeting, and but we're still together.”
Domestic disunity is itself a strategic vulnerability: Americans must stop calling fellow Americans enemies, because the real enemies are leadership in Beijing and Moscow, and disunity risks losing the 21st century to China.
“we can't keep calling fellow Americans enemies. That's not patriotism... we got to be united, cuz if we're not, we lose the 21st century. We lose the 21st century to China.”
What truly threatens Putin is not NATO expansion but democratic expansion—specifically Ukrainians practicing democracy and capitalism—because it undermines his domestic narrative that Russia is a separate civilization from the decadent liberal West while also being kindred to Ukrainians ('Russians with accents').
“What scares Putin the most... is when Ukrainians are practicing democracy. That threatens him because back home he tells the Russian people, 'We're not part of this liberal decadent West.'”
Putin is not a transactional deal-maker who only wants money, but an ideologue motivated by imperial ideas—wanting to be remembered like Peter the Great or Catherine the Great—which is why he tolerates a million casualties for marginal territory, behavior that is irrational under cost-benefit analysis.
“If it was just cost-benefit analysis, he wouldn't let a million Russians be killed or wounded on the battlefield. That's pretty irrational for inches of territory.”
Although American power has declined in relative terms since its 1990s peak, the US remains the most powerful country in the world and is likely to maintain that position because power measured by education, GDP per capita, top universities, and the combined military and economic strength of the free world (nine of the ten largest economies are democracies) far exceeds that of the autocratic bloc.
“When you add up economic power of all the democracies, nine of the 10 largest economies in the world are democracies. Only China makes that list.”
The 'Davos man' phenomenon is visible in the tech sector, which since the 2000s derives more revenue from abroad than domestically (Facebook/Meta, Google, Apple), yet in recent years a fumbling new patriotism is emerging independent of Trump, with figures like Elon Musk and David Sacks asserting US indispensability or volunteering for government.
“it's in the 2000s when for the first moment more of their revenues come from abroad than from here.”
Russia's poor military performance in Ukraine—failing to take Kyiv quickly despite having the world's second- or third-largest army—is a cautionary lesson for Xi Jinping, whose large but untested army and navy may perform similarly poorly.
“Russia had the second or third largest army in the world and people we all thought... they were going to walk to Kiev in 2 or 3 weeks. That turned out not to be true. I hope Xi Jinping is studying that”
Taiwan spends only about 3% of GDP on defense versus Israel's nearly 9%, which is insufficient given its more dangerous neighborhood; the US should cooperatively compel Taiwan to spend more like Israel, extend military service, and build civil defense, because correctly executed deterrence is the best way to avoid war.
“Taiwan spends only about 3% of GDP on defense... Not enough. I they need to be closer to Israel. I write that in the book.”
Richer countries tend to become more democratic—500 years ago the whole world was autocratic, but today the wealthiest countries are where freedom is also found.
“Countries that get rich tend to become more democratic... 500 years ago the whole world was autocratic. Now that's not true. Richest countries where you also see freedom.”
Taiwan's underinvestment in defense may reflect a dangerous societal expectation that it can ultimately cut a deal with China—mirroring how most of Hong Kong's wealthy elite cut deals or left rather than resist (only Jimmy Lai and a few stood up)—a capitulation mindset McFaul senses and considers deeply dangerous.
“There's certainly a view that we can get along with these folks if we have to, and that I think is deeply, deeply dangerous.”
Recent US military demonstrations—the operation in Venezuela and taking out the Iranian nuclear program—signal American capability to do hard military things, the opposite of Russia's failure in Ukraine, and likely make Xi Jinping hesitate before invading Taiwan, which is a desirable deterrent effect.
“if I were Xi Jinping watching what we just did, I would be think maybe we got to practice a little harder... before we try to invade this island.”
Putin is self-consciously aware that Westerners err by assuming Russians think like them; he personally told a US delegation 'we look like you but we don't think like you,' illustrating the recurring American mistake of hoping adversaries like Putin and Xi share Western mental models when they do not.
“He said, 'You know what your problem is? You look at us. Because we look like you... You think that we think like you. But we don't.'”
McFaul grew up in Butte, Montana, got into debate class to earn an easy A, which led to his interest in the Soviet Union, and got into Stanford partly through geographic diversity admissions despite SAT scores 150 points below average.
“I took debate class uh to get my easy A. And that topic that year was to improve US trade policy... we ran a case about trade with the Soviet Union. So that's how I got interested in the Soviet Union.”
We live in a great country.
“Uh we live in a great country, don't we?”