Here’s Why Trump is in No Rush to Reopen the Strait of Hormuz | John Konrad
What this covers
In Episode 473 of Hidden Forces, IDemetri Kofinas speaks with Captain John Konrad — founder of gCaptain, the world’s most-visited maritime and offshore news website, and one of the most influential voices in commercial shipping — about what Konrad calls the Hormuz Hypothesis: a framework for understanding how the Trump administration has assembled the tools to exploit the disruption of commercial shipping through the Strait of Hormuz as part of a broader maritime strategy and political endgame that very few in the media are discussing.
The first hour lays the groundwork for that hypothesis, examining the decades-long decline of the US merchant marine and shipbuilding industrial base, why control of global maritime choke points is inseparable from national security and the dollar’s role as the world’s reserve currency, and how the collapse of the war risk reinsurance market following the outbreak of conflict created an acute insurance crisis for vessels transiting the Persian Gulf. They also discuss how the Trump administration responded by creating a government-backed reinsurance facility through the US International Development Finance Corporation, in coordination with the Treasury and US Central Command, and why this matters for understanding how the global economy is being reorganized — away from free trade and open capital markets, and toward one increasingly shaped by national interests, clandestine statecraft, and great power competition operating below the threshold of open military conflict.
The second hour turns to the strategic logic of the Hormuz Hypothesis itself — specifically, why Konrad believes the Trump administration is in no rush to reopen the Strait and how it intends to use control over that choke point as leverage to extract concessions from Europe, China, and other actors in the international system. They examine what some of those concessions may look like, the concrete outcomes the administration is pursuing through its maritime agenda — including basing agreements, shipbuilding reform, and pushback against Chinese and UN encroachment on the global maritime order — and the cumulative fragility of the global trading network, including what a worst-case breakdown of that system could look like and what winning might realistically mean for the United States in both the short and long term.
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00:00 Introduction 04:15 GCaptain Origin Story 05:26 From Sea to Silicon Valley 07:03 Mose Hypothesis Setup 08:06 Media Blind Spots 10:11 Why Gulf Shipping Matters 11:31 Was the War Deliberate 14:26 US Maritime Decline 19:29 National Security Stakes 24:10 Gulf Disruption and Insurance 29:42 Lloyds Umbrella Layer 30:02 London Shipping Power Center 31:06 Reinsurance Freeze After Feb 28 31:55 Five Eyes And Risk Intel 33:38 When Intelligence Goes Dark 34:36 Insurance Becomes The Bottleneck 34:57 DFC Steps In As Backstop 35:27 War Risk Precedents And Reflagging 37:30 DFC Limits And Multinational Ships 39:06 Insurance As Strait On Off Switch 42:56 Chokepoints Reserve Currency And China 46:41 Why Trump Delays Reopening 52:44 Topics for the Second Hour
If you enjoyed listening to today’s episode of Hidden Forces, you can help support the show by doing the following: Subscribe on Apple Podcasts | YouTube | Spotify | Stitcher | SoundCloud | CastBox | RSS Feed Write us a review on Apple Podcasts at https://apple.co/3fLSIgR Write us a review on Spotify at https://spoti.fi/3tv4zYr Subscribe to our mailing list at https://hiddenforces.io/newsletter/ Subscribe and Support the Podcast at https://hiddenforces.io Follow Hidden Forces on Twitter: https://twitter.com/hiddenforcespod Follow Demetri on Twitter: https://twitter.com/kofinas Producer & Host: Demetri Kofinas
Editor & Engineer: Stylianos Nicolaou Follow Demetri on Twitter at @Kofinas Episode Recorded on 03/31/2026
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The Trump administration has strategically assembled maritime policy tools—specifically war risk reinsurance through the DFC coordinated with Treasury and CENTCOM—to control the Strait of Hormuz as an on-off switch for global commerce, using this leverage to extract concessions from European NATO allies, China, and regional actors while rebuilding U.S. maritime dominance and securing the dollar's reserve currency status.
- The collapse of Lloyd's war risk reinsurance created an acute insurance crisis that only U.S.-backed facilities can solve, centralizing control over commercial traffic through maritime choke points
- The U.S. military possesses sufficient capability to secure the strait but is deliberately not surging assets, indicating strategic withholding of force to maximize political leverage
- Maritime control of global choke points is the historical foundation of reserve currency status, and loss of this domain directly threatens U.S. economic security and funding capacity
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The Persian Gulf is the world's energy center not only for crude oil but also for 30-45% of global fertilizer production (including feedstock), because fertilizer production requires low-cost energy available at wellheads in the Middle East.
“it's 30% of the fertilizer. Why? Because since the Haber-Bosch process, fertilizer is made from low-cost energy. You have the lowest cost energy at the wellhead. There are wellheads there. So, 30% of the fertil- world fertilizer is in the Middle East and it's even 15% higher, 40 to 45% if you include the LNG that goes to other places to make fertilizer remotely.”
Maritime shipping requires 90% of total volume movement globally; airfreight capacity from all U.S. Air Force, UPS, and FedEx combined is less than a single modern Chinese container ship, making sustained military supply via airlift impossible.
“All of the airlift fleet of the entire US Air Force, including civilian UPS, FedEx, it has less cargo capacity than one Chinese built container ship.”
The Trump administration identified Panama Canal control as a choke point priority immediately upon taking office, sent Secretary of State Rubio and Secretary of Defense Hegseth to inspect it, filed lawsuits against Spain over U.S. flag merchant marine access, and conducted the largest single-carrier bombing campaign in history against Houthis.
“Remember, right when he got in office, he said Rubio and Hegseth down to the Panama Canal. That's a choke point. He launched a major lawsuit against Spain not allowing US flag merchant marine ships into Spain. He went on Greenland, UK, Iceland and gap. He had the largest bombing campaign in the history of a single aircraft carrier against the Houthis.”
There are centuries-old laws on the books requiring the government to back insurance for commercial ships and the Navy to protect US-flagged vessels, based on founding-era maritime law, which Trump can leverage to justify the DFC facility.
“there are all these laws in the books that have been on the books for centuries, sometimes back to our founding, that the government has to help commercial back the insurance, and the Navy has to protect US flagships.”
Protection and indemnity (P&I) insurance for commercial vessels operates through a tiered system: individual ship-owner self-insurance, mutual P&I clubs organized by region (Tokyo, America, Norwegian, UK), regional club reinsurance, and finally Lloyd's of London as the master reinsurer covering multi-hundred billion dollar policies.
“the ship owners got together and and Maersk and CMA and they worked together. And the big companies really, first layer is self-insurance. They'll insure some of theirs or they'll they'll write off some of it. And then they get with the other ship owners and they create these P&I clubs. So, there's a Tokyo P&I club, there's an America club, there's a Norwegian club, there's a UK club... And then that master club, it gets reinsured at the reinsurance market.”
The Berlin Airlift is often used as a model for airlift capability, but it succeeded because it was 'a tiny flight' supplying a nearby city (Berlin was 'very close to West Germany'), involved minimal cargo requirements, and 'barely worked' even under ideal conditions. Modern global airlift to sustain military operations across the Pacific is fundamentally infeasible compared to sealift.
“Berlin was very close to West Germany. It was a tiny flight and they were just getting one city the materials they need and it barely worked. Now, think of crossing the entire Pacific. You cannot do this on aircraft.”
The Trump administration has achieved real progress in getting NATO members to commit to sending ships and getting the UK to put Diego Garcia military base deployment on hold (previously considering sale), indicating successful use of the crisis for diplomatic concessions.
“he's already got the Europeans agreeing that they're going to send ships. We had in the very beginning the UK said we can't use Diego Garcia, which is a critical choke point and they were actually going to sell this critical island off. They've put that on hold.”
Ships historically reflagged to U.S. flag during wartime crises (e.g., 1980s Tanker War) to obtain immediate government insurance backing and Navy protection, but this option is currently unavailable because U.S. flagged ships require American captains and there are fewer than 80 U.S. flagged vessels in international waters with insufficient U.S. merchant marine officers to crew them.
“I think roughly 80 or less than 80 US flagged vessels in international waters... This is why in the Tanker War of the 1980s, you saw all of these tankers reflag to US flagships... But, what happens now? We don't have enough American ship captains. So, if they pull that flag out and put an American flag in, those insurance backings require an American captain. There aren't enough of available.”
The U.S. naval shipyard industrial base (HII, Bath Iron Works) depends on secondary manufacturers for components (engines, propellers, welding systems, lifeboats) which historically developed from robust commercial shipbuilding sectors, but now these secondary manufacturers don't exist, causing multi-year delays on military ship construction.
“the Navy itself is reliant on the secondary shipyard. So, we have HII, we have Bath Iron Works making our destroyers, making our aircraft carriers. Our current aircraft carrier, the John F. Kennedy, they started building it 17 years ago... if there's a mistake in the part, we don't have secondary manufacturers. We can't just spin up a new factory to make and have the welders and have the lifeboats and the engine systems.”
Each US Navy destroyer has 96 missiles total: roughly one-third are Tomahawk land-attack missiles, one-third are anti-submarine, leaving only about 30 anti-air missiles per destroyer for air defense. After firing these missiles, reloading can take weeks. This limits the sustained air defense capability per destroyer.
“these destroyers have 96 missiles. 1/3 of them are Tomahawk anti-land, 1/3 are anti-sub. So they only really have 30 anti-air missiles on and then they got to go reload which can take weeks.”
The United States has experienced a decades-long decline in maritime dominance, shipbuilding industrial base, and the U.S. Merchant Marine, with the Maritime Administration reduced from significant Cold War presence to under 300 employees in Washington D.C., while the FAA maintains over 40,000 employees.
“we the United States had dominance in the maritime, naval, commercial shipbuilding after World War II. And slowly that has died away. And the last time we have had a major maritime strategy in this country was under Nixon... The FAA at the DOT are doing the airlines, has over 40,000 employees. The Maritime Administration has under 300 working in DC.”
Lloyd's of London controls 40% of the global maritime reinsurance market and is the central hub for maritime insurance, with other major insurers indexing their rates off Lloyd's quotes, making Lloyd's withdrawal from war risk coverage a critical chokepoint.
“Reinsured by the private market and 40% is Lloyd's of London. And most of the other companies, they index off the Lloyd's of London. So, if you want massive reinsurance, you get a quote from Lloyd's of London and you can shop it around. But Lloyd's is the massive reinsurance”
No U.S. President has had major maritime strategy since Nixon, indicating a 50+ year gap in strategic maritime thinking at the highest government levels.
“we the United States had dominance in the maritime, naval, commercial shipbuilding after World War II. And slowly that has died away. And the last time we have had a major maritime strategy in this country was under Nixon.”
Historically, when commercial insurance was unavailable, the U.S. government created war risk insurance facilities (e.g., WWII Manhattan building, recent Ukraine coverage), and the DFC maritime reinsurance facility is a repurposing of this precedent to address the current Persian Gulf crisis.
“if you go back to World War II, the largest building in Manhattan during World War II was the war risk insurance building. All of these This problem all of our allies, you know, when Denmark was taken over, Maersk sent all its ships to New York, and they had to get insurance. They had to get reflagged... And the government stepped up and said, 'Hey, we're going to underwrite these bonds.'... More recently, Ukraine, they were given war risk insurance”
Cargo insurance (covering the value of goods being transported) is typically purchased by the cargo owner/charterer rather than the ship owner, and operates separately from hull, machinery, and P&I insurance.
“you also need the cargo insurance. So, there's the insurance of the, you know, you have a million barrel supertanker, right? It's what, $100 a barrel? That's $100 in cargo. Usually, whoever charters that, so the ExxonMobil, you know, the Saudi Aramco, they will buy that cargo insurance.”
Control of maritime chokepoints (Gibraltar, Panama Canal, Suez Canal, Strait of Hormuz, Singapore Strait) is historically the foundation of imperial power, allowing toll extraction from global trade, and the U.S. has maintained these chokepoints open for free unlike historical empires.
“It's the ships. 90% of everything is on ships. You control the ships and these choke points. So, the ships can move around the oceans anywhere you want, but they have to converge at these locations like Gibraltar, like the Panama Canal, the Suez Canal, the Strait of Hormuz, the Singapore Strait. They have to converge there. And if you own that narrow thing, you can charge a toll booth. You know, historically, you had to pay to get through these areas. The US has given their maritime control of these joint points for free.”
The U.S. Navy maintains approximately 75 destroyer escorts, but only about 25 are available for deployment at any given time due to dry-dock maintenance and between-deployment cycles, with roughly 12 dedicated to Persian Gulf duties and the remainder supporting carrier battle groups globally.
“We have 75 of these destroyers. Problem is 1/3 are are in dry dock getting refurbished and 1/3 are between deployments. So we only really have 25 of these ships. Rear Admiral Mark Montgomery came out and says we need 12. Well, we got 25 available right now, but half of them are with our carrier force. So you really only have like 12 to 14”
Arab Gulf states are pressing Trump to remain militarily engaged in the Persian Gulf and surge forces, because they fear the consequences of U.S. withdrawal more than they fear continued conflict.
“When Trump said we may pull out, every single Arab country says, 'Don't leave. We want you here. We want you to surge these forces.'”
The Five Eyes intelligence network (US, UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand) includes subsea data cables connecting NSA and CIA in Langley directly to MI6 in London, allowing real-time sharing of intelligence that informs Lloyd's of London's war risk insurance pricing decisions.
“the Five Eyes component means that there are subsea data cables going from the NSA, going from CIA in Langley straight into MI6 in London... And your reason for bringing this up, though, is why? Because it doesn't seem to me that you need to have any kind of You don't need access to a SCIF to know that the war is dangerous... Well, you do need a SCIF because if Iran does have a nuclear weapon, it could hit 100 ships, and that price could be much more than if the US Navy is able”
The global distribution of container transshipment is centered in the Middle East, with most containers traveling from China to Europe but many being transshipped through regional hubs. This makes Middle Eastern ports critical nodes in global container networks.
“It's a transshipment hub for a lot of these containers. Most of them go from China straight to Europe, but a lot get get pulled off and put back on cuz it's in the middle of everything.”
National security is intrinsically tied to economic security because maritime commerce is denominated in U.S. dollars, providing liquidity to the entire U.S. financial system which funds Pentagon operations, and loss of reserve currency status would prevent the U.S. from maintaining military spending.
“first of all, national security is tied to economic security, and everything that moves on ships, our flag, someone else's flag, it doesn't matter, it gets changed in US dollars. So, this is critical to our reserve currency. If you build a building, that billion-dollar building is going to stay up for a long time. It's that when cargo gets loaded on a ship, it's US dollars. When it gets offloaded, that gives liquidity to our entire system, which funds the Pentagon.”
The international maritime order is currently being reorganized away from free trade and open capital markets toward one shaped by national interests, clandestine statecraft, and great power competition operating below the threshold of open military conflict.
“the global economy is being reorganized away from free trade and open capital markets to one increasingly shaped by national interests, clandestine statecraft, and great power competition often operating below the threshold of open military conflict.”
The Houthis' attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea forced all ships going from China to Europe to reroute around Africa, adding massive economic costs to global trade and demonstrating the vulnerability of modern supply chains to asymmetric maritime disruption.
“It really came to a fruition with the Houthis in the Red Sea. All of those ships going from China to Europe, they all had to reroute around Africa. This puts a huge tax on everyone.”
Panama Canal water levels have been chronically low in recent years, reducing cargo capacity and forcing longer transit routes, which increases reliance on alternative maritime pathways and choke point pressure.
“You have low water in the Panama Canal over the last few years.”
China militarizes its merchant fleet by training sailors in military tactics, placing weapon systems on container ships, and stationing 'communist commissars' on vessels, allowing China to rapidly expand warship capacity overnight through merchant marine conversions.
“China is taking a huge part of the market. And China, their merchant mariners, their seafarers, the Danish hire Filipinos, they hire Indonesia. They're just sailors. But the Chinese trains their sailors in military tactics. They put weapon systems on container ships to militarize their fleet. So, they can greatly expand the number of warships that they have overnight.”
The U.S. Navy had a successful record shooting down all Iranian drones and missiles in the Red Sea (Bab el Mandeb) while protecting U.S. flagships, demonstrating technical capability to defend shipping, but this requires expensive $20 million missiles to hit $20,000 drones.
“the destroyer is the only platform that can do this... the Navy do an incredible job against Iranian drones, Iranian anti-ship ballistic missiles in the Bab el Mandeb in the Red Sea... They're shooting down everything. But they're shooting $20 missiles at $20,000 drones.”
The DFC maritime reinsurance facility is coordinated with US Treasury (Scott Bessent), US Central Command, and uses Chubb as the lead private insurance partner, giving the Trump administration centralized control over which vessels receive insurance and thus effectively an 'on-off switch' for commercial shipping through the Strait of Hormuz.
“the DFC is a number of entities, foreign finance entities... Scott Bessent and the White House determine we're going to use this DFC... and they're still working out they're still ironing out this DFC because of the complexity of these multinational entities, which are all tied to one ship.”
The Philippines is the largest source of ship captains globally, not the United States, due to cost pressures and outsourcing incentives created by post-WWII maritime economics.
“the Philippines is the biggest source of ship captains now, not the United States.”
When the Trump administration initiated the conflict on February 28th without advance notice to allies, intelligence networks went dark, Lloyd's of London could not obtain classified threat assessments needed to price war risk insurance, and therefore shut down war risk coverage entirely because the risk became unquantifiable.
“It's normally that MI6 gets that little heads-up, and then they they whispered in the ear of the Lloyd's in London, and Lloyd's gets a team together to start working out these financial spreadsheets. But, because they didn't have any advanced notice, because the intelligence networks went dark, cuz we didn't include any allies, there's no coalition building here, that when that war started, everyone in Lloyd's just goes, 'I don't know what the hell's happening here. We got to figure this out.' And they they put the shutdown in.”
After World War II, the United States provided naval security as a public good, allowing allies to free-ride on this protection, which created perverse incentives for countries to outsource shipbuilding to lowest-cost providers rather than maintain domestic maritime capacity.
“Prior to World War II, the seas were really dangerous places... You had really in Congress and the Senate, you had Republicans who were really the party of commerce and big business. And big business wanted the cheapest price. They wanted the cheapest shipbuilding, so it in Korea instead of the United States, the cheapest workforce.”
The threat environment in the strait is now different than the Tanker War era because of social media. In the 1980s, ship owners could accept crew casualties for profit with limited public visibility. Now, crews can film and broadcast footage of colleagues bleeding out after drone strikes, which ruins ship-owner reputations and constrains the commercial calculus of transiting high-risk waters.
“This is historically different, too, because historically, the ship owners have always put the crews at risk to make money. We were shown the tanker wars. You know, the wealthiest ship owner in the world, John Fredriksen, made a lot of money and he lost, I think, nine crew members along the way. But now you have social media. So, every crew member, they can take video of their fellow buddy bleeding out cuz he got hit by a drone. And that is going to ruin the reputation of ship owners.”
Scott Bessent, as Treasury Secretary, understood that the UK lost its maritime domain and he organized a 'takedown of the Bank of London' (implicitly through financial mechanisms), showing that Bessent understands the reserve currency nexus and is ideologically aligned with reasserting US maritime dominance.
“And this is something Scott Bessent understands. Remember, Scott Bessent was the guy who organized the takedown of the Bank of London because he understood that UK was losing this maritime domain.”
The host argues that preventing the Iranians from posing even a small (1%) threat to vessels would be sufficient to keep insurance premiums so high that most vessels cannot afford to transit, effectively keeping the strait closed without overt US occupation.
“Iran is a large country. It has considerable strategic depth and a population of nearly 100 million people. They don't have an infinite number of resources, but I've read that these drones that they've been using to attack regional infrastructure are relatively cheap and easy to manufacture. And the Islamic Republic, or what remains of it, through its mosaic defense doctrine, may be able to remain operationally effective even in the face of widespread institutional and economic collapse. So, how would the United States prevent the Iranians from continuing to pose even a small threat to commercial vessels and to infrastructure in the Gulf, which would be sufficient to push insurance premiums high enough that most vessels can't afford to take the risk to travel through the strait and therefore it remains effectively closed, which would be enough to really shut down traffic, wouldn't it?”
The DFC has narrow statutory authority to provide financial tools to foreign companies overseas that are tied to US interests. The complexity of multinational ship ownership (where a ship may be owned by one country, operated by another, flagged by a flag-of-convenience nation, insured in yet another jurisdiction, and crewed internationally) makes it very difficult for the DFC to structure insurance solutions. Four weeks into the campaign, the DFC was still ironing out these complexities.
“The problem is, they are really bending, you know, these rules, and they're complicated. You put a US flag ship on the back, the US maritime administrator at DOT can go to the DOT bank within 12 hours and get you that insurance. But, if you are a Liberian flag and you're insured in one country and your seafarers are another, and it's managed out of another company, this gets very difficult very fast. So, the DFC, which is a small organization, they created this. But, now we're we're 4 weeks into the campaign, and they're still working out they're still ironing out this DFC because of the complexity of these multinational entities, which are all tied to one ship.”
All Navy warships were withdrawn from the Persian Gulf immediately prior to the Trump administration's strike on Iran, leaving commercial shipping completely undefended.
“right prior to the strike, all of the Navy warships were pulled out. So, it left these ships that are in the Persian Gulf Totally unprotected >> to attack, right?”
Mainstream maritime media prior to the internet was dominated by dock reporters who had deep expertise and institutional connections, but Craigslist and consolidation caused media organizations to replace them with J-school generalists lacking maritime connections.
“prior to that there were dock reporters. They were guys who were reporters and they just sit down and this is all they do, ships and shipping. And when Craigslist came out, they got rid of the mainstream media got rid of all the specialists in all the fields and went and got young J-school grads who are really good, but they don't have the connections and they don't have the networks and they don't have the expertise of years.”
The Trump administration has not deployed minesweeper assets into the Persian Gulf despite their availability, has not surged the 82nd Airborne, Navy SEALs, or mine-clearing dive teams, indicating deliberate withholding of military capability and strategic restraint rather than inability to reopen the strait.
“Trump did not push the minesweepers close into Fujairah. He pulled them back. The last we knew they were in Singapore. So there's absolutely no rush to do any surges of our capability. We have a lot left in our back pocket, the 82nd Airborne, the Navy SEALs. None of this is being used. The dive teams that can do mines. If we really wanted to open the strait ourselves, we would be surging all of these assets and we're we're just not.”
Everything—national security, economic security, military funding, reserve currency status—is contingent on global maritime trade, but this fundamental truth has been wiped from history books and is not understood by general media or populations.
“this gets so complicated and why we have to spend such a large amount of time with your these very basic things is it's wiped from the history books. No one has an understanding of any of this. So, the people who control the world, these very wealthy Europeans, the power brokers and the people in our government, the CIAs, the war department, they understand that everything, all of our national security, all our economic security, everything is contingent on global trade and that's all contingent on ships.”
Foreign merchant mariners are unwilling to risk their lives on ships carrying military cargo through combat zones without being part of a formal military service, whereas U.S. Merchant Marine officers and crews are willing to take these risks, making them militarily irreplaceable.
“unless you have American merchant mariners who are part of a service, the merchant marine was a service, those foreigners aren't going to take the risk for our military. They're not going to get on a ship that's filled with Air Force bombs and fuel and make that run through. The US merchant marine will”
Mainstream media, energy experts, and naval analysts have been getting the strategic logic of the Hormuz situation wrong, overlooking maritime and insurance dimensions in favor of simplistic energy and military analysis.
“absolutely every hypothesis, every news article, every talking head was getting this wrong two weeks ago, including ourselves. >> you >> this, getting this wrong, just be very clear, what were they getting wrong when you say this? The war, the the strategy?”
If the U.S. withdraws from the Persian Gulf, Israel would expand bombing of regional infrastructure, Iran would retaliate, and the resulting humanitarian crisis could kill millions due to disruption of desalination (3 days of water deprivation limit vs 40 days for food).
“cuz without us if we pull out tomorrow, what's going to happen? Israel's going to go down and it's going to bomb more infrastructure which they have wanted to do and Iran's going to retaliate. It's hard to hit a ship. It's easy to hit the desalination plants and put a lot of people, you know, you can live without food for 40 days, you can only live with water for 3 days. I mean a massive humanitarian crisis and these people are, you know, without that US protection which has been there from World War II.”
The US is the only actor with the financial might to underwrite the DFC maritime insurance facility. The EU could theoretically do something similar but does not have the financial capacity to create an equivalent institution.
“the EU could do this underwriting. They could do a DFC, but they don't have the money to.”
The Trump administration exposed the weakness of European and NATO navies through the Hormuz crisis, demonstrating that alliance-based security cannot fill capability gaps and forcing confrontation with the reality that European militaries are weaker than conventionally believed.
“He's exposed how weak the British Navy is, how weak the German Navy is, how if you look at any military congressional hearing for the past 15 years, every time a congressman says, 'Hey, the Navy's failing this or the Air Force is failing that.' Every general for the last 15 years go, 'Yes, we are, but we have the biggest alliances in the world and our alliance network can fill gaps.' And Trump is showing everyone that the alliance network can't fill their gaps, that these militaries are not what people think they are”
London houses the International Chamber of Shipping, BIMCO (representing vessel owners), and the International Maritime Organization (the UN body that writes global shipping regulations), making London the central hub for global maritime governance.
“London has the shipowners association, the International Chamber of Shipping, the BIMCO, which represents the owners. They have the International Maritime Organization is in London. That's the UN body that writes all of the regulations for shipping.”
The European governments and the Maersk, CMA CGM alliance have been fighting the Trump administration's maritime initiatives since day one to prevent U.S. re-establishment of maritime domain, because U.S. maritime costs are higher than low-cost third-world labor and lower-cost flag states.
“The Europeans have been fighting everything. We talked about the maritime action plan. We talked about Trump's shipbuilding initiative... All of these entities have been fighting Trump since day one to prevent the US from reestablishing its maritime domain. Why? Because even if we underwrite it, it's going to be more expensive than having third world labor and and lower cost regulations.”
Major shipping companies (Maersk, CMA CGM, Cosco) are headquartered in Denmark, France, and China respectively, and historically did not need large national navies to protect their operations because the US Navy provided free global security.
“you have Maersk in Denmark, CMA CGM in France, Cosco in China. They really don't need navies. They didn't need the protection, and they were able to fund those ships and move world trade.”
G Captain incorporates topic experts including captains, chief engineers, naval architects, and former World Bank presidents to provide deeper maritime coverage beyond what generalist journalists can offer.
“We have a lot of topic experts, you know, instead of just new journalists and journalists do great, but we have captains and chief engineers and naval architects and former presidents of the World Bank writing for us. So, we try to get into that deeper level of shipping.”
Democrats at the Senate level did not prioritize protection of maritime industries (like Brooklyn Navy Yard) because non-maritime senators focus on other issues (farming, social problems) in their states, and cannot justify maritime funding to their constituents.
“the Democrat senators, if you are the senator of Idaho, let's say, you really care about farming. But, if you are the senator of New York, do you really care about the Brooklyn Navy Yard? Yes, but all the social, the educational, the other problems take precedent, and they can or not protect those maritime forces.”
John Fredriksen is the wealthiest shipowner in the world, formerly with the largest property in London until recently, and during the Tanker War of the 1980s made significant profit while losing nine crew members.
“John Fredriksen, the wealthiest shipowner in the world, had the largest property in London until recently.”
Conrad and other analysts were initially getting the Persian Gulf conflict wrong, including early analysis in the Hormuz hypothesis article, but subsequent evidence has validated the hypothesis structure and strategic assumptions, suggesting the framework is more robust than early coverage suggested.
“I very clearly made it a hypothesis, but the hypothesis holds up today and we have new evidence since then. So, we were going out on a little bit of a limb. What people have to understand is part of the reason I started G Captain 20 years ago... absolutely every hypothesis, every news article, every talking head was getting this wrong two weeks ago, including ourselves.”