The Fourth Turning is Here | Neil Howe Explains What Comes Next
What this covers
What does it mean to come of age during chaos—and how does that shape the generations who must lead us through it? In this thought-provoking episode of Rabbit Hole, Dave Nadig speaks with Neil Howe—author of The Fourth Turning Is Here—about the evolving role of Gen X in today's world, the generational dynamics underpinning societal shifts, and what history teaches us about crisis, community, and rebirth. This is not just a theory session—it’s a practical guide to understanding where we are in the cycle and what might come next.
Why generational transitions are slowing—and why that matters
The Gen X identity crisis: from latchkey kids to future elders
How community rises from conflict during fourth turnings
Millennials' collective investing mindset vs. Gen X contrarianism
The historical role of financial repression and inflation in crises
Parallels between Gen X and the Lost Generation
How institutions are built—and who builds them
Will the next societal reboot be state-driven or community-driven?
Global synchronization of generational crises and what that implies
What comes after the fourth turning—and how Gen X fits into it
Timestamps: 00:00 – Tax, borrow, inflate: the recurring pattern 01:05 – Introduction to Neil Howe and the fourth turning framework 02:00 – How the current crisis aligns with Howe’s generational predictions 05:06 – The delayed maturity of Gen X and leadership transitions 07:05 – The Gen X ethos and worldview 08:42 – Millennial collectivism vs. Gen X individualism 13:34 – Lessons from the Lost Generation 16:58 – Scenarios for the next 5–10 years 20:00 – The consolidation moment after crisis 24:06 – How individual risk aversion can lead to collective risk-taking 28:13 – Will the next turning reshape capitalism? 30:00 – Inflation as a crisis solution, not a problem 31:00 – Financial repression and investor implications 33:00 – Trump’s prescience and the structural path forward 36:00 – Global generational synchronization and crisis 39:20 – Repeating history when memory fades 41:00 – Is the next institutional structure necessarily state-based? 43:40 – Conflict as the incubator of community 47:04 – The Gen X mission: from outsiders to builders 51:06 – Why Gen X may lead the next institutional resurgence
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Neil Howe argues that generational cycles predictably shape institutional crises and their resolution, with Gen X positioned as pragmatic crisis managers who will rebuild social institutions during the coming consolidation, contrary to their lifelong individualistic conditioning.
- Generational archetypes (nomad, prophet, civic, adaptive) follow predictable life-phase cycles that govern economic and political turning points
- The Fourth Turning crisis will resolve through community-driven institution building, not state ideology, requiring Gen X's contrarian pragmatism as stabilizing force
- Crisis resolution historically employs tax-borrow-inflate mechanisms with financial repression, restructuring wealth and requiring generational willingness to accept collective sacrifice
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Financial repression occurs when governments force creditors to hold bonds at below-inflation yields and require financial institutions to purchase and hold government debt; it was used extensively during WWII (12% inflation on 4.5% bond yields) and the Civil War (greenback requirements for banks).
“Financial repression is not just enough to uh to say, 'Yeah, we're going to have an inflation rate of of, you know, 12%, even though your bond is only getting 4.5%.' Which was the case during World War II, but we're going to force you not to sell that bond. In fact, we're going to require you to buy more of them if you're a bank or if you're various financial institutions.”
Public universities in California during the American High were nearly free (UC tuition ~$25/semester) because society collectively funded them through taxation, reflecting the Greatest Generation's commitment to shared institutions; by the 1980s, this changed as society shifted toward markets.
“I went to UC San Diego, UC Berkeley. I think my my semester tuition was something like $25. I mean, that's all I paid. I mean, and and I mean, that's that seems like a late cycle problem because like even in the 80s, my college tuition now was like less than a car payment, you know? Because we we discovered markets.”
The fundamental insight of foundational social science (Max Weber, Emil Durkheim, William Graham Sumner, Robert Putnam) is that conflict is the incubator of community—communities emerge through shared struggle against common threats.
“the fundamental insight of so much of social science... their fundamental insight... where does community come from? And I would say their common conclusion but one of the one of the axioms of social science as Robert Putnham you know put it in in his book bowling alone is that is that conflict is the incubator of community. It happens every time, right?”
Young adults today experience an economic reality more similar to the no-growth environment of the 17th and 18th centuries than to the early 20th century, which offered greater economic mobility and earlier full adult phases of life.
“I think the experience of young adults today is more like the no growth economic experience of living in the uh 17th and 18th century than it is to live in the early 20th century when uh uh uh economic mobility and uh uh possible full adult phases of life were available much earlier in life than they are today.”
During crisis periods, governments mobilize through a three-step mechanism: tax (what they can extract directly), borrow (bond issuance to fund investment in the future), and inflate (burden-sharing mechanism to transfer wealth from creditors to broader society).
“there are three things uh there and and it's always the same three things by the way. It's it's basically tax, borrow, inflate.”
Historically, when societies enter a collective crisis, they resolve it through three mechanisms: tax, borrow, and inflate. Inflation in late-stage crisis is not a pathology but a solution—it functions as a burden-sharing device that redistributes real wealth from creditors to the broader population, as occurred during WWII and the post-war period
“there are three things uh there and and it's always the same three things by the way. It's it's basically tax, borrow, inflate.”
Financial repression—where governments prevent creditors from liquidating bond holdings and force financial institutions to purchase additional government debt while inflation erodes real returns—is a historical pattern in crisis resolution and will recur during the coming consolidation period
“Financial repression is not just enough to uh to say, "Yeah, we're going to have an inflation rate of of, you know, 12%, even though your bond is only getting 4.5%." Which was the case during World War II, but we're going to force you not to sell that bond. In fact, we're going to require you to buy more of them if you're a bank or if you're various financial institutions.”
Stateless institutions (Bitcoin exemplified) cannot replace nation-states as sources of community and institutional stability because the fundamental social science principle—established by Weber, Durkheim, Sumner—is that conflict is the incubator of community, and sustained community formation requires nation-state aggregation of power through centralized military, bureaucracy, and tax capacity
“It's not necessarily state driven. That's not the essential part of it. Here's the essential part of it Dave. It's communitydriven.”
Deglobalization and reindustrialization of America will require shutting down capital inflows and outflows, forcing the US to fund its entire deficit domestically rather than relying on foreign capital inflows for the last 20 years, leading inevitably to much higher interest rates and requiring renegotiation of the social contract between America and its citizens
“if you are going to shut down imports and exports, you're also going to shut down capital inflows and ex flows, right? That means we're going to have to fund our entire deficit on our own, which we haven't done for the last 20 years. That's going to lead to much higher interest rates totally aside from the inflation premium on it.”
The time required for someone to become an adult in America has lengthened by 5 to 7 years over the past 30 years, with marriage, parenthood, and career establishment occurring significantly later than historically typical.
“the time it takes for someone to become of an adult in America has has lengthened, you know, over the last 30 years. Um, uh, the the age at which someone becomes gets married, becomes a parent, has a permanent career. I mean, all of these things are are 5 to seven years later than they used to be.”
America faces structural necessity to shift toward higher net exports and higher net savings rates, requiring massive painful reindustrialization over a decade or more, which will entail higher prices for goods and potential scarcity on store shelves.
“the whole idea of reindustrializing America, at least part of America, you know, parts of some industries re-industrializ is going to be enormous, painful, difficult process. It's not going to be just a few months. It's not even a few years. It'll take maybe a decade. It'll go way on into the next first turning. But you have to realize that if you are going to shut down imports and exports, you're also going to shut down capital inflows and ex flows”
Nation-states became powerful and embodied community through repeated aggregation of power driven by conflict, as seen in the transition from fragmented Renaissance duchies and communes to the new monarchies of the 14th-16th centuries that built armies, conquered rival powers, expanded bureaucracy, increased tax revenue, and achieved greater peace, commerce, and productivity in a positive cycle.
“the repeatedly in the entire modern era, these conflicts of always worked to the aggregation of power in the nation state. Where do you think the nation state came from after the after the Renaissance when America was divided up and all these little duchies and communes and everything? Well, these nation what they called the new monarchies, you know, coming out of the late 14th and and and 15th and and early 16th century, these new monarchies um they they they built big armies. They conquered these duchies. They conquered these re rebel nobles. They enlisted a a greater bureaucracy. They were able to extend their tax take. They were able to give more peace, greater commerce, greater productivity, more revenue, bigger armies. I mean you see where this is going. This is a positive cycle of nation building”
Reindustrialization of America is an 'enormous, painful, difficult process' that will require perhaps a decade or more and extend into the next first turning era, not be accomplished in months or a few years.
“this whole idea of reindustrializing America, at least part of America, you know, parts of some industries re-industrializ is going to be enormous, painful, difficult process. It's not going to be just a few months. It's not even a few years. It'll take maybe a decade. It'll go way on into the next first turning.”
Passive investing disables the role of active investing in markets, which is to provide accurate price discovery and valuation estimates of firms; the passive craze has contributed to the entire world investing in America based on index concentration rather than fundamental evaluation.
“I worry a lot about passive investing as basically disabling u uh the role of active investing and actually ser you know serving what financial markets is supposed to do uh is actually provide a good estimate of the value of of of uh of of firms right um and uh and I think to some extent in the last couple of years we've even seen the entire world begin to invest in America because of this whole passive craze”
If the US restricts capital outflows and capital inflows decline as a mirror of trade restrictions, interest rates must rise substantially to clear domestic debt markets without foreign buyers, a consequence entirely separate from any inflation premium.
“That means we're going to have to fund our entire deficit on our own, which we haven't done for the last 20 years. That's going to lead to much higher interest rates totally aside from the inflation premium on it.”
Nation-states emerged through 14th-16th century 'new monarchies' that built armies, conquered dispersed feudal entities and nobles, established bureaucracies, expanded taxation, funded bigger armies, and created positive-feedback loops that aggregated power and created national identities.
“Where do you think the nation state came from after the after the Renaissance when America was divided up and all these little duchies and communes and everything? Well, these nation what they called the new monarchies, you know, coming out of the late 14th and and and 15th and and early 16th century, these new monarchies um they they they built big armies. They conquered these duchies. They conquered these re rebel nobles. They enlisted a a greater bureaucracy. They were able to extend their tax take.”
Russia under Putin is rebuilding as a militarized anti-western state, with military service rebranded from place of horror to opportunity for heroism and community status, using veteran benefits and rural income enhancement to consolidate social support.
“Look at Vladimir Putin who's completely rebuilding Russia around this militarized anti-western state. I mean, he's building a war machine. And suddenly in Russia, instead of the army being this horrible place where uneducated refuge goes, it's the time for heroes. You know what I mean? he's giving these huge benefits now to veterans. He's lifting the incomes of these rural communities”
Equal wealth distribution in the Western world during the post-WWII period (1930s-1960s) resulted from a combination of inflation, crisis-induced destruction, rapid economic restructuring, and financial repression that collectively transferred real wealth from creditors to broader society.
“if you look at why not just America but but most of the western world became more equal you know during the a little bit during the 30s more rapidly during the 40s and and dur then the the first turning the American eye the 50s and 60s a lot of it was a combination of of inflation uh crisis you know actually taking away people's wealth obviously there's also just destruction you know and and and and rapid uh uh economic restructuring in industries um and and also financial repression.”
Passive investing, while appearing safe and collective, is actually disabling the role of active investment in price discovery and firm valuation, leading to unintended consequences where passive funds artificially inflate popular assets and mask fundamental weakness, creating systemic risk
“I worry a lot about passive investing as basically disabling u uh the role of active investing and actually ser you know serving what financial markets is supposed to do uh is actually provide a good estimate of the value of of of uh of of firms right”
The fundamental subject of early social scientists (Max Weber, Émile Durkheim, William Graham Sumner) was discovering the sources of community at a time when urbanization was destroying it, and they concluded that conflict is the incubator of community—it happens every time.
“the fundamental insight of so much of social science and and uh uh you know and this was this was Max Vber and this this was Emil Darkheim and this was even in America we had William Graham Sumner and many many others right but their fundamental insight and they were all focused by the way on community this is a time these huge cities were growing throughout Europe and America and everyone was losing community. So the the fundamental subject of of the of the great first generation of social scientists was where does community come from? And I would say their common conclusion but one of the one of the axioms of social science as Robert Putnham you know put it in in his book bowling alone is that is that conflict is the incubator of community. It happens every time, right?”
The 2016-2024 period represents America's seventh great realigning election era, following a pattern of realigning elections occurring in every crisis and awakening since the 1790s.
“many people are calling uh you know, 2016 through 2024 to be America's you know, seventh great realigning election period. We've had them in every crisis and every awakening on quue you know since since you know the 1790s.”
Younger Boomers envied the freedom and experimentation of the teenage counterculture in the 1960s and offered to help break down existing institutions, establishing a coalition between elder Silent generation and younger Boomers against the system.
“the silent generation and the misten awakening in midlife, you know, and they side with the boomers in this, right? You know, these younger boomers, I really envy them, you know, they're they're doing all this as teens. I wish I could wear my long hair like that, but I'll help them break down the system, right?”
The Lost Generation (born ~1883-1900) experienced tremendous volatility and crisis during their midlife (Great Depression unemployment in double digits, GDP crashing, stock market 50% decline in 1937), forcing them to become pragmatists focused on what works.
“reached reached midlife at a time of both the great depression when nothing seemed to work economically you know unemployment double digits GDP cratering then and also huge transitions enormous volatility in the markets I mean you know the the America came back in 1935 36 and then went to this huge retigenous slide again in 37 a 50% decline in the stock market it wasn't just downs it was up and downs it is a roller coaster”
Harold Eisenhower was a very risk-averse president aligned with his Lost generation cohort's pragmatism, wanting to ensure Soviet containment but not wanting to start new wars or take adventurous action, focusing instead on maintaining stability.
“Dwight Eisenhower was a very riskaverse president and I think very much in the style of his generation, you know, he wanted to make sure the Soviets were in their place. He wanted to make but he did not want to do anything adventurous. He did not want to start new wars. He wanted right um and uh and and and it worked. And over that period, America suddenly became more prosperous and you know that we suddenly suddenly gathered gathered momentum.”
The GI generation (born ~1900-1924) wanted to do bolder things with government power (great society, moon program, social programs) in contrast to the nomadic Lost Generation (their predecessors) which was risk-averse and wanted only to maintain stability.
“uh and and and it worked. And over that period, America suddenly became more prosperous and you know that we suddenly suddenly gathered gathered momentum. But the next generation, the GI generation, you know, as as as Jack Kennedy liked to say, they wanted to take longer strides, right? Uh and they wanted to they wanted a great society as as LBJ say. th those those dreams of FDR had been put on hold by these last generation presidents”
Gen X parents are raising their children with extreme protectiveness in contrast to how they themselves were raised (allowed to roam freely), mimicking the Silent Generation's protective parenting response after WWII and Great Depression.
“Gen Xers are raising their kids and have raised their kids... they are raising their kids extremely protectively. And we have seen this pattern generationally time and time again. The last generation we saw that was like Gen X was the lost generation”
American history since the 1790s has been fundamentally cyclical, organized into generational archetypes and four turnings (prophet, nomad, civic, adaptive generations) that repeat in predictable patterns with crisis periods recurring roughly every 80-100 years
“we first talked about uh uh you know American history and and and by extension uh much of Western history being cyclical, modern history being cyclical”
Financial risk-taking behavior in crypto and leveraged markets reflects people feeling they are 'playing with house money' due to prolonged stock market gains, viewing paper wealth as risk-free to speculate with, rather than contradicting the thesis of institutional risk aversion.
“I think it it is people over 30 is my my point. I think Gen Xers are setting the tone for that. But I also think there's a feeling among a lot of people, you know, particularly by the time we got to the late teens, you know, we got five or six years out of the out of the great depress great recession that that, you know, everyone's playing with house money. Um, you know, the stock market is up so much. Uh, this is just paper money. I can play with it.”
As society enters a collective crisis mood, individual risk-taking becomes more acceptable and even celebrated, while simultaneously collective risk-taking (societal commitment to major structural changes) becomes more likely; this paradox has repeated throughout history.
“History suggests that as we grow individually more riskaverse, we often grow collectively more likely to take risks. And that's something very interesting to think about in the context of the fourth turning.”
There is something archetypal in the generational pattern where the generation least accustomed to something (Gen X lacking structure, Silent generation lacking freedom) is the generation that brings that thing back—this pattern repeats across history.
“There is something archetypal in this. And again, we see these roles happening again and again.”
This is an 'yin and yang' pattern—the very thing a generation avoids or resists in youth becomes the thing they master in elderhood, making nomads (who resist institutions) the builders of institutions, and this pattern repeats across generational cycles without exception
“And this sort of my point. It's like we haven't trained on this that this is exactly the yin and yang of the generational cycle, right? It's always a generation that's the least used to something that actually brings it back. And that's the amazing part of it.”
Dwight Eisenhower exemplified the Lost Generation's risk-averse leadership style, not wanting to start new wars or take adventurous action, instead wanting to keep the Soviets in place—a protective posture that allowed America to become more prosperous and gather momentum during his presidency.
“uh but but uh but Dwight Eisenhower was a very riskaverse president and I think very much in the style of his generation, you know, he wanted to make sure the Soviets were in their place. He wanted to make but he did not want to do anything adventurous. He did not want to start new wars. He wanted right um and uh and and and it worked. And over that period, America suddenly became more prosperous and you know that we suddenly suddenly gathered gathered momentum.”
Putin and Xi need each other: Putin needs Xi (China/she) for energy and agricultural products and strategic depth, while Xi needs Putin (Russia) for access to global resources and strategic partnership against the West.
“The two need each other, right? He needs Trump for for energy and for agriculture, right? You mean Putin? She needs Putin. Oh, yes. Say that again. I got to say that. She needs Putin for energy and for for food staffs, right? And and for strategic depth. I mean, he needs that. And obviously Putin needs she because everything from the giant.”
The Silent Generation, born after WWII and Great Depression, became conformist, risk-averse, and rule-following when young (married first date, bought cars by age 20-21), then experienced midlife crisis and claustrophobia-driven rebellion in later life.
“The silent generation came of age famously conformist. You know, in college, their their motto was, you know, um um you know, don't you know, don't do anything out, you know, don't do anything outside the lines, you know... they all got these, you know, these these higher degrees as being the the tinkers and technocrats... many of them took no chances. They they married their first date in high school”
Putin needs Xi (China) for energy and food supplies and strategic depth, while Xi needs Putin for energy and the geopolitical advantage of a Russian ally, creating a deep mutual dependence that makes Western hopes of dividing them or bringing Putin westward 'idiocy'—the two-power alignment is structural, not tactical
“he's giving these huge benefits now to veterans. He's lifting the incomes of these rural communities, you know, and so there's this huge recasting going on. Uh and the idea of of of some people in the White House that, you know, Trump can be suddenly brought over to the west and or distracted from Ukraine, I think is idiocy. I think he is this close to she right now, right? The two need each other, right? He needs Trump for for energy and for agriculture, right? You mean Putin? You mean Putin? She needs Putin. Oh, yes. Say that again. I got to say that. She needs Putin for energy and for for food staffs, right?”
The Boomer generation rejected their Greatest Generation parents' communalism and wanted individualism, which angered the Greatest Generation who remembered that collective sacrifice was the only thing that saved them during WWII.
“that's what they could not stand about their boomer kids their boomer kids all wanted to be individuals and they just thought you realize what the only reason we were able to build all this crap for you spoiled kids is that we were together we believed in community we're willing to tax everyone for these interstate highways and all these sewer systems and all these public colleges which you kids didn't pay a dime to go to.”
By the 1980s and beyond, Americans 'discovered markets' as beautiful in themselves and commodified education, infrastructure, and public goods, replacing collective provision with market pricing, which contributes to late-cycle economic inequality and stress.
“I mean, and and I mean, that's that seems like a late cycle problem because like even in the 80s, my college tuition now was like less than a car payment, you know? Because we we discovered markets. We thought they were beautiful, right?”
The seculum (saeculum)—the long cycle of generational change—requires that each era enter a phase that no one alive remembers, creating conditions where old institutional forms fail and new ones must be invented, making each great crisis a moment of institutional amnesia that forces creativity rather than replication
“And that and and it's interesting because recently we've seen all these 80y year anniversaries. You know, it's 80 year anniversary of be day. I believe that was two days ago, right? And and there you had, you know, Hitler, I don't know, in a few days Hitler's going to shoot himself in the head, you know, in his bunker and all the stuff. Um uh Eisenhower sends his victory telegram just like an excer. The victory telegram was only about 50 words. That was it. the Allied forces have accomplished their objective at something 100, you know, that would boom. That was it. That's all that's all Eisenhower telegraphed back home.”
Stalin rejected the Marshall Plan's extension to Eastern Europe, preventing those countries from participating in post-war Western integration; Polish and Yugoslav leaders approached independently requesting participation but were refused, leading to Soviet domination and later Cold War partition.
“We even were willing to extend the Marshall Plan to Eastern Europe, but uh Stalin, he nixed that idea. I don't know why, but just said, you know, and it was funny because all these Polish leaders and and and the and and particularly Yugoslavia kind of independently saying, can we can we I mean, it looks really great, you know. No. No.”
By the 19th century, nationalism had become established as a right of every people (Woodrow Wilson era), driving US involvement in WWI to enable national self-determination and later the Marshall Plan, which respected the principle that conquered nations like Japan should retain national sovereignty.
“by the 19th century nationalism was considered a right of every people you know by Wedro Wilson that's why we went to war right to to allow every nation to have every you know nation to have its own nation right every cultural nation well and even even the Marshall plan was largely about respecting that belief system that Japan still had a right to be a country called Japan”
Bitcoin and stateless cryptocurrencies represent attempts at non-state-driven institutions, but community-driven crisis resolution historically defaults to state-organized solutions due to state's superior capacity for resource mobilization and enforcement.
“it's not necessarily state driven. That's not the essential part of it. Here's the essential part of it Dave. It's communitydriven... Conflict is the incubator of community... the repeatedly in the entire modern era, these conflicts of always worked to the aggregation of power in the nation state.”
India-Pakistan are now nuclear-armed powers 'lobbing artillery shells' at each other, representing flashpoint potential with Modi (born post-Partition crisis) lacking living memory of existential partition consequences.
“take a look at um take a look at Narendra Modi in India to talk about another flash point. Now we have now we have Pakistan India to worry about, right? Two nuclear armed powers that are now lobbing artillery shells at each other.”
Trump accurately foresaw in 2016 that globalization would reverse and that American culture would shift in a more conservative direction, both of which have come to pass in the last few years, and he often sees where the country is going despite his blunt-edged and chaotic instruments for affecting it.
“I thought in 2016 he was one of the few people who foresaw that globalization was going to reverse, right? And indeed it was uh and that um and that America uh culturally would be shifting direction, you know, in a more conservative direction. And I think we've we've we've seen that actually in the last few years. We certainly see among, you know, younger people now coming of age. So I see a lot of these things he saw I and I I think by and large...Trump, however, um uh bluntedged and chaotic his his instruments for affecting it. Uh he's often very preient at seeing where the country is going.”
Trump's willingness to accept a recession early in his presidency (a stated strategy aligned with Reagan's approach) is smart positioning because it allows him to oversee recovery and economic growth by his second term, giving him credit for expansion.
“I do think despite what Trump says about and I think he's pretty smart to say it, uh you know, I don't mind having a recession early in my presidency. I'll be like Ronald Reagan, you know, beating America by the time it ends. That's just smart. I mean, that's what he should be saying, right?”
Renegotiating the fundamental contract between America and its citizenry (shifting from welfare state to individual responsibility or vice versa) cannot be done without a nearly-existential crisis that forces collective acceptance, at which point Gen X will be positioned to execute it pragmatically.
“to rewrite the American contract requires a level of uh I and people have to allow you to do that and I don't think Trump has earned that that position with the enough of America to be able to renegotiate that contract. And I I think to some of the comments that you make in forth turning is here um like you you have to get through a crisis that is nearly existential before anybody's going to get that kind of authority.”
The 80th anniversary of VE Day and VJ Day (2025) marks the moment when no living person of adult age during WWII remains, making this the psychological pivot point when post-WWII institutions lose their direct legitimacy from 'those who were there'.
“it's 80 year anniversary of be day... We're going to have the 80th anniversary of Nagasaki, Hiroshima... anyone at this 80th anniversary who was age 20 at the time has to be a centinarian, right? We don't have a lot of them left... they're departing about they're they're shrinking at about onethird every year”
The 80th anniversaries of WWII (VE Day, atomic bombs) are symbolically significant because anyone aged 20 during WWII is now 95+ years old (centenarian) and this generation is shrinking at one-third per year, meaning the last living witnesses to the last great crisis are rapidly departing, leaving society without embodied institutional memory
“It have to repeat it. Yeah. I do. Does it does this rebuilding the sort of epyrosis, the burning through fire and rebirth where the wild flowers can bloom, does this have to be stateoriented? I guess that was the point I was trying to make about institutions. I look at something like the rise in Bitcoin, just to be really specific about it, as in a way its own stateless institution. Uh do you is there a path you see forward where these aren't hard drawn lines on a map and are instead either culturally or ideologically drawn lines where we build institutions across borders or is that just pipe dream? It's not necessarily state driven. That's not the essential part of it. Here's the essential part of it Dave. It's communitydriven. It's this intense community of the whole country becomes a band of brothers. That's what the society we learned. You cannot understand the American high. You cannot understand why we were the way we were culturally, socially, the suburbs, the huge middle class, everyone wearing the same gray flannel suit. I mean everything you remember of the late 40s50 and I'm I'm saying literally remember but but our image of that period you cannot understand it without understanding the crisis that scared the crap out of everyone that they had been through right coming together was the only thing that saved them and the generation which came of age in that the what we call the greatest generation that power of community is something they recall for the rest of their lives until the time they died whether it was in 1970s 80s 90s many of them were still voting for Ronald Reagan you know what I mean”
Gen X experienced a 'throwaway' upbringing during their childish phase, with cultural narratives of doom (e.g., 'Bad Seed' movies) positioning them as contemptable and doomed, leading to a self-perception of being 'bad seed' generations.
“This is the generation that grew up with all the childish devil horror movies and you know, everything about that generation was uh bad and contemptable. I mean, let's face it, as soon as they came along. Uh, and I think the the I often say that the the Gen X attitude toward themselves is a little bit like the the child of divorce writ large.”
Gen Xers felt the only way to survive was to take their life rafts and sail in different directions because the whole system was going to sink; Millennials are roping all lifeboats together because they realize if the entire S&P goes down, someone has to save them.
“Gen Xers felt that the only way they could survive is by taking their life rafts and and and and sailing in different directions cuz the whole thing was going to sink. Millennials are roping all of their lifeboats together because they realize if the entire S&P goes down, someone's got to save them.”
Gen X will emerge as pragmatic institutional builders and community anchors during the Fourth Turning, creating stable walls and restraints that enable subsequent institutional flourishing, paradoxically reversing their lifelong aversion to structure.
“Xers will be, believe it or not, the the solid anchors of their community of their whatever community you're talking about, even a neighborhood community or whatever kind of community you're talking, they will be the solid anchor at a time of tremendous crisis. They will be the nononsense pragmatic bottom line at a time when everyone around them is losing you know losing their minds”
The Fourth Turning crisis can resolve through multiple pathways: civil war (internal conflict), external crisis (foreign threat), internal realignment with multiple regeneracies (institutional rebuilding), leading eventually to a final consolidation when society feels its very fate is at stake.
“we have effectively a form of civil war whether it's guns in the streets or just even more you know disruption than we've had already or we have some sort of external crisis which you know maybe we're in the middle of that one... or we end up with sort of an internal realigning... the next regeneracy whether we have two regeneracies, three regeneracies ultimately leads to a consolidation when the country feels that its very fate is at stake”
Passive investing and target-date funds, while appearing risk-averse, actually represent a collective bet on government backstops: millennials invest in the entire market collectively because they know that if indices crash 30-40%, the Fed will intervene to save the system, making individual diversification unnecessary.
“I do see two big trends among millennials. One is we talked about it earlier uh target date funds and passive investing. Uh that is not that is not taking risks that is making a very calculated judgment. I'm going to invest in the entire market... I'm not going to envy my buddies because they're going to be investing the same thing I am. So you know we either all go down together which is okay. It's community investing.”
If major tech stocks like Apple, Nvidia, or Microsoft drop 30-40%, Chairman Powell will hold an emergency press conference and deploy countermeasures, but if a small company on the Russell 2000 crashes, no intervention occurs—creating federal emergency insurance dynamics that encourage concentration of wealth in large-cap index investments.
“you know that if you know Apple or Nvidia or Microsoft go down by 30% or 40%. you know that uh you know chairman Powell is going to have an emergency press conference and he's going to talk about the three five things we're going to do right now to correct this. But if you have some little if you're investing in some little company on the Russell 2000, he's not even going to notice you.”
Millennials are fundamentally different from Gen X in their collective psychology—they are 'roping all of their lifeboats together' through target-date fund passive investing and collective identification, understanding that if the entire S&P 500 collapses, only mutual rescue will save them, making them community-oriented rather than individualistic
“Millennials are roping all of their lifeboats together because they realize if the entire S&P goes down, someone's got to save them. You know what I mean? It's actually pretty clever and I think they're right actually. Uh but but it's a very different collective um uh self-identification.”
The pragmatic 'smash things against the wall and see what works' style of the Trump presidency reflects nomad (Gen X) leadership methodology—abandon elite expertise, try everything, abandon ideology—rather than the institution-respecting caution of prior generations, and this is culturally shocking to establishment but functionally appropriate for crisis
“I think the enormous pragmatism of the honeybger style of the Trump presidency. Just rip everything apart, try everything, smash things against the wall, see what works. Right? This is very This is kind of the soul of pragmatism. Uh, forget about what you've learned. They don't teach you how to govern the Trump presidency in graduate school. You know what I mean? It's not there at the at at at Wharton, you know, and and so this is the style.”
Gen X, unlike most other generations, knows about risk better than any other generation because they were suckled on it (raised in a risky, unstable environment), making them naturally risk-averse but also knowledgeable about risk—a profile that makes them ideal stewards of institutions that must navigate future volatility.
“Generation X knows about risk better than any other generation. They were raised they were suckled on risk right all are terrified at risk. Right? I mean that's the deal right?”
Institutional rebuilding during crisis does not have to be strictly state-driven but must be community-driven, with intense community bonds becoming the essential mechanism, as seen in the post-WWII American High where society operated as a 'band of brothers'.
“It's not necessarily state driven. That's not the essential part of it. Here's the essential part of it Dave. It's communitydriven. It's this intense community of the whole country becomes a band of brothers.”
Global synchronization of generational cycles is occurring as different nations enter their Fourth Turning simultaneously, creating synchronized institutional crises across Russia, China, India, Iran, and the Western world, with leaders (Putin, Xi, Modi) being the first generation born after their respective national crises, making them more aggressive and less constrained by crisis memory
“you commented recently in some of your appearances about um sort of how how the sort of seculum the cycle seems to be sinking more and more globally as we become as we become a more global society.”
The Fourth Turning (crisis period) was predicted to peak in the year 2020 or early 2020s, but the cycle has dilated slightly because the time it takes for Americans to reach full adulthood—defined by marriage, parenthood, and permanent career entry—has lengthened by 5 to 7 years over the last 30 years
“the the timing the the the governor of the length of the cycle is the generational phase of life. Uh that is to say the time it takes from a person to be born to fully come of age as an adult”
The analogy of federal rescue to homeowner's insurance is apt but inverted: if you want your neighborhood to be rescued after fire, you should hope ALL neighbors' houses burn down together, because only collective disaster justifies collective relief—individual loss is ignored
“It's like federal emergency insurance. You know, if you don't want just your house, if your house has to burn down, I'm sorry, but you want everyone all your neighbors houses to burn down cuz then you're going to get aid, right?”
The American middle class, suburban sprawl, and cultural conformity of the 1950s-60s cannot be understood without understanding the World War II crisis that terrified people into recognizing that community was the only thing that saved them, creating a power of community that the Greatest Generation carried for the rest of their lives.
“You cannot understand the American high. You cannot understand why we were the way we culturally, socially, the suburbs, the huge middle class, everyone wearing the same gray flannel suit. I mean everything you remember of the late 40s50 and I'm I'm saying literally remember but but our image of that period you cannot understand it without understanding the crisis that scared the crap out of everyone that they had been through right coming together was the only thing that saved them and the generation which came of age in that the what we call the greatest generation that power of community is something they recall for the rest of their lives”
The Silent Generation's main problem in midlife was claustrophobia from having followed all rules in youth without ever breaking them, leading many to late-life divorces and experimental behavior as they tried to experience what they'd missed, contrasting with Gen X who had complete freedom in youth and now face agriphobia—fear of endless boundless distance with no structure.
“many of them regretted all that early conformity and so many of them had the um the midlife crisis you know the late divorce and you know all of the you know in kind of a wilder time. So here's the contrast is that the silent generation played by the rules totally when they were young and ultimately by midlife their problem was claustrophobia. You know they just never knew what it was to break the rules and just step outside and take bigger chances and so that's what they did. They had a much more experimental late life role...I think ex is just the opposite. You know, when they were young, they could do anything they wanted to. They don't give a crap. And their problem coming into midlife was what we call agriphobia. You know, the fear of just endless open unlimited distance with no time horizons, no barriers, no structure.”
Gen X's relationship with millennials will involve teaching them pragmatism in how to build systems, whereas the Silent Generation related to younger boomers by helping them break down the old system, creating an inverted mentoring dynamic based on the generational archetype of each cohort.
“I think with Gen Xers is that yeah, I'll help millennials build the system again and I'll help build some of these things and I'll I'll kind of teach the millennials how to do it in a pragmatic way.”
When individual risk-taking increases (e.g., sports betting, crypto, leverage, meme stocks), Gen Xers set the tone and view markets as having 'house money' status; people feel they can play recklessly because the underlying assets have inflated so much.
“I actually don't think it's not just, you know, it's I think it it is people over 30 is my my point. I think Gen Xers are setting the tone for that. But I also think there's a feeling among a lot of people, you know, particularly by the time we got to the late teens, you know, we got five or six years out of the out of the out of the great depress great recession that that, you know, everyone's playing with house money.”
The Marshall Plan and post-WWII international architecture were grounded in the principle that every cultural nation had a right to national sovereignty (Wilsonian self-determination), extending even to former Axis powers like Japan, and the US was willing to rebuild even Eastern Europe until Stalin rejected the offer, demonstrating that institutional rebuilding is based on shared belief in national legitimacy
“and even the Marshall plan was largely about respecting that belief system that Japan still had a right to be a country called Japan etc. We we even were willing to extend the Marshall Plan to Eastern Europe, but uh Stalin, he nixed that idea. I don't know why, but just said, you know, and it was funny because all these Polish leaders and and and the and and particularly Yugoslavia kind of independently saying, can we can we I mean, it looks really great, you know. No. No.”
History shows that as individuals become more risk-averse and demand safety nets and government backstops (like the 'Fed put' on markets), societies paradoxically become more likely to take massive collective risks, such as entering wars or undertaking existential restructuring, because the individual safety expectation shifts risk-taking to the collective level
“if history does have one lesson, it's that as we grow individually more riskaverse, we often grow collectively more likely to take risks. And that's something very interesting to think about in the context of the fourth turning.”
The American High (1946–1970s) was a first turning characterized by institutional stability, collective confidence, nationalism, and conformity, where Americans felt individually weak but collectively powerful—'strode the world'—due to the shared trauma of WWII that made them willing to sacrifice for collective institutions like Interstate Highways and public colleges (UC tuition was ~$25/semester)
“at that time all the cement which was very fluid when all these huge institutes were being constructed suddenly begins to harden you know what I mean and then you have you know two and a half decades of the American high which was this period of incredible institutional stability”
The boomer generational cohort, despite being children during WWII and the Great Depression, rejected the collective sacrifice mentality of their GI parents, instead embracing individualism, personal exploration, and skepticism of institutions, creating the 'unraveling' phase that destabilized the American High's institutional consensus
“and that's what they could not stand about their boomer kids their boomer kids all wanted to be individuals and they just thought you realize what the only reason we were able to build all this crap for you spoiled kids is that we were together we believed in community we're willing to tax everyone for these interstate highways and all these sewer systems and all these public colleges which you kids didn't pay a dime to go to.”
Young adults today experience a no-growth economic environment more similar to the 17th and 18th century than to the early 20th century, with economic mobility and full adult phases of life unavailable much earlier in life than historically, and for many young adults everything is essentially on hold.
“I think the experience of young adults today is more like the no growth economic experience of living in the uh 17th and 18th century than it is to live in the early 20th century when uh uh uh economic mobility and uh uh possible full adult phases of life were available much earlier in life than they are today. I think for a lot of young adults it's just everything is on hold for you guys.”
No living adult in the major powers (Russia, China, India, Iran, Pakistan) experienced the last major crisis of their nation, having all been born after WWII, the Chinese Revolution, Partition, etc., creating a uniform generational amnesia across world powers simultaneously.
“nobody alive today was an adult during the last crisis. They have all passed away, which is kind of always true, right? And that's always true. That's the amazing thing about the seculum, right? Is the era we're entering is exactly the era that no one any longer remembers”
You cannot understand the American High (1945-1965) without understanding the crisis that scared Americans into believing that coming together was the only way to survive, and this collective power remained in the consciousness of those generations for the rest of their lives.
“You cannot understand the American high. You cannot understand why we were the way we were culturally, socially, the suburbs, the huge middle class, everyone wearing the same gray flannel suit. I mean everything you remember of the late 40s50 and I'm I'm saying literally remember but but our image of that period you cannot understand it without understanding the crisis that scared the crap out of everyone that they had been through right coming together was the only thing that saved them”
The generational cycle predicted in Howe and Strauss's 1991 book 'Generations' of a crisis peaking in the 2020s has largely played out as expected, though the timing has dilated slightly due to the lengthening of generational phases of life.
“I have to say in all honesty uh this has played out pretty much as we expected... We talked about a crisis of the 2020s and you know it's in that book uh and and and we fortold something that would be the way this this generational cycle plays out would lead to that... due to the uh uh lengthening of generations the the slowing of the timing of generations that I would say we we're pushing uh that the cycle is dilating slightly”
Trump has accurately foreseen major structural shifts including the reversal of globalization and a rightward cultural shift, even if his instruments for affecting change are blunt and chaotic.
“Trump, however, um uh bluntedged and chaotic his his instruments for affecting it. Uh he's often very preient at seeing where the country is going. Right? I thought in 2016 he was one of the few people who foresaw that globalization was going to reverse, right? And indeed it was”
DOGE (Department of Government Efficiency) efforts to fire administrative personnel are 'idiocy' because eliminating social security administrators is 'not even a rounding error' in deficit reduction and misses the necessity of actually renegotiating the social contract through meaningful deficit reduction.
“I mean, really, it's not not this Doge idiocy, right, which which isn't doing anything. I mean, he's basically firing people who administer social security benefits, which which is not even a rounding error. You know what I mean? In other words, you have to really do something about you have to like renegotiate the contract between America and its citizenry.”
Narendra Modi and India represent another example of crisis-era state consolidation, with Pakistan and India now lobbing artillery shells at each other despite being nuclear-armed powers, illustrating the risk of armed conflict during synchronous global crises.
“take a look at um take a look at Narendra Modi in India to talk about another flash point. Now we have now we have Pakistan India to worry about, right? Two nuclear armed powers that are now lobbing artillery shells at each other.”
Donald Trump is psychologically preparing Americans for extreme volatility, chaos, and radical policy shifts (e.g., 'We'll only have two dolls for Christmas') through his unpredictable statements, functioning as what Hegel would call the 'cunning of history'—getting society acclimated to the disruption required for institutional restructuring
“Donald Trump is getting us used to that. You know what I mean? He's getting used to uh extraordinary volatility in markets. Uh, and he's getting used to, I don't know, even the craziest stuff when he says, "Oh, we'll only have two dolls for Christmas." You know, there's this, you know, Donnie two doll. You know, there he is, you know, getting us used to it, coming down, right?”
The Silent Generation came of age immediately after WWII with a conformist motto of 'don't do anything outside the lines' and focused on working within existing systems rather than changing them, becoming technocrats and tinkers who would improve inherited institutions, and many married their first date in high school, achieving economic stability through unions and early purchases of homes and cars.
“The silent generation came of age famously conformist. You know, in college, their their motto was, you know, um um you know, don't you know, don't do anything out, you know, don't do anything outside the lines, you know...we don't want to change the system, we want to work within the system. and they all got these, you know, these these higher degrees as being the the tinkers and technocrats of the system. It would improve on the stuff that older generations were building. They were very conformist, right? And um and many of them took no chances. They they married their first date in high school, right? And and and and they did very well economically.”
Gen X was raised to be protective parents in contrast to how they themselves were raised, and they've raised their children extremely protectively, in a pattern that repeats generationally: generations scarred by the previous crisis become protective parents to the next generation.
“And Gen Xers are raising their kids and have raised their kids. You know, many of them are getting older now. Many of them are obviously in their 20s and so on, getting older, but they are raising their kids extremely protectively. And we have seen this pattern generationally time and time again. The last generation we saw that was like Gen X was the lost generation”
Gen X, born 1961–1981, is a nomad generation that was raised during an era of social neglect ('throwaway generation') with the cultural ethos that most Gen Xers were doomed and only a few would survive, leading them to develop a profoundly individualistic, contrarian, and risk-averse psychology focused on personal differentiation
“we define ex 1961 to 1981”
Political realignment of 2016–2024 shows working-class voters moving Republican while educated professionals move Democratic, reversing the mid-20th century alignment and mirroring the great realigning elections of the 1930s (1932, 1934, 1936), suggesting structural rather than personality-driven politics
“I will tell you that many people are calling uh you know, 2016 through 2024 to be America's you know, seventh great realigning election period. We've had them in every crisis and every awakening on que you know since since you know the 1790s. So this is right on schedule, right? I mean the big transition this time is u you know working class kind of moving Republican and and and educating professional moving to the Democrats, right?”
The GI (Greatest) generation shifted from the risk-averse institutional caution of the Lost generation (Silent generation parents) by wanting to 'take longer strides'—JFK's vision—and build a Great Society, fighting wars, going to the moon, and expanding FDR's New Deal, representing a prophet archetype's instinct for collective ambition after generational survival trauma
“But the next generation, the GI generation, you know, as as as Jack Kennedy liked to say, they wanted to take longer strides, right? Uh and they wanted to they wanted a great society as as LBJ say. th those those dreams of FDR had been put on hold by these last generation presidents”
Trump's deflection from deficit reduction to DOGE-style cutting of social security administrative staffing is insufficient and misdirected; real fiscal consolidation requires renegotiating the 'contract between America and its citizenry,' which only becomes possible after an existential crisis grants political authority to force that renegotiation
“You have to really do something about you have to like renegotiate the contract between America and its citizenry.”
The concept that the Fed (or any central authority) will conduct 'emergency press conferences' and intervene massively when major indices (Apple, Nvidia, Microsoft) fall 30-40% is understood by investors as an implicit guarantee, functioning as federal insurance against systemic loss—but this guarantee becomes fragile once crisis reaches a scale beyond Fed capacity
“you know that chairman Powell is going to have an emergency press conference. What people don't understand is that late in a crisis, inflation is always part of it because inflation is not a problem in that case. It is a solution.”
The Lost Generation (those who reached adulthood around WWI, roughly born 1883–1900) experienced a crisis midlife that parallels Gen X's current transition: they too were raised in a period of perceived societal decline, yet became pragmatic problem-solvers who, as elders, stewarded institutional stability (Eisenhower exemplifying risk-averse institutional management post-WWII)
“The last generation we saw that was like Gen X was the lost generation, right, of Escott Fitzgerald and George Patton and Dwight Eisenhower and, you know, they were the ones who were the, you know, the doughboys who got mowed down during World War I”
Gen X has remained the most Republican generation across all elections in their voting history and is now the number one MAGA generation, voting more for Trump than any other generation, reflecting a survival-based skepticism of democratic idealism and openness to authoritarian problem-solving
“This generation has always leaned more Republican all of their life in every election than the electorate as a whole. And now this generation is the number one MAGA generation. They voted more for Trump than any other generation, right?”
After the Fourth Turning crisis resolves, a new institutional settlement occurs (as happened in 1946 with UN, IMF, Bretton Woods, World Bank, NATO) followed by a First Turning of ~25 years where institutions harden and American society experiences high institutional stability, individualism is not valued, and Americans feel collectively more powerful than individually.
“when all the treaties are signed and you know all the institutions are topped up. It's it's basically we had in 1946 when suddenly not just you know the UN but but the IMF and Bretton Woods and the World Bank and rebuild everything and NATO suddenly you had and at that time all the cement which was very fluid when all these huge institutes were being constructed suddenly begins to harden you know what I mean and then you have you know two and a half decades of the American high”
Eisenhower's VE Day victory telegram was only ~50 words, exemplifying the pragmatic minimalism and lack of rhetorical flourish characteristic of the Lost Generation's leadership style during post-crisis consolidation.
“Eisenhower sends his victory telegram just like an excer. The victory telegram was only about 50 words. That was it. the Allied forces have accomplished their objective at something 100, you know, that would boom. That was it. That's all that's all Eisenhower telegraphed back home.”
The Fourth Turning framework predicts three possible near-term outcomes: internal civil war (armed conflict or escalating disruption), external crisis (requiring collective mobilization), or realignment and institutional renewal without full crisis culmination, with final consolidation occurring only when the nation perceives its very fate at stake.
“you sort of effectively point to three outcomes off the top of my head. one is we have effectively a form of civil war whether it's guns in the streets or just even more you know disruption than we've had already or we have some sort of external crisis which you know maybe we're in the middle of that one it's always hard to know why you're in the middle of it or we end up with sort of an internal realigning that sort of I think you would call that a second regeneracy”
Gen X has consistently voted more Republican than the overall electorate in every election throughout their voting life, and are now the number one MAGA-supporting generation, voting for Trump more than any other generational cohort.
“This generation has always leaned more Republican all of their life in every election than the electorate as a whole. And now this generation is the number one MAGA generation. They voted more for Trump than any other generation, right?”
Israel is currently at or near the culmination of its Fourth Turning crisis, following global patterns of crisis onset synchronization across multiple nations during saecular peaks.
“Um you commented recently in some of your appearances about um sort of how how the sort of seculum the cycle seems to be sinking more and more globally as we become as we become a more global society. Um you talked about sort of Israel perhaps being right in the the culmination of their crisis at the moment.”
Vladimir Putin is rebuilding Russia as a militarized anti-western state, transforming the army from a place for uneducated refuges into a role for heroes, and providing huge benefits to veterans while lifting incomes in rural communities, representing a major recasting of Russian society.
“Look at Vladimir Putin who's completely rebuilding Russia around this militarized anti-western state. I mean, he's building a war machine. And suddenly in Russia, instead of the army being this horrible place where uneducated refuge goes, it's the time for heroes. You know what I mean? he's giving these huge benefits now to veterans. He's lifting the incomes of these rural communities, you know, and so there's this huge recasting going on.”
The host (Dave Ramsey) identifies yolo financial behavior (sports betting, polymarket, leverage, crypto) among individuals across a broad age range (not just under-30s) as evidence contradicting the idea of individual risk aversion, suggesting Gen Xers themselves are adopting speculative financial strategies
“certainly one of the stories of the last five or six years has been the r the rise of sort of yolo financial nihilism certainly in the US. I I don't want to speak elsewhere, but whether it's, you know, the endemic nature of sports betting, poly market, um, massive amounts of leverage, crypto, none of that feels like anybody being riskaverse to me. that feels like a lot of risk-taking behavior at the individual level. And I don't think it's true that that's just entirely folks under the age of 30. I think that I think that's a pretty broad trend that we've seen in investment markets and entertainment markets.”
If there were another market crash like the 2008 GFC, the Fed would start replacing everyone's paycheck just as it did during COVID, because the circuit breaker for misery is now set at a very light point, demonstrating the expectation of collective safety nets during crises.
“if we had another crash um uh like the GFC, I mean, we'd have Feds just start replacing everyone's paycheck just like we did in CO. I, you know, I think actually the the the circuit breaker now for for misery is uh is set at a very light point.”
Gen X was defined as born 1961-1981, making the earliest Gen Xers (born ~1961) only preschool-age during Woodstock and therefore not Boomers, distinguishing them from the older cohort.
“we define ex 1961 to 1981. So, okay, those those early uh 1960s babies uh they were about uh you know, they they were still preschool during Woodstock”
Trump administration officials (JD Vance, Pete Hegseth) represent Gen X leadership style: dismissive of respectable institutional language, preferring to 'shoot from the hip' and try approaches without prior theoretical justification, exemplifying pragmatism over tradition.
“And I think you can I think it's fair to say that u uh the this is the style. And and when I look at those uh those uh signal chats, you know what I mean, with JD Vance, Pete Hegset, you know, Europeans, they're just pathetic, you know what I mean? And it's all like in caps pathetic. This is Gen X as America's leaders. Get used to it. Okay. I mean, get used that unfortunately no longer the respectable man with the respectable language, the multi-elabic phrases, right? No. No. This is shoot from the hip.”
Stalin rejected the Marshall Plan being extended to Eastern Europe despite some Eastern European leaders independently requesting to participate, showing Stalin's preference for controlling Eastern Europe through Soviet domination rather than allowing independent development.
“We we even were willing to extend the Marshall Plan to Eastern Europe, but uh Stalin, he nixed that idea. I don't know why, but just said, you know, and it was funny because all these Polish leaders and and and the and and particularly Yugoslavia kind of independently saying, can we can we I mean, it looks really great, you know. No. No.”
The late 1960s and early 1970s witnessed complete loss of caution in the GI/Boomer generation about collective risks, exemplified by helicopter-dispensed bottled water at Woodstock suggesting 'kids may know something we don't'—reflecting dangerous assumption that traditional risk management could be abandoned.
“At Woodstock, you had helicopters fing bottled water and fing to these kids. I mean, who knows? They may know something we don't know. You know what I mean, right? There was no sense of caution in that generation when it came to big collective risk.”