How Should the U.S. Counter China in the Pacific?
What this covers
A Chinese submarine recently launched an intercontinental ballistic missile into the Pacific, and China has been on the hunt for a security foothold in the region. Meanwhile, the United States has cut assistance and reduced its diplomatic presence in the Pacific. This week, Charles Edel and Kathryn Paik join Will to discuss China’s ambitions in the Pacific, how U.S. interests in the region are evolving, and how Pacific countries are navigating geopolitical competition.
- State of Play audience survey: https://www.surveymonkey.com/r/stateofplaypod - Kathryn Paik, "Bolstering Pacific Resilience: A New Paradigm for Engagement by U.S. Allies and Partners," CSIS, July 21, 2026.: https://www.csis.org/analysis/bolstering-pacific-resilience-new-paradigm-engagement-us-allies-and-partners - Joseph Rodgers, Bonny Lin, and Charles Edel, "Unpacking China’s Recent SLBM Test into the Pacific," CSIS, July 17, 2026.: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KfQoGLnmyWY - Charles Edel and Kathryn Paik, "The Peril of American Neglect in the Pacific," Foreign Affairs, October 10, 2024.: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/peril-american-neglect-pacific --------------------------------------------- A nonpartisan institution, CSIS is the top national security think tank in the world. Visit https://www.csis.org to find more of our work as we bring bipartisan solutions to the world's greatest challenges.
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The US must counter China's expanding influence in the Pacific through consistent diplomatic presence, engagement on Pacific Island priorities (climate, crime, connectivity), and long-term relationship-building rather than security-focused approaches alone, while Pacific Island nations navigate great power competition while seeking partners that address their core development and resilience challenges.
- China is actively seeking dual-use military facilities and political influence in the Pacific while the US has reduced diplomatic presence (no permanent ambassadors) and aid, creating a 10:1 disadvantage against Chinese outreach
- Pacific Island nations have legitimate priorities (climate change, rising sea levels, economic development, drug trafficking) that are distinct from great power competition, and their engagement depends on respecting these concerns rather than only securitizing relationships
- Australia's rapid expansion of security agreements across the Pacific and the Trump administration's inconsistent policies (tariffs, aid cuts, visa restrictions) have created unintended negative consequences that undermine long-term US influence
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Australia's foreign policy is fundamentally shaped by the strategic memory of the Battle of the Coral Sea in World War II, when Australia faced the possibility of being cut off from allies and forced to defend itself alone against a hostile power—a 'strategic DNA' that drives current policy against China.
“in the Australian psyche, the defining moment is the battle of the Coral Sea. Uh that is when they were potentially alone and cut off from everyone else, having to fend on them by themselves before the United States could get there and defeated the Japanese forces at the Coral Sea and Midway at the same time. that kind of like strategic DNA of being alone and cut off with potentially hostile power on your doorstep is the illuminating factor of Australian foreign policy.”
Compacts of Free Association are unique agreements between the US and Palau, Republic of Marshall Islands, and Federated States of Micronesia covering maritime and land territory across from the Philippines to Hawaii, whereby the US provides federal services, programs, and economic assistance in exchange for unilateral defense access and multiple defense sites.
“Our compacts of free association, we've only briefly mentioned that in the North Pacific. Those are uh really unique agreements that we have with Palao, Republic of Marshall Islands and Federated States of Micronesia. Basically covering a swath of maritime and land territory across from the Philippines all the way to Hawaii. Um and these are agreements whereby we give uh federal services and programs and economic assistance to those three countries in exchange for unilateral defense access. And we have um multiple defense sites and defense access throughout those three countries.”
The US must establish diplomatic presence in the Pacific region by posting ambassadors in-country in the entire region, as the current situation (no ambassadors in country anywhere in the region) makes it very hard to compete when the US does not have personnel on the ground who know what is happening.
“number one is being consistent and showing up before we begin to get a little creative on how we might use some of our money, some of our authorities to build our connections around that issue set...the United States has no ambassadors in country in the entire region at this point...It's very hard to compete if you don't have personal on the ground and you don't know what's happening.”
The Pacific Islands Forum has published key strategic documents (the Boyd Declaration and the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific, 2022) that explicitly articulate Pacific Island regional priorities including climate change, rising sea levels, drug trafficking, and transnational crime—priorities distinct from great power competition.
“the Pacific Islands Forum, a very uh unified central body, a regional body um that has put out its own clear documents. The Boyd Declaration, uh the 2050 strategy for the Blue Pacific in 2022, clearly laid out the Pacific's priorities, uh including uh climate change, rising sea levels are going to potentially disappear a couple of the countries in the Pacific by 2050 or beyond. um drug trafficking, transnational crime.”
Great power competition can have a positive deterrent effect by preventing a major conflict if it discourages China from believing it can establish a secure military foothold in the Pacific, which benefits all stakeholders including island nations.
“And we, you know, ultimately if we're deterring a major conflict with China because we're preventing China from thinking it has a foothold in the Pacific, that is of benefit to everybody.”
The US in the last administration (Biden) invested in building secure submarine cables connecting the Pacific islands as part of AI-era infrastructure modernization.
“In the last administration, we put down money to build out some of secure uh cables uh submarine cables that run up there.”
China has been hunting for dual-use facilities across multiple regions (South China Sea, Southeast Asia, Indian Ocean, Africa) using the same template, indicating this is a systematic global strategy, not isolated regional opportunism.
“much like they did in the South China Sea, much like they've done in Southeast Asia, much like they've done in the Indian Ocean region. and frankly on the African continent as well.”
China has multiple strategic ambitions in the Pacific: expanding political influence, creating challenges for Pacific Island nations by shrinking their political maneuver space, complicating Australia and New Zealand's regional role, and making it harder for the US to transit to and through the region in times of crisis.
“there are multiple interests that China has in the Pacific. We'll name some of them uh to expand their political influence to slowly make things more challenging and more complicated for the Pacific Islands themselves. shrinking their political maneuver space, but also for Australia and New Zealand by again putting China more prominently in the region and then for the US by making it more complicated about how we deal with the region, how we transit to the region and and in times of crisis how we might get to and through the region.”
China launched an intercontinental ballistic missile from the South China Sea into the Pacific in early 2024, claiming there was no geopolitical intent, which indicates China is actively working to create a sphere of influence in the southwest Pacific.
“Earlier this month, a Chinese submarine launched an intercontinental ballistic missile from the South China Sea into the Pacific”
The Pacific Island region is enormous—spanning roughly 15-16 hours of continuous flight from California to Australia—containing 14 countries plus additional territories across three sub-regions, yet most island nations have extremely small land masses compensated by enormous exclusive economic zones (EEZs).
“When you're on the plane in California on the tarmac and you're getting ready to take off and fly across the Pacific to Australia, you're traversing down south for like 15 or 16 hours straight of travel. It's an enormous region. And there are three sub regions of it. As [10:32] Katherine said, there are 14 countries, but they're also states and territories. It's really big and it's really diverse, but it's also most of these countries are really really small uh from a geographic landmass perspective. Enormous EEZs.”
Great power competition with China remains the overarching motivation for US engagement in the Pacific region across the last several administrations, including the Biden and Trump administrations.
“the last several administrations would have had to say and admit frankly that the the overarching reason and motivation for driving engagement in the region, this includes the Biden administration, is uh great power competition with China and that and that's a bottom line. um that remains a main driver for this administration”
Australia's Foreign Minister Penny Wong called the Solomon Islands-China security agreement 'the largest failure in Australia post-war diplomacy' and subsequently led a policy shift to forge security agreements with nearly every Pacific Island nation not in the northern Pacific over the following 2-4 years.
“Their foreign minister Penny Wong when she was in opposition when the Solomon Islands happened agreement said this is the largest failure in Australia post-war diplomacy. And so they set out to rectify uh this.”
The Pacific Island region is enormous and strategically critical for the United States because any westbound transit from Hawaii to Asia must pass through this region, making it essential to US access to the Indo-Pacific.
“basically, if you're sailing west from Hawaii, you don't get to Asia. You don't get to the Indopacific region unless you go through this region.”
The Trump administration's initial America First policies had cumulative negative effects on the Pacific region, including obliteration of US aid (the primary US contact point and conduit for Pacific engagement), tariffs hitting small Pacific economies at rates of 20-35%, visa restrictions limiting travel to these countries, and reallocation of US Coast Guard and naval assets to the western hemisphere rather than the western Pacific.
“The development funding that comes out of USAD is the main contact point and a conduit through which the US engages much of the Pacific island region. the tariffs that we talked about, both the liberation day tariffs and now they're redo this time around. You know, some of these tariffs are hitting these very small economies at tariff rates of 20, 30, 35%. The visa restrictions of people going into the countries, the focus on the western hemisphere and subsequently drawing more US coast guard and naval assets to the western hemisphere as opposed to the western Pacific.”
Pacific Island nations are democracies with vibrant, distinct cultures that each face significant challenges including climate change, rising sea levels, connectivity issues, economic prosperity gaps, education deficits, and geographic isolation, making them dependent on external partnerships.
“these nations, these countries, there's 14 countries, a few other territories across the Pacific Islands. These are democracies. They're uh very vibrant cultures. They're very different. Also, you know, we often talk about the Pacific all as one monolith and it's not.”
In 2022, China and the Solomon Islands signed a secretive security arrangement allowing Chinese police forces (which remain present today) and unknown quantities of other security-related arrangements between the two countries, which triggered alarm bells across the US, Australia, and New Zealand.
“the 2022 agreement. I know you mentioned it earlier, but this was a secretive security arrangement between China and the Solomon Islands uh that allowed police forces, which still remain in Solomon Islands to this day, and unknown quantities of uh other security related arrangements between the two countries, which really set off alarm bells across the board.”
A new Solomon Islands Prime Minister Matthew Wall, who is more critical of China than his predecessor, visited both Australia and Washington recently, signaling potential shifts in Solomon Islands' foreign policy direction.
“In addition to Matthew Wall, the new Solomon Island prime minister who's much more critical of China uh than his predecessor has been, who visited Australia, he was in [20:21] Washington just the other week.”
The US needs to maintain consistent attention to the Pacific region because it is bipartisan support and consistent equities affect US national security, but the islands' small size and relatively low spending (compared to Taiwan, Ukraine, Middle East) cause Pacific engagement to fall out of funding vehicles and prioritization more easily than major strategic items.
“what happens with the Pacific is it's not a partisan issue. Uh it is bipartisan support. It is deep and I think consistent equities that affect US national security priorities. But because the islands themselves are small, because the amount that the United States spends is so little comparatively speaking to big ticket items like on Taiwan, like on Ukraine, like in the Middle East, we've seen that somewhat counterintuitively it more easily falls out of funding vehicles, falls out of prioritization than the big ones that you have to debate.”
Building and maintaining long-term relationships with Pacific Island nations requires continued diplomatic presence on the ground, engagement on education and health initiatives, and targeted youth leader programs (like the Vanuatu conference with young Pacific leaders) that create sustained touch points with key leaders and serve influence dividends over years.
“To build and maintain those relationships, we need to continue to have not just diplomats on the ground. As Charlie said, that's a base level requirement. We also need to be engaging more on the education level, health sector. Um we ran a wonderful conference in Vanuatu last year with young leaders, young Pacific leaders, uh where we talked about security for four days and and heard their thoughts and and it helped connect them with the US system and also with each other in a way that's going to stick with each of those young leaders for years to come. And these are small countries. So if you can get that those touch points with just a few key leaders in each country every year, that's going to reap real dividends.”
The Trump administration achieved modest early momentum in Pacific engagement when it welcomed leaders of the three northern Pacific compact states (Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau) to Washington for the first time, which was then built upon by the Biden administration before being subject to review and reversal under Trump 2.0.
“There had been an uptick in [12:38] American attention to Pacific island region starting under Trump won. He welcomed actually the three leaders of the compact states. That's the northern Pacific, the Marshall Islands, Micronia, and Plow to Washington for the first time. That momentum then was built on by the Biden administration.”
After the US imposed tariffs on Pacific Island nations last year, Chinese messaging spread throughout the region claiming the United States is not a reliable partner while China is consistent and dependable, capitalizing on perceptions of US unreliability.
“we saw this especially after the tariffs uh last year that were enacted across the Pacific. We saw um messaging come through the region that was clearly Chinese messaging about the United States not being a reliable partner. But China is China is there consistent, reliable, dependable. So we're starting to see that messaging more and more throughout the region as the reliability of the US comes into question.”
The US frequently claims to be 'a Pacific nation' but often uses this phrase flippantly without backing it up with action, making the statement sound insincere and failing to demonstrate commitment through policy.
“we say, and I think we overuse it that we're a Pacific nation. We are technically we have multiple territories. We have Hawaii is a Pacific state, but we often use it flippantly and we're not really backing it up with action. And so it starts to sound insincere.”
Soft power in the Pacific is not soft—it is a prerequisite for hard power effectiveness; military and security engagement cannot function without underlying people-to-people relationships and trust.
“Can I just uh add uh that none of this stuff is soft. Uh it might look soft on people to people when Katherine says health, but I I will say that very very senior members of our military establishment will tell you that soft power, especially and [29:40] particularly in the Pacific, is what enables anything that's hard power related. If you don't build those relationships, you don't go to do the things that we sometimes need to do.”
Commercial diplomacy with Pacific Island nations is difficult to implement because these are small, niche economies with significant investment risk, and the US cannot simply tell businesses to invest without addressing structural barriers; the Trump administration has recognized this through Deputy Secretary of State Landau's investment summit bringing DFC and EXIM Bank financing tools.
“commercial diplomacy uh in theory uh is a good idea across the board, right? We should all want to drive US businesses and engagement in the Pacific. It is more difficult and I think the administration does realize that. um Deputy Secretary of State Landau hosted an investment summit in Hawaii. He brought with him uh DFC, XM Bank, other financing tools that we have available because there's a recognition that hey, bringing businesses into the Pacific, these small niche economies far away. There's a lot of risk involved and it's hard. You can't just tell US businesses, we're not China, right? We can't just tell our businesses to go and and start spending money across the board.”
Pacific island nations' true national security concerns (as distinct from great power competition concerns) are not being listened to in current regional geopolitical frameworks.
“there is the continued frustration that their true national security concerns across the Pacific are not being listened to.”
When discussing the Pacific Islands region, the US should avoid using language that connotes the islands are small and therefore unworthy of attention, as terms like 'Pacific backyard' or references to 'small states that don't matter much' are fundamentally disrespectful and contradict how one deals respectfully with other nations.
“Any phrase that gives off a whiff of connotation that these are small states and therefore unworthy of our time and attention. [clears throat] Uh sometimes you heard this in Australian vocabulary as calling the Pacific their backyard. Uh sometimes you hear this in America by saying that these are small states that don't matter all that much. That's frankly not true and that's not as Katherine said how you deal respectfully with anyone else. You listen to their concerns.”
The atrophy of US engagement in the Pacific includes decline in people-to-people ties, health security, economic security, and education initiatives—the non-military relationship dimensions that Katherine and Charlie identify as essential for long-term influence.
“there is a frustration...in all of this securitization, we're starting to lose sight of some of the important aspects of these relationships that need to be upheld like peopleto people ties, uh health security, economic security, education. How do we start to bolster these other pieces of the of the US specific relationship? And those are the things that we've also seen atrophy a bit in the past couple of years.”
The second key US priority for Pacific engagement is 'being respectful and listening' to Pacific island nations' own concerns and priorities.
“Thank you Katherine. >> Uh being respectful and listening.”