Mohnish Pabrai's Most Iconic Lecture Ever (Must Watch)
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What if I told you there’s an investor who turned simple, Buffett-inspired principles into a 1,200% return—crushing the market and amassing a fortune of over $150 million? That investor is Mohnish Pabrai, one of the greatest value investors of our time. His success even caught the attention of Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger. But here’s the best part—his strategy is so simple that anyone can apply it. Stick around until the end because I have a special bonus for those who watch the whole video. You’re not going to want to miss this.
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Monish Pabrai argues that investors should systematically identify and reject 'win-lose' business models—those that profit by exploiting customers, suppliers, or other stakeholders—because win-win businesses generate superior long-term returns through customer loyalty and ecosystem health, and this filter alone can eliminate most investment opportunities without requiring deep analysis.
- Win-lose businesses like Valeant, TransDigm, and Credit Acceptance generate profits by gouging customers or suppliers, while Costco's win-win model creates loyalty across all stakeholders and vastly outperforms
- Charlie Munger rejected Credit Acceptance in under 60 seconds by applying inversion—asking 'why should I not invest?' rather than 'why should I?'—a mental model that helps identify predatory business models quickly
- Buffett and Munger passed on Conwood (a chewing tobacco company) despite it being one of the best businesses economically, proving that ethical constraints and win-lose analysis outperform short-term financial gains
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A key lesson for young investors is that you still have agency even at age 19: you cannot change the past (e.g., not starting to invest earlier), but from today forward you can stop making mistakes, spend less than you earn, and compound your savings at scale.
“from the age of 19 I cannot do anything about what happened in the past in life because you never came and talked to me when you or seven it's terrible but that's okay okay but at least we've talked today so from here on out you can stop making the mistakes you made in the past and so spend less than you earn”
The reason sophisticated investors (Ackman, Cunniff, Ubben) invested heavily in Valeant despite it being a win-lose business is partly because of 'crazy wiring' in the human brain—irrationality and cognitive distortions are not character flaws but inevitable features of human neurobiology shaped by evolution.
“that's partly the result of this crazy wiring the brain has it's not a you know perfect rational creation it's got weirdness and so understanding that weirdness can be a big Advantage so I have a one last question so you so you give killing someone the wise you know for this 19 18 years old students what can they do so what other advice would you to give them like at this stage of life like in life in general not just”
Costco maintains a maximum 15% markup on all products and has deliberately kept the food court hot dog price at $1.50 for several decades despite inflation, sacrificing short-term profit maximization for long-term customer loyalty and ecosystem trust
“they do not Mark things up more than 15% that's the maximum markup they have and Costco could raise prices by 5% or more tomorrow across the board and their profits would go up and their sales would not change at least not in the short term but they don't do that because they're not really a retailer they're like a buying agent”
Charlie Munger called Valeant's core strategy of buying smaller drug companies and raising prices 'deeply immoral' and said 'sewer' was too light a word, making these criticisms while Valeant was still 'flying high' and before the stock collapsed
“Charlie Munger called valian score strategy and this and he said this before the decline in the stock price he called valiant's core strategy of buying smaller drug companies and then raising prices deeply immoral he said sewer was too light a word for Valiant and buffer and Munger made these comments while Valiant was still flying high and deeply loved by Amman uben and ruin kif”
Credit Acceptance makes auto loans to borrowers with extremely low FICO scores and high default risk at interest rates of 30-50%, requires car dealers to retain skin-in-the-game (3% of deal value) to properly vet borrowers, and uses GPS-enabled remote disabling devices that stop cars after 24 hours of missed payments
“Credit Acceptance is a company that makes auto loans and they make auto loans to people who have the worst possible credit so these are people who have repeatedly not paid back their loans in the past people who have defaulted on their credit cards who have had maybe foreclosures on their homes they have never been responsible about credit they are the people they lend to but they have a very unusual business model so what Credit Acceptance does is because they are lending to people with extremely low FICO scores and very high risk of default the interest rates are extremely high 30% 40% 50% interest rate”
Munger's talk on 'The Psychology of Human Misjudgment' (identifying 25 causes of cognitive error) should be re-read every year and is crucial for understanding how human brains are 'wired'—our brains result from messy evolutionary history with ancestral and newer parts creating distortions from reality
“one of the talks you know the psych 25 causes of human misjudgment uh psychology of human misjudgment I mean I think I try to reread that talk every year that talk really does a great job explaining how humans are wired and it's it's a huge advantage in life if you understand especially the wiring defects of humans our brains are not rational Creations our brains are a result of a very messy long history of evolution and there's ancestral parts of a brain and there's newer parts of the brain and it's a mishmash of a lot of different things and there's a lot of distortions from reality caused in our brains”
Valeant Pharmaceuticals built a business model of acquiring smaller drug companies, gutting their R&D departments, and dramatically raising prices on existing drugs (many of which were under patent or life-saving), which created short-term earnings growth but was fundamentally a win-lose model that eventually collapsed.
“there was a guy who was the CEO Valiant who was a former consultant at McKenzie and he had an Insight that basically pharmaceutical companies had a lot of inefficiency in the way they spent money on R&D so he had analyzed and found that a lot of farma companies really do not kind of do a holistic analysis of how efficient or effective they R&D is so he came up with a business model where Valiant would acquire smaller drug companies it would gut their R&D departments basically almost wipe them out and they would look at the portfolio of the all drugs that the company was selling and they would increase the hell out of the prices on those drugs so many of these drugs were under patent many of these were life-saving drugs they that really didn't bother them they basically raised prices to as high as they could get away with”
If a 19-year-old can maximize contributions to tax-advantaged retirement accounts (IRAs, 401ks) from age 19-68 at 15% annualized returns, a $5,000 initial contribution grows to approximately $5 million, and if they continue saving $5,000-20,000+ annually after college and career advancement, they can accumulate tens of millions by retirement age through compounding alone.
“let's say for example because I'm only going to put it in one or two stocks concentrate the hell out of it let's say it grows at 15% a year so I asked her what would that amount be when she turned 68 which was 50 years from now so if you know the rule of 72 which you can Google if you don't know that 72 divid by 15 is 5 basically 15% compounded will double every five 5,000 is going to become 10,000 in 5 years it's going to become 20,000 in 10 years 40,000 15 years so on 50 years is 10 5year periods that's 2 the^ of 10 2 to the^ of 10 is24 let's throw away the 24 because I like easy math so 5,000 time 1,000 is 5 million”
Charlie Munger's primary mental model for identifying bad investments is 'inversion'—instead of asking 'why should I invest?', he asks 'why should I NOT invest?', using the flimsiest reason to reject an opportunity until he cannot find any disqualifying reason
“I thought a lot to myself about how does Charlie do it or how did he how did he do it and how was he so fast because I saw his brain it blew my mind to watch his BL brain in action on Credit Acceptance a company he does never he's never heard of and in less than 60 seconds he's dismissed it and I realized that the model that he's using is the model of inversion so Charlie always said invert always invert a lot of problems can be solved by using inversion and so the question he asks himself anytime he en encounters any investment is not why should I make this investment he's looking for the flimsiest reason to take a pass so his mind is immediately running on why is this a bad investment not why is this a good investment and when he keeps hammering on it and cannot come up with a reason like Costco then he falls in love with the investment”
Charlie Munger called Valeant's core strategy of acquiring smaller drug companies and raising prices 'deeply immoral' and said 'sewer' was too light a word for Valeant, making these comments while Valeant was still valued by sophisticated investors like Ruane Cunniff, Bill Ackman, and Jeff Ubben.
“Charlie Munger called valian score strategy and this and he said this before the decline in the stock price he called valiant's core strategy of buying smaller drug companies and then raising prices deeply immoral he said sewer was too light a word for Valiant and buffer and Munger made these comments while Valiant was still flying high and deeply loved by Amman uben and ruin kif”
In June 2015, Ruane Cunniff Kar held more than one-third of its $21 billion portfolio in Valeant (approximately $7.5 billion), and both Bill Ackman's Pershing Square held about 30% of its $14 billion portfolio in Valeant (over $4 billion) and Jeff Ubben's ValueAct Capital held about $3.3 billion of its $20 billion portfolio in Valeant, and all three subsequently suffered huge losses when Valeant imploded.
“in the middle of 2015 had more than onethird of its portfolio inv Valiant so about 7 a. half billion inv Valiant out of about $21 billion portfolio bill amman's merging Square had about 30% in Valiant so about four more than 4 billion out of a 14 billion portfolio and some of you might know Jeff huin at Value act Capital he had about 3.3 billion invalent out of $20 billion portfolio all three of them suffered huge declines and huge losses when Valiant imploded”
The critical rule for wealth-building is to 'spend less than you earn, always put the money to the max if you can in a retirement account, and let it compound,' following Charlie Munger's principle: 'do not interrupt compounding unnecessarily.'
“from here on out you can stop making the mistakes you made in the past and so spend less than you earn always put the money to the max if you can in a retirement account and let it compound one of monger's best quotes is do not interrupt compounding unnecessarily”
Conwood chewing tobacco's margins expanded dramatically after the Pritiker family acquired it in 1986 for $400 million: by 2005 (20 years later) pre-tax margins had reached 55% and net operating margins 36%, and they sold it for $3.5 billion—approximately a 9x return.
“the biters bought the business for 400 million in 86 like Charlie said J pritsker snapped it up so fast because it was just so easy to see this was going to just mint money and the pitka sold it 20 years later for 3 and a half billion so they had you know close to like a 9x or something 8 or 9x and the business kept going after that if you go another 10 years forward to 2016 you can see that sales have doubled profits have gone up even higher than sales and so now the after tax margin is almost 40%”
Having fluency in the U.S. tax code and understanding how to use tax-sheltered accounts (Roth IRAs, 401ks) to compound money without taxation is a major advantage in life, giving tax-aware investors significantly higher long-term wealth accumulation than tax-ignorant investors.
“having fluency in the US tax code is important being able to compound money in a taxfree manner is important so the when my daughter was 19 actually she was 18 when when my daughter was 18”
If you hang out with people better than you, you become better; if you hang out with people worse than you, you become worse, which is why being a 'harsh grader' of friendships and pruning relationships with people who aren't lifting you up is important, even though it feels cold-hearted.
“if we hang out with people better than us we become better if we hang out with people worse than us we become worse you know that should be pretty obvious when you think about it issue that we run into as humans is we have friendships and sometimes we may have friends who aren't great humans and they may even pull us down one of the important things in life which is difficult to do is to be a harsh grader with your friends so you have to increase interactions and friendships with the people who are better than you and you have to let go some of the ones that aren't quite there”
Because there are approximately 50,000 stocks available, investors can be extremely selective and say no to almost everything, and the discipline to reject most opportunities in favor of only pursuing clear win-win models creates exceptional returns.
“so in capitalism because there's 50,000 stocks we can be extremely selective we can say no to almost everything”
In mid-2015, Ruan KF had more than one-third of its $21 billion portfolio (≈$7.5 billion) in Valeant, Bill Ackman's Pershing Square had about 30% of its $14 billion portfolio (≈$4+ billion) in Valeant, and Jeff Ubben's ValueAct Capital had about $3.3 billion out of a $20 billion portfolio in Valeant, and all three suffered huge losses when Valeant imploded
“Ruan KF at that time in the middle of 2015 had more than onethird of its portfolio inv Valiant so about 7 a. half billion inv Valiant out of about $21 billion portfolio bill amman's merging Square had about 30% in Valiant so about four more than 4 billion out of a 14 billion portfolio and some of you might know Jeff huin at Value act Capital he had about 3.3 billion invalent out of $20 billion portfolio all three of them suffered huge declines and huge losses when Valiant imploded”
TransDigm has delivered 173x returns over 18 years (33% annualized) despite Munger's moral opposition, and its shareholders include sophisticated investors like Wally Weiss (on Berkshire's board), Chuck Akre, Maverick Capital, Steve Mandel, and Daniel Loeb
“trans dime if you look at this company it's up 173 X in the last 18 years 33% annualized unbelievable”
Buffett did not consult Munger about the GenRe acquisition ($2 billion deal when Berkshire's market cap was only $60-70 billion) until it was 'almost done', possibly because Buffett was tired of Munger's rejections and wanted to avoid being told 'no'
“when they bought Genry which was the largest acquisition Burkshire had done I think they did the deal in what 96 or 97 or somewhere around around then and Genry turned out to be a huge problem investment for Burkshire they had to work very hard because the culture had eroded and they had not realized that and they had paid a big price for it so Monga was asked about the Genry investment it was a $2 billion acquisition for Burkshire at the time I think the market cap was only like 60 70 billion at the time maybe less and he said oh I didn't know about this deal until it was almost done so it's interesting a$2 billion deal is not bought brought to the board of Burkshire it's not brought to the lifetime partner of Warren Buffett Warren looks at the deal and proceeds on his own and probably one of the reasons he didn't bring it up to Charlie is because he got probably sick and tired of the nose and say oh this one I I know insurance I'm going to go do this”
Understanding the US tax code—specifically the ability to compound money in tax-sheltered accounts (Roth IRAs and traditional IRAs)—is a critical skill for wealth building because it multiplies returns without reducing principal
“having fluency in the US tax code is important being able to compound money in a taxfree manner is important”
Warren Buffett stated that hanging out with people better than you makes you better, and hanging out with worse people makes you worse—therefore, it is important to be a 'harsh grader' with friends, increasing interactions with better people and decreasing or ending relationships with people who aren't 'quite there'
“Buffett talks about he says that if we hang out with people better than us we become better if we hang out with people worse than us we become worse you know that should be pretty obvious when you think about it issue that we run into as humans is we have friendships and sometimes we may have friends who aren't great humans and they may even pull us down one of the important things in life which is difficult to do is to be a harsh grader with your friends so you have to increase interactions and friendships with the people who are better than you and you have to let go some of the ones that aren't quite there”
Valeant Pharmaceuticals built a business model of acquiring smaller drug companies, gutting their R&D departments, and dramatically raising prices on existing drugs—many of which were life-saving and under patent—generating large short-term earnings but representing a win-lose structure
“there was a guy who was the CEO Valiant who was a former consultant at McKenzie and he had an Insight that basically pharmaceutical companies had a lot of inefficiency in the way they spent money on R&D so he came up with a business model where Valiant would acquire smaller drug companies it would gut their R&D departments basically almost wipe them out and they would look at the portfolio of the all drugs that the company was selling and they would increase the hell out of the prices on those drugs”
Munger's principle 'do not interrupt compounding unnecessarily' means avoiding the temptation to withdraw from retirement accounts or interrupt wealth accumulation for vacations, fancy cars, or other immediate consumption, because each interruption compounds opportunity cost over decades.
“one of monger's best quotes is do not interrupt compounding unnecessarily so we're not going to go on vacation of you know empty the 401K or empty the IRA or go to Hawaii or something or buy a fancy car and all of that we're going to live a happy life and a happy life doesn't need a lot of money”
Costco's low-price strategy (max 15% markup, $1.50 hot dog price unchanged for decades despite inflation) and high employee wages (50% above Walmart) are not profit-maximizing in the short term—Costco could raise prices 5%+ and still maintain sales—but the company chooses the long-term win-win approach because it operates as a buying agent, not a retailer.
“they do not Mark things up more than 15% that's the maximum markup they have and Costco could raise prices by 5% or more tomorrow across the board and their profits would go up and their sales would not change at least not in the short term but they don't do that because they're not really a retailer they're like a buying agent”
Charlie Munger referred to Costco as the ultimate win-win-win business model because it does an exceptionally good job for customers, shareholders, employees, and vendors simultaneously, with benefits flowing across the entire ecosystem.
“Charlie referred to Costco as the ultimate win-win-win business model so it is a business that does an exceptionally good job for all its customers it is a business that does a very good job for its shareholders it is a business that does a really good job for its employees it's a business that does a very good job for its vendors just the entire ecosystem benefits”
Buffett and Munger rejected ownership of Conwood (a chewing tobacco company) in 1986 despite calling it 'one of the best businesses I've ever seen in terms of the economics' with unbelievable financial figures, because they deemed it immoral to profit from a product that kills people
“we looked at we were invited down and we looked at a company that made a product that perfectly legal probably one of the best businesses I've ever seen in terms of the economics of it”
Credit Acceptance makes auto loans to people with the worst credit (FICO scores, defaults, foreclosures) at extremely high interest rates (30-50%), requires the car dealer to have skin in the game by financing part of the loan, uses remote disabling devices to shut down cars when payments are 24+ hours late, and has generated exceptional returns for investors like Ruane Cunniff and others, yet represents a win-lose model through predatory lending.
“what Credit Acceptance does is because they are lending to people with extremely low FICO scores and very high risk of default the interest rates are extremely high 30% 40% 50% interest rate the second thing that they do is that the car dealership that is selling the car is made to have skin in the game”
If a 19-year-old starts with earned income from a summer job ($5,000-$6,000) and invests it in an IRA with 15% annualized returns, it will compound to approximately $5 million by age 68 (50-year timeframe), doubling every 5 years following the Rule of 72
“the 5,000 that she made at 18 at the age of 68 15% annualized compounded is $5 million and then I told her at 19 you might do another internship you might make a little bit more money but let's say you save another 5,000 at 69 that's going to be another $5 million”
After persistent wealth compounding from age 19 onwards, investors will eventually reach a point where they significantly outpace their peers financially—peers will appear 'way back' and 'you can't even see them from where you are'—representing the long-term effect of compounding discipline
“you keep compounding and you're done you know you live a good life you put some away and then you're you know you wake up one day you look to your left and look to your right and those people who are your peers they're way back from where you are and you can't even see where them from where you are and that's it”
Win-lose business models, where one party benefits at the direct expense of another (such as suppliers experiencing extended payment terms), are fundamentally different from win-win models and tend to create instability.
“there are many business models which you could call as win lose so for example there's a company that stretches out the payments they have to make to their suppliers you know maybe they take 60 days or 90 days pay their suppliers and they use that float to improve their financials well that works well for the company but not so well for the supplier right so that's kind of an example of a win-lose business model”
In the 2005 Berkshire Hathaway annual meeting, Warren Buffett stated that Berkshire would own stocks of cigarette companies but would not want to own and operate the whole cigarette-manufacturing business, illustrating Buffett's principle of rejecting full ownership of certain win-lose businesses while potentially accepting minority positions.
“Warren Buffett says yeah well we've referred in past meetings to one we did on that basis we will own stocks of companies where we wouldn't want to own the whole business I'm not sure that the logic is perfect on that but we would not have trouble owning stock in a cigarette company we wouldn't want to manufacture cigarette you know we might own a retail company that sells cigarettes I mean there are all kinds of gradations but we do not there are things we do not want to own and be responsible for their businesses where we have no problem owning their stocks or bonds”
A win-lose business model is one where one party benefits at the expense of another, such as when a company stretches payments to suppliers from 60 to 90 days while using that float to improve its own financial metrics—a benefit to the company but not the supplier.
“there are many business models which you could call as win lose so for example there's a company that stretches out the payments they have to make to their suppliers you know maybe they take 60 days or 90 days pay their suppliers and they use that float to improve their financials well that works well for the company but not so well for the supplier right so that's kind of an example of a win- lose business model”
TransDigm's ability to raise prices dramatically (up to 10x) is enabled by the structure of aircraft manufacturing where almost no parts are made by the primary manufacturer (e.g., Boeing), parts must be FAA-approved, and typically only one or two suppliers exist for any particular part, creating pricing power without competition.
“trans time is in the Aerospace parts manufacturing business... if you have something like the Boeing 737 airplane for example almost none of those parts are made by Boeing is basically an assembl right... it takes a lot to get a part qualified and approved by the FAA to go into an airplane... typically these parts that go into the Boeing 737 or Airbus Etc do not have more than a couple of Manufacturers sometimes they might just be one manufacturer of a particular part”
The aerospace parts business is inherently concentrated because acquiring FAA approval for a new part manufacturer is so difficult that aircraft parts typically have only one to three manufacturers, creating artificial monopolies that allow dominant suppliers to extract monopoly pricing regardless of customer preferences.
“typically these parts that go into the Boeing 737 or Airbus Etc do not have more than a couple of Manufacturers sometimes they might just be one manufacturer of a particular part and they may never be more than two or three because it's not that you manufacture the part you have to have that part approved by the FAA and the fa FAA is not going to approve a part unless they're 5,000% sure about the quality and nature of the manufacturer”
Buffett and Munger turned down the opportunity to acquire Conwood chewing tobacco in 1986, which was offered for $400 million and showed an operating profit margin of 22% pre-tax, because they viewed it as an immoral business that kills people even though it would have been highly profitable.
“the Conwood deal came to Buffett and Munger in 1986 and you see the numbers for 1985 those were the numbers that they were looking at it was offered to them for 400 million and you can see that the operating profit in 85 was around 22% pre tax”
The Conwood business generated a 9x return over 20 years (1986-2006), with sales doubling and profits increasing more than 5x, achieving pre-tax operating margins of 55% and after-tax margins exceeding 40% by 2016, demonstrating exceptional business economics
“the Conwood deal came to Buffett and Munger in 1986 and you see the numbers for 1985 those were the numbers that they were looking at it was offered to them for 400 million and you can see that the operating profit in 85 was around 22% pre tax and then you know if you fast forward to 2005 or so which is about 20 years after they passed on the deal you can see that sales had gone up they a little bit more than doubled but profits had gone up a lot more they had gone up like more than 5x the pre-tax margin on the business was around 55%”
Costco operates a 'win-win-win' business model where customers get low prices, shareholders get strong returns, employees earn 50% more than Walmart with low turnover and internal promotion pathways, and suppliers benefit from reliable high-volume relationships
“Charlie referred to Costco as the ultimate win-win-win business model so it is a business that does an exceptionally good job for all its customers it is a business that does a very good job for its shareholders it is a business that does a really good job for its employees it's a business that does a very good job for its vendors just the entire ecosystem benefits”
Warren Buffett complained to Pabrai that Charlie Munger was the 'Abominable No Man' because Munger rejected almost every investment opportunity brought to his attention, knowing that Munger would tell him 'how stupid I am' before even hearing the details
“in capitalism because there's 50,000 stocks we can be extremely selective we can say no to almost everything and Warren's biggest complaint with Charlie was he was what you call the Abominable no man okay like Warren knew that anytime I call Charlie he's going to tell me how stupid I am and how bad the idea is okay so Warren knew even before he called Charlie that almost anything is going to bring to Charlie's attention Charlie is going to reject okay”
Munger stated that chewing tobacco causes approximately 5% of the cancer that cigarettes cause, but this did not change their decision to reject Conwood because the product was addictive and would definitively kill people.
“the cancer caused by that mouth tobacco is maybe 5% of the cancer you get from cigarettes but it's not still you definitely are going to get kill people”
The rule of 72 allows quick mental calculation of doubling time: divide 72 by the annual growth rate to find the number of years for money to double (e.g., 72 ÷ 15% = ~5 years for 15% annual growth).
“If you know the rule of 72, which you can Google if you don't know, 72 divided by 15 is 5. Basically 15% compounded will double every 5 years.”
Pabrai believes that having an 'aha moment' about your calling or aptitude is critical, and when it strikes, the response must be to 'seize the moment and go all in,' not to casually acknowledge it and move on.
“the thing is that for all of us in different fields or different interests that we have we are going to sometimes have an aha moment and the important thing when you have that aha moment is to seize the moment and to go all in”
Munger told Pabrai during a private dinner that he was not interested in Credit Acceptance 'because we don't want to do predatory lending, we don't want win-lose business methods,' which caused Pabrai to immediately stop analyzing the company and thank Munger for saving him from the investment.
“I had a dinner with Charlie and I brought up at a dinner with Charlie this must have been like you know maybe three four years back and I said Charlie have you heard of a company called Credit Acceptance he said no so I said uh let me describe the business to and I must have spent less than a minute talking to Charlie about Credit Acceptance explaining the business exactly the way I explained it to you and he interrupted me he said we're not interested in that kind of business and that was really surprising to me so I asked him he said we don't want to do predatory lending we don't want win-lose business methods”
Pabrai inferred that Munger uses the mental model of inversion—asking 'why should I NOT make this investment?' rather than 'why should I make it?'—which allows him to rapidly identify and reject win-lose business structures without spending significant analytical time.
“I thought a lot to myself about how does Charlie do it or how did he how did he do it and how was he so fast because I saw his brain it blew my mind to watch his BL brain in action on Credit Acceptance a company he does never he's never heard of and in less than 60 seconds he's dismissed it and I realized that the model that he's using is the model of inversion so Charlie always said invert always invert a lot of problems can be solved by using inversion and so the question he asks himself anytime he en encounters any investment is not why should I make this investment he's looking for the flimsiest reason to take a pass so his mind is immediately running on why is this a bad investment not why is this a good investment and when he keeps hammering on it and cannot come up with a reason like Costco then he falls in love with the investment”
Win-win and win-lose business structures are difficult to identify in all cases; while some are obvious (casinos, cigarettes), many are subtle and appear superficially attractive (like Valeant and TransDigm), which is why applying the win-lose filter at the beginning of analysis is essential to avoid disasters.
“these win lose type scenarios are not easy to figure out all the time sometimes it's obvious but many times it's not I mean you can look at a cigarette company and say yeah this doesn't work work or you can look at a casino and say it's beenn lose Etc but sometimes you get to models like trans dive which appear to be great”
When Pabrai was 30 years old, he read a Warren Buffett biography and had an 'aha moment' realizing that Buffett's quote 'I'm a better investor because I'm a businessman and I'm a better businessman because I'm an investor' explained the interplay between business strategy and investment analysis that Pabrai himself was practicing.
“when I was reading when I was reading Warren buff one of his biographies of Warren Buffett when I was 30 and the big aha moment that hit me was that Buffett has a quote he says I'm a better investor because I'm a businessman and I'm a better in businessman because I'm an investor there's an interplay between running a business and being a good investor”
Charlie Munger's talk on the 'Psychology of Human Misjudgment' (25 causes of human misjudgment) is worth re-reading annually because understanding human cognitive wiring and its distortions from reality is a major life advantage.
“the psych 25 causes of human misjudgment uh psychology of human misjudgment I mean I think I try to reread that talk every year that talk really does a great job explaining how humans are wired and it's it's a huge advantage in life if you understand especially the wiring defects of humans our brains are not rational Creations our brains are a result of a very messy long history of evolution and there's ancestral parts of a brain and there's newer parts of the brain and it's a mishmash of a lot of different things and there's a lot of distortions from reality caused in our brains”
Happy life doesn't require a lot of money, as illustrated by Pabrai and his partner's weekly $6 Costco dinner dates (hot dog, free drink, sometimes pizza), which are more enjoyable than $200 restaurant dinners and demonstrate that life quality comes from relationships and experiences, not expenditure levels.
“like for example once a week my partner and I have dinner at Costco okay both of us have hot dogs the drinks are free and I might sometimes get a slice of pizza it's like six bucks it's a great date night and and I get to spend an hour in the most orgasmic place on it you know Costco I just watch the Swarms of humanity so happy with their loaded cards as they leave as they leave Costco it's a great date you know and the price is right and then the next night we go for dinner at some fancy place it's like 200 bucks and it wasn't even as good so I'd say just do all your dates at Costco then that means you met the right person and basically you keep compounding and you're done you know you live a good life you put some away and then you're you know you wake up one day you look to your left and look to your right and those people who are your peers they're way back from where you are”
Win-win investments tend to produce exceptional long-term returns because they generate extreme customer loyalty and goodwill, whereas win-lose investments create resentful, 'pissed off' customers forced into a corner who will switch suppliers or seek alternatives the moment constraints relax
“and then actually those win-win the win-win win-win investments will end up having such tremendous returns for investors because of the extreme loyalties and Goodwill so if you think of customer of trans time a customer of trans time or a customer of valant is a pissed off customer they are being forced into a corner and they're forced to pay a high price a customer of Credit Acceptance even if he's a deadbeat thinks the 50% interest rate he's paying is gouging even though he's defaulted on every loan he's taken in the past”
When Pabrai described Credit Acceptance to Charlie Munger in a dinner conversation (likely 3-4 years before the video), Munger dismissed it in under 60 seconds, saying 'we're not interested in that kind of business' because it represented predatory lending and a win-lose business model
“I had a dinner with Charlie and I brought up at a dinner with Charlie this must have been like you know maybe three four years back and I said Charlie have you heard of a company called Credit Acceptance he said no so I said uh let me describe the business to and I must have spent less than a minute talking to Charlie about Credit Acceptance explaining the business exactly the way I explained it to you and he interrupted me he said we're not interested in that kind of business and that was really surprising to me so I asked him he said we don't want to do predatory lending we don't want win- lose business methods”
The most valuable action a young person can take when they experience an 'aha moment' is to 'seize the moment' and 'go all in'—momentum and full commitment matter more than waiting for perfect conditions or spreading effort across multiple interests
“for all of us in different fields or different interests that we have we are going to sometimes have an aha moment and the important thing when you have that aha moment is to seize the moment and to go all in so one of the things that I realized when I was reading when I was reading Warren buff one of his biographies of Warren Buffett when I was 30 and the big aha moment that hit me was that Buffett has a quote”
Pabrai acknowledges that being a 'harsh grader' of friendships 'flies in the face of loyalty' and requires 'difficult or unpleasant actions' that may seem 'cold-hearted', yet these actions are important for long-term personal development
“one of the important things in life which is difficult to do is to be a harsh grader with your friends so you have to increase interactions and friendships with the people who are better than you and you have to let go some of the ones that aren't quite there and you know a lot of people are loyal and this flies in the face of loyalty so if your mental model is loyalty over all else then you may be hurting yourself longterm so again I think in life what happens is that we have choices and many times these choices require us to take what sometimes might be difficult or unpleasant actions and those difficult and unpleasant actions may not be natural and may even be one might say inhumane or you know cold-hearted if you will but I think that those are really important things to keep in mind”
Pabrai, in his final meeting with Charlie Munger (exactly 30 days before Munger's death in 2023), asked Munger who among his 8 children and many grandchildren stood out as exceptional, and Munger answered 'no one'—implying that no member of his immediate family matched his intellectual level
“in my last meeting with Charlie which was exactly one month before he passed away I I never in my I think my friendship with Charlie was about four 13 14 years in 13 or 14 years I never asked him to meet me because I always felt like he's got a lot of Demands on his time and I don't want to be like you know making requests Etc so whenever I met for bridge or dinner or whatever it was on on monger's initiative right so he's the one who said let's meet whatever in the summer of 2023 I felt like I wanted to meet Charlie so for the first time ever I actually approached his assistant and said you know can you please see if Mr a monger available for dinner sometime and I'd like to meet him and he immediately said yes and I met him and it turned out that that dinner was exactly 30 days before he died and I didn't know at that time that that would be the last time I would see him or that would be the last and it was just me and him there were just two of us for that dinner and his mind was still really sharp and everything and I asked him a question and you know he's got eight kids and he's got I don't know infinite grandkids and many great grandkids and I said Charlie you know in your genan poo who stands out and his answer to me was no one okay so so I said what do you mean Charlie I know I know so many of your kids and grandkids they've gone to all these Elite schools and they've done so well he said oh yeah he's saying they're smart they've done well in school and they they've done well in life and all of that but they're not he said I know the question you're asking Mish and they are not at that level”
When asked about succession at Berkshire after Warren Buffett's death, Pabrai argues that the skills needed to manage/maintain Berkshire differ from those required to create it (Tim Cook couldn't have created Apple but excels at managing it), and that size is the core challenge, not the successor identity
“it's a different skill set to keep Burkshire going than what was required to create it you know the creation of Apple needed Steve Jobs but Tim Cook couldn't have created Apple but he's proven to be a great leader in managing and running app and so the the skill set needed at Burkshire to take it forward from here is not the skill set that Warren and Charlie had led to the creation of bsh so keeping it going is a lot simpler than the creation Now having said that the big challenge with bsha haway is size and it size is a problem even if Warren and Charlie lived forever so it's not so much a successor issue it's an issue that would be an issue no matter who's running it”
Pabrai realized that Warren Buffett's quote 'I'm a better investor because I'm a businessman and I'm a better businessman because I'm an investor' reflected that both activities use the same strategic thinking part of the brain, and Buffett allocated 80% of his time to investment strategy while Pabrai was only allocating 4% to his business strategy
“one of the things that I realized when I was reading when I was reading Warren buff one of his biographies of Warren Buffett when I was 30 and the big aha moment that hit me was that Buffett has a quote he says I'm a better investor because I'm a businessman and I'm a better in businessman because I'm an investor there's an interplay between running a business and being a good investor and what I realized when I was looking at the way he was doing different Investments is that I had been an entrepreneur since my mid 20s 24 25 and I was spending maybe three or 4% of my time figuring out the strategy and direction of the business I had and then about 95 96% of the time on the blocking and tackling to actually execute on that strategy”
Successor leadership at Berkshire Hathaway (Greg Abel) requires a different skill set than the creation of Berkshire: creation required Buffett and Munger's genius for capital allocation and identifying exceptional businesses, whereas management of an existing $1+ trillion company requires operational excellence and culture maintenance, not transformational thinking.
“it's a different skill set to keep Burkshire going than what was required to create it you know the creation of Apple needed Steve Jobs but Tim Cook couldn't have created Apple but he's proven to be a great leader in managing and running app and so the the skill set needed at Burkshire to take it forward from here is not the skill set that Warren and Charlie had led to the creation of bsh”
In 2005, Warren Buffett stated that Berkshire would not own whole businesses in certain sectors on moral grounds but would own their stocks or bonds, giving cigarette companies as an example where they would own stock but not manufacture or control operations.
“Warren Buffett says yeah well we've referred in past meetings to one we did on that basis we will own stocks of companies where we wouldn't want to own the whole business I'm not sure that the logic is perfect on that but we would not have trouble owning stock in a cigarette company we wouldn't want to manufacture cigarette”
Because capitalism offers 50,000 stocks to choose from, investors can be extremely selective and can say no to almost everything, which gives them the option to wait for win-win businesses rather than settle for win-lose businesses with good financials.
“in capitalism because there's 50,000 stocks we can be extremely selective we can say no to almost everything”
Bill Ackman, Ruan Capital, and Value Act Capital are very good investment shops, yet they missed the basic fact that Valiant's business model was win-lose, demonstrating how easy it is for smart investors to overlook this fundamental distinction.
“and Bill Amman is a really smart investor I'm I'm going to talk about some investors here I'm not trying to beat up on them I respect a lot of these investors but I'm just telling you how easy it is for our brains to miss something obvious so these are really smart investors ruen kif is a very good shop Bing square is a very good shop value at Capital is very good shop they missed something very basic the what they missed was that the business model was win lose”
Berkshire Hathaway's acquisition of GenRe (one of the largest acquisitions Berkshire has made, done around 1996-97 for $2 billion when Berkshire's market cap was only $60-70 billion or less) turned out to be a huge problem investment because the company's culture had eroded, and Munger said he didn't know about the deal until it was almost done, suggesting Buffett avoided bringing it to Munger because he was tired of the rejections.
“when they bought Genry which was the largest acquisition Burkshire had done I think they did the deal in what 96 or 97 or somewhere around around then and Genry turned out to be a huge problem investment for Burkshire they had to work very hard because the culture had eroded and they had not realized that and they had paid a big price for it so Monga was asked about the Genry investment it was a $2 billion acquisition for Burkshire at the time I think the market cap was only like 60 70 billion at the time maybe less and he said oh I didn't know about this deal until it was almost done”
Charlie Munger in his final meeting with Pabrai (exactly 30 days before Munger's death) said that among his eight children and infinite grandchildren and great-grandchildren, 'no one stands out' at his level, and Pabrai concluded that among all 8 billion humans currently alive, and going back 2,000 years in history, there is no one like Charlie Munger.
“I asked him a question and you know he's got eight kids and he's got I don't know infinite grandkids and many great grandkids and I said Charlie you know in your genan poo who stands out and his answer to me was no one okay so so I said what do you mean Charlie I know I know so many of your kids and grandkids they've gone to all these Elite schools and they've done so well he said oh yeah he's saying they're smart they've done well in school and they they've done well in life and all of that but they're not he said I know the question you're asking Mish and they are not at that level so there was no one there right”
As an entrepreneur, Pabrai had spent about 3-4% of his time on strategy and direction and 95% on execution and blocking-and-tackling, but he found the 4% strategy work far more interesting and realized he could increase that percentage to 80% by focusing on investing rather than operating a business.
“what I realized when I was looking at the way he was doing different Investments is that I had been an entrepreneur since my mid 20s 24 25 and I was spending maybe three or 4% of my time figuring out the strategy and direction of the business I had and then about 95 96% of the time on the blocking and tackling to actually execute on that strategy so most of the time went on you know executing on it”
Pabrai's practice of coming to Omaha every May since 1997 (over 25 years) has resulted in deep, life-changing friendships with exceptional people, and the Berkshire shareholder population is self-selected and self-filtered to be above-average humans, creating a high-quality peer group.
“when I come to Omaha every May when I come to Omaha you know I've been I've been coming to Omaha every May since 1997 so it's like more than a quarter century and so many deep friendships have come out of Omaha and when I look at the folks I met in Omaha who are now part of my close friends they're off the charts so for example you know the the average book Shah hatway shareholder is an above average person you know he's not he or she is not the same as the general population and uh that Universe of people in Omaha is kind of self selected and self filter to give you a certain kind of person”
When Pabrai became friends with Charlie Munger, he met Munger's peer group and found their 'quality level was truly off the charts', and deliberately worked to befriend Munger's friends, which led to 'extremely wonderful' outcomes and deep friendships
“when I when I became friends with Charlie I started to meet his friends and when I met his friends I was blown away the quality level of these people was truly off the charts and I know that what what have happened which I didn't see in the you know decades before I met Charlie was that he probably went through a pruning process where he increased interaction with some folks and decreased interaction with other folks you know so one of the easy decisions I made was I tried to make friends with Charlie friends now a lot of them are old and some have passed away and so on but that actually was extremely wonderful because these these are these people were just so off the charts”
Pabrai and his partner have weekly dinner dates at Costco (hot dog, drink, sometimes pizza for ~$6 total), which provides satisfaction, relationship time, and observation of customer behavior—competing weekly dates at fancy restaurants for $200 did not provide greater satisfaction
“once a week my partner and I have dinner at Costco okay both of us have hot dogs the drinks are free and I might sometimes get a slice of pizza it's like six bucks it's a great date night and and I get to spend an hour in the most orgasmic place on it you know Costco I just watch the Swarms of humanity so happy with their loaded cards as they leave as they leave Costco it's a great date you know and the price is right and then the next night we go for dinner at some fancy place it's like 200 bucks and it wasn't even as good so I'd say just do all your dates at Costco then that means you met the right person”
Pabrai recommends 'Poor Charlie's Almanac' ($25) as more valuable than a four-year degree from UNO, and the book's second half contains 11 talks by Charlie Munger spanning 'thousands of years of human wisdom'
“the the one book which I'm sorry to say would be of more value than four years at UNO would be poor Charlie Alman you know if you were to spend about $25 buying poor Charlie Almanac it's slightly cheaper than the four years at Uno with I think maybe more take-home value other than Professor Lou's class and the back half of the book has about 11 talks that Charlie Munger has given over the years those are Priceless those have thousands of years of human wisdom in them”
Pabrai compares Munger to Benjamin Franklin (both are 'one of a kind' with unusual traits), but concludes there are things unique to each and that Munger 'had an incredible body of work he left for us'
“people draw analogies with Ben Franklin I think Ben Ben Franklin's one of of a kind I mean I think he's very unusual and Charlie has a lot of common trates with Ben Franklin but there are things about Charlie that were not part of Ben Franklin many things about Ben Franklin are not part of Charlie so I think that the amazing thing about Charlie is that there's an incredible body of work he left for us”
Warren Buffett's biggest complaint about Charlie Munger was that he was the 'Abominable No Man'—someone who would reject almost every investment idea Buffett brought to him—but this filtering function was extraordinarily valuable because Berkshire's track record is partly due to all the deals Munger stopped Buffett from making.
“Warren's biggest complaint with Charlie was he was what you call the Abominable no man okay like Warren knew that anytime I call Charlie he's going to tell me how stupid I am and how bad the idea is okay so Warren knew even before he called Charlie that almost anything is going to bring to Charlie's attention Charlie is going to reject okay”
Munger's core value to Berkshire Hathaway lies in blocked investments—a hypothetical list of every deal Buffett wanted to make that Munger rejected would be 'a great list to look at', and it is Munger's veto power that explains much of Berkshire's superior investment record
“Charlie's huge value to Burkshire I wish we had a list of every investment that Warren wanted to make and Charlie said no that would be a great list to look at because it went through one great mind and then the second great mind stopped it and it's because of the Second Great mind I thing is why Burkshire has a record it has is because so many of the deals that Warren would have done didn't happen”
Monish Pabrai turned Buffett-inspired principles into a 1200% return and accumulated over $150 million in net worth, becoming one of the greatest value investors of his time.
“what if I told you there is an investor who turned simple Buffet inspired principles into a 1200% return crushing the market and a massing a Fortune of over $150 million that investor is monish PAB one of the greatest value investors of our time”
Pabrai started investing at age 30 after accidentally reading a Warren Buffett biography, experiencing an 'aha moment' that led him to begin studying public companies in 1994 with approximately $1 million from the partial sale of his company
“you know I didn't know a lot about investing I accidentally read a book about Warren Buffett when I was about 30 years old and the light bulb went off so you know at 19 you have a huge head start on me you know I didn't know what investing or stocks or compounding or anything else was till I was 30 so 1994 was when I first started to invest”
Poor Charlie's Almanac is worth more educational value than four years of undergraduate education (specifically noting the exception of Professor Lou's class), containing ~$25 of cost and 11 talks by Munger with 'thousands of years of human wisdom.'
“The one book which I'm sorry to say would be of more value than four years at UNO would be Poor Charlie's Almanac. You know if you were to spend about $25 buying Poor Charlie's Almanac, it's slightly cheaper than the four years at UNO with maybe more take-home value, other than Professor Lou's class. And the back half of the book has about 11 talks that Charlie Munger has given over the years. Those are Priceless. Those have thousands of years of human wisdom in them.”
Pabrai believes Greg Abel will be 'a very good leader' for Berkshire because he is 'capable', 'smart', and 'understands the Berkshire culture', and Berkshire has 'tailwinds' (liquidity, reputation) that will allow it to 'shine' during crises and go 'on the offense'
“so I think Greg Abel will be a very good leader I think he's a very capable guy very smart and I think he understands the Bur culture and Burkshire has got a lot of Tailwinds going for it has a great reputation and so if we have a crisis which you know humans have a good record of creating crisis every 10 15 years or so if we have a crisis Burkshire will shine it's got a lot of liquidity and it can go on the offense and such so I think the worksh show of The Future Has a good future”
The average Berkshire Hathaway shareholder is an above-average person who is self-selected and self-filtered by the universe of Berkshire investors, and Charlie Munger's friend circle represents an extreme version of this positive selection effect.
“the average book Shah hatway shareholder is an above average person you know he's not he or she is not the same as the general population and uh that Universe of people in Omaha is kind of self selected and self filter to give you a certain kind of person and in the case of Charlie's friends there that was an extreme version of that”
The body of work Munger left (Poor Charlie's Almanac, archived Berkshire meetings transcripts, daily journals) provides concentrated wisdom that can help people become better investors and thinkers, making his death survivable through his intellectual legacy.
“the amazing thing about Charlie is that there's an incredible body of work he left for us so we have poor Charlie's Almanac we have all the Burkshire meetings which are archived on buffett. cnbc.com we have all the daily transcripts and all of that so we have a lot of resources and things that Munger said available to us and I think that studying those can only help us become better”
At age 35, Pabrai was independently wealthy (outside of his operating business), executed a CEO search to replace himself, and freed himself to spend 'all my time on that 80%' like Buffett, focusing entirely on investment analysis.
“it enabled me to make a choice where I said I'm not going to run my business anymore so I basically started a search for a CEO so that I would leave my business and I could spend all my time on that 80% like Buffett was spending”
Munger said regarding Conwood: 'We were poor and we were young and poor by modern standards and you know we very human and we could see it was just like putting $100 million in a bushel basket and setting it on fire as we walked away,' indicating the massive financial opportunity cost of rejecting the deal.
“you know we were poor we were young and poor by modern standards and you know we very human and we could see it was just like putting $1 100 million in a bushel basket and setting it on fire as we walked away”
Prior to Munger's intervention, Pabrai had thought Credit Acceptance was helping a demographic that would not otherwise have access to cars, failing to recognize the predatory lending aspect of the business model until Munger identified it as win-lose.
“so you know it was interesting to me because till I spoke to Charlie it had never really dawned on me that credit acceptance for the win lose model to me it seemed like they were helping a demographic that would would not have wheels would not have a car and helping them becoming responsible but Charlie's kind of standards are we can make a lot of money by taking the high road”
Starting at age 19 versus age 30 provides an 11-year advantage in compounding, and while that time cannot be recovered, asking about starting wealth-building at 19 is 'not too bad' compared to asking at age 30
“if you at night 19 if you have a very good understanding so it depends what your objectives in life are if your objective in life is to compound assets and be successful and be wealthy and so on it's a relatively simple game if you just do a few things and one of the most important things is you're already asking me the question when you're too old so I wish you asked me this question question when you were 7 years old because we lost 12 years man we lost 12 years that we cannot bring back but it's better than asking me this question when you're 30 years old so it's not too bad 19 is not a bad age”
Blackstone, under Steve Schwarzman, has built a valuable 'toll bridge' business because sovereign wealth funds (Abu Dhabi, Qatar, Singapore) need few places to deploy their capital, and Blackstone has been prudent with leverage (non-recourse debt), making it a 'win-win' business structure
“Blackstone is a wonderful Company Steve schwarzman built tremendous Company You Know The Sovereign wealth funds have huge amounts of money to put to work and they have very few places where they can give that money to be put to work so they are like three or four toll bridges like Blackstone and Apollo and Brookfield and the Abu Dhabi investment Authority or the Qatar Sovereign rent fund or Singapore's wealth fund these are the places they have to give the money to and they've been really good at how they've deployed at scale so I think it's a very good business if you think of it from a win-win win- lose point of view lose part of it possibly could be leverage you know Leverage is always a negative but you know almost all their leverages is non- recourse and they're usually quite prudent about the way they do that so yeah it's a good business serving a demographic that needs their product”
Blackstone is a wonderful company built by Steve Schwarzman that serves as a toll bridge for sovereign wealth funds (Abu Dhabi, Qatar, Singapore) which have trillions to invest but only 3-4 places to deploy capital (Blackstone, Apollo, Brookfield), making it a win-win business with strong fundamentals.
“Blackstone is a wonderful Company Steve schwarzman built tremendous Company You Know The Sovereign wealth funds have huge amounts of money to put to work and they have very few places where they can give that money to be put to work so they are like three or four toll bridges like Blackstone and Apollo and Brookfield and the Abu Dhabi investment Authority or the Qatar Sovereign rent fund or Singapore's wealth fund these are the places they have to give the money to”
Leverage in investment and lending businesses can be a negative factor, but most of Blackstone's leverage is non-recourse, and the firm is prudent in how it uses leverage, so it's a manageable risk in the overall win-win business model.
“If you think of it from a win-win win- lose point of view lose part of it possibly could be leverage you know Leverage is always a negative but you know almost all their leverages is non- recourse and they're usually quite prudent about the way they do that”
Berkshire Hathaway's future is relatively secure despite succession uncertainty because the company benefits from size, great reputation, strong liquidity position, favorable tailwinds, and a demonstrated ability to offensively deploy capital during crises, which occur roughly every 10-15 years.
“Burkshire will shine it's got a lot of liquidity and it can go on the offense and such so I think the worksh show of The Future Has a good future”
In 1980, Berkshire Hathaway stock was trading at around $400 per share, and in 1986 when Conwood was offered to Buffett, the stock price was probably between $1,000-$2,000 per share with a market cap around $400-500 million; the $400 million Conwood acquisition would have been a very sizable transaction representing 80-100% of Berkshire's market cap at the time.
“so in 1980 the stock price of Burkshire Hathaway was around $400 a share okay what is now about you know seven close to 700 $700,000 a share was almost w200 of that price in 1980 in 1986 I'm guessing the price may have been somewhere between 1,000 and 2,000 per share around there and the market cap of Burkshire which is now hovering around a trillion would have been around you know well under a billion you know maybe 500 4 500 million or so so this particular deal was a very meaningful deal for them you know in terms of if they had done this deal it would have been a very sizable part of bsh haway at that time”
Monish Pabrai turned a $1 million net worth (from selling part of his company in 1994 when he was 30 years old) into $13-14 million within 5 years through stock market investing at a 70% annualized compound rate, then became independently wealthy and able to leave his business to focus full-time on investing.
“so in 94 when I was 30 I had about a million dollars I just sold a portion of my company and after tax I had 1 million so I said okay I'm going to start studying these public companies and I'm going to try to figure out which ones are likely to do well in the future... the million that I had at that time in 94 had done really well I had compounded at more than like 70% a year it was sitting at about 13 or 14 million”
Charlie Munger left behind an extensive body of work including Poor Charlie's Almanac and Berkshire Hathaway annual meeting transcripts archived on buffettcnbc.com, all of which contain Charlie's wisdom and can be studied to improve one's thinking and decision-making.
“we have poor Charlie's Almanac we have all the Burkshire meetings which are archived on buffett. cnbc.com we have all the daily transcripts and all of that so we have a lot of resources and things that Munger said available to us and I think that studying those can only help us become better”
The video includes a bonus offer: exclusive access to 'Charlie Munger's 11 Mental Models to Outperform the Market,' framed as the same mental models that transformed Pabrai's investing approach, available for download via a link in the video description.
“here is your reward I'm giving you exclusive access to something that's never been released anywhere else on the internet Charlie monger's 11 mental models to outperform the market for completely free these are the same powerful principles that transformed my investing approach”