China Expert Explains China’s Plan for Global Domination - And Its Biggest Weakness
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This is a conversation with Michael Sobolik, a Senior Fellow at the American Foreign Policy Council and an author of the book Countering China’s Great Game. And in this interview, we talk about China’s grand strategy - and what it actually looks like.
We discuss what are China’s geopolitical ambitions and why their origins go back way further than most people think, how does China uses the Belt and Road to increase their influence and why it often shoots itself in the foot doing so or why China is in danger of an imperial overstretch and how does Taiwan fit into its global vision.
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Michael Soik argues that China's geopolitical strategy is rooted in a millennia-old imperial strategic culture emphasizing civilizational superiority and expansionist ambitions, and that this creates near-term security threats (particularly over Taiwan) despite long-term demographic and economic headwinds that may eventually constrain China's power.
- China's current CCP strategy inherits from 2,000+ years of imperial strategy centered on the 'Mandate of Heaven' and civilizational superiority, not just post-1949 communism
- The Belt and Road Initiative is primarily a geopolitical tool to build global influence and enable military presence, not an economic venture, following the historical tribute system model
- Xi Jinping views Taiwan reunification as essential to his legacy and China's rejuvenation, and is preparing militarily for war; this represents an acute near-term threat despite China's long-term decline
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The concept of 'Zhongguo' (Middle Kingdom) in Mandarin is not merely a geographical label but encodes the political belief that China was the civilizational center and standard by which all other civilizations were measured, and this civilizational superiority claim translated over time into a conviction of political superiority and the right to rule 'all under heaven' (tianxia).
“in Mandarin this understanding of civilizational superiority is captured in the word that the Chinese used to just what how they call themselves Chong and Mandarin what how we translate in English to China literally means Middle Kingdom and this is not just a geographical statement that they were making thousands of years ago they believe civilization they were the Middle Kingdom and the standard by which all other civilizations were measured”
During the dynastic era, China's tributary system aimed at securing political influence and acknowledgment of Chinese superiority rather than total territorial conquest, meaning countries had to recognize China as the most powerful entity but retained some autonomy.
“during the dynastic period I think a term that a lot of your listeners will probably have some famili familiarity with is China's tribute system so during the dynastic era it wasn't that China was trying to conquer every single square mile of territory in its near Broad or Beyond what China through successive dynasties was trying to realize was political influence not necessarily total political control they wanted to have that acknowledgment from the Nations around them that China was in charge that China was the most powerful political entity in the neighborhood”
China has a continuous strategic culture traceable back to 221 BC through its imperial dynasties, and this historical heritage remains part of China's material culture and current political decision-making under Xi Jinping, who repeatedly references it to justify contemporary policy.
“you can trace back the Imperial era of China to 221 BC and before that you had the Waring States period and that strategic Heritage like let alone strategic heritage that historical Heritage is still very real inside of China and for anyone who spent time there it's part of their material culture and it's part of their story and even during uh the prc's existence you have Mao and even today X jingping cons continually and consistently pointing back to that historical Heritage to make sense of what China is doing today”
During the imperial era, China grew by a factor of four from the first to final dynasty, representing a pattern of imperial overstretch that Chinese Communist Party officials have concealed from Western counterparts during diplomatic exchanges like early Kissinger-Nixon talks.
“from the first dynasty to the final Dynasty China grew by a factor of four and that is a political reality that many Chinese communist party officials have tried to conceal and hide from their Western counterparts like you see this in the early exchanges with Kissinger and Richard Nixon in particular”
Xi Jinping's rise to power in 2012-2013 further locked in Chinese strategic calculations of American decline and Western weakness, intensifying commitment to assertive foreign policy.
“there was the sense that our moment has come the moment of to restore the greatness of China has come uh the long-term trends are favorable this is it and then when Xi Jinping Rose to power in 2012 and 2013 those calculations I think were even more locked in”
China's aggressive behavior in the South China Sea toward the Philippines through the Chinese Coast Guard has been reckless and dangerous, and has paradoxically strengthened the US-Philippines alliance by forcing the Philippines to seek American military support for protection.
“the way that the people's Liberation Army or I guess to be more precise the Chinese Coast Guard has been behaving in the South China Sea towards the Philippines has been nothing short of irresponsible Reckless and dangerous”
In 2010, Yang Jiechi, China's foreign minister, told a counterpart in Singapore at an ASEAN Summit that 'China is a big country, other nations are small countries, and that's just a fact,' a statement that encapsulates CCP statecraft and reflects the hierarchical nature of Chinese diplomacy.
“Young jeta Who at the time was the foreign minister of China was in Singapore for an azion Summit and he got really irritated at I believe it was the Singaporean foreign minister and that really famous quote came out of that exchange he said China is a big country other nations are small countries and that's just a fact that really encapsulates the ccp's statecraft in a lot of ways”
The Belt and Road Initiative was never primarily an economic venture; it has not made significant money for Beijing despite being presented as solving China's unemployment and overcapacity problems, and its core function is geopolitical rather than commercial.
“from its Inception the brri was never primarily an economic Venture and I think there there are a couple defenses of that the first one is that it hasn't really made a whole lot of money for Beijing and on paper the BR was supposed to solve multiple problems for China all at the same time one of them of course was the Quest for uh increased economic influence at Washington's expense but China also had these internal issues of increasing unemployment and overc capacity with production that they needed to find ways to export”
Western democracies derive legitimacy from internal sources—free and fair elections allowing citizens to replace ruling authorities—whereas throughout Chinese history there was no internal source of legitimacy; instead legitimacy was based on external demonstrations of power and will, a pattern that persists under the CCP and is not unique to communist ideology.
“in the United States and throughout European Democracies we have an understanding of legitimacy that is inherent within our political system free and fair elections it doesn't get much more complicated than that if there's a dissatisfaction with the ruling Authority at B the voters can decide again whereas throughout China China's history there was no internal source of legitimacy it was based on a demonstration of power and will and that is very much at play today under the Chinese Communist party but is not necessarily unique to the CCP”
NSC-68, the White House memorandum approved by President Truman in 1950 before the Korean War, articulated a whole-of-government vision with no ambiguity that the Soviet Union was a first-order threat to vital Western interests militarily, politically, and ideologically, whereas comparable clarity about China as an existential ideological threat does not exist today in Western thinking.
“NSC 68 which is the really famous White House memorandum that President Harry Truman approved in 1950 shortly before the Korean war that laid out this ho of government and this over this this broad vision of what this competition between the the Soviet Union and the free nations of the world was and you read it and there was no ambiguity about how the Truman Administration then subsequently the Eisenhower Administration and then several others after there was the shared understanding that the Soviet Union was a was a first order threat to the vital interests of the West militarily politically ideologically uh in so many different ways”
The Belt and Road Initiative is entering a second phase following initial hard infrastructure spending, where People's Liberation Army naval presence, intelligence presence, or both follow shortly after BRI memoranda are signed, as evidenced in the Pacific Island region, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America.
“the brri is entering its second phase phase one was hard infrastructure a lot of money a lot of big construction projects uh the second phase is what follows that memoranda memorandum of understanding that every nation signs to enter the brri not that long afterwards the people's Liberation Army come knocking on your door and you see see this in the Pacific Island region you see this in Southeast Asia you see this in the Middle East and you see this in Latin America what follows brri construction projects is often either pla Naval presence or uh intelligence presence or a combination of both”
China's strategy toward other nations involves policy coordination to get countries to 'sing from the same song sheet' on policy matters, reflecting its desire for alignment rather than mere economic benefit.
“it was policy coordination it was getting Nations inside of the project to be singing from the same song sheet on policy”
In 2008-2009 following the global financial crisis, Wen Jiabao (then premier) stated there was a sense that the global tide was turning away from the United States and that the West was in inexorable decline not just due to the financial crisis but because of America's mismanaged wars in Iraq; Beijing believed 'our moment has come' to restore China's greatness as long-term trends appeared favorable.
“hentau who then was the premier authority figure in China uh talked about how there was the sense that the global tide was turning away from the United States and that the West seem to be in this inexorable decline not just because of the financial crisis but because of the mismanaged America's misman mismanaged Wars in Iraq in particular and there was the sense that our moment has come the moment of to restore the greatness of China has come uh the long-term trends are favorable this is it”
The CCP's goal is to make the world safe for its tyranny and unsafe for freedom and democracy, not to achieve total world domination like Nazi Germany; this strategy involves discrete influence operations that are difficult to discern and often aims at soft control rather than hard conquest.
“the CCP is out to make the world safe for their tyranny and unsafe for Freedom unsafe for democracy that doesn't mean you need to topple every single Democratic regime it needs what what it does mean for Beijing is influence sometimes in very discret ways that are difficult to discern with the naked eye but this quest for influence and in some cas is uh a soft control is what the CCP is after today”
The US alliance system, built on commercial power and free trade rather than territorial conquest following the Spanish-American War, represents a unique model where the US believes freedom and liberty are good for all nations and engages them as true partners rather than as principal-and-subsidiary relationships.
“we had this deciding this moment of really critical decision leaving the 19th century and entering the 20th century where if America wanted to go down the road of becoming an imperial power we could have done it in the wake of the Spanish American War uh not only did we get new territory in the uh Caribbean we got the Philippines out of the Spanish-American war and it left the United States with this awkward question of we were a revolutionary power against one of the greatest empires in Europe and now yet here we are holding effectively Colonial protectorates what do we do and our slow but steady decision was to move away from that model of statecraft and to have a path toward power and influence that was denominated primarily by commercial power and free trade and then connected with that a network of alliances”
Xi Jinping has publicly stated without apology or equivocation that he wants to be remembered as the leader who reunified China, and this psychological and political reality regarding Taiwan cannot be downplayed; for a nation with unsettled borders like China (divided since 1949), border settlement is a first-order business priority.
“Xi Jinping has also said without apology or equivocation that he wants to be the one to be remembered for having reunified China and I think the psychology of Taiwan is one that that we cannot downplay”
Hal Brands and Michael Beckley's book 'Danger Zone' argues that while China faces long-term economic and demographic headwinds and may be a declining power, this makes China more dangerous in the short term, not less, because declining powers are more prone to risky military action.
“Hal BRS and one of his I think former colleagues Michael Beckley wrote an important book a couple years ago or maybe within the past year on this called danger zone and it's the exact argument that you're making long-term economically and demographically China is facing some really intense headwinds and it's an open question whether they can overcome it they may be a declining power perhaps I think you can make a reasonable case for that I also think that uh Hal and Michael are are equally correct when they say in the short term they're even more dangerous than a lot of analysts and politicians would give them credit for”
Western failure to deter Vladimir Putin from annexing Crimea in 2014 and invading Ukraine in 2022 established a precedent that creates urgency around Taiwan; if China successfully takes Taiwan, it will not stop there and will continue territorial expansion in its near-abroad, making Taiwan deterrence a critical defining priority of transatlantic statecraft.
“we failed to deter Vladimir Putin from annexing Crimea in 2014 from further invading Ukraine in 201 202 uh this war has been going on for so long now 2022 um yeah um we we failed to to stop Putin we cannot fail to stop XI uh if he gets Taiwan he's not going to stop there it is true that the CCP isn't Nazi Germany but they have territorial Ambitions and they're near abroad just look at the the map of the Ching Dynasty uh and look at their aggressiveness on the Sino Indian border look at the territory they lost to the Russians in the 19th century in the far Northeast look at what they're doing with crossb settlements in Bhutan uh Mongolia will not fairwell if Taiwan Falls uh and its near abroad this is a belligerent expansive power as it always has been throughout its imperial history that is not changing and uh making sure that Taiwan does not go the way of Ukraine must be the primary defining interest of transatlantic statecraft”
Most Western China analysts start their analysis around 1949 when Mao founded the People's Republic, occasionally incorporating the 'century of humiliation' from the 19th century, but they overlook the most crucial element: China's continuous imperial era from 221 BC onwards.
“a lot of China analysts on either side of the Atlantic tend to start history around 1949 when Mao established the People's Republic of China every now and then you'll have some analysts that will bring in the layer of analysis of the century of humiliation from the 19th century when various European powers uh infil Tred China and there was a divvying up of influence and and and all that stuff but the the real element of China's history that I think is so crucial to understand is that China has a long history of uh in its Imperial era which really goes overlooked”
There is no consensus within the West that it is in a cold war with the People's Republic of China; most Western politicians bristle at the cold war framing, a situation that differs from the clear consensus during the Soviet-Cold War era, and this lack of consensus creates a strategic asymmetry favoring Beijing because the CCP has decided it is in a cold war with the Free World.
“there is there is no consens ensus that the West is in a cold war with the People's Republic of China right now that that consensus does not exist and if anything most western politicians will bristle at that framing of Cold War”
China does not attempt to cultivate alliances in the way the United States does; historically, China pursued hierarchical relationships emphasizing recognition of Chinese superiority rather than partnerships of equals, and this represents a potential weakness in Beijing's geopolitical strategy.
“Beijing does not try to cultivate alliances at least in the way that the United States has... China has not tried to cultivate allies in that way and if you look at their history they never really did like part of like this whole notion of the Middle Kingdom and ruling over all under Heaven on the one hand yes there is some belligerence in there and that does stem from the the legalist tradition in uh China's philosophical Heritage but it's also quite confusion in this hierarchical approach to the world instead of building Partners where there is a commitment there China is a is trying to gain a recognition of superiority of their superiority from other nations”
The CCP lacks a good feedback loop for self-correction in policy because there is no incentive for officials to tell Xi Jinping hard truths; recent purges of PLA leadership and the forced removal of Hua Guofeng at a Party conclave (escorted out with foreign media present) demonstrate Xi's willingness to use an iron fist, suggesting his inner circle may lack advisors willing to voice dissent.
“there is no really good feedback Loop for self policy self-correction because I think it's quite possible that Xi Jinping has created this insular bubble around him where there's no incentive for people to say hard things like to tell hard truths to him”
Even if China takes Taiwan, this would not resolve China's long-term demographic crisis or necessarily improve its economic woes, but it would help China in the short term and lock in geopolitical gains before the effects of long-term decline set in.
“this should instill a sense of urgency it's not that the CCP can evade those longer term Trends by locking in gains today like even if they were to take Taiwan that wouldn't change their demographic crisis you know in the long term it wouldn't necessarily it wouldn't necessarily turn around their economic woses but it sure would help in the short term H”
Xi Jinping characterized the Belt and Road Initiative as the centerpiece of his foreign policy and wrote it into the Constitution; from 2013-2016 it received astronomical funding for hard infrastructure, but has since been retooled and scaled down, now focusing on green energy and other sectors while declining in scale.
“the Bon road is historically when it was rolled out in 2013 xiin ping was not shy about characterizing it as the centerpiece of his foreign policy he wrote it into the Constitution and for from 2013 certainly to 2016 the amount of funding the project received was astronomical”
Xi Jinping performs 'wolf warrior diplomacy' and acts undiplomatic enough to be offensive to host countries, such as with Europe, Australia, and the Philippines, inadvertently turning countries that could be neutral or allied with China into adversaries through overly aggressive behavior.
“Chinese diplomats would perform the sort of wolf Warrior diplomacy and they would act so um undiplomatic that it would be almost offensive to their host countries”
Western recognition of dependence on China as a problem is limited to economic and public health contexts (like COVID), but lacks the shared understanding that this represents a systems competition that could be existential to democracy itself.
“there is an understanding today I think that dependence on the PRC is a problem economically and in some cases with public health like covid the the covid pandemic was a great example of that but I do not think there is this shared sense of clarity that the West is in a systems competition with the Chinese Communist party that could be existential that is not there yet”
During the COVID-19 pandemic, China may have perceived an opportunity to expand influence as Western economies and societies were harder hit earlier than China; wolf warrior diplomacy during this period reflected a calculation that China had more relative power to deploy.
“and then when Xi Jinping Rose to power in 2012 and 2013 those calculations I think were even more locked in and during covid I think there was this this wage perhaps that they sensed an opportunity because I think Western economies and the the virus itself hit the West a lot harder and a lot sooner than it really hit China at least from the outside looking in and they sensed an opportunity”
Xi Jinping is preparing China for war quite possibly over Taiwan, as evidenced by steps to allow rapid reserve mobilization, construction of bomb shelters throughout the country, food rationing and storage for crisis, and other indicators typical of regimes preparing for war.
“I think that Xi Jinping is preparing China for war quite possibly over Taiwan if you look at uh steps that he's taken to make it easier to call a reservice quickly if you look at steps that he has taken to construct bomb shelters throughout the country to ration and store food for an event in a crisis and a whole host of other different indicators the CCP is taking steps that any regime would take to prepare for war and they have been doing this for a while now”
Taiwan represents the most vibrant democracy in the Indo-Pacific and certainly in East Asia; at this point in 2024, American policymakers should not find it difficult to choose between supporting the CCP (a revisionist entity seeking to make the world unsafe for democracy) and supporting Taiwan.
“Taiwan is one of the most vibrant maybe the most vibrant democracy in the Indo Pacific certainly in East Asia um this is something that we need to force stall we failed to deter Vladimir Putin from annexing Crimea in 2014 from further invading Ukraine in 201 202 uh this war has been going on for so long now 2022 um yeah um we we failed to to stop Putin we cannot fail to stop XI uh if he gets Taiwan he's not going to stop there”
Policymakers should assume the CCP will remain a highly resilient political entity despite long-term demographic and economic trends; the CCP has proven its ability to make difficult adjustments and subsume potential challengers (like businessmen under Deng Xiaoping's reforms) into the party structure, and should not be expected to decline without external pressure.
“when you talk about responsible policymaking and responsible statecraft uh hope for the best but plan for the worst uh policy makers on both sides of the Atlantic I think should have as their operating assumption that the CCP is going to continue to be a highly resilient political entity they have been through hell and back and in some cases they have inflicted hell on their own people and many others like the cultural revolution Great Leap Forward to Only Name it a couple of examples but this political entity has been proven to be remarkably resilient even in the under the rule of D xaing when they were executing this economic opening the the party was able to subsume these businessmen into the party and convince them that they had an interest in not working against the party but within it and with it”
The CCP's interest in territorial expansion extends to map of the Qing Dynasty boundaries, the Sino-Indian border (where they demonstrate aggressiveness), territory lost to Russia in the 19th century in the Far Northeast, and cross-border settlements in Bhutan; if Taiwan falls, Mongolia will not fare well given China's pattern of expansionist behavior throughout imperial history.
“it is true that the CCP isn't Nazi Germany but they have territorial Ambitions and they're near abroad just look at the the map of the Ching Dynasty uh and look at their aggressiveness on the Sino Indian border look at the territory they lost to the Russians in the 19th century in the far Northeast look at what they're doing with crossb settlements in Bhutan uh Mongolia will not fairwell if Taiwan Falls uh and its near abroad this is a belligerent expansive power as it always has been throughout its imperial history”
Xi Jinping links the Belt and Road Initiative to a broader vision called 'community of common Destiny For All Mankind,' which represents a Marxist vision of the world and the future that the CCP is trying to build globally.
“when you listen to Xi Jinping talk about the BR it is not an end unto itself it is always linked to this broader Vision that she has for the globe what he calls a community of common Destiny For All Mankind which if you peel back what that means and understand it in the party's own terms it's a quite Marxist vision of the world and of the future of the world that the CCP is trying to build”
The Biden administration is too optimistic about long-term Chinese decline trends and bases policy partially on that optimism; while Biden's China policy has some positive elements, this optimism should not be the basis of policy, and the US and allies cannot afford to 'sleep on this' and must find ways to actively weaken the CCP's ability to exert global influence and control.
“I would say that this is a big disagreement I've had with President Biden I think that he is right to look at these longer term Trends and to say China's not going to be a problem like he could that could be right I think you can make a great case for it but that should not be the basis of policy it shouldn't inform the Crux of our approach to them and and I the Biden policy to China is a mixed one I've been a fairly consistent critic but In fairness they've done some really good things I'm not saying it's been a total disaster but I do think that he's a bit too optimistic about the long-term Trend and if if the United States and our allies are going to preserve a world that is favorable for democracy we can't sleep on this one we're going to need to find ways to weaken the ccp's ability to exert its influence and control globally”
The host podcast introduces Michael Soik as a senior fellow at the American Foreign Policy Council and author of 'Countering China's Great Game'.
“this is a conversation with Michael soik a senior fellow at the American foreign policy Council and an author of a book called countering China's great game on China's Grand strategy”
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