Trump is just the beginning | John Gray on the future of American politics
What this covers
John Gray on Donald Trump, what comes after him, and the rise of fascism in the United States.
Is JD Vance more dangerous than Donald Trump?
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John Gray is one of Britain’s most eminent and controversial philosophers. Known for his critiques of liberalism and the Enlightenment, Gray forces us to confront uncomfortable truths about civilisation, morality, and the illusion of progress. In this IAI interview, hear how his life experiences and career as a philosopher led him to become one of the most original and provocative voices in the contemporary Western world. From attacking humanism as a religion in disguise to authoring groundbreaking books such as Straw Dogs and The New Leviathans, John Gray is a thinker whose influence many believe will endure for decades to come. Interviewed by Andy Owen.
#trump #politics #democracy #jdvance #fascism #uspolitics
John Gray is one of Britain’s leading philosophers and public intellectuals, renowned for his penetrating critiques of liberalism, humanism, and the Enlightenment faith in progress. A former professor at the London School of Economics, Gray is the author of numerous acclaimed works including Straw Dogs, The Silence of Animals, and The New Leviathans. His writing challenges our most cherished assumptions about morality, politics, and what it means to be human.
Andy Owen is a writer and former British Army officer whose work explores morality, leadership, and the human experience in conflict.
The Institute of Art and Ideas features videos and articles from cutting edge thinkers discussing the ideas that are shaping the world, from metaphysics to string theory, technology to democracy, aesthetics to genetics. Subscribe today! https://iai.tv/subscribe?utm_source=YouTube&utm_medium=description&utm_campaign=https://iai.tv/video/the-life-and-philosophy-of-john-gray
00:00 Will Trump ever relinquish power? 00:39 Populism, liberalism, and how Hilary Clinton paved the way for Trump's first presidency 03:40 Trump will force an irreversible change in American government 04:32 What's happening in America is worse than fascism 05:57 What will come after Trump? 07:25 The rise of Nigel Farage, the fall of Kier Starmer, and the crisis in British politics 09:44 Javier Milei and radical libertarians 10:09 There's an economic shock coming that will destabilise politics
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John Gray argues that populism is a rational political response to liberal policy failures, not mere demagoguery, and that without understanding its causes, Western democracies face escalating authoritarianism culminating in figures more radical and ideologically committed than Trump.
- Populism represents backlash against social disruption caused by liberal policies, not inexplicable wickedness
- Trump's successor (likely JD Vance) will be more radical and ideologically consistent, creating irreversible institutional change
- Economic crisis in global bond markets will destabilize politics within 1-2 years, creating fundamentally different political landscape by 2030
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Populism, as commonly understood by liberals, is a word liberals use to describe the political backlash against the social disruption produced by their own policies, but liberals fail to understand or acknowledge their own causal role in producing these phenomena.
“populism, as I understand it, is a word liberals use to describe the political backlash against the social disruption produced by their own policies. They don't understand that what they have done or failed to do has produced or helped to produce these morbid phenomena that we now see.”
What is happening in America now under Trump is worse than classical fascism because American fascism will lack the time-boundedness of historical fascism; whereas Nazi Germany could be militarily defeated and civil society could re-emerge, the structural conditions of modern America (extreme polarization, digital networked opposition) make fascism potentially irreversible.
“fascism was time bound. Fashion was primarily into war. It came about as a result largely of the disruption of life because of after the first world war and after uh Nazism was defeated. Fascism went on in some European countries, Portugal, Spain. But after Nazism was defeated, basically it could you could take out the fascist elites, you could inflict military defeat. Uh um and then what had survived even to some extent in Nazi Germany over civil society could kind of reemerge. What's happening in America now is different.”
Society is now so polarized that there cannot be reversion to pre-Trump conditions; whatever political outcome emerges will be fundamentally different and will require understanding of what drove the original polarization.
“America is much more polarized. And this is very relevant to ideas of progress. People say progress is always possible. Not when there's no agreement on what progress means”
British public has gradually normalized getting poorer over decades as long as services continued and borrowing increased, but this equilibrium depends entirely on continued access to global bond markets; sudden withdrawal would create shock.
“We got used to getting poorer because it was slow. um uh as long as we could borrow more and have services, however difficult they might be, national health, long waiting lists, so on and so forth, trains that don't work very well. We got used to that. And perhaps if it could go on like that forever, just bumping along, we could remain used to it. But unfortunately, a lot of the money from that is comes from global markets, comes from um global bond market”
Populism is a word liberals use to describe political backlash against the social disruption produced by their own policies, which they fail to recognize as their responsibility.
“populism, as I understand it, is a word liberals use to describe the political backlash against the social disruption produced by their own policies. They don't understand... what they have done or failed to do has produced or helped to produce these morbid phenomena”
Farage's proposed economic policies (partial nationalization of utilities) are fundamentally not deliverable because imposing massive cuts to fiscal spending is extremely difficult when current spending levels have become normalized, even in the context of populist political movements.
“The problem is that if he does come to power he won't be able to do it not because the civil servants stop him though they might try because but because it's extremely difficult to impose massive cuts on fiscal spending when they become a norm.”
The critical test of whether Trump will attempt to overturn democratic processes is his response to midterm election losses; if he claims they are fraudulent ('a hoax') rather than accepting them as legitimate, this signals entry into what can be called a fascist or proto-fascist mode.
“The next thing to look for is how does he respond when he loses the midterms? Does he say, 'Well, fair doses.' I don't think so. I don't think so. What he will say is, 'It's a hoax. This is what I expect. I can't.' Now, if he does that, if he really tries to resist the democratic push back against some of his policies, then we're in a different ball game. We're really in a different world because then we're in a uh uh people call it fascist but in a way it's worse than that”
The UK adapted to decades of wage stagnation and service degradation by borrowing more and maintaining the illusion of consumption and service provision (NHS, trains); this arrangement is sustainable only as long as global bond markets continue funding it.
“we got used to getting poorer because it was slow. um uh as long as we could borrow more and have services, however difficult they might be, national health, long waiting lists, so on and so forth, trains that don't work very well. We got used to that. And perhaps if it could go on like that forever, just bumping along, we could remain used to it.”
Farage is more comparable to Georgia Meloni (a successful European populist) than to a tribute act, based on his sophisticated political sense, but his economic policies are ultimately undeliverable because imposing massive fiscal cuts becomes impossible once populations accept public services as a norm.
“No, he's more like Georgia Maloney, one of the most successful European politicians. He's got a tremendous sense of what what the uh there's a problem of course about Faraj's uh switch which is that it's not deliverable. The problem is that if he does come to power he won't be able to do it not because the civil servants stop him though they might try because but because it's extremely difficult to impose massive cuts on fiscal spending when they become a norm”
Liberals, when confronted with populism, maintain that they weren't liberal enough and should have pushed further on their policies, demonstrating a systematic incapacity to recognize how their policies created the disruption driving populist backlash.
“The only thing they ever admit to, I mean, when I talk to them, is that they weren't liberal enough. Uh well, we were tremendously liberal, of course, and rational. No one would deny that. I would, but anyway. Uh um but maybe we should have gone further on that”
Trump is a real estate operator and reality TV showman who has moved into politics by correctly reading and reflecting American popular sentiment and anxieties ('the American unconscious'), rather than by ideological commitment or policy expertise.
“Trump is a real estate operator and a reality TV showman who's moved into politics by reading the American unconscious correctly on a lot of issues.”
Hillary Clinton's description of 40% of Americans as 'deplorables' was a major factor in Trump's 2016 electoral victory, and this dismissal of legitimate economic grievances (30 years of income stagnation) drove voters toward populism.
“I said in August of uh 2016 that that I thought Trump would win and that the main reason or one of the main reasons he would win was actually uh um um this description of voters or 40% of American voters by Hillary Clinton as um deplorables”
If Trump loses midterm elections and responds by claiming fraud (calling them a 'hoax'), rather than accepting them as legitimate, this constitutes a threshold event after which America enters a qualitatively different political regime.
“Now, if he does that, if he really tries to resist the democratic push back against some of his policies, then we're in a different ball game. We're really in a different world”
Javier Milei's radical austerity policies in Argentina, while nominally successful (claiming to consult economic policy from a medium in contact with his dog), are now facing rebellion because sudden massive cuts have caused extraordinary suffering for people losing access to hospitals and public services.
“I mean you heard of MLE in Argentina. He uh with a chainsaw. He says he takes his economic policies by consulting a medium who is in touch with his one of his dogs. Uh but actually up till now he's been moderately successful but now there's rebellion going on because there've been an enormous amount of sudden suffering for lots of people who are don't have access to hospitals and other public services and so on.”
Key players in British politics operate outside the major parties and adopt non-standard positions, with Nigel Farage exemplifying this pattern through a leftward shift in economic policy including partial nationalization of utilities.
“the live players in British politics are so to speak outside most of them of the uh the major parties and so they adopt non-standard positions. If you've been watching, don't say you should, but if you've been watching Farage, what you might have noticed lately is a a left turn in his economic policies, partial nationalization of the uh of utilities, water to to start with and so on”
The case of Javier Milei in Argentina illustrates the limits of radical fiscal austerity: despite initial success, massive sudden suffering in populations without access to hospitals and services has triggered rebellion, demonstrating the political unsustainability of extreme cuts.
“I mean you heard of MLE in Argentina. He uh with a chainsaw. He says he takes his economic policies by consulting a medium who is in touch with his one of his dogs. Uh but actually up till now he's been moderately successful but now there's rebellion going on because there've been an enormous amount of sudden suffering for lots of people who are don't have access to hospitals and other public services and so on”
What is happening in America now is worse than classical fascism because fascism was time-bound (tied to specific post-WWI conditions) and could be defeated militarily, whereas American authoritarianism operates through institutional capture without clear endpoint.
“people call it fascist but in a way it's worse than that because fascism was time bound. Fashion was primarily into war. It came about as a result largely of the disruption of life because of after the first world war and after uh Nazism was defeated. Fascism went on in some European countries, Portugal, Spain. But after Nazism was defeated, basically it could you could take out the fascist elites, you could inflict military defeat”
Deep disenchantment with mainstream politics means that the current situation cannot be improved without first understanding its causes; attempting to solve the crisis without this understanding is futile.
“we can't expect to improve or even the present situation or even to prevent it becoming worse unless we understand something of why it came about.”
Americans have experienced 30 years of wage stagnation (or income reduction), which liberal elites dismiss as irrelevant when addressing populism, treating economic suffering as less important than cultural values.
“the reduction in their life life their income and their wealth which had been going on in America or at least stagnation in their income Wells for 30 years. It's irrelevant.”
Liberals' only acknowledged response to their own failures is to claim they 'weren't liberal enough' and that the solution is to go further in the same direction, rather than reconsidering whether their approach itself is flawed.
“The only thing they ever admit to, I mean, when I talk to them, is that they weren't liberal enough. Uh well, we were tremendously liberal, of course, and rational. No one would deny that. I would, but anyway. Uh um but maybe we should have gone further on that.”
Based on Trump's past behavior (claiming previous elections were fraudulent), his personality makes it extremely unlikely that he would accept midterm election losses gracefully; he will instead claim they are hoaxes, which will trigger democratic resistance and potential regime crisis.
“he still says the the the last election, the one before the one he won was hope. Was a hoax. He didn't. I mean, he even said, as you know, that he never met Peter Mandlesen. He'll simply deny it. And then what will he do?”
An economic shock (currency/sovereign debt crisis) in the global bond markets over the next 1-2 years will destabilize UK politics and likely force an early general election, because the funding for current service provision comes from global bond markets and sudden withdrawal would trigger systemic stress.
“a lot of the money from that is comes from global markets, comes from um global bond market. If that's pulled out suddenly, then there's then there's a big shock. So that sort of connects with what what the one thing I can sort of say with reasonable confidence is that the political world in this country and other countries will be very different by 2030.”
Trump's institutional strength (Supreme Court appointments, National Guard control) makes his power-consolidation attempts more dangerous and consequential than previous executive power-grabs.
“he's basically neutered the courts either by putting his own people in on in them in the Supreme Court or um um ignoring them. He's got the National Guard at his disposal.”
The Social Democratic Party's emergence as a political challenger in the 1980s does not provide a useful precedent for Reform UK's chances, because the depth of current disillusionment is much more profound than it was in the 1980s.
“I remember when the social democratic party the 1980s they emerged as a challengers to the two main parties and at one point they were commanding over 25% of the vote. Some people now say it'll be the same with reform. I don't think so. I don't think so. Um the depth of disillusionment now is much more profound.”
The key indicator of whether Trump will move toward authoritarianism is his response if he loses the midterms: if he denies the results as a 'hoax' rather than accepting them, it signals a shift from electoral politics to authoritarian consolidation.
“The next thing to look for is how does he respond when he loses the midterms? Does he say, 'Well, fair doses.' I don't think so. I don't think so. What he will say is, 'It's a hoax. This is what I expect”
Trump predicted to win 2016 based on pattern: if major demographic/electoral coalition is explicitly denigrated by political establishment, that coalition will consolidate support for the outsider candidate challenging that establishment.
“I said in August of uh 2016 that that I thought Trump would win and that the main reason or one of the main reasons he would win was actually uh um um this description of voters or 40% of American voters by Hillary Clinton as um deplorables. I thought he would win again as he did win again”
Trump won the 2024 election and will likely use his power to produce what amounts to irreversible change in American government, including neutering the courts through Supreme Court appointments and having the National Guard at his disposal.
“I thought he would win again as he did win again and I think he's now going to use the power that he does have to produce an irreversible change in American government. Uh uh he's basically neutered the courts either by putting his own people in on in them in the Supreme Court or um um ignoring them. He's got the National Guard at his disposal.”
Populist movements in Europe (Farage in UK, Meloni in Italy) are now the 'live players' in politics, while establishment parties have become sclerotic and unable to offer solutions; successful populists like Meloni combine pragmatism with populist appeal.
“the live players in British politics are so to speak outside most of them of the uh the major parties...he's more like Georgia Maloney, one of the most successful European politicians. He's got a tremendous sense of what what the uh”
Trump's policies are proving not as popular as expected; there is disillusionment setting in due to economic crises including inflation, rising cost of living, and a danger of a dollar crisis, which will force Trump to confront the question of whether to back off or escalate.
“now a lot of his policies are proving not as popular as they expected. There's a danger of a crisis of the dollar. The there's inflation. the cost of living is getting worse. Disillusionment will will set in. And then the question is, what does he do?”
The key players in British politics are now largely outside the major parties and therefore adopt non-standard positions; Nigel Farage represents this pattern and is more strategically comparable to Italy's Giorgia Meloni than to being a trivial 'tribute act'.
“the live players in British politics are so to speak outside most of them of the uh the major parties and so they adopt non-standard positions. If you've been watching, don't say you should, but if you've been watching Farage, what you might have noticed lately is a a left turn in his economic policies, partial nationalization of the uh of utilities, water to to start with and so on. Um, nobody ever thought he would do it. I was sure he would do it. People were saying he's just a thrite. It's a That tribute act. No, he's more like Georgia Maloney, one of the most successful European politicians.”
Farage has recently adopted left-wing economic positions including partial nationalization of utilities (water) despite his long association with right-wing ideology; this shift demonstrates strategic flexibility and mirrors the approach of successful European populists like Giorgia Meloni.
“if you've been watching Farage, what you might have noticed lately is a a left turn in his economic policies, partial nationalization of the uh of utilities, water to to start with and so on.”
Trump is a real estate operator and reality TV showman who entered politics by correctly reading American public sentiment, but now many of his policies are proving unpopular, creating disillusionment that may push him toward more radical responses.
“Trump is a real estate operator and a reality TV showman who's moved into politics by reading the American unconscious correctly on a lot of issues. But now a lot of his policies are proving not as popular as they expected. There's a danger of a crisis of the dollar. The there's inflation. the cost of living is getting worse. Disillusionment will will set in”
Trump has neutered the courts by placing his own people on the Supreme Court and ignoring judicial decisions, giving him control over the National Guard, and positioning himself to implement irreversible changes to American government.
“he's basically neutered the courts either by putting his own people in on in them in the Supreme Court or um um ignoring them. He's got the National Guard at his disposal”
JD Vance is more dangerous than Trump as a potential successor because he is more radical, more ideologically consistent, less easily flattered by elite social performance (e.g., being driven around Windsor Castle), and crucially, he genuinely believes in his radical agenda rather than treating politics as a business opportunity.
“will be more radical still either via uh JD Vance who is more radical more consistent and less easily flattered. He'll not be um he'll not be swayed by um being driven around Windsor Castle. um he'll do what he wants to do and that's for another reason which is unlike Trump he believes in it.”
Hillary Clinton's description of 40% of American voters as 'deplorables,' combined with her dismissal of their economic suffering (30 years of wage stagnation) as irrelevant and her message that coal miners should accept unemployment, directly contributed to Trump's electoral victory by confirming voters' perception of liberal contempt for them.
“when Hillary Clinton described 40% of the nation as the American nation as deplorables what she should have really done is kept on saying it louder and louder that would have converted them telling them that they're deplorables that their that their feelings are atistic that they're invariably racist that the reduction in their life life their income and their wealth which had been going on in America or at least stagnation in their income Wells for 30 years. It's irrelevant.”
The difference between optimism and hope is significant, with hope being superior to optimism as a framework for understanding the current crisis (the speaker's answer is cut off before completing the definition).
“you have um been accused of being a a a political pessimist. um sometimes even annihil but um but I I find much that's hopeful in your work as well. I wondered if you could just um explain the subtle difference between optimism and hope. Well, optimism is um the belief that if you apply certain types of thinking”
Extreme polarization in America means that progress becomes impossible, because progress requires societal agreement on what progress means; when no such agreement exists, only different and incompatible futures can result.
“America is much more polarized. And this is very relevant to ideas of progress. People say progress is always possible. Not when there's no agreement on what progress means. If society uh we are less polarized, I think in this country uh than America is, but there can't now be, I think, a reversion to the pre-Trump, pre-C Charlie, pre can't you've gone beyond that. Whatever happens will be different.”
David Cameron's response to populism—dismissing it as inexplicable upheaval of 'wickedness, demagoguery, ignorance'—was extraordinarily stupid because it reveals complete failure to recognize his own policy failures' role in producing populist backlash.
“I think I learned an enormous amount from an extraordinarily and characteristically stupid observation by David Cameron when he was when he was when he was asked, you know, what about this? He, oh, that's populism. As if it had absolutely nothing to do with anything he'd ever done or failed to do. It's just a completely inexplicable upheaval of wickedness, demagoguery, ignorance, etc.”
The American unconscious—the collective emotional and psychological substrate of national sentiment—can be read and reflected by political operators who understand its structures, as Trump has done.
“Trump is a real estate operator and a reality TV showman who's moved into politics by reading the American unconscious correctly on a lot of issues.”
David Cameron's dismissal of populism as 'inexplicable wickedness' with no connection to his own policies or failures represents the typical liberal response: denying responsibility while attributing electoral disruption to ignorance and demagoguery.
“I learned an enormous amount from an extraordinarily and characteristically stupid observation by David Cameron when he was when he was when he was asked, you know, what about this? He, oh, that's populism. As if it had absolutely nothing to do with anything he'd ever done or failed to do. It's just a completely inexplicable upheaval of wickedness, demagoguery, ignorance, etc.”
Rather than addressing economic grievances, liberal politicians like Hillary Clinton attacked working-class voters morally as racist and ignorant while dismissing their 30 years of income stagnation as irrelevant, thereby accelerating populist consolidation.
“telling them that they're deplorables that their that their feelings are atistic that they're invariably racist that the reduction in their life life their income and their wealth which had been going on in America or at least stagnation in their income Wells for 30 years. It's irrelevant. What they should do is shut up and be I think she actually went to a mining town and told them that they should all um mining era that they should all be glad that that we're going to become unemployed”
Trump will deny losing midterms as a 'hoax' and attempt to resist democratic pushback, signaling transition from electoral politics to authoritarianism, based on his consistent pattern of denying previous electoral losses.
“You've only got a year to wait. You'll find out if he backs off. Wouldn't be characteristic, would it? Because he still says the the the last election, the one before the one he won was hope. Was a hoax. He didn't. I mean, he even said, as you know, that he never met Peter Mandlesen. He'll simply deny it”
Trump will become 'the godfather of populisms' more radical and disruptive than he intended, because his policy failures and loss of popularity will create space and demand for more consistent, ideologically committed populist successors.
“Trump will be the godfather of populisms, if I can call them that, more radical um uh uh and more uh uh disruptive than any he either intended or um uh uh imagined.”
Trump will be the godfather of more radical populisms that he neither intended nor imagined, and his successor (JD Vance) will be more radical, more ideologically consistent, and less susceptible to flattery or distraction than Trump himself.
“my speculation will be that Trump will be the godfather of populisms, if I can call them that, more radical um uh uh and more uh uh disruptive than any he either intended or um uh uh imagined”
The political world in the UK and other countries will be very different by 2030; the speaker can say this 'with reasonable confidence' based on structural economic and political vulnerabilities.
“the political world in this country and other countries will be very different by 2030”
An economic shock from global bond markets will destabilize UK politics within 1-2 years (or sooner), potentially triggering an early general election and fundamentally reshaping the political landscape by 2030.
“there'll be some sort of economic shock which will uh um destabilize politics and may ultimately then result in a in an early general election... one thing I can sort of say with reasonable confidence is that the political world in this country and other countries will be very different by 2030”
Disenchantment with mainstream politics in Britain and other Western democracies cannot be resolved without an economic crisis, and a major foreign exchange crisis (similar to Liz Truss's crash) is likely to occur within 1-2 years.
“I think the difficulty is that the underlying disenchantment with mainstream politics has reached a point where it can't really be expressed without some sort of crisis. And if you ask what was the trigger of the crisis I would say and this sounds a little dull because it's not in the realm of ideas but of economic realities. I think a kind of super Liz trust crisis on this on the uh foreign exchanges might do it”
The underlying disenchantment with mainstream politics in the UK has reached a point where it cannot be expressed without some sort of crisis; an economic shock (specifically a 'super Liz Truss crisis' in foreign exchanges) is likely to be the trigger for major political realignment.
“the underlying disenchantment with mainstream politics has reached a point where it can't really be expressed without some sort of crisis. And if you ask what was the trigger of the crisis I would say and this sounds a little dull because it's not in the realm of ideas but of economic realities. I think a kind of super Liz trust crisis on this on the uh foreign exchanges might do it.”
The Social Democratic Party of the 1980s achieved over 25% vote share as a challenger to the two main parties, but the current disillusionment is much more profound and will not follow the same trajectory as Reform UK or similar challenger parties.
“I remember when the social democratic party the 1980s they emerged as a challengers to the two main parties and at one point they were commanding over 25% of the vote. Some people now say it'll be the same with reform. I don't think so. I don't think so. Um the depth of disillusionment now is much more profound”
The challenge is to find partial remedies for the crisis of liberalism; such remedies are necessarily 'partial' because the crisis is structural and deep.
“what are the partial remedies that you would look to now”
Thomas Hobbes and his work (referenced as influence on the speaker's recent book 'New Leviathans') can contribute to understanding the current political crisis, implying Hobbesian analysis of state breakdown and reconstruction is relevant.
“maybe talking a little bit about um a thinker that's influenced your last book new leviathans Thomas Hobs what he can contribute to that conversation”
The present UK government led by Keir Starmer will not last until the 2029 general election; there is 'practically zero chance' of this government surviving that long because it is 'systemically weak' with no clear policy direction.
“There's practically zero chance of the present government led by Karma going into an election in 2029. You won't be there that long. The government won't be there that long. It's too systemically weak. Uh and basically um no one has any ideas hardly about what to do”
Liberalism has been characterized by tremendous commitment to rationality and liberal principles, but this self-assessed commitment has not prevented policy failures or the social disruption that produced populism.
“we were tremendously liberal, of course, and rational. No one would deny that. I would”