Breaking The Engagement: How China Won And Lost America | Hoover Institution
What this covers
The Hoover Institution Program on the US, China, and the World held "Breaking the Engagement: How China Won & Lost America" on Wednesday, June 4, 2025 from 4:00pm - 5:30pm PT in the Shultz Auditorium, George P. Shultz Building.
For over five decades following the 1972 rapprochement between the United States and China, the two countries seemed to be steadily building a sound relationship, even accounting for periodic setbacks like the Tiananmen Square massacre. The last decade, though, has seen a sharp increase in tensions and a complete reorientation of American policies toward China—from “engagement” to “competition.” What happened? In this book talk on "Breaking the Engagement: How China Won & Lost America", esteemed scholar David Shambaugh examines the evolution, expansion, and disintegration of the American engagement strategy towards China.
The event featured: - David Shambaugh, Esteemed Scholar and Award Winning Author - Elizabeth Economy, Hargrove Senior Fellow and Co-Director of the Program on the US, China, and the World at the Hoover Institution - Larry Diamond, William L. Clayton Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution
To learn more about the program on the US, China, and the World, visit: https://www.hoover.org/research-teams/program-us-china-world
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Shambaugh argues that U.S.-China engagement strategy succeeded in 'winning over' China through the 1980s-2010s by aligning with China's reformist policies, but China has progressively lost America since 2010-2012 as Xi Jinping reversed liberalization and the relationship shifted from cooperation to comprehensive competition driven by mutual securitization and diverging expectations.
- U.S. engagement was premised on four core goals: modernizing, liberalizing, socializing China internationally, and people-to-people exchange—all rooted in a deep American missionary impulse to reshape China
- China's 2010 turning point marked when foreign actors began facing increased impediments; Xi's 2012 ascension intensified securitization, making the relationship incompatible with original engagement premises
- The irony of engagement: deeper bilateral presence generated deeper suspicions rather than cooperation; China saw U.S. tactics as subversive peaceful evolution since John Foster Dulles' 1955 testimony
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National security has become the number one national priority of Xi Jinping himself, the Chinese Communist Party, and the Chinese government, and has overtaken development as the primary goal of the Chinese state, with Xi laying out a comprehensive concept of security (zongti anquan) that includes no fewer than 22 categories of national security with several sub-elements within each category.
“National security has become the number one uh national priority of Xiinping himself of the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese government and has overtaken development as the primary goal of the Chinese state. Um and Xiinping has laid out a what he calls the uh zuni anuan the comprehensive um concept of of security which has no fewer than 22 categories including several sub elements within each category of national security.”
In the 1960s, there were grassroots activist efforts in American society advocating for opening to communist China, including the American Friends Service Committee (Quakers), the UN Association of the United States, the League of Women Voters, the American Chamber of Commerce, and notable academics including Robert Scallopino, John King Fairbank, Alexander Eckstein, Doak Barnett, and Alan Whiting.
“Um um but I also recount in that chapter that there were kind of activist efforts in the American society who were um agitating for or advocate I should say advocating for um some sort of relationship with um communist China, the the American Friends Service Committee, the Quakers, the UN Association of the United States, League of Women Voters, the American Chamber of Commerce, and several Notable academics uh notably Robert Scallopino, John King Fairbank, Alexander Xstein, Dope Barnett, Alan Whiting and others were all instrumental and in the 60s we're talking about now here in um advocating for some olive branches, some opening to China.”
Since 1955, when John Foster Dulles testified before Congress about peaceful evolution, Mao and the Chinese Communist Party assumed this was the American strategy to peacefully evolve the CCP out of power, and this has been the CCP's default assumption about the U.S. ever since 1955—and, Shambaugh argues, the CCP is right, as that is exactly what the U.S. has been trying to do.
“Ever since in fact uh 1955 and John Foster Dulles's famous uh testimony in front of Congress about peaceful engage and peaceful evolution that John at that time Mao and the Chinese communist said oh that's what these Americans are out to do us do to us peacefully evolve us. That's 1955 folks. Well, so that's been their default assumption about us ever since. And guess what? They're right. That's exactly what we've been trying to do.”
Beginning around 2010, a wide variety of American actors—NGOs, journalists, U.S. companies, foundations, universities, educational exchange organizations, the U.S. embassy and consulates—all began to encounter considerably increased obstacles to their work in China, marking a turning point after which impediments to normal operations dramatically increased.
“beginning around 2010, a wide variety of American actors began to encounter considerably increased obstacles to their work in China. Non-governmental organizations, journalists, US companies, foundations, universities, and educational exchange organizations, US embassy and its consulates, and many other American actors. all. It's never been easy for any of these actors to work in China, but there was a um 2010 in retrospect was a turning point and after which all began to encounter increased impediments and obstacles to their normal work in the country.”
During the 2008-2010 period in China, there was an incredibly vibrant civil society with a lively internet, protests, entrepreneurs and human rights lawyers meeting in salons to discuss democracy, with entrepreneurial groups visiting Taiwan to observe Chinese democracy, and approximately 180,000 protests in 2010 around issues like environment and pensions, along with non-party-affiliated individuals running for local elections.
“Um, you had, you know, a big entrepreneur taking a group of other entrepreneurs to Taiwan to show them what a Chinese democracy could look like. Um I I think there was a lot of and you know you had what was it the count I think in 2010 was 180,000 protests right in China around issues like the environment um and pensions and and other things. And so to to my mind, oh, let me just point out too, you had, you know, um, individuals beginning to run that were not affiliated with the party running for election, right? And so, um, you know, at the local level, and now, of course, they ran into some trouble sometimes, but nonetheless, I think overall directionally, I think there was this sense of of hope, one might say, um, that China was on this trajectory.”
Even during the pre-engagement era during the Cold War height under Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations, there were those who advocated for relaxing containment and opening ties to China, with President Kennedy, eight days before his assassination on November 14, 1963, declaring that the U.S. was not wedded to a policy of hostility to China and would reappraise policies if China indicated a desire to live at peace.
“So even during the um pre-engagement era during the cold war height of the cold war during the Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson administrations there were those who advocated for relaxing containment and opening ties to China. Let me digress here for a second concerning President Kennedy. uh eight days prior to his tragic assassination on November 14th, 1963 um in what turned out to be his last press conference in response to a journalist's question concerning the possibility of trade with China. Kennedy suddenly declared to the assembled, you can see the assembled journalists, you can read for yourselves, quote, 'We are not planning on trade with red China,' as it was then known, in view of the policy that red China pursues. But if the red Chinese indicate a desire to live at peace with the United States and with other countries surrounding it, then quite obviously the United States would reappraise its policies. Last sentence, we are not wedded to a policy of hostility to red China,' unquote in 1963, ladies and gentlemen.”
The British and European responses to Tiananmen differed significantly from the American response; while Americans wanted to 'slap them down' and punitive measures, the British and Continental Europeans preferred to keep diplomatic doors open and maintain engagement despite the massacre, viewing this as a means to stability.
“Very interesting lesson I learned. The British were not as sort of punitive as Americans wanted to be. You know, we wanted, you know, to slap them down and shame them and castigate them as they deserved. But the British and the Europeans on the continent, interestingly, I learned because I was very involved with the commission, European Commission and others. Europeans had a different reaction to Tian even though they had the same transformative change China approach.”
The American approach to China has been shaped by a deep, paternalistic 'missionary impulse' (Warren Cohen's term) to mold and shape China that dates back several centuries and predates President Nixon's 1971-1972 opening by more than a century, originating with early 19th-century American ambassadors
“to fully understand the rise and fall of the engagement strategy oops really requires I believe Recognizing the longstanding and deeply embedded paternalistic missionary impulse which was actually Warren Cohen's term originally to the missionary impulse to mold and shape China that lies at the core of the American approach to China over several centuries. Um, indeed, American attempts to shape, mold, and change China far predate President Nixon's opening. They date back to the 1800s, in fact.”
There has been no 'who lost America' debate in China, and Chinese America-watchers and participants in domestic Chinese discourse accept zero blame for the deterioration of the U.S.-China relationship over the last decade, believing instead that the deterioration is 100% the fault of the American side.
“Well the short answer in short is a resounding no. um Chinese China these America watchers and the people who participate in this discourse in China accept zero blame for the deterioration of the relationship over the last decade and they believe and there has been no who lost America debate therefore as far as they're concerned um the deterioration of the relationship over the last 8 to 10 years is 100% the fault of the American side.”
The concern that 'you cannot lose the younger generation' (referenced from Kingfisher's book about Xi's father) may explain Xi's propaganda and mobilization campaign for younger Chinese, with Xi essentially trying to hold back or reverse modernization theory by controlling the younger generation's exposure to liberal ideas and values.
“So I want to pose this challenge by linking today's remarkable event on your book with yesterday's remarkable event on Joseph Tigian's new book the party's interest come first the life of Xi Jang Shun father of Xi Jinping and Joseph referred there uh to some concern of she the father uh which maybe ran through the party. Uh moreover that you cannot lose the younger generation. Okay. And so it's very clear now that one of the things that Xiinping has embarked upon maybe with the fingers in the dyke to hold back modernization theory is a propaganda and mobilization campaign for the younger generation.”
Shambaugh was not surprised by the CCP's violent suppression of the 1989 Tiananmen Square demonstrations because he understood the regime saw it through a lens of regime survival; Deng Xiaoping did not view the protests as a civil rights movement but as comparable to the Cultural Revolution and the Red Guards, and he perceived it as an existential political threat requiring forceful suppression
“I was not surprised by the Leninist response of Dang Xiaoping and using force to suppress this uh these demonstrations. I have to say and I said so at the time because I think Dong saw a repeat of the cultural revolution and the red guards right there in the same place in Tianaan Square and that the regime he saw it in in survi regime survival terms and it was an existential politically existential crisis for him and the Chinese communist party and he did not opt for the jaozion approach to talk to the students. Um and he finally opted for the coercive approach.”
The U.S.-China relationship has historically oscillated in a repetitive love-hate cycle between amity and enmity, a pattern that extends back many decades through the imperial, republican, and communist periods, which late historian Warren Cohen called the 'love-hate cycle'
“This relationship has been anything but steady and consistent. It fluctuates um repetitively back and forth between amity and enmity...the late and I feel great China historian Warren Cohen...referred to this repetitive fluctuant dynamic as the lovehate cycle in the USChina relationship um and he traced it uh back many many decades.”
Since 1955, when Secretary of State John Foster Dulles testified to Congress about 'peaceful evolution,' the CCP has regarded American engagement and liberalization efforts as intended peaceful transformation of China's political system; Dulles's terminology confirmed the CCP's default assumption that the U.S. strategy has always aimed at regime transformation, and 'guess what? They're right. That's exactly what we've been trying to do'
“Ever since in fact uh 1955 and John Foster Dulles's famous uh testimony in front of Congress about peaceful engage and peaceful evolution that John at that time Mao and the Chinese communist said oh that's what these Americans are out to do us do to us peacefully evolve us. That's 1955 folks. Well, so that's been their default assumption about us ever since. And guess what? They're right. That's exactly what we've been trying to do.”
The first American ambassador to China, Anson Burlingame, advocated for 'cooperative policy' and 'patient paternalism,' seeking to work cooperatively with Chinese reformers, while his successor J. Ross Brown favored coercive pressure, diplomatic pressure, moral condemnation, and threats of force to induce reform
“Berlingame advocated for what he called the cooperative policy and what might be described as patient paternalism patient paternalism to work with Chinese reformers in a cooperative fashion. By contrast uh Ambassador Brown uh favored a coercive policy to pressure China to undertake reforms. Berling game indulged the Chinese even learning the language and theqing court they they loved him...By contrast Brown was condescending. He advocated tough diplomatic pressure, moral condemnation and the threat of force.”
When engagement and the tactics for implementing it were 'hammered out,' Taiwan had not yet democratized (it suspended elections) and South Korea had not yet democratized (both happened a decade later), so getting the chronology right shows that modernization theory expectations about democracy in Taiwan and South Korea were hopes, not known outcomes when engagement strategy was designed.
“important to remember they had not happened yet. When engagement, what became known as engagement was hammered out. We just had Kongju. the Taiwan uh had suspended the elections. It's a decade later. So getting the chronology right here when talking about what was known what were the priorities of the objectives”
The turning point in China's trajectory was Xi Jinping's ascension to power, after which he immediately began cracking down on media and eliminated editorials discussing the future of political reform, representing a deliberate reversal of the liberalizing trajectory visible in the 2008-2010 period.
“And I know you date you dated to 2010. Um, I think I can still look back and see a lot of of of dynamism um, in China's political, you know, and its polity. um even at that point but for me it was really Xiinping and then the crackdown on on you know from the minute he took power on the newspapers changing the editorials so there was no mention of the future of political reform”
The 2017 foreign NGO management law in China cut the number of foreign NGOs working in China from over 7,000 to under 500, eliminating the opportunities for engagement and cooperation that existed previously.
“You know, the law in 2017 on management of foreign NOS's literally, you know, cut the number of NOS's, foreign NOS's working in China from over 7,000 to under 500. So there's just not that opportunity to engage in the same way and not the opportunity for business to do business in China in the same way.”
There is no classified master document in the National Archives that explicitly lays out the engagement strategy; instead, it must be reconstructed from reading declassified documents from successive administrations, each with their own internal classified documents, but the core elements and tactics are discernible across all administrations from the 1970s onward.
“there is no classified master document in the national archives in Washington DC that lays out the engagement strategy. There's indeed an enormous debate about what the engagement strategy was and chapter one of the book explores that debate. there are some people in the audience who have been participants in that debate but um so there's each administration came along had their own internal classified documents but I think if you read them all and I trace in the book all these administrations through these were the core elements of the strategy and the tactics.”
Engagement was not just a formal government policy but a broad coalition in American society spanning government, states, businesses, NGOs, and educational institutions, all of which had stakes in and benefited from the strategy, making it politically sustainable through its elasticity and benefit distribution across constituencies.
“so that's what sustained engagement for three three four decades but um since over the last decade As I say, um, um, Xiinping has, make no mistake, it's Xiinping who has broken the engagement. The Chinese side has broken the engagement, this book argues. Um, and that argument echoes Susan Shur's own recent book, Overreach: How China Derailed Its Peaceful Rise. So Susan and I are analyzing the same phenomenon...the actual interest of different American actors which I collectively call the engagement coalition. Engagement was not just a policy. It was a broad gaga series broad coalition in our society and in our national government and amongst our states bought into this grand strategy of engagement. there was something in it um for everyone in fact that the elasticity you might say of the engagement strategy was its beauty and no foreign policy in the United States can be sustained without domestic buyin from different constituencies um so that's what sustained engagement for three three four decades”
American liberals have fundamentally encountered Chinese Leninism; American attempts to change China through engagement have failed, not due to flawed strategy but because the Chinese Communist Party has stubbornly resisted American attempts at transformational change, and the CCP views engagement tactics as subversive to its political system and power
“American liberalism has run into Chinese Leninism. That is and then and the Chinese have stubbornly resisted American attempts to change it. Now, one can certainly understand why if you look at it from the perspective of the CCP and Chinese side um because they see this strategy and these tactics as subversive to their political system and their power and their control.”
The engagement strategy had four core elements: modernize China economically and technologically, liberalize China politically and socially (distinguished from democratize), integrate and socialize China internationally into the postwar liberal order, and exchange people in multiple professions in both societies.
“US engagement strategies sought to in my view modernize China economically and technologically, liberalize China politically and socially. Notice I did not say democratize. I said liberalize. Difference to integrate and socialize China internationally into the postworld war II international liberal order. And fourthly to exchange people in multiple professions in both societies. What I call in the book engagement as process. So to repeat to modernize, liberalize, socialize and exchange with China.”
Over four decades from the 1980s through the 2010s, China won over America through its generally reformist domestic and foreign policies which coincided with America's premises and expectations of the engagement strategy, with the United States expectations being the independent variable and China's behavior the dependent variable in this relationship.
“over four decades from the 1980s through the 2010s, China won over America proverbally through its generally reformist domestic policies and foreign policies which coincided with America's the premises and expectations I should say of America's engagements strategy towards China. So the United States expectations um of China is the independent variable in this story. China's behavior uh is the dependent variable.”
The 2018 Hoover Task Force report on Chinese Influence and American Interest, co-led by Larry Diamond with participation by Liz Economy and Shambaugh himself, was the first serious investigation of Chinese influence operations and is now considered commonplace in policy discourse.
“And there's no better source on this than, in fact, the 2018 Hoover Task Force report that Larry Diamond co-led and Liz Economy and I were part of um um entitled Chinese Influence and American Interest. That was gosh, that was seven years ago, but that was really the first um serious investigation of this subject. Now it's considered rather um commonplace unfortunately.”
President Kennedy, eight days before his assassination on November 22, 1963, declared in his last press conference that the U.S. was not planning to trade with Red China given China's policies, but added 'if the red Chinese indicate a desire to live at peace with the United States and with other countries surrounding it, then quite obviously the United States would reappraise its policies' and 'we are not wedded to a policy of hostility to red China'
“eight days prior to his tragic assassination on November 14th, 1963 um in what turned out to be his last press conference in response to a journalist's question concerning the possibility of trade with China. Kennedy suddenly declared...quote, "We are not planning on trade with red China," as it was then known, in view of the policy that red China pursues. But if the red Chinese indicate a desire to live at peace with the United States and with other countries surrounding it, then quite obviously the United States would reappraise its policies. Last sentence, we are not wedded to a policy of hostility to red China," unquote”
In the 2008-2010 period, China exhibited an incredibly vibrant civil society with an internet alive with protests, entrepreneurs, human rights lawyers, and scholars meeting to discuss China's democratic future, with approximately 180,000 protests in 2010 around issues like environment and pensions, and individuals unaffiliated with the party running for local elections
“Um, and I think if you look back to that, um, 2008, 2009, even 2010 period, um, you saw in China an incredibly vibrant civil society, right? An internet that was alive with protests. You had uh entrepreneurs and human rights lawyers and um scholars meeting in these salons to talk about the future of democracy in China...you had what was it the count I think in 2010 was 180,000 protests right in China around issues like the environment um and pensions and and other things.”
Beginning around 2010, a wide variety of American actors—non-governmental organizations, journalists, US companies, foundations, universities, educational exchange organizations, the US embassy and consulates, and other American institutions—began to encounter considerably increased obstacles and impediments to their normal work in China
“beginning around 2010, a wide variety of American actors began to encounter considerably increased obstacles to their work in China. Non-governmental organizations, journalists, US companies, foundations, universities, and educational exchange organizations, US embassy and its consulates, and many other American actors. all. It's never been easy for any of these actors to work in China, but there was a um 2010 in retrospect was a turning point and after which all began to encounter increased impediments and obstacles to their normal work in the country.”
During the 1980s and from 1995 through 2010 (14 years), there was creeping liberalization in China under Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, with elements of civil society, media, rule of law emerging, which made Engagement (capital E) possible.
“all the elements that we saw appear in the 80s and then after the tenement hiatus beginning 1995 under Jang Zamin all the way through to 2010 that's when things changed as I say 2010 those were 14 years of creeping liberalization still under Jang Min and Huin Dao.”
When facts change, policy should change, as John Maynard Keynes said ('When the facts change I change my mind. What do you do, sir?'), but some people in the US including the 're-engagement school' haven't changed their minds despite the facts changing.
“Um not really. I thank you Tom for the observations. Um it just um was it John Maynard Kanes who said um when the facts change I change my mind. What do you do sir? Well there are some people in this country the re-engagement school I call them who haven't changed their minds even though the facts have changed but um I I agree with you Tom um about the chronology and so on.”
Elizabeth Economy adds that engagement to change China was not a continuous policy and that different tactical approaches (cooperative versus coercive) can elicit different Chinese responses, so even with constant expectations, the method of pursuing those expectations matters—Jay Ross Brown and Berlingame exemplify how tactical choices affect outcomes.
“And let me just say I think the expectations remain constant but I think as your book shows there is an oscillation between the containment and the engagement parts of this right and those two different policy approaches could yield different policy results coming out of China right so I mean even though the expectations remain constant when we change the way that we try to realize our objectives that can elicit different responses from China I just I just want to to Oriana's point I think there are we do do things differently at different points in time and the question then becomes is the Chinese response different as well to those different you know policies to realize our objectives that's where Jay Ross Brown and Berling game come right you know um coercive policies are not going to produce cooperation from the Chinese side yet our when we have more cooperative policies they see it as subversive too so we Americans can't win”
National security has become the number one priority of Xi Jinping himself, the Chinese Communist Party, and the Chinese government, and has overtaken development as the primary goal of the Chinese state; Xi has laid out a 'zongti anquan' (comprehensive concept of security) with no fewer than 22 categories including multiple sub-elements within each category
“National security has become the number one uh national priority of Xiinping himself of the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese government and has overtaken development as the primary goal of the Chinese state. Um and Xiinping has laid out a what he calls the uh zuni anuan the comprehensive um concept of of security which has no fewer than 22 categories including several sub elements within each category of national security.”
The British and European response to Tiananmen Square differed from the American response; while Americans wanted to 'slap them down and shame them and castigate them,' the British and Europeans, despite sharing the transformational change goal, chose to 'keep the door open' and maintain engagement even after the crackdown
“Interesting though, the British decided I came back, I said, well, look, this is not a good environment for exchanges. Um, but, uh, they wanted to keep the door open. Very interesting lesson I learned. The British were not as sort of punitive as Americans wanted to be. You know, we wanted, you know, to slap them down and shame them and castigate them as they deserved. But the British and the Europeans on the continent, interestingly, I learned because I was very involved with the commission, European Commission and others. Europeans had a different reaction to Tian even though they had the same transformative change China approach.”
A new counter-China coalition has replaced the engagement coalition, comprising many of the same actors but now aligned against rather than for engagement, representing a fundamental realignment of American political economy and interests concerning China.
“and has been replaced over the past decade by a new strategy of what I describe in the book as comprehensive competition and a new counter China coalition has replaced the engagement coalition. It's a broad coalition. Many actors are part of the new coalition as they were the old one.”
Engagement strategy was fundamentally a Cold War strategy developed when the Soviet Union was at its apex, designed to use China as a counterweight and then build openness after containment was addressed—the chronology matters for understanding what the original objectives were.
“this was fundamentally a cold war strategy in my view. We're running running out of time and and the the the point you both made is we can't go back to policies developed for a different time when the world is different, China's different, we're different.”
Shambaugh published an essay in the Wall Street Journal in 2015 whose misleading title caused him to be largely banned from substantive engagement in China for nine years thereafter
“in that year he published a little essay in the Wall Street Journal whose misleading title as he explains caused him to be largely banned from substantive engagement uh in China for nine years.”
Chinese politics since Deng Xiaoping has oscillated between fang (opening/relaxation) and suo (closing/tightening) cycles, typically lasting 7 years of fang followed by 1-2 years of suo, with this cycle repeated multiple times, but currently China is in year 13 of suo (closing), which is unprecedented and overdue for a reversal.
“students of Chinese politics um are familiar with the what's known as the fun show cycle. Fun show joti um fang is for open show is for close um and Chinese this was coined by former um UCLA professor Richard Bal and um if I'm not mistaken and argues that you know Chinese politics is since dung has oscillated back and forth between pong and show usually and it's Warren Cohen who actually counted this if I recall correctly seven years of pong and then there's a a kind of catharsis pull back for usually one to two years of show followed by seven six or seven more years of pong then one or two of show and this has been a repetitive process since the 1980s. So unfortunately right now we are in year 13 of show. China is overdue for a lot of fun and there are a lot of people inside the party not just in the civil society who so if Xiinping slips in the bathtub or whatever you know disappears from the scene tomorrow I will wager that the party will snap back to interesting”
Chinese politics has historically oscillated according to the 'fang-shou' (open-close) cycle identified by UCLA professor Richard Baum, with alternating periods of approximately 7 years of 'fang' (openness) followed by 1-2 years of 'shou' (closure); as of the discussion, China is in year 13 of 'shou' and is overdue for a return to 'fang', and there are many people inside the party (not just civil society) who support liberalization
“Students or scholars of Chinese politics um are familiar with the what's known as the fun show cycle. Fun show joti um fang is for open show is for close um and Chinese this was coined by former um UCLA professor Richard Bal and um if I'm not mistaken and argues that you know Chinese politics is since dung has oscillated back and forth between pong and show usually and it's Warren Cohen who actually counted this if I recall correctly seven years of pong and then there's a a kind of catharsis pull back for usually one to two years of show followed by seven six or seven more years of pong then one or two of show and this has been a repetitive process since the 1980s. So unfortunately right now we are in year 13 of show. China is overdue for a lot of fun and there are a lot of people inside the party not just in the civil society who”
In 2012, Xi Jinping came to power and over the last 13 years the trends and obstacles China's reformist policies had created have dramatically increased both domestically and externally, characterized by what international China specialists refer to as China's 'assertiveness' and 'wolf warrior' public diplomacy, with everything in China becoming increasingly securitized.
“But then in 2012 um Xiinping came to power and over the last 13 years these trends and obstacles have only dramatically increased domestically and externally with what international China uh specialists refer to as China's quote assertiveness and quote um wolf warrior public diplomacy. Everything in China has become increasingly securitized on Chen Hua Chinese over the past decade and this securitization has impacted a wide variety of American and other foreign actors inside of China.”
Shambo emphasizes that the third element in his analysis is agency: he is not a determinist, believing that both societies have big responsibility and agency to pull back and to construct various mechanisms to manage competition, preventing inevitability of conflict even over Taiwan, since there are other actors besides Washington and Beijing.
“So third question is about the third element is agency to avoid conflict. I am not a determinist. I think that this relationship and both societies have the responsibility big responsibility and they have the agency to pull back and to construct as I say various mechanisms to manage the competition. So that's where I am in my five schools. I'm a member of the comprehensive competition school and the manage competition school if you wonder. So I think that we aren't there's nothing inevitable about you know the the competition. it doesn't going to result in conflict even over Taiwan. There are other actors besides Washington and Beijing there.”
The core argument of the book is that over four decades from the 1980s through the 2010s, China won over America through its generally reformist domestic and foreign policies which coincided with and conformed to America's expectations and premises of engagement; when China's policies conformed with American expectations, cooperation and non-conflictual relations followed, but when China did not conform, frictions emerged
“the answer to these puzzles and the basic argument of my book is that over four decades from the 1980s through the 2010s, China won over America proverbally through its generally reformist domestic policies and foreign policies which coincided with America's the premises and expectations I should say of America's engagements strategy towards China...when China's policies and behavior conformed with American expectations, the two could cooperate and generally had non-conlictual relations. But when China did not conform to American expectations, frictions followed.”
Despite reduced access and constrained visibility into Chinese civil society under Xi, underlying desires for liberalization persist among the urban middle class, as evidenced by small-scale research by scholars like Jennifer Pan on urban middle-class Chinese attitudes, which shows they still desire rule of law, freedom of assembly, and free speech.
“And I think some of the smallcale research that people like Jennifer Pan does here like on on urban middle class Chinese you know suggests that there is still a desire you know within the middle class uh of China uh for and maybe this is the liberalization as opposed to democracy but the liberalization of the political system. They want the rule of law. They want the ability to assemble. They want free speech.”
The deeper the engagement and presence of each country in the other's society, the deeper the suspicions and the greater the frictions that emerged—a counterintuitive finding that contradicts the liberal assumption underlying engagement that deeper interaction would produce stronger cooperation.
“the deeper the engagement and the presence of each country in the other's society, the other's country, the deeper the suspicions and the greater the frictions that emerged. So this is this is counterintuitive and and an irony real irony because engagement was premised on the liberal assumption that the deeper and broader each side's presence in and interactions with the other the greater the cooperation and the stronger the relationship would be. All right. So, quite to the contrary”
Despite the structural problems in US-China relations, Shambaugh argues there is no inevitability of war—he rejects Allison's Thucydides trap thesis and instead believes agency exists for both societies to construct mechanisms managing competition and preventing escalation to military conflict.
“If by conflict you mean war... I would say conflict is war. Okay. As opposed to competition or an adversarial relationship is diff. So I don't see an inevitability of war. So I don't agree with Allison's book... I am not a determinist. I think that this relationship and both societies have the responsibility big responsibility and they have the agency to pull back and to construct as I say various mechanisms to manage the competition.”
The 2018 Hoover Task Force report entitled 'Chinese Influence and American Interest' (co-led by Larry Diamond with Shambaugh and Elizabeth Economy as participants) was the first serious investigation of Chinese influence operations in the United States, and what was then considered novel is now commonplace.
“And there's no better source on this than, in fact, the 2018 Hoover Task Force report that Larry Diamond co-led and Liz Economy and I were part of um um entitled Chinese Influence and American Interest. That was gosh, that was seven years ago, but that was really the first um serious investigation of this subject. Now it's considered rather um commonplace unfortunately.”
The banning or aggressive enforcement of restrictions on Chinese student visas to the United States is very mistaken, inappropriate, and counterproductive, as American educational exchanges represent one of the country's greatest soft power assets, and the U.S. has the wherewithal to monitor espionage on its campuses without resorting to blanket restrictions.
“Yes, I think that is very mistaken. very inappropriate mistaken and that is the ban or cancellation on the visas. Well, both I mean it's unclear what his policy on the visas exactly is. We're going to aggressively enforce. What does that mean? First of all, but no, I believe in the o our American open door policy in educational exchanges. That's one of our greatest ass soft power assets as a society. Um, and we have the wherewithal to monitor espionage in our society and on our campuses. Um, so, you know, throwing the baby out with the bathwater with that sort of ban, it's knee-jerk. It's it's just really uh unproductive and silly.”
During the 1960s, activist efforts in American society advocated for opening relations with communist China; key organizations mobilizing for this opening included the American Friends Service Committee (Quakers), the UN Association of the United States, League of Women Voters, the American Chamber of Commerce, and notable academics including Robert Scallopino, John King Fairbank, Alexander Eckstein, Doak Barnett, and Alan Whiting
“I also recount in that chapter that there were kind of activist efforts in the American society who were um agitating for or advocate I should say advocating for um some sort of relationship with um communist China, the the American Friends Service Committee, the Quakers, the UN Association of the United States, League of Women Voters, the American Chamber of Commerce, and several Notable academics uh notably Robert Scallopino, John King Fairbank, Alexander Xstein, Dope Barnett, Alan Whiting um were all instrumental and in the 60s we're talking about now here in um advocating for some olive branches, some opening to China.”
Despite reduced visibility of dissent and civil society due to stricter controls, different opinions and desires for political liberalization still exist within China, particularly among the urban middle class; research by scholars like Jennifer Pan shows that urban middle-class Chinese still express desire for rule of law, freedom of assembly, and free speech
“those differences of opinions still exist, right? And so just because what we have access to seems so much more constrained and limited, it doesn't mean that there aren't as many opinions, different opinions inside China as there are in the United States. And I think some of the smallcale research that people like Jennifer Pan does here like on on urban middle class Chinese you know suggests that there is still a desire you know within the middle class uh of China uh for and maybe this is the liberalization as opposed to democracy but the liberalization of the political system. They want the rule of law. They want the ability to assemble. They want free speech.”
Mutual securitization of the relationship by both the American and Chinese governments over the past decade has contributed significantly to the downward trajectory of the relationship, with both sides bearing some responsibility for this securitization
“Mutual securitization has definitely contributed to the downward trajectory of the relationship. I argue over the last 10 years both sides have done it. Both sides have some responsibility.”
Xi Jinping, not any external actor, has broken the engagement strategy; the Chinese side has broken engagement by pursuing policies that diverged from American expectations
“Xiinping has, make no mistake, it's Xiinping who has broken the engagement. The Chinese side has broken the engagement, this book argues. Um, and that argument echoes Susan Shur's own recent book, Overreach: How China Derailed Its Peaceful Rise.”
The transition from liberalization to crackdown under Xi Jinping was marked by the cessation of newspaper editorial mentions of political reform; whereas pre-2012 China showed dynamism in civil society, from the moment of Xi's accession editorial content shifted, eliminating discussion of the future of political reform
“for me it was really Xiinping and then the crackdown on on you know from the minute he took power on the newspapers changing the editorials so there was no mention of the future of political reform”
Shambaugh's view differs from Mearsheimer's in that while both acknowledge structural problems, Shambaugh believes engagement was a reasonable strategy—not naive or fundamentally mistaken—whereas Mearsheimer views engagement as inherently flawed from the start given structural constraints
“Absolutely. Yes. And I should have mentioned one other person, Erin Freriedberg. I associate myself with Freiriedberg's analyses too. Um more than mesh and you're quite right um Larry. Um so I I see agency. It could I agree with Condi, you know, it was not this was a good um strategy. It was a for various reasons and it simply didn't go the way the American side had anticipated or hoped. It's the Chinese side that after Xiinping that broke the engagement.”
Critics of engagement retrospectively argue that modernizing China created a peer competitor, liberalizing failed due to CCP resilience, socializing China internationally was only partially successful and increasingly seen as failure as China acts illiberally and revisionistically, and exchanges with China were hugely asymmetrical with little reciprocity—China gaining substantially more than Americans from exchanges.
“Now the critics uh of engagement retrospectively would argue modernized China why you're creating a peer competitor. Liberalize China, good luck. You've failed or we've failed because of the resilience and the strength of the Chinese Communist Party. Socialize China internationally partially successful, I would argue, but increasingly seen as a failure as China is acting in many more illiberal and and revisionist ways. Um and lastly, exchanges with China, critics would argue, hugely asymmetrical. There has been little reciprocity over the decades between the two sides. The Chinese have gained substantially more from exchanges than have Americans.”
Elizabeth Economy offers a counterpoint: Wang Jisi, a prominent Chinese scholar, stated in a 2018 Financial Times interview that for 200 years the U.S. has maintained a consistent strategic goal of free flow of goods, capital, and information/values; while the Chinese should criticize the U.S., they should recognize that 'China's own actions have changed Sino-U.S. relations and U.S. perceptions of China' and that 'if we are looking for the cause, it was the change in China's policy that led to adjustments in U.S. policy'
“Um, and I'm just going to read it to you and you can tell me later whether you agree or not. But here's what he says. Uh, for over 200 years, the US has never changed its strategic goal for its relationship with China. Free flow of goods and capital and free flow of information and values. Chinese have always had reservations or imposed boycots to oppose these two goals. We should criticize and have reason to criticize the US United States. But we should realize China's own actions have changed Sino US relations and US perceptions of China. Here he's speaking about the Xinping period. If we are looking for the cause, it was the change in China's policy that led to adjustments in US policy. US policy has changed because China changed.”
The peak of Cold War Soviet power was at a point that the US government 'didn't do so bad' in terms of dealing with the American security dimension before dealing with China; the US government role was minimal (just removing containment restrictions) while the private sector was unleashed to build contacts and trade in China as part of the implementation strategy of engagement.
“US government didn't do much except remove containment like restriction, but it said go ahead. The same for civil society in there and Oxenbergs build as many ties contacts as possible as a way of buttressing the relationships so they wouldn't all go bad at the same time. Uh that was a very persuasive argument uh to us... The unleashing of the American private sector basically to do its thing. That's the implementation strategy of engagement.”
The U.S.-China relationship is like a bad marriage where divorce is not an option; despite profound conflict, the U.S. and China 'have to figure out a way to coexist' because war over Taiwan or in the Indo-Pacific theater would be 'absolutely catastrophic,' requiring establishment of various management mechanisms, hotlines, and dialogue channels
“I tell my students, USChina relationship as bad as it gets. It's like a it's a a bad marriage where divorce is not an option. We have to figure out a way to coexist because war over Taiwan to begin with if not broad more broadly in the Indoacific theater is a possibility and it would be absolutely catastrophic. So we've got to figure out a way various mechanisms to remain I'm not going to say engaged because I don't like that you know to talk hotlines this that and the other thing but um you know we cannot just decouple and cut off this is not in our national interest and it's not feasible either.”
The American approach to China over several centuries is rooted in a longstanding and deeply embedded paternalistic missionary impulse to mold and shape China, with American attempts to change China far predating President Nixon's opening and dating back to the 1800s and the first two American ambassadors, Anson Burlingame and J. Ross Brown.
“to fully understand the rise and fall of the engagement strategy oops really requires I believe Recognizing the longstanding longstanding and deeply embedded paternalistic missionary impulse which was actually Warren Cohen's term originally to the missionary impulse to mold and shape China that lies at the core of the American approach to China over several centuries. Um, indeed, American attempts to shape, mold, and change China far predate President Nixon's opening. They date back to the 1800s, in fact. And the first two American ambassadors to China. On the left you have Anson Berlingame after whom Berlingame, California just north of here is named in case you local residents didn't know. He was the first American um ambassador um minister they call to to China um and his and subsequently J. Ross Brown who succeeded him.”
During the preface period, Shambaugh visited China at least once a year for professional purposes from 1979 to 2015 (36-37 years), traveled to 27 of China's 31 provinces, engaged party/government/military officials at multiple levels, lectured in Chinese and English to multiple audiences, and became one of the best-known American China scholars in China, also living off and on in China for a total of five years
“Professor Shamba visited China at least once a year for professional purposes for 35 years, 36 years from 1979 to 2015. Uh and in that year he published a little essay in the Wall Street Journal whose misleading title as he explains caused him to be largely banned from substantive engagement uh in China for nine years. And during those uh 36 years when he was traveling um uh to Beijing and other parts of China, he engaged party government and military officials at multiple levels. traveled to 27 of China's 31 provinces, lectured in Chinese and English to multiple audiences and became in China, I think one of the best known American scholars of China and of the US China relationship. Uh during that period, he also lived off and on in China for a total of five years.”
American liberalism has run into Chinese Leninism, and the Chinese have stubbornly resisted American attempts to change the system because from the CCP's perspective, the engagement strategy and its tactics are subversive to their political system and their power and control.
“So in short, what's happened here? American liberalism has run into Chinese Leninism. That is and then and the Chinese have stubbornly resisted American attempts to change it. Now, one can certainly understand why if you look at it from the perspective of the CCP and Chinese side um because they see this strategy and these tactics as subversive to their political system and their power and their control.”
Shambaugh argues that engagement was 'not naive' and 'not a mistake' but rather 'a gamble' and 'a bet' that 'could have gone either way'; if Chinese politics had gone a different direction (presumably toward greater liberalization), the bet might have worked out better; the failure was not inevitable but contingent on Chinese choices
“a lot of people think and you quote our own director of the Hoover Institution as saying she thinks that um our policy of engagement was not naive um and not a mistake. It was worth a try, right? It's just it was a bet. It was a gamble. It could have gone either way. Uh, and this kind of relates to the bigger question I want to ask. You know, if Chinese politics had gone a different way, the bet might have worked out better. It just didn't work out.”
Modernization theory as applied to China was pretty well correct, as evidenced by the explosion of civil society, growth of liberal aspirations, and possibilities for political change visible in China through 2010, with this trajectory suggesting that political transformation was a genuine possibility before Xi's reversal.
“I think it's not difficult to argue that modernization theory as applied to China was pretty well correct which is why you saw the explosion of civil society, the growth of more liberal uh aspirations, the possibilities for change uh and then this turning point moment where Xiinping came in and said either I'm going to crack down or Um, you know, thinking about your 2015 article, maybe this explains their explosive reaction to the title, the coming crackup of uh the CCP”
Over the past decade, Xi Jinping has broken the engagement; China's side has broken the engagement, and this argument echoes Susan Shirk's own recent book 'Overreach: How China Derailed Its Peaceful Rise,' with both authors analyzing the same phenomenon and arriving at similar conclusions.
“um, Xiinping has, make no mistake, it's Xiinping who has broken the engagement. The Chinese side has broken the engagement, this book argues. Um, and that argument echoes Susan Shur's own recent book, Overreach: How China Derailed Its Peaceful Rise. So Susan and I are analyzing the same phenomenon and um, coming out pretty much in the same place.”
American engagement strategy was not naive or a mistake but rather a gamble with reasonable strategic logic that could have gone either way depending on how Chinese politics evolved; it was a good strategy that simply did not produce the hoped-for outcomes due to Chinese political choices rather than fundamental flaws in the strategy itself.
“a lot of people think and you quote our own director of the Hoover Institution as saying she thinks that um our policy of engagement was not naive um and not a mistake. It was worth a try, right? It's just it was a bet. It was a gamble. It could have gone either way. Uh, and this kind of relates to the bigger question I want to ask. You know, if Chinese politics had gone a different way, the bet might have worked out better. It just didn't work out. I don't think that's Mirshimer's view...Absolutely. Yes. And I should have mentioned one other person, Erin Freriedberg. I associate myself with Freiriedberg's analyses too. Um more than mesh and you're quite right um um Larry. Um so I I see agency. It could I agree with Condi, you know, it was not this was a good um strategy. It was a for various reasons and it simply didn't go the way the American side had anticipated or hoped.”
Over the past decade, China's previously positive image amongst the American public has taken a steep decline, with more than 83% of Americans viewing China unfavorably as of 2024, 42% viewing it as an enemy, 50% as a competitor, and only 6% as a partner, according to Pew Research Center data
“China's previously positive image amongst the American public has taken a nose dive since uh 2012 or thereabouts to to today whereby last year in 2024 more than 80% as you can see from this first slide 80% of the American public view China unfavorably more than 80% 83 I think um moreover PE the Pew uh Pew data Pew Research Center and they found also last year that 40 42% now of the American public view China as an enemy. 50% see it as a competitor while only 6% see China as a partner.”
China's America watchers and the Chinese government have accepted zero blame for the deterioration of the relationship over the last decade; there has been no 'who lost America' debate in China comparable to the 'who lost China' debate in the U.S. after 1949; the Chinese side attributes 100% of the relationship's deterioration to American actions
“the short answer in short is a resounding no. um Chinese China these America watchers and the people who participate in this discourse in China accept zero blame for the deterioration of the relationship over the last decade and they believe and there has been no who lost America debate therefore as far as they're concerned um the deterioration of the relationship over the last 8 to 10 years is 100% the fault of the American side.”
The 2017 foreign NGO management law reduced the number of foreign NGOs operating in China from over 7,000 to under 500, dramatically curtailing the civil society engagement mechanisms that were central to the engagement strategy
“the law in 2017 on management of foreign NOS's literally, you know, cut the number of NOS's, foreign NOS's working in China from over 7,000 to under 500.”
The engagement strategy ran its course; the engagement coalition has crumbled and been replaced over the past decade by a new strategy of comprehensive competition and a new counter-China coalition comprising many of the same actors as the old coalition but now opposed to engagement
“the engagement strategy had run its course. The engagement coalition had crumbled and has been replaced over the past decade by a new strategy of what I describe in the book as comprehensive competition and a new counter China coalition has replaced the engagement coalition. It's a broad coalition. Many actors are part of the new coalition as they were the old one.”
China's image among the American public has sharply deteriorated since approximately 2012, with 83% of Americans viewing China unfavorably as of 2024, 42% viewing it as an enemy, 50% as a competitor, and only 6% as a partner, according to Pew Research Center data
“How is it that China's previously positive image amongst the American public has taken a nose dive since uh 2012 or thereabouts to to today whereby last year in 2024 more than 80% as you can see from this first slide 80% of the American public view China unfavorably more than 80% 83 I think um moreover PE the Pew uh Pew data Pew Research Center and they found also last year that 40 42% now of the American public view China as an enemy. 50% see it as a competitor while only 6% see China as a partner.”
Shambaugh opposes bans or aggressive cancellation of Chinese student visas to the United States; he believes such bans are 'very mistaken,' 'very inappropriate,' 'knee-jerk,' and 'unproductive and silly,' as they throw 'the baby out with the bathwater' when the U.S. has the capacity to monitor espionage on campuses; educational exchanges are 'one of our greatest soft power assets'
“I think that is very mistaken. very inappropriate mistaken and that is the ban or cancellation on the visas...I believe in the o our American open door policy in educational exchanges. That's one of our greatest ass soft power assets as a society. Um, and we have the wherewithal to monitor espionage in our society and on our campuses. Um, so, you know, throwing the baby out with the bathwater with that sort of ban, it's knee-jerk. It's it's just really uh unproductive and silly.”
The engagement strategy should be distinguished between capital-E engagement (engagement with the regime) and small-e engagement (engagement between the two societies), and while capital-E engagement with the CCP regime has run its course given the regime's securitization and Xi's reversal of liberalization, small-e societal engagement through dialogue and connectivity remains vital and should continue despite increased obstacles.
“But liberalization, civil societ, all the elements that we saw appear in the 80s and then after the tenement hiatus beginning 1995 under Jang Zamin all the way through to 2010 that's when things changed as I say 2010 those were 14 years of creeping liberalization still under Jang Min and Huin Dao. So as long as the Chinese were um liberalizing politically allowing those sorts of elements of civil society, media, rule of law, then the Americans can can work with that regime with the capital and engagement with a capital E, which is with the regime. Engagement with a small E, you're quite right, is between the two societies. So these aren't mutually exclusive. I'm glad you posed the question. And I just want to be clear here that we need to have small e engagement. Absolutely. And we need dialogues. We need various uh connectivity between our two societies.”
Deng Xiaoping's 1989 decision to use military force to suppress the Tiananmen demonstrations was not surprising because the CCP had experienced four decades of brutal internal repression before 1989, and Deng perceived the student movement as a repeat of the Cultural Revolution and an existential political crisis requiring coercive rather than dialogue-based responses.
“I have to say and I said so at the time because I think Dong saw a repeat of the cultural revolution and the red guards right there in the same place in Tianaan Square and that the regime he saw it in in survi regime survival terms and it was an existential politically existential crisis for him and the Chinese communist party and he did not opt for the jaozion approach to talk to the students. Um and he finally opted for the coercive approach. Um so you know what can one say? But it wasn't a great shock. Many people were shocked. No no I get it. The CCP had been through four decades of brutal repression of their society prior. And this wasn't the first time the PLA had killed Chinese. So no it was not a big surprise to me.”
The appendix of the book examines China's 'America watchers'—China's own specialists on the United States—and their understanding of the engagement policy and explanations for the deterioration of the relationship; Shambaugh found an 'abysmal and shocking intelligence failure' among these specialists who failed to anticipate the significant shifts in American society, government, and thinking about China during the Obama years prior to Trump's policy shift
“I found in fact that these so-called America watchers or America's specialists um you can watch without being a specialist. Um this I found an abysmal and shocking intelligence failure on China's on the part of these individuals who were supposedly the best China had. They totally failed to anticipate and understand the significant shifts occurring in American society, government and thinking about China during the Obama years prior to the shift in policy under Trump.”
Critics of engagement retrospectively argue: modernizing China produced a peer competitor; liberalizing China was a failure due to the resilience of the CCP; socializing China internationally has been only partially successful and increasingly seen as a failure; and exchanges were asymmetrical with little reciprocity, with Chinese gaining substantially more than Americans.
“Now the critics uh of engagement retrospectively would argue modernized China why you're creating a peer competitor. Liberalize China, good luck. You've failed or we've failed because of the resilience and the strength of the Chinese Communist Party. Socialize China internationally partially successful, I would argue, but increasingly seen as a failure as China is acting in many more illiberal and and revisionist ways. Um and lastly, exchanges with China, critics would argue, hugely asymmetrical. There has been little reciprocity over the decades between the two sides. The Chinese have gained substantially more from exchanges than have Americans.”
Shambaugh believes there are deeper forces beyond the president in shaping China policy, including figures like Matt Pottinger who captured China policy during the first Trump administration and drove it forward with others, and it is too early to assess Trump 2.0
“I think there are deeper forces than the president himself and we saw during the first Trump administration those forces Matt Puttinger in particular captured China policy and drove it along with others and I give Matt great credit in fact for what he did and I discuss um his role extensively in the book. So, it's too early to say, I think, in this this Trump 2.0, um, where they're going. Um, and, uh, you see a kind of tension.”
The CCP sublimated its deep fears of peaceful evolution during the reform period because they perceived larger benefits to be gained from the engagement relationship; this fear has always been beneath the surface and episodically re-emerged, driving periodic CCP crackdowns
“the Chinese communists sublimated their fears of the of peaceful evolution because they had larger benefits to be gained from the relationship but it's always been under the surface and popping up.”
Shambaugh distinguishes between engagement with a capital 'E' (strategic cooperation between U.S. and Chinese governments) and engagement with a lowercase 'e' (society-to-society ties); capital-E engagement may be finished, but lowercase-e engagement between societies remains necessary and should continue to prevent the worst-case scenario (Graham Allison's outcome)
“So as long as the Chinese were liberalizing politically allowing those sorts of elements of civil society, media, rule of law, then the Americans can can work with that regime with the capital and engagement with a capital E, which is with the regime. Engagement with a small E, you're quite right, is between the two societies. So these aren't mutually exclusive. I'm glad you posed the question. And I just want to be clear here that we need to have small e engagement. Absolutely. And we need dialogues. We need various uh connectivity between our two societies. That's the best way to prevent a Graham Allison kind of outcome.”
Economy asks whether the book presents inevitable conflict between US and China, distinguishing this from structural realist analyses (Allison, Mearsheimer) and ideological conflict analyses (Pottinger, Doshi), and wondering how Shambo positions himself against these other frameworks.
“I I think I wonder how you um see the inevitability of conflict. I think one of the things that struck me initially was that this book was so much more than you know an effort by Graham Allison or you know Mirshimer and that sort of structural realist analysis right but there is that inevitability of conflict that both of them see and it's more than a sort of Matt Pottinger and Rush Doshi ideological conflict makes all of this inevitable but there are some elements of all of this in your book and I'm wondering how do you position yourself, not so much in the schools of thought that you uh put out there, but in terms of the literature, how do you think of this book uh positioned against these other kinds of of arguments?”
The U.S.-China relationship can be conceptualized as a dance in which the United States is most often leading with China following, at some points the two are perfectly in sync, but at other times the United States comes on too strong and China pushes back, and the U.S. feels rejected, describing what Shambaugh calls the oscillating pattern of engagement, disillusionment, and re-engagement.
“I had the sense of a dance actually between the United States and China and a dance in which the United States is most often leading with China following and at some points the two are perfectly in sync but at other times the United States comes on too strong and China pushes back and then the US feels rejected you know and this in some respect I think describes uh what David calls this oscillating pattern of engagement, disillusionment and then re-engagement.”
Xi Jinping's concern about losing the younger generation to liberalization, as documented in Joseph Tignor's book on Xi Jangshun (Xi's father) and the party's priorities, suggests Xi sees generational vulnerability as requiring an active propaganda and mobilization campaign to retain the loyalty of young Chinese.
“uh moreover that you cannot lose the younger generation. Okay. And so it's very clear now that one of the things that Xiinping has embarked upon maybe with the fingers in the dyke to hold back modernization theory is a propaganda and mobilization campaign for the younger generation.”
China has milked engagement for its own benefit while sublimating its fears of peaceful evolution because larger benefits from the relationship convinced it to cooperate despite the underlying assumption that American engagement was subversive—but once those benefits diminished under Xi Jinping, the underlying suspicions resurfaced and overrode cooperation.
“so they have taken by taking advantage of Americans America's you know perhaps naive laress China has milked engagement for its own benefit many American constituencies um all bought into the strategy as I say this was the beauty of of the strategy it was elastic it gave farmers and different parts of our society um a stake stakehold they became stakeholders in the coalition so this is how China won America and many other European, Asian and other nations have all accepted all accepted this strategic policy logic and they pursued their own versions of engagement uh with China. Okay. So um but I think so that's a kind of summary of the core argument of the book. Um but to fully understand the rise and fall of the engagement strategy oops really requires I believe Recognizing the longstanding longstanding and deeply embedded paternalistic missionary impulse”
Wang Yizhou, a Chinese scholar, stated in a 2018 Financial Times interview that for over 200 years the US has maintained consistent strategic goals of free flow of goods, capital, information and values, and that China's actions—not US policies—have caused the relationship shift, suggesting this Chinese scholar agrees with Shambaugh's argument.
“a quotation um by Wangisa uh from an interview that he did. I think it was in 2018 in the Financial Times... for over 200 years, the US has never changed its strategic goal for its relationship with China. Free flow of goods and capital and free flow of information and values. Chinese have always had reservations or imposed boycots to oppose these two goals... But we should realize China's own actions have changed Sino US relations and US perceptions of China... If we are looking for the cause, it was the change in China's policy that led to adjustments in US policy. US policy has changed because China changed.”
The U.S.-China relationship is best understood as a bad marriage where divorce is not an option, and thus the two countries must figure out a way to coexist rather than pursuing either complete decoupling or conflict, because war over Taiwan or more broadly in the Indo-Pacific would be absolutely catastrophic.
“I tell my students, USChina relationship as bad as it gets. It's like a it's a a bad marriage where divorce is not an option. We have to figure out a way to coexist because war over Taiwan to begin with if not broad more broadly in the Indoacific theater is a possibility and it would be absolutely catastrophic. So we've got to figure out a way various mechanisms to remain I'm not going to say engaged because I don't like that you know to talk hotlines this that and the other thing but um you know we cannot just decouple and cut off this is not in our national interest and it's not feasible either.”
Shambo believes it would behoove the Chinese side to read his book to better understand the profound changes in American policies and perspectives and China's own agency and role in those changes, though he hardly anticipates a Chinese translation of the book.
“I think this book would it would behoove the Chinese side to read this book to better understand the profound changes in American policies and perspectives and China's own agency and role therein. Um but I'm hardly anticipating a Chinese translation of the book.”
Trump, in contrast to all previous presidents, does not appear to possess the impulse to change China politically or bring it into the international system, representing an aberration from the consistent American desire to transform China
“President Trump himself is an aberration from all these previous presidents who did have a transformational vision of China to some extent. Um but the uh transformational vision um is um apparent to me in his administration particularly Secretary of State Rubio”
Shambaugh characterizes the U.S.-China relationship as one of indefinite comprehensive competitive rivalry (ICCR), which is intrinsically competitive, comprehensive in scope, represents a classic great power rivalry, and is indefinite in temporal duration, meaning it will be with the United States and China for a very long time.
“I argue that the USChina relationship is in my view now characterized indefinite comprehensive competitive rivalry which makes for a very bad acronym iiker or something indefinite comprehensive competitive rivalry. you know, intrinsically competitive, comprehensive in scope, um, a classic great power rivalry and indefinite in temporal nature. It will be with us folks for a very long time.”
China's America-watchers—specialists who study the United States—made an abysmal and shocking intelligence failure by totally failing to anticipate and understand the significant shifts occurring in American society, government, and thinking about China during the Obama years prior to the Trump policy shift.
“I found in fact that these so-called America watchers or America's specialists um you can watch without being a specialist. Um this I found an abysmal and shocking intelligence failure on China's on the part of these individuals who were supposedly the best China had. They totally failed to anticipate and understand the significant shifts occurring in American society, government and thinking about China during the Obama years prior to the shift in policy under Trump.”
The engagement strategy had four core elements: (1) to modernize China economically and technologically; (2) to liberalize China politically and socially (not democratize); (3) to integrate and socialize China into the post-World War II liberal international order; and (4) to exchange people in multiple professions across both societies
“US engagement strategies sought to in my view modernize China economically and technologically, liberalize China politically and socially. Notice I did not say democratize. I said liberalize. Difference to integrate and socialize China internationally into the postworld war II international liberal order. And fourthly to exchange people in multiple professions in both societies. What I call in the book engagement as process. So to repeat to modernize, liberalize, socialize and exchange with China. Those are the four core elements as I see it of and goals of engagement.”
Shambaugh positions himself with the 'comprehensive competition school' and the 'manage competition school'; he rejects the 'Stealth Rival' school (which sees China as having a secret grand strategy to undermine the U.S.), the 're-engagement school' (which advocates returning to the old strategy), and the 'strategic empathy school' (which emphasizes understanding China's insecurities); his own position is 'assertive competition' and 'competitive coexistence'
“So I'm a member of the comprehensive competition school and the manage competition school if you wonder. So I think that we aren't there's nothing inevitable about you know the the competition. it doesn't going to result in conflict even over Taiwan...I'm not a determinist and I think if we with some you know smart people and patience and we can kind of find some more temporary equilibrium before it reverts to the mean.”
The 'Re-engagement' school argues that the United States should get back to the old engagement strategy, that it should never have abandoned engagement under Trump and Biden, that the old strategy still serves US well, that China is not an adversary or even competitor, and that the US needs to take a deep breath, re-extend the hand to Beijing, and re-engage with the Chinese side.
“those who argue that the United States simply needs to get back to the old engagement strategy. They should should never have abandoned it under Trump and Biden in the first place. The old strategy still serves the US well, that China is not an adversary or even a competitor of the United States and the US needs to kind of take a deep breath, re-extend the hand to Beijing and re-engage with the Chinese side.”
On June 4, 1989 (today in this June 4, 2024 event), Shambo reflects that he was watching the Tiananmen crackdown on television from London, where he was in his second year at SOAS (School of Oriental and African Studies), and found himself in TV studios for six weeks trying to interpret what was happening, but was not surprised by the Leninist response under Deng Xiaoping.
“I remember one year ago today sitting in the Staler auditorium with a wonderful session that you organized with Perry Link and others to commemorate this tragic event. Um so I was in fact uh living in in London, England at the time. I was uh my first position at at SOASS. It was my second year there and um watch right watching this on television in the UK and being on television. I had never been on television before that period. But I found myself living in TV studios for six weeks trying to interpret what was going on and this and that.”
From the Chinese perspective, the downturn in relations began around 1989 because it looked like a repeat of the Cultural Revolution with foreign manipulation (the 'black hand of the United States') intervening and exploiting vulnerabilities inherent in connections that came about because of engagement.
“I absolutely agree that the the downturn, the difficulties arise from Chinese decisions and actions. And I would date it slightly earlier than 2010. But from a Chinese perspective, it was beginning to look a lot like 19889, 2009. Um, and part of that was the black hand of the United States intervening and exploiting vulnerabilities inherent in connections which come about because of engagement.”
The American government has securitized the U.S.-China relationship in response to Chinese securitization, and mutual securitization has definitely contributed to the downward trajectory of the relationship over the last 10 years, with both sides bearing some responsibility.
“So the American government as a consequence has also securitized the relationship. Mutual securitization has definitely contributed to the downward trajectory of the relationship. I argue over the last 10 years both sides have done it. Both sides have some responsibility.”
The U.S.-China relationship is now characterized by 'indefinite comprehensive competitive rivalry' (ICCR)—intrinsically competitive, comprehensive in scope, a classic great power rivalry, and indefinite in temporal nature; this condition will persist for a very long time
“I um uh lay it out in chapter nine and for a future American China polic uh strategy and policies and I proceed from my premises that the USChina relationship is in my view now characterized indefinite comprehensive competitive rivalry which makes for a very bad acronym iiker or something indefinite comprehensive competitive rivalry. you know, intrinsically competitive, comprehensive in scope, um, a classic great power rivalry and indefinite in temporal nature. It will be with us folks for a very long time.”
Ironically, the deeper the engagement and presence of each country in the other's society, the deeper the suspicions and greater the frictions that emerged, contrary to the liberal assumption that deeper interaction would produce greater cooperation
“the deeper the engagement and the presence of each country in the other's society, the other's country, the deeper the suspicions and the greater the frictions that emerged. So this is this is counterintuitive and and an irony real irony because engagement was premised on the liberal assumption that the deeper and broader each side's presence in and interactions with the other the greater the cooperation and the stronger the relationship would be.”
There are people inside the Chinese Communist Party (not just civil society) who blame Xi Jinping for the deterioration of the relationship, but they cannot have an open 'who lost America' debate because of the censored media system, showing that dissent exists in China even if not publicly visible.
“And I just want to be clear here that we need to have small e engagement. Absolutely. And we need dialogues. We need various uh connectivity between our two societies. That's the best way to prevent a Graham Allison kind of outcome. Um so and many Chinese, you're also quite right, uh that we know, um blame their side. They can't have an open who lost America debate because of their censored system. But I've had personal conversations with including one year ago now in Beijing with people who blame behind closed doors Xiinping for um their role in the deterioration of the relationship.”
Engagement was not merely a policy but a broad coalition encompassing American government, states, businesses, universities, NGOs, and civil society, each with its own stake in the relationship; this elasticity and the diversity of stakeholder interests across multiple sectors was the beauty and strength of the engagement strategy, allowing it to sustain itself for three to four decades
“the actual interest of different American actors which I collectively call the engagement coalition. Engagement was not just a policy. It was a broad gaga series broad coalition in our society and in our national government and amongst our states bought into this grand strategy of engagement. there was something in it um for everyone in fact that the elasticity you might say of the engagement strategy was its beauty and no foreign policy in the United States can be sustained without domestic buyin from different constituencies um so that's what sustained engagement for three three four decades”
The book proposes five schools of thought on American China policy: (1) stealthy rival—China has secret strategy to replace US as world power, (2) comprehensive competition—US locked in zero-sum competition requiring offense across security, diplomacy, commerce, technology, (3) re-engagement—US should return to old strategy, (4) strategic empathy—China reacting to US aggression and needs understanding, and (5) manage competition—compete assertively but with guard rails and dialogue mechanisms.
“First is the what I call the stealthy rival school... Second school I distinguish is what I call the comprehensive competition school... Third school I identify as is what I call the re-engagement school... Then there is a group I call the strategic empathy school... then lastly is what I call the manage competition school”
Secretary of State Marco Rubio has a distinguished and deep understanding of China from his service in Congress; he has done extensive work to educate himself on China policy and has worked 'with his fingernails dirty in the garden,' developing substantial expertise
“there was no member of Congress on either in the House or the Senate who had a better more granular understanding of China than Marco Rubio. He's for during his service. He he gets it. He's done his time. His fing fingernails in the garden, China garden are dirty. He has worked hard to educate himself”
Shambaugh's 2015 Wall Street Journal article had a misleading title that caused him to be largely banned from substantive engagement in China for nine years, suggesting that media representation of views can have significant consequences for scholarly access and engagement.
“In that year he published a little essay in the Wall Street Journal whose misleading title as he explains caused him to be largely banned from substantive engagement uh in China for nine years.”
There is no single classified master document in the U.S. national archives that explicitly lays out the engagement strategy; instead, each administration produced internal classified documents, but analysis across administrations reveals consistent core elements and tactics
“there is no classified master document in the national archives in Washington DC that lays out the engagement strategy. There's indeed an enormous debate about what the engagement strategy was and chapter one of the book explores that debate...so there's each administration came along had their own internal classified documents but I think if you read them all and I trace in the book all these administrations through these were the core elements of the strategy and the tactics.”
Shambaugh increasingly appreciates and associates himself with John Mearsheimer's structural realist analysis; upon first hearing Mearsheimer's 'Tragedy of Great Powers' thesis at the Wilson Center, Shambaugh thought it 'the craziest thing I'd ever heard,' but has come to view him as prescient and careful; the problems in U.S.-China relations are structural, ideological, and culturally embedded
“over time I have to say I have come to um appreciate and associate myself with Mir Shimemer more and more. When he first came out with his tragedy of great powers book I was in the audience at the Wilson Center. I thought it was the craziest thing I'd ever heard. But I have to say the more I've listened to him and I think he was preient and I think he's a careful scholar. It's structural argument. The problems in USChina relations are structural. They're ideological and they're embedded culturally too.”
Shambaugh visited China at least once a year for professional purposes for 35-36 years from 1979 to 2015, traveled to 27 of China's 31 provinces, lectured in Chinese and English to multiple audiences, engaged party, government, and military officials at multiple levels, and lived off and on in China for a total of five years, making him one of the best-known American scholars of China and the U.S.-China relationship within China.
“Professor Shamba visited China at least once a year for professional purposes for 35 years, 36 years from 1979 to 2015. Uh and in that year he published a little essay in the Wall Street Journal whose misleading title as he explains caused him to be largely banned from substantive engagement uh in China for nine years. And during those uh 36 years when he was traveling um uh to Beijing and other parts of China, he engaged party government and military officials at multiple levels. traveled to 27 of China's 31 provinces, lectured in Chinese and English to multiple audiences and became in China, I think one of the best known American scholars of China and of the US China relationship. Uh during that period, he also lived off and on in China for a total of five years.”
Shambaugh personally experienced the 2010 turning point as a senior Fulbright scholar at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Institute of World Economics and Politics while researching his book 'China Goes Global,' when the Chinese Academy did very little to facilitate his research, serving as a harbinger of things to come in the academic domain.
“I personally experienced it too. I was a senior fullulbright scholar at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Institute of World Economics and Politics that year trying to research my book China Goes Global. But the Chinese Academy did very little to help facilitate that research. Uh so it was a kind of harbinger of things to come in the in the academic domain.”
Secretary of State Marco Rubio has a deep, granular understanding of China, with a distinguished track record and being arguably the member of Congress with the best understanding of China during his service, having spent extensive time and effort educating himself on China policy, though some of his tactical approaches may be inappropriate.
“Um but the uh transformational vision um is um apparent to me in his administration particularly Secretary of State Rubio and he has a long track record and a distinguished one I would argue. In fact I would go so far as to say there was no member of Congress on either in the House or the Senate who had a better more granular understanding of China than Marco Rubio. He's for during his service. He he gets it. He's done his time. His fing fingernails in the garden, China garden are dirty. He has worked hard to educate himself”
Shambaugh was dispatched by the British Academy three weeks after Tiananmen to assess whether the situation would permit continuation of scholarly exchanges; he found the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences occupied by the PLA, society traumatized, and martial law in place; he and his wife subsequently lived in China for six months
“Well, uh, Academy of Social Sciences was literally occupied by the PLA and, um, everybody was traumatized. Martial law was in place and then my wife and I went back and lived there for the subsequent six months.”
Shambaugh explicitly saved President Reagan's life from a possible assassination attempt during Reagan's 1984 state visit to China; while he does not elaborate in the discussion, he teases this as a 'real empirical story' that might incentivize readers to purchase the book
“Maybe an incentive to go to the back and buy a copy at the end or um but there's a real story there. Real empirical story. There may also be some surprises for for readers like how I might have saved President Reagan's life from a possible assassination attempt in during his state visit to China in 1984.”
The book contains an autobiographical essay in which Shambaugh includes what he teases as a 'real empirical story' about how he may have saved President Reagan's life from a possible assassination attempt during Reagan's 1984 state visit to China
“There may also be some surprises for for readers like how I might have saved President Reagan's life from a possible assassination attempt in during his state visit to China in 1984. Let me just tease you with that. But there's a real story there. Real empirical story.”
Shambaugh finished writing the last chapter and appendix of his book exactly one year before the event (one year prior to June 2024, or June 2023), working at Hoover Institution as a distinguished visiting fellow on sabbatical from George Washington University, finishing at the Herbert Hoover Memorial Building (HHMB)
“It was exactly one year ago. Um I was um at the nearing the end of a truly productive half year here as a distinguished visiting fellow during sbatical from my home institution at George Washington uh University. And I was literally um I was at my glued to my desk across the courtyard here in the Herbert Hoover Memorial Building, HHMB as it's commonly known around here, finishing the last chapter in the appendix of the book. That was one year ago. Here we are, fast forward 365 days and it exists.”
Elizabeth Economy argues the book is both analytically rigorous and engagingly written, offering a fresh perspective and distinctive argument that cuts through noise and opinion with real scholarship, and serves both as a richly detailed historical account and as a contemporary guide to policy and understanding
“Um, why do I say David a great book? Um, I think it's analytically rigorous. uh he offers a fresh perspective and a distinctive argument and it is really engagingly written and that in this day and age is not that easy to do.”
Elizabeth Economy views Shambaugh's book as 'analytically rigorous,' offering a 'fresh perspective and distinctive argument' that is 'engagingly written,' cutting through contemporary noise to provide deeply researched scholarship grounded in facts and informed analysis
“David has in fact written a great book...I think it's analytically rigorous. uh he offers a fresh perspective and a distinctive argument and it is really engagingly written...he's cut through the noise uh and really produced a deeply researched uh study that is grounded in facts and informal analysis.”
The book is 'two books in one'—the first part is a richly detailed history of the U.S. approach to China focusing on the missionary impulse and the ongoing battle between containment and engagement narratives, while other books have covered this history but Shambaugh uniquely elevates the continuities through detailed quotations and historical moments across both U.S. and Chinese responses
“the book is actually I would argue two books in one and I think some of that came through in in David's presentation but the first part or first book of in some sense is really a very richly detailed history um of the US uh approach to China and I think you know he talked about the deep roots um of the sort of missionary impulse in the United States...what David does differently is really elevate I think and offer um a lot of examples both in terms of quotations um uh but also sort of historical moments that really elevate the continuities uh uh throughout history”
The book's second part provides exposition of all the actors and interests shaping U.S. policy, how the Chinese respond, and the disillusionment that follows, showing how China alienated both the national government in Washington and American society outside Washington, causing China to lose America across multiple sectors and constituencies
“Then the second part of your book as you described is really just um a terrific exposition of all the actors and interests and debates that are shaping US policy how the Chinese respond and then that sort of disillusionment um uh that follows. So that also has that element of of a dance. And then finally, I think what makes this book, you know, so distinctive and special is really the storytelling.”
Some Trump administration tactics regarding China are 'inexcusable and inappropriate,' though Shambaugh declines to specify or elaborate which tactics, stating he prefers not to speculate about future events as a scholar rather than pundit
“from what we can tell, and believe me, some of the tactics that he is using are are are inexcusable and inappropriate and um but you know, um I think we see snippets.”