The Future of the Aircraft Carrier - New Threats, Power Projection & Growing Fleets

China acquired an old Soviet Kuznetsov-class carrier hull as an apparent floating casino in 1998 for 20 million dollars, underwent complex international negotiations to transit the Dardanelles, lost its tow in a storm costing a sailor's life, circumnavigated Africa rather than using Suez Canal, and rebuilt it into the Liaoning to gain carrier operating experience, demonstrating both how nations acquire carrier capability and the complications of the process.

“In 1998 it was actually Ukraine that put up a rusting aircraft carrier hull for auction. A company subsequently bought it for about 20 million US dollars, claiming that their plan was to tow it to Macau and convert it into a floating hotel and casino...Having bought the ship, protracted negotiations with Türkiye were needed in order to get permission to pass through the Dardanelles...Only to then lose its tow in a storm 3 days later, an accident which cost a sailor their life. Finally, because you're not allowed to take unpowered vessels through the Suez Canal, this carrier had to go the long way. Being towed through the Strait of Gibraltar, down south around Africa, and then finally to China.”

Authorizing multiple carriers in advance (block-buy) allows significant cost savings through shipyard planning and supply chain optimization, as demonstrated by US authorization of USS Enterprise and USS Doris Miller in 2019, which cut approximately 247 million dollars off Enterprise's cost and 2.64 billion off Doris Miller's cost compared to single-ship procurement.

“For fiscal year 2019 the US Congress authorised funding for two carriers at the same time, CVN 80 USS Enterprise and CVN 81 USS Doris Miller. The two ships would be built in sequence with Enterprise being delivered in 2028 and Doris Miller being delivered in 2032. But according to the CRS, just that simple act of authorising the ships in advance allowed the US to realise significant savings. Cutting about $247 million off the cost of Enterprise and 2.64 billion off the cost of Doris Miller.”

For anti-ship ballistic missiles to successfully destroy a carrier, a complete 'kill chain' must succeed: the carrier must be located and positively identified thousands of kilometers away, accurate targeting information must be maintained as the carrier maneuvers, this information must be communicated to decision-makers and missile operators quickly, and the missiles must penetrate carrier strike group defenses—if any link in this chain fails, the attack fails.

“in order to kill a target with a missile you first need to find it. And while an aircraft carrier is big, the ocean is bigger and a carrier tends to move. So you need a system that can identify a carrier thousands of kilometres away from your own shore line, positively identify it as a carrier, and then maintain an accurate enough track on it that you can actually task a weapon against it.”

Nuclear-powered carriers require refueling intervals of 20-25 years and offer more endurance and horsepower per displacement, while conventional carriers are cheaper upfront but require frequent fuel resupply (roughly monthly at efficient cruising speed) and impose logistical constraints on operations.

“The refuelling interval for a nuclear aircraft carrier will usually be somewhere between 20 and 25 years. And there will be fewer logistical consequences if you need to push the ship closer to its maximum speed for protracted periods.”

The F-14 Tomcat, contrary to popular perception from Top Gun films emphasizing dogfighting, was actually a long-range high-speed interceptor designed to carry the AIM-54 Phoenix air-to-air missile with range comparable to modern European Meteor missiles, providing air defense against Soviet long-range anti-ship aircraft.

“If you've watched a full allotment of Top Gun films, you might associate the F-14 Tomcat with close-range dogfights and shooting down Su-57s using its gun. In reality, Tomcat was a very heavy, long-range high-speed interceptor capable of carrying the very long range AIM-54 Phoenix air-to-air missile...The thing was an absolute chonker, almost three times the mass of the AIM-120. And despite entering service in the 1970s had a maximum theoretical range more akin to the modern Meteor from Europe as opposed to any of its other American contemporaries.”

Aircraft carriers provide multiple distinct military functions simultaneously: they increase fleet awareness through reconnaissance, provide air defense for the strike group, enable long-range offensive power projection, and serve as force multipliers that increase the combat capability of supporting surface and subsurface units.

“For fleets that operate them, carriers tend to be the centrepiece of naval task forces. They increase the awareness of the fleet by launching reconnaissance aircraft and helicopters, provide air defence using their on-board fighters, and in some cases add other functions like jamming and electronic warfare. Much of the rest of the carrier strike group in turn will act to defend the carrier.”

The Gerald R. Ford-class carrier was originally scheduled to begin full deployment in 2017 but was delayed until May 2023 primarily because the ship's 11 advanced weapon elevators were not functional at commissioning, with only 2 of 11 certified operational by early 2019 and certification not completed until 2021, demonstrating risk in fielding new ship classes.

“The Gerald Ford was commissioned into the United States Navy in July 2017. In early 2019, two of those 11 weapon elevators were certified and operational. By April of 2020 that number was up to 5 out of 11, with number 6 certifying in July of 2020, 3 years after the ship's original commissioning...The Ford would finally begin its first full-length deployment in May 2023.”

Catapult-assisted aircraft launch systems are expensive and complex but enable carriers to operate a wider array of aircraft types with larger payloads in energy-efficient manner, while short take-off and vertical-landing designs limit operators to high thrust-to-weight ratio aircraft like fighters with payload restrictions.

“The solution, if you actually want to operate a wide array of aircraft with large payloads in an energy efficient manner (for the aircraft that is) is to find a way for the ship to help impart extra energy to the aircraft while it's taking off. This is achieved through the use of a catapult. Basically a catapult structure is built into the deck, an aircraft is secured to it, and then using either steam or electro-magnetic propulsion, the carrier basically yeets the aircraft off the flight deck. These systems can be expensive, technically complex and difficult to maintain, but you get more options when it comes to air wing composition and payload.”

Communicating targeting information from sensor to decision-maker to shooter in real time over thousands of kilometers is not straightforward, as shown by Ukrainian experience where the Russian military still struggles to reliably hit moving targets behind the lines after 600+ days of war.

“Now to someone used to playing strategy games this might sound like the simplest step. An enemy unit appears, you right click it, it ceases to be. But as we've seen in Ukraine, this sort of networking and tasking isn't easy. More than 600 days in, the Russian military still struggles to reliably hit moving targets behind the lines.”

A full-sized fleet aircraft carrier costs approximately the entire GDP of Madagascar (about 5.5 billion US dollars) just to construct, and this enormous cost shapes not just what the carrier is but who the carrier is for: exclusively great powers interested in power projection rather than smaller nations or those interested primarily in self-defense.

“you could practically sink the entire GDP of the nation of Madagascar, about 5.5 billion US dollars, into constructing a single ship and then sustaining it for a couple of years.”

France operates only one nuclear-powered carrier, the Charles de Gaulle, which at 42,000 tons is about half the displacement of the Ford-class, enabling only about half the air wing, and limiting strategic flexibility because any crisis must occur when the single ship is available, making carrier deployment a major strategic decision.

“In terms of size, displacing around 42,000 tons puts it in roughly the same weight class as the America-class amphibious assault ships we just talked about...The CdG is less than half the displacement of the Ford, which means you only get about half the air wing...the French Navy is going to be hoping it's one that occurs when the ship is available.”

China's third carrier Fujian is expected to be the largest non-American carrier in service and will be equipped with electromagnetic catapults, representing a design much closer to American supercarriers than anything Russia or the Soviet Union produced, indicating significant technological progress in Chinese carrier design.

“China's third carrier by contrast, which has been launched but not commissioned, is expected to move well beyond the old Kuznetsov design. The new carrier, Fujian, is expected to be the largest non-American carrier in service, be equipped with electromagnetic catapults, and represent something much closer to American supercarriers than anything Russia or the Soviet Union ever produced.”

A nation operating a single-carrier fleet requires at least one carrier air wing, while the US operates 11 carriers but only maintains 9 carrier air wings, allowing economies through shuffling air wings between carriers during maintenance periods.

“If you want to operate a one-carrier navy, realistically you need at least one carrier air wing. Sure, they may not be embarked when the ship is undergoing significant maintenance, but you need them when you are sailing, so it's one for one. The Americans meanwhile can afford to do a little bit of shuffling. And so the rules that say the Navy needed to maintain at least 11 CVNs, only said it needed to maintain 9 carrier air wings.”

In the post-Cold War period, the development of new anti-carrier weapons slowed as the Soviet Union broke up and most countries were focused on economic concerns rather than developing new generations of anti-carrier weapons systems.

“the carriers got a little bit of a break in the 1990s. When the Soviet Union broke up, most people were more concerned with making ends meet than continuing to develop new generations of anti-carrier weapons.”

The US Navy is required by law to maintain at least 11 active supercarriers and 9 carrier air groups, reflecting Congressional conviction that this force structure is necessary for American strategic interests, though this legislation was passed nearly 15 years ago when bipartisanship was more prevalent.

“By law the Navy is required to maintain at least 11 active supercarriers and 9 carrier air groups. In other words, Congress feels so strongly about the need to maintain at least 11 carriers that it was actually able to agree on passing a piece of legislation to make sure that happened. Although to be fair, that was almost 15 years ago and bipartisanship was just a little bit more in vogue at the time.”

A 2016 declassified report on alternatives for next-generation aircraft carriers examined de-scoped Gerald Ford designs, smaller 70,000-ton designs, America-class-sized carriers, and 20,000-ton escort carriers, finding most could perform some existing carrier missions but all cheaper options involved tradeoffs in survivability, sortie generation, or sustained independent operation.

“In 2017 there was a released version of a declassified 2016 report that looked at alternatives for next generation aircraft carriers. These included everything from de-scoped less capable versions of the Gerald Ford, to a smaller 70,000 ton design, to carriers closer in size to the America class, or even 20,000 ton escort carriers. The report's conclusions were that most of these designs could do at least some of the existing carrier mission. Although overall, they were pretty dismissive of the 20,000 ton option. What they also found however, is that none of the cheaper options were entirely without trade-off. With issues including reduced survivability, reduced sortie generation, or a decreased capacity for independent sustained operation.”

At the start of World War Two, many nations' navies had more battleships than carriers, but by 1945 the US had 28 fleet carriers, 71 light and escort carriers, supported by only 23 battleships, demonstrating a fundamental shift in naval power projection dominated by aircraft.

“Before World War Two, in many nations battleships had outnumbered carriers. Jump forward to 1945 and the US had 28 fleet carriers, 71 light and escort carriers, supported by 23 battleships and 72 cruisers.”

Carrier threats from anti-ship ballistic missiles, hypersonics, and submarines are primarily relevant in all-out peer-on-peer conventional conflicts, whereas French or British carriers deploying to Africa face much lower threat levels, meaning carrier vulnerability is scenario-dependent rather than universally true.

“a lot of those new and emerging threats to the carrier we talked about, anti-ship ballistic missiles, hypersonics, vast salvoes of cruise missiles and advanced submarines, those are all threats that are really only going to be present in an all-out conventional peer-on-peer conflict. If France and Britain have a go at each other in 2050, maybe those weapon systems will be deployed. But if you are talking about the French deploying their next generation carrier to support operations in Africa, those threats are probably much less likely to be there.”

China is simultaneously both claiming to lead in anti-carrier capability (through developing ASBM and hypersonic systems) and heavily investing in producing next-generation aircraft carriers of its own, suggesting that countries believe vulnerability reduction for own carriers doesn't require eliminating carriers but rather developing offset advantages.

“The People's Republic of China claims to be a leading power when it comes to anti-carrier capability, but at the same time it is investing very heavily in producing next-generation aircraft carriers of its own. That suggests that even countries that see a path to making carriers more vulnerable, also see a reason to continue investing in them.”

The Soviet Navy during the Cold War developed heavy, long-range anti-ship missiles and naval aviation with stand-off anti-ship missiles for engaging American carrier groups while remaining less vulnerable to defending carrier fighters, calculating that mass missile salvoes provided the best odds against supercarriers despite accepting that not all missiles would reach targets.

“The Soviets may have lagged when it came to carrier-based technology and experience, but they were excellent when it came to rocketry and missile design. And so you see generations of Soviet warships that packed their decks with massive missile launch tubes. With each one containing usually a very heavy, very long range, and very lethal anti-ship missile. Essentially calculating that the best engagement odds would come from getting within range, firing off your missile barrage and then running.”

During the Falklands War, the Argentinian failure to sink British carriers HMS Invincible or Hermes would have been catastrophic for Britain because those two ships were responsible for all air defense for the entire task force, making carrier capability critical to the campaign even though they weren't the primary combat objective.

“Think for example of the British naval task force during the Falklands War, and it's hard to imagine how that campaign would have even been possible if the Argentinians had somehow managed to sink or disable HMS Invincible and Hermes. Which were the two ships launching the British Sea Harriers that were handling air defence duties for the entire task force.”

Finding and tracking carriers is becoming more transparent with better sensors paired with better analytical tools like artificial intelligence, but it may also be possible to locate and target the satellites doing the finding and helping to target carriers, suggesting anti-satellite countermeasures could disrupt the targeting chain.

“There has been some media reporting that countries like China may now be able to track carriers more or less in real time using satellites. The reality does seem to be that the modern battle space is getting more and more transparent, with better sensors paired with better analytical tools like artificial intelligence. But just as it might be possible to locate a carrier against the backdrop of an ocean, it might be possible to locate the satellites that are finding and helping to target it.”

US carrier construction costs increased dramatically from 1955 to 2017, with the original Nimitz-class at 80,000 tons costing approximately 1 billion dollars in 1975 (equivalent to 5-6 billion in 2023 dollars), while the Gerald R. Ford at 100,000 tons cost just over 13 billion—a 25% increase in displacement but more than doubling in price, driven by increased displacements, new technology integration, and inflation.

“In 1975 the original Nimitz-class supercarrier at just north of 80,000 tons displacement came in at a cost of 1 billion US dollars, equivalent to about 5 billion in 2019, or 6 billion in 2023. Jump forward to America's most recent carrier, also the first ship in a new type, and the Gerald R. Ford's final procurement cost came in just north of 13 billion. A roughly 25% increase in displacement to 100,000 tons, but more than a doubling in the price.”