The War is Evolving: George Friedman on Miscalculations in Iran
What this covers
The US-Israeli war with Iran has no end in sight as strikes on both sides continue. With Iran’s capitulation failing to materialize and the IRGC’s true strength revealed, the conflict is in a state of evolution.
On this episode of Talking Geopolitics, GPF Chairman George Friedman joins host Christian Smith to discuss shifting US war aims, the rising price of oil as the Strait of Hormuz remains a critical chokepoint, and just how long this all might last.
Visit http://www.geopoliticalfutures.com for world-class geopolitical analysis and discussion, and to access our full 2026 Forecast: Re-anchoring the World.
Source description (no synthesized summary yet).
The US-Iran war has exposed a fundamental intelligence failure: the assumption that destroying Iran's civilian government would end the conflict overlooked the IRGC's independent power structure and resilience, creating an unanticipated problem of maintaining the Strait of Hormuz that may require ground forces contrary to Trump's stated objectives.
- The IRGC operates as a decentralized 'Mosaic Force' with independent regional command authority, making it resilient to air strikes despite the civilian government's destruction
- Closing the Strait of Hormuz by IRGC drone and missile attacks creates a new military objective—keeping the strait open—that appears solvable only with sustained ground troop presence
- Trump's stated goal of avoiding ground wars in the Eastern Hemisphere directly conflicts with the operational requirement to defeat the IRGC and maintain Persian Gulf oil flows
This asset isn't compiled yet
You're seeing its claims, ranked. Compile it to build the argument threads, weight them, and check each claim against your library — the full view.
The belief that air power alone could force Iranian government capitulation, without ground forces, was based on a flawed historical precedent and represented a simplistic military model.
“there was also part belief very interesting belief that it could be done with simply air power. By air power, I mean drones, missiles, and aircraft. And there was never a time when air power alone was able to force government into capitulation save in Japan where the air power was used as atomic bombs and that Japan had already lost that war, that it was over.”
Presidents do not personally develop military or political strategy; this is handled by intelligence and military institutions, though the president bears ultimate responsibility.
“one of the things we have to be very careful of is thinking that Trump himself provided the intelligence for what was regime change. That he himself designed air strikes as a fundamental way to do this. Presidents don't do that and I don't think this president or any president is capable of developing either a political or military strategy.”
The US administration believed that destroying the Iranian civilian government (the prime minister and his aides) would eliminate Iran's governing structure, but this assumption overlooked the IRGC, a separate powerful institution with independent military, economic, and security authority.
“What we have seen is the regime was destroyed at the first strike... Destroy the prime minister, destroy his aides, everything else. The regime, as they understood it, was destroyed. But, they did not understand that that was not the full nature of the regime. Something else was in place. And that was the IRGC. This Islamist force that not only had the power over the military, but had massive economic and other power in the country.”
The IRGC's closure of the Strait of Hormuz—a major global oil transport chokepoint—represents a new military problem that the US administration appears not to have anticipated in its initial war planning.
“The IRGC responded in a way that might have been expected, but wasn't, which is they closed the Straits of Hormuz. The Straits of Hormuz blocks the Persian Gulf. The Persian Gulf is one of the main producers of oil in the world, of energy in the world, therefore.”
The fundamental purpose of the US war on Iran was to neutralize Iran's nuclear program and achieve regime change.
“The fundamental purpose of this war was to neutralize the the nuclear program of Iran, and also to have regime change.”
International Energy Administration reserves and increased production from other sources can mitigate oil price spikes in the short term (days to weeks), but do not solve the fundamental problem if Strait closure persists beyond that window.
“there is an international energy administration that has large reserves of oil. And they've released a good amount of this, which means that we will have oil prices rising, but to some extent, it's not going to be a fundamental breakdown of the global economic system, so long as a solution is found to the Straits of Hormuz”
Regional Gulf states are small and sparse, lacking the military capacity to subdue Iran independently, and therefore cannot fulfill the burden-shifting role that the US has attempted to assign them.
“When it emerged that that wasn't going to happen, the idea that these countries have the ability to subdue Iran, when you take a look at the the Gulf states, they're very small, sparse.”
Iran is divided into multiple ethnic groups (e.g., northern Iran is settled by Azeris who are linked to Azerbaijan), which creates structural weaknesses that the US could potentially exploit if it had the will and understanding to do so.
“Iran is a large, large country. It's a very complex country. It is divided into ethnic groups. For example, most of northern Iran is settled by Azeris, people who are in Azerbaijan, a smaller country to its north. And they're different community than other communities. It is divided into many of these ethnic groups. It is also divided between this army of the nation and the IRGC, the army of ideology. And there are many ways in which it is possible to manipulate this weakness in Iran.”
The burden-shifting strategy of the US under Trump, and in large part before, has been to get regional players like Saudi Arabia and Turkey to take responsibility for the Middle East from the US, but those countries are concerned about unintended consequences from wars like the Iran war.
“the US strategy under Trump and and in large part before as well, it has been burden shifting, has been uh trying to get regional players like Saudi Arabia and Turkey uh in in the Middle East to take over the responsibility for the region in large it to a large extent from the US. Those countries though are very much concerned about unintended consequences from wars like this. They obviously worry about beyond the horrible nature that would be if if there was a civil war in Iran, the consequences for refugees, for attacks on their countries, for oil exports, all those sorts of things.”
Opening and maintaining the Strait of Hormuz as a military objective appears to require sustained ground troop presence to protect against IRGC drone and missile attacks from hundreds of miles away.
“Air power can destroy the drones that are there. If there are more drones, they can be put into position and continue the attack. Two things have to happen. The drones have to be destroyed, and the forces that are blocking the Straits of Hormuz destroyed as well, and kept open. And therefore, that involves potentially inserting troops on the ground”
Trump's stated campaign promise to avoid ground wars in the Eastern Hemisphere directly conflicts with the apparent military requirement of ground force deployment to maintain Strait of Hormuz access and defeat the IRGC.
“he swore that we would not be engaged in wars in the Eastern Hemisphere. This was one of his fundamental peace. And this was a necessary thing to believe. He is now facing a war in which it is possible that cannot be won without ground forces being put in place.”
Turkey, despite having missiles fired at its Incirlik air base, has no desire to take on a primary role in the war against Iran and will not assume burden-shifting responsibility.
“The Turks, even though they have had two missile two missiles or three missiles fired at them, primarily the Incirlik air base that the Americans have in Turkey, have no desire to take over this role.”
The Strait of Hormuz closure creates a global energy crisis that threatens the world economic system unless the Strait is reopened within weeks to months.
“in the long run, going out a month or two or three, uh we're really looking at a fundamental problem if Straits of Hormuz are not opened. And therefore, a new military problem, apparently unanticipated, emerges. Opening the Persian Gulf through the Straits of Hormuz”
The IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) is structured as a decentralized 'Mosaic Force' where different regional areas operate independently outside central command authority, making it much more resilient to destruction than a traditional hierarchical military organization.
“The IRGC persisted on surviving. And in fact, they were more resilient than we expected. They have something called the Mosaic Force. I a force in which different areas are able to operate outside the command of the center. So, in other words, they are decentralized and therefore much more difficult to destroy.”
Iran cannot likely produce new weapons in sufficient quantities to replace losses, limiting the IRGC to attrition as weapons are destroyed by air strikes.
“or can they produce them, which I don't think they can.”
Wars are inherently unpredictable in their execution and outcome, similar to how macroeconomics can predict broad economic outlines but microeconomics struggles with detailed engineering-level forecasting.
“Now, the fundamental problem with war is that it's unpredictable. Geopolitics as a whole is like macroeconomics compared to microeconomics. The broad outline of the economy can be seen to some extent. The details, the engineering process of economics is much more difficult to predict. This is same is true with geopolitics.”
The chaotic reality of implementing geopolitical strategy at the tactical level—which Friedman calls the 'engineering' level—has proven less stable and more unpredictable than the orderly geopolitical framework suggests.
“This points out the chaotic level of engineering that is below the very orderly geopolitical level that I work on. Beneath that is the application of geopolitical reality, which can, and in this case has turned out to be quite unstable and chaotic and not at all anticipated by the United States.”
The Artesh, Iran's secular professional army that emerged from the Shah era, is reportedly hostile to the IRGC but has not been attacked by the US and does not appear to be resisting the IRGC.
“There's also a point to be remembered, which is there's another army, the Artesh, which is the army that emerged from the Shah of Iran. For it is not ideological in nature. It is fairly large. And it is said to be hostile to the IRGC”
The White House's claims that much of Iran's military has been destroyed and obliterated are likely overstated, as evidenced by continued missile and drone launches against other countries and the IRGC's sustained operational capability.
“Well, what I'm saying, I don't think it's true. Because if it collapsed, what would be going on? We're still seeing missiles launched even to countries like Turkey that are not involved. Various other countries are being hit. Now, the amount of attacks coming from the IRGC to other countries has declined.”
The intelligence failure was systemic, involving not only policymakers but also the intelligence community and military planners who misunderstood the IRGC's role and structure.
“I think that the understanding that we had of Iran was a systemic failure. That is the intelligence community misunderstood it. That is the military had a simplistic model of how the war would be fought. There were many people involved in this mistake.”
If the Artesh could be brought into the operation and is willing to help the US, this would create an additional tool for defeating the IRGC, but this depends on whether the Artesh has the capability and will to do so—both of which are mysteries.
“If this force could be brought into the operation, if it chooses to, so please it can, and is rewarded properly, this is another tool that could be used by the United States if they were willing to become a tool of the United States. And this is the mystery.”
The IRGC's decline in attack frequency may indicate either that they are running out of weapons or strategically hoarding them and waiting, with the true state being an intelligence matter.
“Now, the amount of attacks coming from the IRGC to other countries has declined. So, there seems to be a dramatic decline in the amount of capabilities they have. They may be running out or they may be hoarding them, waiting to something else. That I don't know, and I would hope that our intelligence services knows.”
The nuclear problem is compounded by two now-simultaneous issues: uranium enrichment (technical disarmament) and oil supply disruption (geopolitical coercion through Strait closure).
“At the same time, the nuclear question doesn't go away. That remains there. But there is now two issues. One issue is uranium. The second issue is oil.”
The only path to ending the war may be negotiated peace, which is extremely difficult politically but necessary if military defeat of the IRGC is not achievable.
“It would seem to me that the only thing that we could do is make peace. Which is going to be a very difficult thing to do and for all sorts of reasons.”
A secondary path to reducing IRGC power is forcing them out of the Strait of Hormuz and Persian Gulf region specifically, rather than attempting to destroy them everywhere.
“and secondly to figure out a way to defeat them the IRGC, if not everywhere, at least on the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf region. Forcing them elsewhere.”
Trump faces a deep political problem because he must account for the war's failure to achieve its objectives quickly as promised, and this becomes a liability he must manage politically within a short timeframe.
“He has now a deep political problem that he has to deal with. And fairly quickly.”
Regional states initially supported the US war because they believed it would succeed quickly and be hostile to Iran, but this support reversed once it became clear the war would be protracted and require their involvement.
“I think initially these countries didn't mind it because they thought the attack would be successful and they were fairly hostile to Iran, okay? When it emerged that that wasn't going to happen, the idea that these countries have the ability to subdue Iran”
Wars have greater impact on the global economy now due to globalization and interdependence, but this is not unprecedented—World War II had much greater economic impact than the current Iran war.
“Well, I would say 80 years ago it was much greater. World War II was devastating to the global economy.”
Friedman acknowledges uncertainty about IRGC power and states he does not possess intelligence sufficient to recommend specific military strategy, deferring to intelligence agencies while expressing hope they have better information.
“I don't have that kind of intelligence. I would hope that the various intelligence organizations in the Department of Defense and the CIA have far better intelligence than I do. My view is that the IRGC turned out to be more politically powerful, militarily powerful, than it was anticipated. I don't know how much more powerful.”