
What this covers
Jeremy Grantham’s investment firm GMO made its name betting against the mania of the late 1990s and the mid-2000s housing boom. In this episode of The Big View, he tells Peter Thal Larsen how artificial intelligence has forced Big Tech firms into a fight to the death.
#News #Reuters #Newsfeed #world #business #AI #artificialintelligence #TheBigView
👉 Subscribe: https://reut.rs/4b8fRGn
Keep up with the latest news from around the world: https://www.reuters.com/ Follow Reuters on Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/Reuters Follow Reuters on X: https://twitter.com/Reuters Follow Reuters on Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/reuters/?hl=en
Source description (no synthesized summary yet).
Jeremy Grantham argues we are currently in a major stock market bubble driven by AI investment that will eventually revert to mean, but the timing and severity depend on whether AI competition produces genuine productivity gains or merely redistributes wealth among tech giants.
- The market entered bubble territory 4-5 years ago and checked every indicator of a 'super bubble' by end of 2021, but ChatGPT's arrival in October 2022 triggered an AI investment boom that has prevented the expected crash
- The Mag 7 tech companies have shifted from operating as separate monopolies to competing in the same field (AI), which historically leads to destructive competition, margin compression, and mean reversion rather than sustained supernormal profits
- Productivity gains from AI will not translate to profit margins once the technology becomes commoditized and universally adopted—the same pattern seen with computers and the internet
This asset isn't compiled yet
You're seeing its claims, ranked. Compile it to build the argument threads, weight them, and check each claim against your library — the full view.
The railroad bubble and the internet bubble both involved genuinely transformative technologies that people correctly recognized would 'change life in every way' and increase economic power, but excessive capital flowed into these industries anyway, causing bubbles where multiple competitors all lost money despite the technology's ultimate success.
“A bubble is associated with really powerful real ideas. And uh the more obviously powerful the idea is, the more likely it is to be a bubble... everyone built a new railroad so we had multiple lines from Leeds to Manchester and everybody lost money... It's not that the internet didn't have enormous promise... they were too obvious a good idea. A life changer. And in the decline of 2000, 2001, 2002... Amazon went down 92%.”
Bubbles are NOT associated with fake ideas but with really powerful real ideas, and the more obviously powerful and life-changing the idea is, the more likely it is to be associated with a bubble.
“And people think a bubble is a kind of faking out uh not at all. A bubble is associated with really powerful real ideas. And uh the more obviously powerful the idea is, the more likely it is to be a bubble.”
A breakthrough in productivity does not necessarily equate to a breakthrough in profitability; if everyone has a brilliant new machine or technology, everyone will be productive but no one will make particularly good money
“Everyone thinks that just because we might have a breakthrough in productivity that equates with a with an enormous breakthrough. Yeah. We will have a breakthrough in productivity. But that doesn't mean you have a breakthrough in profitability. If everybody has a brilliant new machine, everyone will be productive. No one will make particular particularly good money”
The S&P 500 declined 25%, growth stocks fell 35%, and the Magnificent 7 tech stocks fell 40% after Grantham's January 2022 prediction, but the introduction of ChatGPT in late October 2022 reversed the decline and sparked a strong rally in those same stocks.
“the market crashed down. The S&P went down 25, the growth stocks 35, the mag 7 40%. And the bond market had the worst day in modern history. Uh and then, late October, they very inconveniently for me introduced chat. Chat GPT. And chat set off an amazing rally in the in the mag 7, plus or minus a few other companies.”
If you invest in renewables, they will continue to get cheaper and cheaper; if you invest in fossil fuels, they will get increasingly expensive, creating a powerful economic incentive to transition without requiring behavioral sacrifice.
“So, you you invest in it, it'll get cheaper and cheaper. And you do you invest in fossil fuels, it'll get more and more expensive.”
Climate change analysis differs fundamentally from financial market analysis because it requires predicting a future that will be completely unlike the past, yet we must prepare for it despite inability to apply standard regression-to-mean and statistical methods
“it requires a completely different uh sort of analytical approach from the way you might study financial markets...This is something where you're looking at the future and saying the future is going to be completely unlike the past and but nonetheless we must we must prepare for it”
US GDP growth over the last 25 years has steadily underperformed: the most recent 20-year period underperformed the prior 20-year period, which underperformed the 20 years before that, despite market enthusiasm about recent performance
“Everyone is so thrilled with the US doing unexpectedly well, but it hasn't done as well as it was. The last 20 years has underperformed the previous 20 years and that underperformed the prior 20 years”
Investing in renewable energy makes economic sense because technologies continue getting cheaper with investment, while investing in fossil fuels makes prices more expensive, not to mention exposing investors to political risk from oil dependency vulnerabilities
“You invest in it, it'll get cheaper and cheaper. And you do you invest in fossil fuels, it'll get more and more expensive. Not to mention, as has been stuck up our nose recently, uh the political exposure, the dangers of being dependent on oil”
Insurance markets are acting as 'canaries in the coal mine' on climate risk, beginning to signal alarm (or dropping dead, depending on interpretation) about increasing climate-related losses, making insurance costs rising indicators of climate impact escalation
“And and insurance are are like the canary in the coal mine. They're beginning to uh chirp or drop dead, depending on your interpretation of the canary”
The Japanese real estate market was even more impressive than the stock bubble, with the land under the emperor's palace being equivalent in value to the entire island of Manhattan.
“And their real estate market, believe it or not, was even more impressive. They used to say that the land under the emperor's palace was equivalent to the whole of Manhattan.”
From 1975 to 2025 (50 years), there has been almost no increase in hourly wages adjusted for inflation for the typical worker in the middle of the income distribution, while the people at the top have roughly doubled their money.
“From 75 onwards for the 50 years, there's hardly an increase at all in the hourly rate adjusted for inflation uh for the typical worker. The guy in the middle has made 5 or 10% progress. The people at the top have have doubled their money.”
The 1990s tech bubble (1998-2000) and the 2007-2008 housing bubble both exceeded two standard deviations, with the housing bubble reaching three sigma (approximately once every 100+ years), making it the worse offender despite the stock market crash appearing more dramatic.
“We have had a splendid bubble in '98, '99, 2000. We had, uh, a a really splendid housing bubble, which went way over two sigma to three sigma, one every 100 years or longer. Uh, the US housing market basically had never bubbled like that.”
The Japanese stock market bubble of the late 1980s-early 1990s, which reached 65 times earnings (compared to its historical level of 21 times earnings), represents the most outrageous outlier in any developed market in modern times, and serves as the cautionary example that should make value managers fear any current market excess.
“The most important and impressive was really Japan. Um, and, uh, that, um, had never sold over 21 times earnings. And then it started to rise and rise and ended up at 65. So, 65 times earnings. I I like to say that that's the example that should make any value manager wake up screaming in the middle of the night. Because however bad you think the current situation is or the tech bubble of 2000 was, it never came close to the Japanese bubble.”
From 1935 to 1975 (40 years), productivity growth averaged 3.5% annually, and the poorest quarter of the population increased their share of GDP and grew at 4-4.5% while the super-rich grew at only 2.5-3%, creating shared prosperity where everyone was happy.
“from 1935 to 75, you you have kind of 40, despite the depression, 40 glorious years in terms of uh of productivity. It's about 3 and 1/2%, which is a hell of a lot for a a big chunk of time. And uh everybody got rich. But the distinctive feature of that 40 years... is that the poorest quarter got slightly more of the pie than they had. And so they didn't grow at 3 and 1/2%, they grew at 4 or 4 and 1/2. And the super rich, instead of growing at 3 and 1/2, grew at 3 or 2 and 1/2.”
Amazon's stock declined 92% during the internet bubble's bust (2000-2002) despite being a 'ridiculous number' and a genuine success story, but the company ultimately 'inherited the world as the internet delivered slowly but surely the benefits that people had seen.'
“Amazon went down 92%. You should check this. It's such a ridiculous number. And then out of that wreckage, it inherited the world as the internet delivered slowly but surely the benefits that people had seen.”
The internet bubble of 1999-2002 saw Amazon rise 5-6x in 1999 as people recognized it as an obviously good idea and life-changer, but too much capital flooded into internet companies, causing Amazon to fall 92% during the 2000-2002 bear market, after which it 'inherited the world' as the internet delivered promised benefits slowly but surely
“the internet. It's not that the internet didn't have enormous promise. Uh Amazon had just gone up five or six times in uh in '99. But uh they attracted too much money. Uh they were too obvious a good idea. A life changer. And in the decline of 2000, 2001, 2002, a rare three-year bear market, Amazon went down 92%. You should check this. It's such a ridiculous number. And then out of that wreckage, it inherited the world as the internet delivered slowly but surely the benefits that people had seen”
A breakthrough in productivity does not automatically equate to a breakthrough in profitability; if everyone has the same brilliant new machine, everyone will be more productive but no one will make particularly good money because the competitive advantage is neutralized.
“We will have a breakthrough in productivity. But that doesn't mean you have a breakthrough in profitability. If everybody has a brilliant new machine, everyone will be productive. No one will make particular particularly good money.”
The concept of 'career risk' prevents large commercial firms like Goldman Sachs or JP Morgan from taking contrarian positions and going against market trends, because the uncertainty of long-term market moves exceeds the client's patience, making it impossible for major institutions to advise clients to get out of markets.
“if you're if you're a Goldman Sachs or a JP Morgan, you you can't afford to play that game. And and the problem, incidentally, is the uncertainty of long-term market moves is greater than the client's patience. That's it. Once you've got that one line in your head, you know uh if you're a big company, you're never going to tell your clients to get out of the market. You're always going to be bullish.”
The stock market is a coincident indicator of current economic conditions (earnings, sentiment), not a predictor of long-term dividend and earnings streams; it reacts to current conditions by multiplying earnings by a PE ratio that also reflects current sentiment.
“I have learned actually quite long ago that the market is a coincident indicator. It is not a predictor of long-term streams of dividends and earnings discounted back. That's all complete nonsense. What the market does is if you're nice to me today, I multiply you by a high PE. If you're nasty today, like 1974 with an oil crisis and inflation, I'll multiply the the depressed earnings by a depressed PE, double counting.”
Individual investors and institutions never receive serious bear market advice from any major institutional firm because it is 'simply terrible business' that they cannot afford, creating a systematic information asymmetry where bullish bias is structural, not incidental.
“the general individual investor and the institution will never receive serious bear market advice from either the from any of the institutions. They never have. They never will. It's simply terrible business that they [30:15] can't afford.”
Wage stagnation and wealth concentration from 1975-2025 has created social discontent where voters 'kick the rascals out' regardless of whether the ruling party is right-wing or left-wing, explaining political volatility across both the US and Europe
“they get very easily disgruntled. And the same has happened to a lesser degree in Europe. And uh what that results in is pretty tricky um politics. And the best way of of seeing that is that they vote against the party in power. Doesn't matter if they're right-wing like the conservatives, kick the rascals out. Left-wing in in in France, kick the rascals out”
AI's productivity increases will throw many people out of work, and while there may be redeployment opportunities that are respectable and decent-paying, there may not be, creating risk of social unrest and pushback if productivity growth exceeds the pace of new job creation
“the increase in productivity throws a lot of people out of work. There may be redeployment opportunities for them that are respectable and decent paying, but there may not be. And uh if they if the productivity is faster than we can absorb the new jobs, you will get a lot of social unrest and a lot of pushback and a lot of strange things that we haven't any will experience with”
US GDP growth has declined across three successive 20-year periods: the economy is underperforming compared to the previous 20 years, which underperformed the 20 years before that, creating a pattern of secular growth deceleration.
“Monopolies are great for corporate profits and the market cap, but but slightly bad for GDP growth. So, you should have expected to see the GDP slow down a bit and that's what happened. Everyone is so thrilled with the US doing unexpectedly well, but it hasn't done as well as it was. The last 20 years has underperformed the previous 20 years and that underperformed the prior 20 years.”
Grantham was an early pioneer in quantitative investing and spent a large portion of his firm's budget on computers when they were new; when computers were the leading-edge advantage, they provided competitive benefits over smaller firms, but eventually everyone had computers and they became just a cost of doing business.
“When we finished paying for our computer, which we choked on, we had we it helped us have a an advantage in calculating everything for a couple of years, particularly over uh smaller firms like us. And uh and then everyone had a computer. It It was just a cost of doing business.”
Both climate analysis and financial market analysis are fundamentally data-driven and involve making logical conclusions from observable evidence, though the data types and time horizons differ.
“I would say the similarities are that they're both data-driven. You You look at the data and you try and make the logical conclusion.”
Insurance costs act as a 'canary in the coal mine' for climate impacts, with insurers beginning to show stress as climate-related disasters increase in frequency and severity.
“And then insurance costs. And insurance are are like the canary in the coal mine. They're beginning to uh chirp or drop dead, depending on your interpretation of the canary.”
The current bubble broke down in early 2022 with the S&P 500 declining 25%, growth stocks 35%, and the Mag 7 tech stocks declining 40%, but ChatGPT's introduction in late October 2022 triggered an AI investment rally that reversed the decline
“I wrote a quarterly letter on January the 15th, 2022, saying, "Let the wild rumpus begin." In other words, very rare for me, the timing is now. The market should go down if it's listening to history...Anyway, the market crashed down. The S&P went down 25, the growth stocks 35, the mag 7 40%. And the bond market had the worst day in modern history. Uh and then, late October, they very inconveniently for me introduced chat. Chat GPT. And chat set off an amazing rally in the in the mag 7”
The Mag 7 tech companies previously operated as monopolies in seven separate domains (Microsoft in software, Apple in devices, Google in search, etc.), each commanding high profit margins through pricing power
“the mag seven used to represent really strong monopolies in seven different areas. They each control their field. Microsoft, Apple, Google, and so on”
The railroad boom produced multiple competing railroad lines between cities like Leeds and Manchester, with everyone losing money on individual lines, but the wreckage eventually led to infrastructure that transformed the world
“people looked at the railroads and said, "Oh my god, this is going to change life in every way. It's going to increase the power of the economy." They were right, completely. But everyone as as my colleague Edward Chancellor says, you know, everyone built a new railroad so we had multiple lines from Leeds to Manchester and everybody lost money. And out of that wreckage of of of money, however, there were lots of lines built and and uh it changed the world”
Jeremy Grantham's firm was able to implement contrarian strategy because it was a private firm; during the tech bubble, it went from $30 billion to $20 billion in assets while competitors went from $30 to $50-60 billion, but then from $20 to $22 billion as crash recovered, then $22 to $165 billion over next 4 years
“Yeah, we were a private firm, and if we chose to lose half our business quickly, that was that which we did, that was our business...In the tech bubble, we went from uh 30 billion to uh 20. When everyone else was going from 30 to 50 or 60, we went to 20, which is nearly impossible...And then in the break, when they went back from 50 to 35 or 30, we went from 20 to 22...And then in the following 4 years, we went from 22 to 165”
From 1935 to 1975 (40 years), US productivity grew at approximately 3.5% annually while the poorest 25% of the population captured slightly more than their proportional share of that growth, growing at 4-4.5%, while the super-wealthy grew at 2.5-3%, resulting in broad-based prosperity and social stability.
“from 1935 to 75, you you have kind of 40, despite the depression, 40 glorious years in terms of uh of productivity. It's about 3 and 1/2%, which is a hell of a lot for a a big chunk of time. And uh everybody got rich. But the distinctive feature of that 40 years, thanks to FDR and the war and so on, is that the poorest quarter got slightly more of the pie than they had. And so they didn't grow at 3 and 1/2%, they grew at 4 or 4 and 1/2. And the super rich, instead of growing at 3 and 1/2, grew at 3 or 2 and 1/2.”
From 1975 onwards (50 years), hourly wages adjusted for inflation have seen barely any increase for typical workers, while the middle 50% have made 5-10% progress and the top 1% have doubled their money, representing a massive wealth transfer from workers to the rich.
“From 75 onwards for the 50 years, there's hardly an increase at all in the hourly rate adjusted for inflation uh for the typical worker. The guy in the middle has made 5 or 10% progress. The people at the top have have doubled their money.”
Over 90% of Grantham's wealth has gone to his foundation for environmental protection, and the foundation operates as 'shock troops' making aggressive new investments in renewable energy, clean technology research, and new enterprises to address climate change
“well over 90% of everything I have has gone into into our foundation for the protection of the environment. And and and we try and operate there as kind of shock troops. We We want to be making aggressive new investments, helping new groups get going, whether they're profit or non-profit, uh helping to pioneer the research, and um and helping new enterprises get off the ground”
The Japanese stock market bubble reaching 65 times earnings (vs historical 21x) is the most important and outrageous example of a bubble in a developed market in modern times, and its real estate bubble was even more extreme, with land under the emperor's palace valued equivalent to Manhattan.
“the most important and impressive was really Japan. Um, and, uh, that, um, had never sold over 21 times earnings. And then it started to rise and rise and ended up at 65. So, 65 times earnings. I I like to say that that's the example that should make any value manager wake up screaming in the middle of the night. Because however bad you think the current situation is or the tech bubble of 2000 was, it never came close to the Japanese bubble. The Japanese bubble, I believe, was far and away the most important and, uh, outrageous outlier of of any developed market in modern times.”
Analyzing climate change requires a completely different analytical approach from financial markets analysis, because it involves predicting a future that is genuinely unlike the past, rather than applying statistical rules (like two standard deviations) based on historical patterns.
“this whole issue is is one where it requires a completely different uh sort of analytical approach from the way you might study financial markets... you're looking at the future and saying the future is going to be completely unlike the past and but nonetheless we must we must prepare for it.”
From 2000 to 2025, every industry experienced an increase in monopolistic tendencies and a shrinkage in the number of serious competitors, which is beneficial for corporate profit margins and market valuations but detrimental to GDP growth.
“in the period from 2000 to 2025, every industry had an increase in uh monopolistic tendencies. There were fewer big players. The number of firms uh competing seriously shrunk. Every industry, some it didn't matter that much and some it was a very big deal. And uh that in a way that's a bit disappointing. Monopolies are great for corporate profits and the market cap, but but slightly bad for GDP growth.”
Federal Reserve policy under Alan Greenspan initiated a style of management that may have made extreme valuation events (two standard deviation outliers) more frequent than the historical average of every 36 years.
“There's some indication that more recently, after Alan Greenspan and his troops, they've, uh, initiated a style of Federal Reserve policy that would make them a little more often.”
Monopolies have inflated the share of GDP going to corporations while suppressing the share going to workers, transferring wealth from ordinary people to corporations, which has created political discontent and caused voters to punish incumbents regardless of party affiliation.
“Monopoly has... it transfers a lot of money from ordinary people to the corporations. And we've seen their share of GDP go up. And it doesn't take much to uh disgruntle the ordinary worker.”
Within 10 years, everyone will have access to AI and will be buying the best service they can afford; the competitive advantage will have been competed away, and AI will become something firms must have but which provides no material competitive advantage and will create no pressure on profit margins.
“If you look out 10 years and then turn around and look back, everyone will have AI. Everyone will be buying the service they can afford. And the com- competitive advantage will have been competed mostly away. It will be something you have to do. If you don't have an expert uh uh uh on your staff, you better get one. And uh everyone will have their expert. Everyone will be buying the best service. And uh or two. And uh it it won't be a material advantage. And certainly will be no pressure on profit margins.”
Career risk—the threat of losing business or employment if an investment manager deviates too long from market consensus—prevents large commercial firms from providing serious bear market advice to clients, making it impossible for institutional investors to receive accurate market timing from major firms
“the problem, incidentally, is the uncertainty of long-term market moves is greater than the client's patience. That's it. Once you're Once you've got that one line in your head, you know uh if you're a big company, you're never going to tell your clients to get out of the market. You're always going to be bullish. And and therefore, the general individual investor and the institution will never receive serious bear market advice from either the from any of the institutions. They never have. They never will. It's simply terrible business that they can't afford”
The market is a coincident indicator, not a predictor of long-term streams of discounted dividends and earnings; the market multiplies current earnings by a PE multiple that changes based on current sentiment and conditions, with both earnings and PE moving together to produce current valuations
“I have learned actually quite long ago that the market is a coincident indicator. It is not a predictor of long-term streams of dividends and earnings discounted back. That's all complete nonsense. What the market does is if you're nice to me today, I multiply you by a high PE. If you're nasty today, like 1974 with an oil crisis and inflation, I'll multiply the the depressed earnings by a depressed PE, double counting”
The process of mean reversion in markets—where outlier valuations eventually return to long-term averages—is fundamental to capitalism working properly; failure of mean reversion indicates a broken capitalist system
“if that doesn't happen, then then the system is broken somehow, right? That then then you're not that the capitalism is not attract is not working properly...Absolutely. Yeah. No, you could say that the capitalist system was about as broken as it gets”
From 2000 to 2025, every industry experienced an increase in monopolistic tendencies with fewer big players and reduced competition, which suppressed GDP growth while benefiting corporate profits and market capitalization
“in the period from 2000 to 2025, every industry had an increase in uh monopolistic tendencies. There were fewer big players. The number of firms uh competing seriously shrunk. Every industry, some it didn't matter that much and some it was a very big deal. And uh that in a way that's a bit disappointing. Monopolies are great for corporate profits and the market cap, but but slightly bad for GDP growth”
Bubbles are not primarily about faking or deception; rather, they are strongly associated with genuinely powerful, transformative ideas, and the more obviously powerful the idea, the more likely it is to produce a bubble
“people think a bubble is a kind of faking out uh not at all. A bubble is associated with really powerful real ideas. And uh the more obviously powerful the idea is, the more likely it is to be a bubble”
When earnings are rising and sentiment is positive, the market goes up even when the catalyst is positive (like bombing Iran); the market rise is explained by earnings growth, not by forward-looking assessment of the political risks of the bombing
“people say, "How is it possible that we've had a war and the market went up 5% since we bombed Iran?" Everyone can see that that's nonsense. My response is, "Well, if you view it through my coincident eyes, you just say, 'And what about earnings?' Oh, they're rising nicely. That's why the market's up 5%. End of discussion."”
Mean reversion in markets has worked well for the 100 years prior to 2000 but has not worked well for the last 25 years, with monopoly being the biggest and perhaps sufficient explanatory factor for this breakdown
“From 2000 onwards, you've had a kind of kink in the history. Mean reversion worked beautifully for the 100 the 100 years prior and and it hasn't worked that well for the last 25 years. And and monopoly has been one of them, the biggest reason by far and I think sufficient to more or less explain everything”
AI adoption will cause job displacement and potential social unrest as productivity gains exceed the economy's ability to absorb and redeploy workers into new jobs, creating 'a lot of social unrest and a lot of pushback and a lot of strange things that we haven't any will experience with.'
“The increase in productivity throws a lot of people out of work. There may be redeployment opportunities for them that are respectable and decent paying, but there may not be. And uh if they if the productivity is faster than we can absorb the new jobs, you will get a lot of social unrest and a lot of pushback and a lot of strange things that we haven't any will experience with.”
Atmospheric CO2 has climbed remorselessly from 280 parts per million (pre-industrial) to 430 parts per million (current), and will likely peak at 550 ppm even with serious effort to reduce emissions, requiring eventual reduction back to 300 ppm to prevent long-term ocean level rise.
“There is data on CO2 particles in the atmosphere. Uh and uh they've climbed remorselessly from 280 parts per million to 430. And uh we think if we really try a bit harder and the technology stays good and improves, uh we'll be lucky to peak out at 550 parts per million. And uh incidentally, we have to get that back to 300 or the ocean levels continue to rise slowly all the time into the dim dim distant future.”
Electric vehicle sales in Europe are up 40% year-over-year, indicating market acceptance of EV technology, whereas the US is displaying an almost unique ability to miss obvious trends and be self-destructive by not pursuing EV adoption.
“sales of EVs in in Europe are up 40% year over year. Now, they're not up that much in the US. US is displaying a almost unique ability to miss the obvious and be self-destructive.”
AI investment capital expenditure has escalated from 2023 through 2026, remaining strong enough to shock the system and make economic performance appear unexpectedly strong, while also sustaining unusually high corporate profit margins for the Magnificent 7 companies.
“if you look at the CAPEX you'll see that 2023 is a compared to 2024 25 26. It's just escalated. So it's stayed strong enough to kind of shock the system and make it feel like it was unexpectedly strong. And with the corporate profits from the mag seven unexpectedly strong again.”
Voter behavior in recent elections shows that voters across countries punish incumbents regardless of party affiliation or whether they are right-wing or left-wing, and the 2020 US shift from Biden to Trump was actually smaller than the prior seven European elections.
“they vote against the party in power. Doesn't matter if they're right-wing like the conservatives, kick the rascals out. Left-wing in in in France, kick the rascals out. And ironic ironically the the shift from Biden to Trump, much analyzed by everybody, was less than the seven prior elections in Europe.”
Atmospheric CO2 has risen from 280 parts per million to 430 parts per million, and if current trends continue with aggressive technology improvements, it will likely peak around 550 ppm, requiring subsequent reduction to 300 ppm to prevent continued ocean level rise over hundreds of years
“There There is data on CO2 particles in the atmosphere. Uh and uh they've climbed remorselessly from 280 parts per million to 430. And uh we think if we really try a bit harder and the technology stays good and improves, uh we'll be lucky to peak out at 550 parts per million. And uh incidentally, we have to get that back to 300 or the ocean levels continue to rise slowly all the time into the dim dim distant future. Uh hundreds of hundreds of years”
Even though the political consensus around climate has shifted away from Grantham's position in recent years, companies globally have recognized the economic and security advantages of renewables over fossil fuels and are planning accordingly, as evidenced by 40% year-over-year EV sales growth in Europe
“Anybody who hasn't taken on board the vulnerability of oil and gas compared to the security of of solar wind and storage is brain dead. They all have and they're all planning accordingly. And sales of EVs in in Europe are up 40% year over year”
Wind, solar, and energy storage have made far more progress than expected when Grantham first wrote about these technologies 15 years ago, with storage costs falling to less than one-tenth of previous levels and continuing to decline
“Wind, solar, storage have all made much more progress, by the way, than we thought. When I first started to write some papers 15 years ago, we we never expected storage in particular to be Oh, if perhaps three times the current price would not have surprised me. It It's come down to less than a tenth since I wrote my first paper. Less than And it's still falling like a rock”
The AI investment boom has been so powerful and sustained that it has maintained corporate profit growth and prevented the market from sliding into recession that would have occurred without ChatGPT and AI investment
“Chat set off an amazing rally in the in the mag 7, plus or minus a few other companies. And uh secondly, the AI investment became so strong that it dragged an economy back from sliding into a recession. I think in a non-chat world, what would what would have happened is the market would have continued to go down. And in in 2022, we would have slipped into a mild recession”
Current AI investment is exhibiting the same pattern as railroads and internet bubbles: too much money being pushed into a transformative technology that is obviously powerful and life-changing
“and that is exactly as you can see dear listener. You can see that happening in spades almost today”
Heavy downpours caused by climate change have cost the global economy about half a percent of GDP in recent years, whereas 20 years ago such weather events did not cause serious economic damage, and prevention of natural disasters from fires, floods, droughts, and ocean flooding costs substantial money
“we can see in the last 2 or 3 years. Last couple of years. We reckon it's cost the global GDP about half a percent. We used to worry about it 20 years ago, but it didn't actually cost any serious money. And now it does. Preventing preventing all these natural disasters, fires, floods, and droughts. It's uh an occasional ocean floods. Cost a lot of money”
CO2 and methane have been known for over 100 years to create a heat-trapping blanket effect in the atmosphere, and the precise mechanisms of how temperature increases lead to more water vapor (about 15% more than used to exist) and subsequently more heavy downpours are well understood
“they've known the effect for over 100 years that CO2 has as uh creating a blanket to trap the heat, the same with methane and nitrous oxide. They know precisely uh uh reasonably precisely uh what is going on...The air carries more water vapor. That's just physics. We carry about 15% more water vapor than we used. What are the consequences of that? Well, one of them is more heavy downpours”
Technology is 'perhaps the last best hope' for solving climate change because humans do not appear sensible enough as a species to voluntarily sacrifice for the welfare of future generations.
“Technology it is perhaps the last best hope because it doesn't appear that we're sensible enough as a species to want to actually sacrifice to do the right thing for our grandchildren. Screw our grandchildren, you know.”
Oil supplies have been maintained through reserve stocks built into the system and logistical lags (long shipping times), but these buffers are being exhausted, meaning geopolitical oil risks are about to become much more acute.
“we've been floating along uh on on the reserves that were built into the system and the lags. It took weeks and weeks for the last oil tankers to just finish their journey and unload in Japan... now we're coming to the end of that.”
Grantham considers himself a 'fanatic on climate change' because he views it as life-threatening for the human species, potentially putting civilization in a 'very bad place' within 40-50 years without serious action.
“I suppose I have to think of myself as a fanatic on on climate change because I I consider it uh life-threatening for for our species. I think in as little as 40, 50 years, we could be in a very bad place.”
Warmer air carries about 15% more water vapor than previous conditions, which causes more heavy downpours visible in recent years, costing the global economy about 0.5% of GDP annually in disaster costs and recovery expenses.
“The air carries more water vapor. That's just physics. We carry about 15% more water vapor than we used. What are the consequences of that? Well, one of them is more heavy downpours, which we can see in the last 2 or 3 years... We reckon it's cost the global GDP about half a percent.”
The Federal Reserve and regulatory authorities took a passive stance toward the Magnificent Seven's monopolistic consolidation, not intervening like Teddy Roosevelt's antitrust actions against Standard Oil, which allowed these firms to become 'grand global monopolies' rather than local ones.
“They were enormously helped by the way in the Justice Department's attitude [11:34] and the administration's attitude to monopolies. They They weren't interested. So, they were not stepping in like Teddy Roosevelt to break up uh the great Standard Oil. So, these were not just local monopolies. They were often grand global monopolies.”
Technology is perhaps the last best hope for addressing climate change because the human species does not appear sensible enough to make voluntary sacrifices for the sake of future generations
“Technology it is perhaps the last best hope because it doesn't appear that we're sensible enough as a species to want to actually sacrifice to do the right thing for our grandchildren. Screw our grandchildren, you know”
Grantham considers himself 'a fanatic on climate change' because he considers it life-threatening for humanity, with potential for the species to be in a 'very bad place' in as little as 40-50 years without serious action
“I have to think of myself as a fanatic on on climate change because I I consider it uh life-threatening for our species. I think in as little as 40, 50 years, we could be in a very bad place”
Wind, solar, and energy storage technologies have made far more progress than expected 15 years ago; storage costs have fallen to less than one-tenth of what Grantham projected, and are continuing to decline, while fossil fuel costs are rising due to political exposure.
“Wind, solar, storage have all made much more progress, by the way, than we thought. When I first started to write some papers 15 years ago, we we never expected storage in particular to be Oh, if perhaps three times the current price would not have surprised me. It It's come down to less than a tenth since I wrote my first paper. Less than And it's still falling like a rock.”
The housing bubble was well-behaved in its pattern (rising for 3 years, then declining for 3 years) and reached 3-sigma (a one-in-100-years event), whereas the US housing market had never bubbled at that extreme before and required both Greenspan and Bernanke to create it.
“We had, uh, a a really splendid housing bubble, which went way over two sigma to three sigma, one every 100 years or longer. Uh, the US housing market basically had never bubbled like that. It it took Greenspan and Bernanke working hard to create that situation. And, uh, very well-behaved, incidentally. It went up for 3 years and then down for 3 years. It looked looked perfect.”
Federal Reserve policy since Alan Greenspan's tenure has made bubble occurrences more frequent than the historical 36-year rate, suggesting policy choices have increased market volatility and bubble frequency.
“There's some indication that more recently, after Alan Greenspan and his troops, they've, uh, initiated a style of Federal Reserve policy that would make them a little more often.”
CO2, methane, and nitrous oxide have all been known for over 100 years to trap heat in the atmosphere similar to a blanket, creating a greenhouse effect; the precise mechanisms and consequences can be calculated from this physical understanding.
“They know the effect. And they've known the effect for over 100 years that CO2 has as uh creating a blanket to trap the heat, the same with methane and nitrous oxide. They know precisely uh uh reasonably precisely uh what is going on.”
When dominant firms compete directly in the same market, they engage in aggressive, destructive capitalism akin to late 19th century practices where firms went 'for the throat' rather than maintaining oligopolistic equilibrium, leading to margin compression
“these seven uh firms are not your average firms. They are ultimately aggressive. We have actually learned to develop a very sharp-edged form of capitalism, not unlike the late uh 19th century, where uh Standard Oil and so on went for the throat. And and and bully the railroads into increasing increasing the freight rates on their competitors and so on. I mean, really dirty pool. And and we've gotten pretty sharp sharp-edged. And these guys are the winners. They They go for the throat”
The stock market is currently in a bubble and has been for 4-5 years, with clear indicators that it checked every marker of a 'super bubble' by the end of 2021.
“Starting at the end, yes, we are in one and have been for some time... We entered bubble territory quite a long time ago, um, this time, 4 or 5 years ago, uh, and it it bubbled nicely, uh, till the end of 20 21. The end of 2021 it it checked off every indicator of what you might call super bubble coming to the end.”
We are currently in a stock market bubble and have been for some time, entering bubble territory 4-5 years ago
“Starting at the end, yes, we are in one and have been for some time”
The United States displays 'an almost unique ability to miss the obvious and be self-destructive' in terms of adopting EVs and transitioning from fossil fuels compared to Europe
“US is displaying a almost unique ability to miss the obvious and be self-destructive”
The best historical comparison for understanding the current AI bubble is the tech/internet bubble of 1999-2002, which felt very similar up until the end of 2021 and early 2022, before ChatGPT introduced an unprecedented new variable.
“I think the most useful straightforward comparison is with between the tech bubble and uh the first half of this bubble we're in now. Up to the end of 2021 and even into the break of 2022, it felt very much like the uh internet bubble uh forming and breaking.”
Trump should be considered for major environmental awards because no one has done more good for the long-term health of the planet than him, as major corporations have recognized the vulnerability of oil/gas dependence and the security benefits of solar, wind, and storage.
“Trump should be considered for the great environmental prize that they give every year. Because no one has ever done this much a good for a long-term green planet. Anybody who hasn't taken on board the vulnerability of oil and gas compared to the security of of solar wind and storage is brain dead.”
A bubble can be statistically defined using two standard deviations from trend data; events exceeding two standard deviations occur approximately once every 36 years in the stock market (compared to the mathematical expectation of once every 44 years for random data), making this definition both statistically rigorous and practically useful.
“And uh being slightly nerdy, we looked around for a sta- a statistical way of defining it. And very conveniently, there was this concept of two sigma, two standard deviations. And uh a standard deviation just tells you how rare an outlier is in a in a field of data. And it turns out that it's uh every 44 years on an annual basis. A a two sigma event uh upside and downside is every 44 years uh you get an outlier. And in the stock market in real life, uh you get one every 36 years, but I was surprised how close that was to 44.”
The Magnificent 7 tech companies previously represented strong monopolies in seven different sectors (Microsoft, Apple, Google, etc.), each dominating their own field, but now they are all preparing to directly compete against each other in the same AI field, fundamentally changing their competitive dynamics.
“the mag seven used to represent really strong monopolies in seven different areas. They each control their field. Microsoft, Apple, Google, and so on. And and now they're all bracing to be the top dog in the same field. This is utterly different.”
The critical question about the current market is how much of the profit and PE gains is permanent versus temporary, and how long the Magnificent 7 can maintain their profit margins as competitive dynamics shift from regional monopolies to head-to-head competition.
“now the question is how much of that is permanent, how much of the PE move is justified. But I think most importantly how long can they maintain their profit margins? I have a very strong feeling on that.”
The vulnerability of tech companies' valuations to technological breakthroughs is high, as the assumption that they will maintain dominance in AI technology rests on the belief that no other breakthrough technology will disrupt their position.
“By the way, the vulnerability, the vulnerability of these people to a technological uh breakthrough of some other kind. You know, a new a new type of of chip, a new type of technology. Um there doesn't seem to be uh to me a death grip on on this technology the way people are assuming.”
The Magnificent Seven have developed and refined a 'sharp-edged form of capitalism' similar to the ruthless late 19th-century practices of Standard Oil (bullying railroads into raising freight rates on competitors), where the winners use aggressive tactics to maintain dominance.
“We have actually learned to develop a very sharp-edged form of capitalism, not unlike the late uh 19th century, where uh Standard Oil and so on went for the throat. And and and bully the railroads into [12:34] increasing increasing the freight rates on their competitors and so on. I mean, really dirty pool. And and we've gotten pretty sharp sharp-edged. And these guys are the winners. They They go for the throat.”
The cloud computing market had only three major competitors (unlike the seven in AI) and they maintained a 'very well-behaved oligopoly' by intuitively coordinating to take it easy on each other, but the AI competitors are openly 'screaming at each other,' indicating this level of coordination is unlikely to occur.
“they had a little go around on the cloud, but they're only three and they handled it very carefully and they either intuited that the others were you know, take it easy on me, I'll take it easy on you and they they shared the market, a [14:40] very well-behaved oligopoly. But this is not You didn't hear the cloud people screaming at each other, but you hear the AI people doing that.”
A bubble can be defined statistically as a two-sigma (two standard deviation) event, which occurs approximately once every 36-44 years in stock market data, representing an outlier far removed from the long-term trend
“we looked around for a sta- a statistical way of defining it. And very conveniently, there was this concept of two sigma, two standard deviations. And uh a standard deviation just tells you how rare an outlier is in a in a field of data. And it turns out that it's uh every 44 years on an annual basis. A a two sigma event uh upside and downside is every 44 years uh you get an outlier. And in the stock market in real life, uh you get one every 36 years”
When Grantham paid to acquire computers for his investment firm, it provided a competitive advantage for a couple of years, but once everyone had computers it became just 'a cost of doing business' producing only modest returns on capital with no upward pressure on profit margins
“When we finished paying for our computer, which we choked on, we had we it helped us have a an advantage in calculating everything for a couple of years, particularly over uh smaller firms like us. And uh and then everyone had a computer. It It was just a cost of doing business. All you should expect to make in that situation is a modest return on the capital involved”
Looking out 10 years from now and turning back, everyone will have AI, everyone will be buying whatever AI services they can afford, competitive advantage will be competed away, and AI will become something all firms have to do just to maintain parity
“If you look out 10 years and then turn around and look back, everyone will have AI. Everyone will be buying the service they can afford. And the com- competitive advantage will have been competed mostly away. It will be something you have to do. If you don't have an expert uh uh uh on your staff, you better get one. And uh everyone will have their expert”
During the tech bubble, Grantham's firm was making 6-7% annual returns while the market surged, which was enough to lose half its clients despite being right, because short-term underperformance is intolerable to clients regardless of long-term correctness
“All we did was under We didn't even lose money, of course. We were making 6 or 7 or 8% a year, just much less than than uh the high shots and much less than the market. 6% a year uh less than the market. And that was enough in two and a quarter years to lose half our clients. None of whom came back”
Unlike the cloud computing market where three major players (AWS, Azure, Google Cloud) engaged in careful, cooperative behavior and informally shared the market, the AI competition is characterized by public hostility and aggressive chest-beating, indicating a race dynamic unlike any in recent tech history.
“they handled it very carefully and they either intuited that the others were you know, take it easy on me, I'll take it easy on you and they they shared the market, a very well-behaved oligopoly. But this is not You didn't hear the cloud people screaming at each other, but you hear the AI people doing that.”
Technology companies may be vulnerable to disruption from unexpected breakthroughs in chip design or entirely new types of technology, meaning they do not have a 'death grip' on their dominant positions
“the vulnerability, the vulnerability of these people to a technological uh breakthrough of some other kind. You know, a new a new type of of chip, a new type of technology. Um there doesn't seem to be uh to me a death grip on on this technology the way people are assuming”
Grantham does not see evidence of the Magnificent Seven's aggressive AI competition being reflected in market commentary or analysis, despite it being a simple and straightforward logical outcome of their competitive situation.
“Even though that argument seems so simple and straightforward, I don't see it anywhere. People think all seven of them are going to make obscene profits. Well, that would be new. When does that ever happen in any market ever?”
The shift from Biden to Trump was less significant than seven prior elections in Europe, suggesting anti-incumbent voting is primarily driven by economic discontent rather than unique American political factors
“the shift from Biden to Trump, much analyzed by everybody, was less than the seven prior elections in Europe”
The recent oil crisis showed that the world is ending reliance on reserve buffers built into the system, with oil tankers taking weeks to unload and supply chain lags that previously provided time to adapt now coming to an end
“the oil crisis. People don't realize we've been floating along uh on on the reserves that were built into the system and the lags. It took weeks and weeks for the last oil tankers to just finish their journey and unload in Japan, you know. All of these things bought us bought us time and our reserves were pretty good depending on which country. And and now we're coming to the end of that”
Grantham's firm lost half its clients (and none came back) during the tech bubble of 1997-1999 by being underweight the market while it was still rising, losing 6-7% annually versus market gains, which was enough to lose clients despite ultimately being right.
“We'd done pretty well through '97. All we did was under We didn't even lose money, of course. We were making 6 or 7 or 8% a year, just much less than than uh the high shots and much less than the market. 6% a year uh less than the market. And that was enough in two and a quarter years to lose half our clients. None of whom came back.”
Grantham's firm managed to weather the career risk by being a private firm that could afford to lose business; they dropped from $30 billion to $20 billion in assets while competitors went from $30 billion to $50-60 billion, then recovered to $165 billion in the following 4 years after the market crashed.
“we were a private firm, and if we chose to lose half our business quickly, that was that which we did, that was our business... we went from uh 30 billion to uh 20. When everyone else was going from 30 to 50 or 60... then in the break, when they went back from 50 to 35 or 30, we went from 20 to 22... in the following 4 years, we went from 22 to 165.”
The tech bubble of 1999-2000 provides the most useful comparison to the first half of the current bubble (through 2021), showing similar patterns and validating Grantham's 2022 prediction that the market would break
“I think the most useful straightforward comparison is with between the tech bubble and uh the first half of this bubble we're in now. Up to the end of 2021 and even into the break of 2022, it felt very much like the uh internet bubble uh forming and breaking. And a lot of the nuances that we could discuss were were similar and uh made me very confident that in late 2021 uh the market would break, and it did”
Grantham was surprised that despite believing markets are 'totally inefficient', they almost obey statistical rules that would apply to a random series, as if markets were efficient, with outlier events (two standard deviations) occurring roughly every 36 years as predicted by theory.
“I'm a great believer that the market is totally inefficient. And the fact that it would almost obey a statistical rule that applies to a random series, uh, as if the market were efficient, uh, surprised me. But, uh, 36 years seems like for most people a pretty workable definition of an outlier, an extreme event, doesn't it?”
Grantham has donated over 90% of his wealth to his foundation for environmental protection, and the foundation operates as 'shock troops' making aggressive new investments, pioneering research, and helping new enterprises get off the ground.
“the great majority, well over 90% of everything I have has gone into into our foundation for the protection of the environment. And and and we try and operate there as kind of shock troops. We We want to be making aggressive new investments, helping new groups get going, whether they're profit or non-profit, uh helping to pioneer the research, and um and helping new enterprises get off the ground”
Each of the Magnificent Seven is willing to spend $200 billion or more on capital expenditure in a single year to achieve AI dominance, viewing it as a winner-take-all competition where being first to the next breakthrough is worth any investment.
“And here they are looking at each other now and saying, 'It's going to be vastly important to be the biggest and the best at AI. To be the first one to get the next generation breakthrough in in uh in AI. And it doesn't matter if it takes me 200 billion in cap eight this year, I'm going to do it.'”
The exact same dynamic of excessive capital deployment that occurred in railroads and internet is happening 'in spades almost today' in AI, with investors falling over themselves to fund AI ventures regardless of valuation, such as the SpaceX IPO.
“And that is exactly as you can see dear listener. You can see that happening in spades almost today... I was talking to someone the other day about some bankers about the SpaceX IPO and and the the sort of the the extent to which people are falling over themselves to put money into that IPO regardless of the valuation”
All seven Mag 7 firms view AI as a field where being the biggest and best at AI is 'vastly important' and winning the next AI generation breakthrough is critical enough to justify spending $200 billion or more in capex this year regardless of return calculations.
“they've learned to be the winner who takes all. And uh and here they are looking at each other now and saying, 'It's going to be vastly important to be the biggest and the best at AI. To be the first one to get the next generation breakthrough in in uh in AI. And it doesn't matter if it takes me 200 billion in cap eight this year, I'm going to do it.'”
On January 15, 2022, Grantham wrote a quarterly letter stating 'Let the wild rumpus begin,' predicting the market would decline if it were listening to history, as all indicators showed the bubble was peaking.
“I wrote a quarterly letter on January the 15th, 2022, saying, 'Let the wild rumpus begin.' In other words, very rare for me, the timing is now. The market should go down if it's listening to history.”
Being wrong for 2.25 years during a bubble was acceptable to Grantham because his firm was private and willing to accept the risk; most firms cannot and will not accept such pain, choosing to 'want the quiet life' instead.
“Only only a an independent firm with a willingness to be uh exposed to the possibility of a semi-disastrous drop in business... We were only wrong for 2 and 1/4 years... who who wants to play that game? Um everyone wants the quiet life. I I strongly recommend you don't do it.”
Both financial market analysis and climate analysis are fundamentally data-driven, examining data and making logical conclusions, allowing similar analytical approaches despite different subject matter
“I would say the similarities are that they're both data-driven. You You look at the data and you try and make the logical conclusion”
The 5% stock market gain following the Iran bombing appears nonsensical from a fundamental analysis perspective, but is explained by Grantham's coincident indicator model: the market rose because earnings were rising nicely, not because of the geopolitical event.
“people say, 'How is it possible that we've had a war and the market went up 5% since we bombed Iran?' Everyone can see that that's nonsense. My response is, 'Well, if you view it through my coincident eyes, you just say, 'And what about earnings?' Oh, they're rising nicely. That's why the market's up 5%.”
Predicting outcomes from genuine novelty is difficult and uncertain, creating challenges in analyzing AI's impacts that prior experience may not resolve
“Not novelty is uh from a predicting point of view, novelty is uh difficult”
The market's valuation of tech firms reflects an irrational consensus belief in their permanent exceptionality; Grantham recommends checking the actual 92% Amazon decline statistic to validate his claim about bubble destruction even for winning companies.
“You should check this. It's such a ridiculous number.”
The political consensus around environmental action has shifted away from climate priorities, making Grantham's environmental advocacy less influential, but he views this shift as temporary and counterproductive given the evidence.
“the feeling is at the moment that there's a bit of a the consensus has moved away from from from that position. I just wonder how you how you think about that”
Trump (and by extension anyone who fails to recognize the inevitable shift from fossil fuels to renewable energy) should paradoxically be considered for environmental prizes because failure to address energy transition creates conditions that force rapid renewable adoption by necessity and cost competitiveness.
“the story was the story was that Trump should be considered for the great environmental prize that they give every year. Because no one has ever done this much a good for a long-term green planet. Anybody who hasn't taken on board the vulnerability of oil and gas compared to the security of of solar wind and storage is brain dead. They all have and they're all planning accordingly.”