Mark Galeotti - Russia has Defied Predictions of Analysts and Media. What are we Still Getting Wrong

Russian intelligence services have been significantly degraded in their ability to operate in the West due to massive spy expulsions, forcing them to rely on non-official cover operatives who risk imprisonment, and making it much harder to move money to and from Russia; as a result, Russia has been forced to rely more on remote disinformation, which has proven less effective than feared.

“there's been such a huge Spate of expulsions of Russian agents all across the west and indeed Beyond but particularly in the West that that absolutely has put a significant crimp into the capacity of the Russians to to sort of carry out the kind of operations that they did they're obviously having to rely more on people under so-called non-official cover who don't have the joys of diplomatic immunity and therefore if they're caught they can actually be put in prison but also it's much harder to travel to and from Russia these days it's very difficult to move money to and from Russia these days”

The Russian liberal opposition is fragmented and faces structural problems: they lack a unifying figure since Navalny's imprisonment; they also talk about a 'beautiful Russia of the future' and being a 'normal country' without explaining the mechanism of change from current dysfunction to that state, and they lack a groundswell of organic civil society mobilization like Ukraine's.

“they talk about the beautiful Russia of the future they talk about being a normal country but without talking about the mechanism how you get from this point to that point how you rebuild a country's institutions not from the top down but from the ground up and can you do any of that stuff without some kind of Groundswell of uh you know organic development of Civil Society like we saw in Ukraine but which seems to be curiously absent in in Russia”

Putin was a very mediocre KGB agent—not a high-flyer, rated as a solid B—and his mythology as a master spy has been constructed by blending this minor KGB service with the fictional figure of Carla from John le Carré's novels, creating a false aura of sophistication that obscures his ordinariness.

“he was a very mediocre KGB agent you know he was not one of the High Flyers he was no way a bond figure we've actually seen some of his assessments and basically he was a solid B he was fine but but nothing more”

Russia's recovery will be limited and painful if systemic change doesn't occur; the regime will use escalating repression against domestic opposition—not Stalin-scale killing of 'tens of thousands' (lacking stomach and capacity) but 'selective brutality' targeting influential figures to silence entire groups, similar to Belarus's approach after 2020.

“we're not talking stalinism I think it doesn't have either the stomach or the more the capacity to start killing people by their tens of thousands and and such like but nonetheless I mean I think there are still unfortunately unplummed depths to which we can expect the criminal to go when it gets more scared when it feels that it has no alternative”

The generation of KGB veterans around Putin (aged 68-74) who came from non-elite backgrounds and suddenly became wealthy during the 1990s have a distinctive emotional investment in their status and feel entitled and resentful toward the West and Ukraine; they are not representative of younger Russian political elites (50-60 somethings) who lack this emotional component and would pragmatically prefer to rebuild Western relations.

“it's definitely the sort of a toxic last gasp of homozyticus now if you look at the people around Putin as well as Putin himself they're pretty much all in the 68 to 74 years age bracket the overwhelming majority of KGB veterans and also almost all of them were not from established nomenclature party Elite families they were the first in their family to finally make it into the big leagues so they were the ones who suddenly thought wow we've got it made when suddenly the system collapses and there is that sense of almost who stole it from us entitlement uh that that has been broken”

Russia's greatest generational wealth transfer is underway as the kleptocrats of the 1990s approach succession, and the necessity of establishing rule of law to manage this transfer could create the foundation for future democratic reforms; historically, kleptocracies have sometimes created rule of law frameworks for their own self-interested reasons, which then enable democratic transitions.

“Russia is on the cusp of one of the greatest intergenerational transfers of wealth the world has ever seen as the the generation that's stolen the 1990s is now beginning to think about succession now the problem with the 1990s and I want a bit of a soapbox here but bear with me is what it really demonstrated is you can have rule of law without democracy you cannot have democracy without rule of law that was Russia's mistake then they tried to bring a democracy without rule of law and of course it didn't work well if if the collectorcrats can begin you know for their own selfish reasons want to create more rule of law that lays the foundations for the generation after who can maybe begin to become the true reforming Democratic generation of Russia”

Russia's regional governments are increasingly sidelining Moscow's authority and creating horizontal connections between regions, developing what Galeotti calls 'corrupt federalism by the back door,' where local leaders placate Moscow while actually running their regions independently; this represents an inadvertent decentralization of power that mimics patterns from late Soviet times.

“you are getting a kind of corrupt federalism by the back door that local governments increasingly they're saying Moscow not as a solution but as a problem and therefore they're trying to find ways of sidelining we're getting more uh horizontal connections between regions um but also I suspect that there is a lot more of basically just kind of placating Moscow saying yeah yeah we're doing that while actually cabals of local leaders so essentially run things much for themselves this is what we saw in late Soviet times after all”

Putin's paranoia became increasingly poorly calibrated to reality after the early-mid 2010s because information flow through the Russian system broke down—he had always been paranoid, but when he was receiving accurate intelligence about threats and dissidents, his paranoia was finely tuned; now, with information pathways blocked, his paranoia is crudely calibrated and disconnected from actual conditions.

“for example the shift to a parliamentary rather than presidential system it's something that for example Mikhail kodakowski is very much sort of pushing it's increasingly also cropping up in Russian in Russia liberal uh conversation again an awareness that actually that's one of the problems that rather than putting your faith in a better president and hoping that works out that you need an Institutional structure”

In the 1990s under Yeltsin, Putin's role was as a loyal subordinate who would protect Yeltsin's circle from prosecution and ensure embezzlement could proceed without consequence, and this was his entire value proposition—not strategic vision but being a reliable bag carrier and cleaner.

“his career was essentially as being everyone's favorite bag carrier the loyal Deputy who basically would have his principles back who would make sure that whatever needed to get done got done that the evidence was was burnt and thrown away that you know basically you could you can embezzle to your heart's content whatever and don't worry let me of vladimirovic has got everything in hand”

Russian opposition figures operating from outside Russia have historically failed to gain traction inside Russia, and those who attempt to lead an external opposition movement face constant infiltration and subversion by Russian intelligence services, mirroring the fate of the White forces during the Russian Civil War who were defeated not just militarily but through infiltration and information warfare.

“outside of Russia's borders what we've actually seen is there's been a succession of oppositionist figures outside Russia's borders who have constantly failed to get any traction inside”

Russian disinformation cannot change people's minds about fundamental issues (e.g., converting Ukraine supporters into war supporters) but can only exacerbate existing tendencies and radicalize latent concerns; its primary effect is to mobilize people who already have concerns about a particular issue rather than create entirely new political positions.

“it has not proven anywhere near the kind of world-winning weapon that some people have suggested but above all all it can do is exacerbate existing Tendencies it can sort of a better word radicalize it can't change people's minds you can't take someone who you know today is a firm supporter of Ukraine's struggle for his freedom and turn them in a week's time into a zed Ted what you can do is take people who let's say have concerns about the amount of money that is being spent on Ukraine and convince them that this is important enough that they should write to their MP or go and join a protest somewhere”

COVID-19 accelerated Putin's isolation because he likely could not be safely vaccinated (due to possible immunocompromise), forcing him to isolate from almost everyone except his closest circle, while ideological hawks like Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev had monthly cycles of isolation built into their schedule that allowed them regular face-time with Putin, while pragmatists like Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin had very little direct contact because they were actually running the country and couldn't afford two-week isolation periods.

“I still suspect that we'll find out in due course that somehow put in his immunocompromised and therefore could not be vaccinated it's worth noting that although we were totally vaccinated for someone who often so often has um you know bare-shirted uh sort of press picks we never got to see him being vaccinated or anything like that um so maybe it'll be that he couldn't and certainly it meant that basically the people who actually had face time with him face to face and although yes he has video conferences there is a physicality to power and influence actually being there you know the people who were there were a handful of his friends and cronies the same generation the same mindset”

Before the Ukraine war, Russia's economic debate at high levels was conducted between three factions—the technocrats (pushing for reform), the securocrats (primarily concerned with state power), and the kleptocrats (focused on stealing as much as possible)—and this debate continued during the war, with none of them discussing economic rationality because rationality doesn't motivate Putin or Patrushev.

“it was already a debate taking place like most Russian debates a quiet one behind the scenes but between sort of technocrats the Sakura crats and the kleptocrats shall we say you know the technocrats are saying we need to reform securecrats not really caring about reform as such so long as the state power was maintained which is difficult to have with reform because in a way that state power also depends on your capacity to basically decide who's a winner and who's losers and The Collector crowds are just going to steal as much as they can”

Ukrainian resistance has forced Russians to confront that Ukraine is a genuine nation with its own national identity and will to independence, and Putin's 'laboratories of tyranny' in territories he has occupied have not succeeded in breaking Ukrainian resistance; this contradiction between Putin's imperial assumptions and Ukrainian reality represents a potential fundamental shift in Russian self-understanding.

“putting aside these phenomenal and extraordinary inventors as well as determined resistance to the Russians you know before February one one could look at Ukraine as a state with you know massive problems of corruption and General State incapacity um it's a sort of classic example of how human doesn't release that are often translate when I I once suggested that actually ukrainians ought to put statues of Vladimir Putin in their main squares because he is in some ways the father of the true Ukrainian Nation it has been this Crucible of war that had truly brought ukrainians together”

Nikolai Patrushev, the Security Council Secretary, is more hawkish and ideologically extreme than Putin himself, pushing him toward war and dangerous decisions; Patrushev believes in baseless claims about Western plots (citing a psychic's alleged reading of Madeleine Albright's dreams) and is the primary figure briefing Putin about the outside world, painting an extraordinarily paranoid and xenophobic picture of Western intentions.

“a security Council secretary Patra Chev who for me is a very very baleful presence uh if anything the person who's even more hawkish than Putin and definitely pushes him in that direction I mean I've called him the most dangerous man in Russia”

The West mishandled policy toward Russia in the 1990s through a combination of 'benign neglect' when engagement was needed and 'hectoring and patronizing policy' when restraint was warranted; going forward, the West should practice 'tough love'—opposing specific Russian actions while distinguishing between opposition to the regime and opposition to the Russian people, and offering a 'fast track back' to international engagement on terms that Russia must demonstrate it wants.

“I think we we dramatically mishandle policy towards Russia in the 1990s with a kind of combination of um negligent neglect when we needed to be engaged and um sort of hectoring and patronizing policy when we should have just let the Russian you know in areas where we should let the Russians be with this time I think we have to square that Circle of showing that we're opposed to many of the things that the Russian state has done but not the Russian people but also that we are willing to offer a kind of a fast track back into the human race but that this will be a path that Russia has to demonstrate that it wants to step on”

The 2014 Crimean annexation was a crucial turning point where Putin made decisions unilaterally and expected Russians merely to applaud; from this point forward, Putin ceased caring about domestic issues and focused entirely on his personal historical legacy and Russia's place in the world, effectively flipping the model so that Russia exists to serve the president rather than the president serving Russia.

“I really think that frankly um in hindsight the annexation of Crimea I think was probably a crucial point um in the short term it gave him this sort of sugar here to the popularity with only Russians because they genuinely thought Crimea was right for me theirs but it was a point when it was absolutely the Czar making the decisions on behalf of ordinary Russians and fine they like this they didn't like the successive decisions but the point is their job was simply to applaud”

Within Russian institutions (particularly education), many people are currently required to voice support for the war and regime while privately dissenting, a pattern that mirrors how Soviet citizens publicly conformed while privately mocking their system; this suggests that surface compliance does not indicate genuine legitimacy.

“there's a lot of people who are having to say a lot of real nonsense at the moment because that's required of them I mean I just know from my own experience and the people I can still talk to and you know other sources as well that you know a lot of people they're doing it because they have to they're gritting their teeth just as they did in Soviet times and we shouldn't forget just how quickly what looked like a one-party state in which everyone wore that little red cravats and went out and on supotnik and everything else and did all the things that a good communist would do would then go back and around the kitchen table ream out their Soviet leaders”

Putin operates a 'court system' rather than a modern bureaucracy, where policy is determined by which 'political entrepreneurs' can pitch ideas that capture his attention today, with preference often given to the more exciting and dramatic proposals rather than careful, rational, institutionalized structures—similar to a medieval court competing for the monarch's favor.

“we have a court in which actually the courtiers are all trying to win the favor and the ear of the monarch and I've called this system an autocracy because in some ways actually your job isn't determined by what's on your business card or your office door it's by what the boss wants you to do today which may all be totally different from tomorrow”

Civil society exists in Russia more than Western observers recognize, and the repression is precisely because authorities fear its potential; this is why Alexei Navalny had to be imprisoned—he was bridging factional divides within the opposition and building a genuine national movement rather than a Moscow-based movement, which made him exceptionally dangerous to Putin.

“I question that I think actually Civil Society is more present in Russia than we might think and in some ways it helps explain the very pitch of authoritarian repression that we're seeing at the moment I mean the key thing is and this is why Alex was so dangerous to Putin that so much so they needed to be poisoned and then you cause basically imprisoned for as long as they need because they all just simply add to his sentence as and when necessary is precisely he seemed to be a figure who was able to actually Bridge previous divides between well it would often been a very very sort of fractious and fragmented opposition movement”

During the immediate aftermath of the Ukraine war (if Russia does not achieve clear victory), nationalist emotions generated by the state to mobilize for war will need to find an outlet, and if the state cannot credibly control them, other figures may emerge to 'harvest' them, potentially leading to recriminatory violence and further instability.

“depending on how successful the Russians are I just don't think they're going to be particularly successful but they know so if we assume they're like at best they might hold on to Crimea um you know however much that spin nonetheless there will be all of these passions which have been generated by the state to mobilize for war but now have to go somewhere and if the state can't credibly control them they will unfortunately be others who will emerge to basically you know Harvest that that”

Russia's technocrats (such as Prime Minister Mishustin, Moscow Mayor Sobyanin, and Central Bank chair Nabiullina) are often phenomenally effective and capable, but they have been unable to prevent sanctions from being effective because they cannot change the underlying system—they operate despite Putin, not thanks to him, often subverting the system while maintaining loyalty.

“the technocrats very very capably have responded to it it's still having an effect and it will continue to do so but they've done as good a job as anyone could to deal with it but the point is they have to do this despite not thanks to Putin um you know often it's about almost how they can subvert the system to actually get along with things while still protesting their loyalty”

Putin has abandoned efforts to reform the Russian domestic economy because such reforms are slow, difficult, and tedious; instead, he has turned to foreign policy where he can exercise direct executive power, declare wars, and make dramatic moves—though the results are often ineffective due to corruption undermining military capability and general institutional weakness.

“this also I think explains why Putin like so many leaders who become frustrated at their inability to change their own country because actually that's very very hard who is and therefore instead look to foreign policy because that's a place in which you can do the dramatic the heroic where actually the you know the the boss actually has executive power you can declare war you can make a peace treaty you can send your troops in and nothing can really stop you now okay the troops May well end up being rubbish because corruption has ensured that they haven't got the the radios and the all-weather tires and everything else that they need”

Despite the overall economy appearing to function (GDP figures are 'surprisingly good'), the military economy is thriving while the civilian economy is in serious trouble, and even civilian sectors that continue operating do so largely through state subsidies—the car industry is a classic example, producing Ladas with no airbags or GPS for a market that would prefer Chinese cars, creating an unsustainable situation mimicking the Soviet economy's core problem.

“if you disaggregate the military from the civilian economy I mean it's very clear the military economy is going great guns the arms factories are trying to move on to 24-Hour production four shift system Etc whereas the civilian economy is is in real trouble”

Even during the current highly repressive period (the most repressive since the 1980s), expressions of disaffection continue across a spectrum—from arson attacks on military draft offices (connected to mobilization resistance) to small-scale wildcat strikes and protests on economic issues—indicating that people internalize a sense of having rights to a say in their lives and their country despite the futility.

“we're also getting all kinds of reports about there are continuing expressions of disaffection ranging for the full spectrum from Arsenal attacks on military draft offices particularly connected to the mobilization campaign just perhaps a more extreme all the way through to actually continuing protests on economic issues usually relatively small Wildcats”

The Kremlin fears the 'Polish scenario'—that a spontaneous strike or protest (like Solidarity in Gdansk) could suddenly ignite a society-wide uprising that unifies previously fragmented opposition; this fear is why the regime works to keep opposition fragmented and is aware that economic deterioration will increase protest potential in the future.

“you sometimes hear banded around the fear of the Polish scenario after what happened with the solidarity Trade union in in Poland that led to the Declaration of martial law that no one would have thought necessarily that a strike in Gdansk shipyards would have suddenly become the catalyst that brings together a whole society-wide dissatisfaction and that's what they're worried about that who's going to be the next selective Owen sir you know what's going to be the next solidarity Trade union that could possibly just out of nowhere start to bring these things together”

Russia, as a post-ideological state, can pragmatically work with any political faction in the West—left, right, black lives matter, white supremacists—if it seems useful, demonstrating a purely instrumental approach to influence rather than ideological alignment.

“the Russians absolutely still have capabilities particularly because this is an essentially um not just morally bankrupt but also post ideological state so they can work with the left with the right with black lives matter with white supremacists you know whoever they think is useful they can find some way of building common ground with”

Putin's foreign aggression techniques (torture, disappearances, summary executions, ethnic cleansing, filtration camps, falsification of criminal cases) have been tested and refined in territories like Chechnya, South Ossetia, Crimea, and Donbas, before being applied at scale in Ukraine; these are not random brutality but deliberate methods.

“we've seen those sort of techniques then become imported into Russia itself as of course we've seen you know the degradation of civil society and rule of law so we've got chechnya South asetia Crimea donbass and now Ukraine itself you've seen extraordinary uh perversions of rule of law and I would say even sort of you know Humanity the torture disappearances summary executions hostage taking detentions filtration ethnic cleansing falsification of criminal cases arson destruction of the rule of law and the Judiciary”

Mikhail Khodorkovsky has been actively pushing for constitutional change in Russia, particularly toward a parliamentary (rather than presidential) system, and this idea is increasingly appearing in Russian liberal discourse, representing growing awareness that institutional rather than personalistic solutions are needed.

“the shift to a parliamentary rather than presidential system it's something that for example Mikhail kodakowski is very much sort of pushing it's increasingly also cropping up in Russian in Russia liberal uh conversation again an awareness that actually that's one of the problems that rather than putting your faith in a better president and hoping that works out that you need an Institutional structure”

Russia cannot pursue both military victory in Ukraine and significant economic recovery; the war economy is consuming resources that could otherwise support civilian development, creating a long-term scarring of productive capacity that will persist even if the war ends.

“the Russian economy was facing serious systemic challenges and there was already a debate taking place like most Russian debates a quiet one behind the scenes but between sort of technocrats the Sakura crats and the kleptocrats shall we say...with the the war economy what we're seeing is in some ways again we're still seeing this challenge”

Russians regard themselves as Europeans and increasingly believe they have a stake in their nation (unlike under Tsars or Soviets); this belief is difficult to erase once acquired, creating long-term grounds for optimism about the possibility of sustained democratic change.

“Russians regard themselves as Europeans Russians increasingly as I said I think do believe that they have a stake in their nation in a way that Russians never had in the past they didn't have as peasants under the Tsar they didn't have as Citizens under the Soviet leadership you know it's very hard to to lose that belief once you've acquired it”

Putin functions as a Rorschach inkblot onto which everyone projects what they want to see—Western liberals saw a reform-minded leader, nationalists saw a strong hand, and Western leaders believed only they could negotiate with him—because he is essentially a gray, unremarkable figure whose only real skill is manipulating people's perceptions of him.

“Putin isn't quite one of them nonetheless he thought that uh they thought that he basically represented a certain strand of opinion I think this has always been one of Putin's relatively few strengths is that the gray man and he is a very very gray man becomes something of a kind of Rorschach ink blot if I'm going to mix my metaphors on whom everyone overlays what they want to see”

Russia's three most likely political futures can be categorized as: Red (continued centralized war economy with Zed patriotism aesthetics but actual managerial control), White (Orthodox ultra-nationalist fascism), or Blue (loosely structured central state with emerging civil society); the timeline and mechanisms of transition between these scenarios depend on how the war ends and whether generational change occurs.

“if you take the red outcome which is the sort of centrists Soviet authoritarian sort of system that to the war economy that we've currently got what's the chance of that continuing or the white which will be a sort of you know Orthodox Ultra nationalist Zed Patriot sort of white fascism or the blue which could be a Loosely structured weaker central Russian state but with emerging Civil Society”

Russia's sanctions will remain in place regardless of whether the war ends, as long as Putin is in the Kremlin; even if sanctions were lifted, capital would not return to Russia quickly because investors have seen how fast political conditions can change and the lack of security of their assets.

“I think really some form of sanctions are now going to remain regardless of the war so long as Putin is in the Kremlin but even if one could take away all of these constraints it's not as though everyone would be flocking back into the Russian Market having seen how things can can so quickly change the lack of security that they have and such like”

Alexei Navalny's decision to return to Russia despite knowing he would be imprisoned was an act of both extraordinary bravery and patriotism; he wanted to avoid becoming another ineffective Russian exile politician advising from a Western think tank, and instead put all his 'skin in the game' to make clear he was genuinely committed to change in Russia.

“certainly navalny when he went back I mean it was an extraordinary act not just a bravery but a patriotism I think he probably knew that he was going to be arrested and he knew exactly what the outcome was going to would be but there was that sense of precisely he didn't want to become another one of those Russian expat politicians who from a nice comfortable birth in uh DC based Think Tank invade upon the Russians that they should be rising up against this regime he wanted to make sure make it very clear that he was putting all his skin in the game”

Some figures in the Western left maintain sentimental support for Russia, partly because 'America is the great Satan,' but also because they conflate today's Russia (which is neoliberal, economically liberal, and hostile to worker organization) with the Soviet Union, leading them to support a country with very different characteristics than the one they imagine.

“I almost find it fascinating the degree to which there are figures within the British and European left who still somehow feel a sort of a a Sentimental support for Russia in part because it's not America and as we all know America is the great Satan but also because they somehow conflate today's Russia with the Soviet Union even though today's Russia is to a large extent a kind of neocon um you know extreme finite for economic liberal playground in which absolutely as mentioned you know trade unions have no real power individuals do you know do not really have a anywhere near the sort of the rights of organization and supporters in the west”

Yevgeny Prigozhin, the founder and manager of the Wagner mercenary group, exemplifies the political entrepreneur model; he has managed various operations (troll farms, election interference, mercenary deployment) and is willing to do 'whatever is needed,' making him a tool for Putin to deploy as he sees fit.

“if you you have any precaution these sort of financial backer and manager of the Wagner mercenary group I mean in the past he's done everything from run troll Farms to hack the American elections to um basically sending his Wagner mercenaries around Africa looking for for Good Financial deals and more than anything else but this is it it's it's whatever whatever you need doing”

After 2012, when Putin returned to the presidency following two terms as prime minister and money became tighter, he could not maintain his dual role of satisfying both the embezzling elite and ordinary Russians, so the burden fell on ordinary Russians while the elite kept their perks, creating mass protests that Putin interpreted not as organic expressions of discontent but as CIA-orchestrated plots.

“the money was beginning to get tighter and frankly because the embezzlers of the elite were not going to give up their perks the burden had to Fallen ordinary Russians but also Russians were thinking well yeah okay that's fine it was great you know it's not the 1990s but what's the future going to offer us what's your vision and Putin didn't have one for ordinary Russians”

Late-stage Putinism is characterized by the exhaustion of the regime's 'creative capacities and potentials,' meaning the system can no longer innovate or adapt; it can only apply increasingly crude and desperate measures to maintain control as its underlying contradictions become unsustainable.

“I think this is last stage putinism to perfectly honest it's precisely the the real creative capacities and potentials of putinism have been thoroughly exhausted because you know if we're honest like all regimes like all leaders Putin has evolved over time well devolved whatever changed anyway um and the Putin we see now is certainly not the Putin that we saw in 2000 or 2008”

Putin and his generation never dealt with Russia's Soviet past; they privatized and 'turned to market' but never had to reckon with the contradiction that the Soviet Union was simultaneously a Russian Empire and something distinct from Russia, an ambiguity that remains unresolved.

“Russia never really broke away from its Soviet past sure it it privatized it turned to the market and and it was a sort of democracy but it never really had to deal with its Soviet past it was able to basically say well I don't know that was the Soviets and there was a complex relation that the Soviet Union was not a Russian Empire and it also was um and I think that ambiguity was never dealt with”

Leonid Volkov, a prominent Navalny-associated figure operating from exile, has been discovered to have campaigned on behalf of oligarchs, temporarily damaging both his own reputation and creating a 'taint' on Navalny's team by association; this illustrates the difficulty of maintaining organizational coherence and clean opposition credentials while operating from outside Russia.

“with the case of Leonid volkov who has been um uh you know what should I say campaigning uh in the interests of oligarchs and has to an extent put a bit of a taint on navalia's team temporarily and certainly a big stay on his own reputation”

Some people within US, UK, and other governments are thinking about post-war Russian policy, but they are not currently getting bandwidth or attention because the focus is on winning the current conflict; however, when an 'endgame' begins to appear on the horizon, these thinkers should be able to 'segue' into implementation mode.

“there are there are people I have encountered people within us UK and other governments who are thinking these thoughts it's just that clearly at the moment you know no no one's really going to be spending much bandwidth honour I mean I think they should but I understand why they're not really thinking about post-war they're thinking about what we need to do during the War I just hope that when that does begin to come over the horizon then people can segue into it”