Is America Overstretched? A Conversation With General David Petraeus
What this covers
With the ever-present possibility of tensions between the United States and China in the Indo-Pacific, the war between Russia and Ukraine with no end in sight, and a new crisis between Israel and Hamas in the Middle East that could easily escalate, the United States seems to be stretched along several political and military fronts. How should President Joe Biden’s administration think strategically and tactically about this new arc of crisis in Europe, the Indo-Pacific, and the Middle East? Can it successfully resource America’s role in these conflicts? What are the key challenges it faces, and how much political bandwidth does it have at home to fashion policies that are both sustainable and effective? Join Aaron David Miller as he sits down with General David Petraeus to discuss these and other issues, as well as his new book Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare From 1945 to Ukraine.
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Strategic leadership quality—specifically whether civilian and military leaders get 'the big ideas right' by understanding context and crafting coherent strategy—is the primary determinant of success or failure in modern conflicts, as exemplified by contrasting leadership in Ukraine, Gaza, and Iraq.
- Putin fundamentally misunderstood Ukrainian resilience and overestimated Russian capabilities, while Zelensky correctly assessed the conflict and mobilized the nation, demonstrating the decisive impact of strategic clarity
- Post-conflict planning failures in Iraq (inadequate governance preparation, de-Baathification without reconciliation) directly enabled ISIS's rise, proving that strategy must extend beyond military victory to reconstruction and counterinsurgency
- Gaza presents an even more complex challenge than Iraq or Vietnam because Hamas embeds itself in civilian infrastructure, tunnels, and uses human shields, requiring Israel to simultaneously destroy an enemy, administer territory, and prevent reconstitution—a task impossible without comprehensive strategic vision beyond military operations
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The average length of a military conflict since 1816 is 100 days according to research from the University of Chicago and Uppsala University, and if a conflict lasts more than a year, it is likely to enter a multi-year phase lasting as long as 10 years.
“the average length of a military conflict uh according to the University Chicago and up upsa University since 1816 is 100 days 100 days the average length of a conflict since 1816 uh if a conflict lasts for more than a year according to this study it's likely to go um into a multi uh a multi-year phase lasting as many as 10 years”
Plato's quote that 'Only the Dead will see the end of War' suggests conflict will remain part and parcel of the world humans live in for the foreseeable future.
“you quote Plato um in in a chilling chilling quote Only The Dead will see the end of War um you know this book conflict uh I [46:10] suspect that word conflict is going to remain part and parcel of the world in which we live”
The US has not faced direct fundamental security threats to the homeland since the late 18th century when great powers were in the US backyard, or arguably during the War of 1812 when the British burned the capital.
“if our security is not directly threatened and frankly not since the late 18th century when we had the great powers in our backyard or I I would guess during the War of 1812 when the British uh burned part of the capital has our security been directly [15:20] or fundamentally um threatened”
The US defense industrial base was not prepared to simultaneously restock multiple types of weapons for multiple simultaneous conflicts, creating competition between Ukraine and Israel support in specific weapon systems like 155mm Howitzer ammunition.
“former under Secretary State under Secretary of Defense rep policy Michelle floro and specifically on the issue of resourcing these conflicts she says and I quote our industrial base was not prepared to have to restock so many different types of weapons for multiple purposes at the same time”
Henry Kissinger, historically skeptical of NATO enlargement, now asserts that the security of NATO begins at the Ukrainian-Russian border, representing a fundamental shift in understanding NATO's eastern boundary.
“Henry Kissinger himself who was for years not a huge fan of NATO enlargement as you'll recall um says that the security of NATO begins at the Ukrainian Russian border and [10:06] that's the new reality that we have to embrace”
Global South countries, for whom the US cannot assume automatic support, view the Western-led international order with skepticism, requiring the US to actively make the case that the liberal international order is good for the world rather than assuming buy-in.
“and so we even have to convince other countries uh that this is generally good for the world uh and that will be met with a degree of skepticism by some of them but but again you have to make that case but here in the United States uh of course then you do start to get very much into domestic politics”
The rules-based international order established after World War II has served the world and the United States reasonably well despite its imperfections, and sustaining it is in both American and allied national interest.
“the rules-based international order that we and our allies and the victors of World War I helped establish in the wake of a 50-year period that had two horrific world wars and the Great Depression and the intent of this system that was created was to try to prevent further world wars and to try to prevent further economic collapse and you know to varying degrees I think that that rules-based International order has served uh the world world and and certainly serve the United States reasonably well for all of its imperfections”
Post-conflict planning failures in Iraq included inadequate planning for governance, inadequate de-Baathification policies that fired the military without providing family support, and lack of reconciliation at all administrative levels including tens of thousands of needed bureaucrats, compounding initial problems.
“which was the inadequacy of our postconflict planning of course I was a two star division Commander during the fight to Baghdad I remember asking in Kuwait could you give us a little more detail on what happens after we get to Baghdad and top of the regime and we're basically told you know you just get us to bdad will'll take it from there and obviously that was more than inadequate and then beyond that we compounded our problems by some policy decisions to fire the Iraqi military without telling them how we're going to help them provide for their families and even more important deification down without reconciliation [24:45] which was a cruo missing element uh all the way down to a level that included the tens of thousands of bureaucrats that we needed to run the country”
President Zelensky's former background as an actor and comedian who played a president in a TV show before being elected president actual president gave him unique communication and performance skills that contribute to his strategic leadership effectiveness.
“he communicates brilliantly of course now it helps it he's a former actor you a comedian who played the president so well he got elected president”
Israel must employ clear-and-hold methodology in Gaza, not just clearing buildings sequentially, but leaving substantial numbers of soldiers behind to prevent enemy reinfiltration and to administer territory and restore basic services (water, sewage, markets) before Hamas can reconstitute.
“at the end of the day you have to do that by clearing and holding you have to do it methodically uh deliberately and you can't give it up you just can't go from uh again this building to the next one you have to leave soldiers there to ensure that the enemy doesn't reinfor R that's particularly acute in this case because of the 300 miles of tunnel underneath Gaza City”
Money spent on successful deterrence, while substantial, costs far less than the money required to prosecute actual wars, making investment in deterrence capacity a cost-effective strategy.
“money spent on deterrence um as substantial as it may seem at the time uh if successful is a lot less than what has to be spent on War”
The October 7 Hamas attacks on Israel killed approximately 1,400 Israelis in a population of 9.3 million, which on a per-capita basis would equate to over 50,000 American deaths, and 240 hostages would equate to over 7,000 Americans, making the trauma extraordinary and incomparable to the 9/11 attacks.
“keep in mind now that we lost not quite 3,000 uh innocent civilians in the 911 attacks per capita uh 1,400 in a population of about 9.3 million that would equate to to over 50,000 Americans having been killed and 240 hostages that's over seven or more thousand uh as well so the trauma of this has been extraordinary”
Madeline Albright, with President Clinton's help, coined the term 'indispensable power' to describe the US role in the world, though there is a risk that term is becoming politically polarizing.
“one of my former bosses the late man Albright coined a term she actually borrowed it from uh President Clinton she talked about the United States as the indispensable power”
Petraeus was a two-star division commander during the fight to Baghdad and requested details about post-conflict governance planning but was told essentially that commanders should focus on the military victory and others would handle the aftermath, revealing the inadequacy of post-conflict planning.
“I was a two star division Commander during the fight to Baghdad I remember asking in Kuwait could you give us a little more detail on what happens after we get to Baghdad and top of the regime and we're basically told you know you just get us to bdad will'll take it from there”
George Wellstone's observation that the American public wants as little foreign policy as possible unless it directly impacts them (terrorism, oil embargo) is still generally accurate as a rule of thumb.
“I think it was George Well equipped that when it comes to foreign policy the American public wants of little wants as little of it as possible and I suppose unless it directly [19:01] impinges whether that's in the form of terrorism or or uh an oil embargo um that rule of thumb probably is correct”
Churchill's aphorism that democracy is 'the worst of all forms except for all the others' applies similarly to the post-WWII international order, suggesting that despite flaws, alternatives are worse.
“you know as Churchill used to say about democracy it's the worst of all forms except for all the others uh and so I think continuing that uh continuing to contribute to the world to sustain that particular uh set of organizing institutions and principles and structures is in our national interest”
Petraeus and Roberts's book 'Conflict' analyzes warfare evolution from 1945 to Ukraine, examining major conflicts and drawing lessons about strategic leadership quality as the primary determinant of success.
“he's also the author of a must read new book [1:13] conflict the evolution of warfare from 1945 to Ukraine”
The US has a unique geographic advantage due to friendly non-predatory neighbors (Canada and Mexico) to the north and south and ocean 'liquid assets' to the east and west, which is historically unique in the annals of modern history.
“our geographic location is so fortuitous it's Unique in the annals of modern history we're sandwiched between two non-predatory powers to our [14:49] north and south and literally fish you know to our Eastern West would one historian wish it been me brilliantly described as our liquid assets”
The Institute for Economics and Peace found rising levels of conflict in 13 of the last 15 years, and the number of countries engaged in conflicts outside their borders rose from 58 in 2008 to 91 in 2022.
“the Sydney based Institute for economics and peace found Rising levels of conflict in 13 of the last 15 years and the numbers of countries engaged in conf lict outside of their borders has risen from 58 to 2008 to 91 in 2022”
Abbas (Palestinian Authority President) is in the 18th year of a four-year term and canceled elections in 2021, and can barely administer 40% of the West Bank he controls, making him an implausible candidate to govern Gaza.
“abas is in the 18th year of a four-year term he canceled elections in 2021 he could barely administer the 40% of the West Bank he controls let alone ride into Gaza on the back of an Israeli am of a tank”
Hamas operatives are willing to blow themselves up to take Israeli soldiers with them, which creates a particularly pernicious threat because any individual with bulky clothing or a vehicle that doesn't adhere to Israeli instructions must be considered a potential suicide bomber.
“you have individuals who are willing to blow themselves up to take Israeli Soldiers with them that's a particularly pernicious threat because it means that anybody with bulky clothing or a vehicle that doesn't P doesn't adhere to your [23:42] instructions has to be considered”
The US defense spending levels are at their lowest as a share of GDP in more than two decades, yet Michelle Floro questions whether current spending levels are sufficient to simultaneously support Ukraine, Israel, and border security.
“can we train equipment support three fronts with defense spending at the lowest level as a share of our of our economy in more than two decades”
238,000 humans died in global conflicts in 2023, representing a 96% increase year-over-year, with Ukraine and Ethiopia accounting for the majority of deaths (82,000 in Ukraine and 104,000 in Ethiopia in 2022), making 2022 the deadliest year since the Rwanda genocide in 1994.
“last year 238,000 humans died in global conflicts which was a massive increase of some 96% year-over-year largely a result of two conflicts uh Ukraine and Ethiopia in 2022 an estimated 82,000 humans were killed in Ukraine and 104,000 in E Ethiopia making 2022 the deadliest year since the Rwanda genocide in [2:15] 1994”
Hamas prevents at least some, if not substantial numbers, of civilians from evacuating Gaza through leaflets, text messages, and phone calls by Israeli forces, while also using 240+ reported hostages as a way to tie down Israeli forces and create additional civilian protection.
“you have huge numbers of civilians that are being asked to get out of the way by leaflets by text messaging by phone calls and either cannot or will not it's known [23:11] that Hamas prevents at least some of them if not substantial numbers from doing that and Hamas is willing to use civilians as as human Shields along with the uh more than 240 hostages that are reportedly still being held”
The US defense industrial base needs to dramatically increase production of certain weapon systems, but these constraints do not necessarily affect the systems underpinning deterrence in the Indo-Pacific region.
“clearly as I mentioned the industrial base does need to uh dramatically increase its production of certain types of systems but those are not necessarily the systems that are the underpinning of deterrent say in the Indo Pacific region”
The rules-based international order was created by victors of WWII specifically to prevent future world wars and economic collapses like those of the preceding 50 years (including two world wars and the Great Depression).
“the rules-based international order that we and our allies and the victors of World War I helped establish in the wake of a 50-year period that had two horrific world wars and the Great Depression and the intent of this system that was created was to try to prevent further world wars and to try to prevent further economic collapse”
Vietnam is an example of strategic leadership failure where the US did not 'get the big ideas right' until 1968, and France failed to recognize that building a large base in Dien Bien Phu to draw Viet Minh into conventional battle was strategically flawed, demonstrating how initially plausible strategies can be proven wrong by enemy adaptation.
“Vietnam you can argue that we didn't get the big Ideas right until 1968 the French certainly didn't get the big Ideas right the idea that you know so you're frustrated with the gorillas that won't come to battle so let's build a big base in dbn Fu and see if that will draw them to battle that work out so again there's a number of these kinds of examples”
There is currently a military stalemate in Ukraine despite Ukrainian victories in earlier battles (Kyiv, Sumy, Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Kherson west of the Dnipro), with Russia still occupying approximately 20% of Ukrainian territory, indicating the war remains unresolved.
“the challenge is of course that despite the ukrainians winning the Battle of keev Sumi chern harke hary of oblast harison and so forth that was west of the nepro that right now even their own commander-in-chief military commander and chief acknowledges that uses us the world stalemate which is president did not appreciate it appears uh but nonetheless that's the challenge so that this is still not decided uh and Russia still occupies not quite 20% of the country”
There are approximately five or six billion dollars in Ukraine assistance that is authorized and appropriated but not yet expended, and this remaining funding will be exhausted very soon, requiring Congress to authorize additional appropriations to sustain Ukraine support.
“yes there's another five or six billion uh in assistance that's authorized and appropriated still for Ukraine but again that will be expended here pretty soon and we need to continue these programs”
Defense spending is at its lowest level as a share of the economy in more than two decades, and there are inefficiencies in those spending levels that could be addressed if the military-industrial-Congressional complex would allow it.
“I agree with her on the defense spending levels as well although I'd like to see some efficiencies in those defense spending levels if the military industrial and Congressional complex would allow that”
The withdrawal from Afghanistan demonstrated that US leadership is necessary for maintaining global order and deterrence—all US allies wanted to remain, but when America withdrew its 3,500 troops, everyone else was forced to withdraw, and the subsequent loss of helicopter/air support led to the rapid collapse of Afghan forces.
“the best example of this was that all of our partners in Afghanistan wanted to remain there we had 3,500 troops uh we hadn't taken a loss in battle in 18 months uh we chose to withdraw and everyone else had to withdraw as well as did the 15,000 plus contractors who kept the very sophisticated Us helicopters and fixed wi aircraft that were the entire lynchpin of the defense concept for Afghanistan”
Ukraine's strategic leadership under President Zelensky contrasts sharply with Russia's under Putin: while Zelensky correctly assessed Ukrainian resilience and mobilized the nation comprehensively, Putin fundamentally underestimated Ukrainian capability and overestimated Russian forces, resulting in a flawed strategy to rapidly take Kyiv and replace the government.
“Putin completely underestimated the response of the ukrainians the resilience the determination the capability the skill the will and frankly the response of the US and and the uh the West collectively he overestimated the capabilities of his own forces very substantially uh and basically got the big Ideas wrong the idea that they could within a few days take keev top of the government replace president sininsky with a pro-russian figure and go home to a victory parade obviously proved to be just more than a little bit flawed”
Post-conflict Gaza governance will require Israeli reoccupation and security oversight for an indefinite period because no Arab state will be willing to manage counterinsurgency against Palestinians while being constrained by Israeli presence, making this a 'strategic nightmare' for Israel but likely inescapable.
“we really are talking General petrius about an extended and prolonged Israeli um not that they want to reoccupation of Gaza which is going to wouldn't it tend to obstruct and impede a Rec even a reconstruction effort given the fact that the Israelis are going to be looking at every shipment to make sure that item X doesn't have a dual use to feed a what could be a residual Hamas or islamist presence uh on the street I mean it's a night it's a strategic nightmare for the Israelis it's going to be very very challenging but I feel that it is very likely inescapable because again this is not just about restoration of basic services and yes reconstruction this is about ensuring that Hamas and Islamic shihad cannot reconstitute themselves”
Gaza presents a more challenging military context than Fallujah, Ramadi, Mosul, Marieupol, or Hue City because of the combination of dense urban population (21,000 per square mile), 300 miles of underground tunnels, Hamas use of human shields and civilian infrastructure, suicide bombers, and the enemy's superior local terrain knowledge.
“there is inevitably going to be very substantial civilian loss of life and enormous damage and indeed destruction to civilian infrastructure in such a campaign against such an enemy who uses human as civilians as human Shields who doesn't wear uh a uniform who will have rigged rooms buildings to blow up boat booby traps has substantial uh tactical expertise and creativity 300 miles of tunnels underground uh and again headquarters underneath refugee camps and hospitals and weapon storage in mosques so again this is why I laid out that the context truly could not be more challenging”
Iraq's post-2011 failure to prevent ISIS reconstitution occurred because Iraqi leadership shifted focus from monitoring ISIS to addressing Sunni protests and pursued sectarian policies, while the US had withdrawn combat forces, allowing ISIS to metastasize within 2-3 years into the first jihadist caliphate.
“the Iraqis learned the hard way because they were the ones that were supposed to be keeping their eye on the Islamic State they took it off of the Islamic State focused on Sunni demonstrators when the Prime Minister pursued highly sectarian policies literally within 24 hours at started after the departure of our final combat forces in late 2011 uh and again a couple of years l L there you have the first ever islamist extremist caliphate in the world stretching from Northeastern Syria to Northern Iraq”
Hamas operates fundamentally differently from the Islamic State despite both being extremist organizations: Hamas has Palestinian nationalism embedded in its ideology, whereas ISIS was a pure jihadist caliphate, making Hamas only imperfectly analogous to groups like ISIS or al-Qaeda in Iraq, but both require destruction as irreconcilable enemies.
“I do see them again as analogous to the Islamic State albeit an imperfect analogy in that the Hamas has some degree of Palestinian nationalism wrapped up in it but that said again does need to be destroyed um it is analogous to the al-Qaeda and Iraq eventually the Islamic State”
Israel faces a unique geographic disadvantage compared to the US relationship with al-Qaeda: Hamas is located on Israel's border (analogous to eastern Afghanistan for the US), making the proximity problem far more acute and preventing extended over-the-horizon counterterrorism.
“keep in mind that this is an enemy who's on Israel's border right Eastern Afghanistan that's the point I wanted to make we didn't have a proximity problem with Al-Qaeda”
Senate Republican leader Mitch McConnell is among the strongest supporters of Ukraine funding in America, indicating that Republican opposition is not uniform or principled but concentrated in the House majority dynamics.
“there's a very strong bipartisan majority in the senate in fact the [9:03] minority leader the Republican leader is among the strongest supporters of Ukraine maybe in America not just in Capitol Hill in Washington”
The US Administration may lack concrete alternatives or advice to provide Israel for reducing Palestinian civilian casualties in Gaza beyond calling for adjusted ordinance and better intelligence, making it difficult for the administration to exercise leverage.
“I don't want to get into domestic politics if we can avoid it that the perception of the of our to work for Ukraine and Israel clearly uh is different as a consequence of different political parties is there a bandwidth problem do you think um especially as we head into an election year”
The media's coverage cycles are so short (15 minutes) that the Ukraine war has essentially disappeared from American media frames after being dominated for a year, immediately replaced by focus on the Israel-Gaza war.
“you know I've now watched and been immersed in the in the media piece of the Gaza the Israel Gaza a war for the last month and I have to say it it it sort of you know drives home the not the the message that in the media nothing in America lasts more than 15 minutes because Ukraine has essentially disappeared from from the frame from the Media frame”
The trauma from October 7 attacks on both Israeli and Palestinian societies will likely produce a period of political reckoning and introspection that could lead to different administrations in Israel and the US, making immediate 'day after' planning artificial and unrealistic.
“a trauma like these to both societies are going to bring about a period of Reckoning Reckoning and introspection and political change uh and I suspect that's why the day after proposition to me seems so artificial um it's probably at a minimum the year after which may in fact produce different administrations conceivably uh in Israel and even here”
The US strategic objective should be to help Ukraine hasten the moment when Putin recognizes the war is unsustainable economically and militarily, combined with sanctions and export controls that convince Russia the war is not viable on the home front.
“the big idea for us ought to be that we should do everything humanly possible to help Ukraine hasten that moment together with our European partners and other Western allies and partners to hasten the moment when Putin realizes that this war is unsustainable able and also to to carry out the other element of this which is the sanctions export controls uh economic sanctions and personal sanctions as well uh to convince Russia that this is not viable in the home front either”
The US should act as the leader in 'keeping plates spinning' across multiple global threats (China, Korea, Israel, ISIS, cyber), with allies and partners helping, rather than viewing this as a burden.
“if you think of the us as the guy in the circus who's keeping a lot of different plates [11:08] spinning um we are the leader in that particular effort and there is no alternative to that yes we do have allies and partners that help us keep all these plates spinning”
Israel must adhere to the purity of arms, its interpretation of the laws of land warfare, military necessity, and proportionality in the Gaza campaign, though Petraeus is reluctant to second-guess specific operations without knowing the tactical context.
“clearly it's incumbent on Israel uh to adhere to the purity of arms which is their concept their interpretation of uh the laws of land Warfare and the concept of military necessity and proportionality Etc but I'm really reluctant to second guess that without knowing what was the target what was the military necessity”
The United States maintains unique global leadership not because it is altruistic toward others, but because maintaining international order and global stability is in America's direct national interest through economic prosperity and security.
“we do that not because it's helpful for others we do it because it is in our national interest to do so”
Strategic leadership requires four key tasks: getting the big ideas right (understanding context and developing appropriate strategy), communicating the strategy effectively, overseeing implementation through personal example and energy, and continuously refining the ideas through feedback and adjustment.
“first and foremost and most important is to get the big Ideas right to craft the right strategy to understand the nature of the war and and develop uh the appropriate strategy”
Petraeus supports packaging Israel, Ukraine, border security, and FEMA funding together as a single legislative package that the US can afford, arguing the bundled approach will improve the prospects of all components passing.
“I'd like to see us package Israel Ukraine actually border uh Federal admin Emergency Management agency which is also in need of some additional funding because of the extreme weather and other events that we've experienced put it all together we can afford it we can do this uh and let's get on with it”
The 'mowing the grass' strategy—periodic military operations against Hamas followed by periods of relative peace before Hamas reconstitutes—is no longer viable; Hamas must be destroyed and cannot be allowed to reconstitute.
“there's no way you can go back to mowing the grass as the strategy used to be for dealing with Hamas and then get a period of relative peace and then you'd have to do it again they have to be destroyed they are irreconcilable in the same way that Al-Qaeda and Iraq which became the Islamic State”
The United States is not currently overstretched despite confronting multiple simultaneous challenges (Ukraine, Middle East, potential Taiwan conflict) because America is not engaged in active combat at scale but rather advising, assisting, and enabling other nations to conduct their own conflicts.
“I think the number of challenges and the complexity of the challenges is greater than at any time since World War II but I don't think that we're overstretched uh first of all let's just recognize we are not engaged in active conflict in any scale what we are doing is helping the ukrainians uh to combat the primary threat to uh Europe and and NATO”
The US delayed critical military aid decisions to Ukraine, including withholding tanks and F-16s during the summer 2023 offensive when they were most needed, and lacked air superiority doctrine necessary for breaching Russian defenses, contributing to the failure of Ukrainian offensive gains.
“even though we've provided enormous Support over $44 billion doar uh in security systems alone we delayed some of the really critical decisions our tanks were not there for the summer offensive our f-16s or other countries f-16s were not yet uh released and actually overhead and our Doctrine says that to conduct a breach of the kind of substantial defenses the Russians created requires air superiority they don't even have air parity so again the challenges here are considerable”
Political bandwidth concerns regarding US support for Ukraine and Israel differ by political party, with stronger bipartisan support for Israel than for Ukraine, reflecting domestic political divisions rather than actual capacity constraints.
“uh and the truth is that both houses of Congress there is a bipartisan majority uh supporting additional funding and and Munitions and so forth for Ukraine just as there is even more so certainly for Israel uh but we're gonna have to work our way through that”
Malik provides outstanding analysis and insight, and his book 'Conflict' is a must-read work that has direct relevance to understanding contemporary warfare.
“he's also the author of a must read new book conflict the evolution of warfare from 1945 to Ukraine we're going to talk a lot about the book today because it has direct relevance to um the discussion at hand”