84-Year-Old Billionaire: How I Turned a Small Blueberry Business into a Global Empire | John Bragg

When interest rates fell to historically low levels (1-2%), Bragg recognized that the spread between borrowing cost and dividend yield (5%+) was so wide that borrowing to buy dividend-paying stocks was a no-risk arbitrage; he deployed substantial capital during this window.

“We've always had a modest portfolio, but when interest rates were down to where we could borrow money for one or two%, we said, 'Look, this is an opportunity. We should get at this.' And so, we did borrowed lots of money to buy good stocks, and it's been the right thing to do.”

Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island are the only jurisdictions in North America that restrict the movement of honeybees across provincial borders, a protectionist policy originally established when local beekeepers lobbied the government to exclude outside competition.

“Nova Scotia and PEI are the only jurisdictions in North America that have restrictions. It's in historically it was about protectionism. some local beekeepers got together and lobbyed the government and said, 'We don't want others coming in here. This is our market.'”

Wild blueberries have antioxidant levels double those of cultivated blueberries and significantly better flavor, making them the preferred ingredient for premium jam manufacturers like Andros in France, despite their higher cost.

“Oh, it's tremendous difference. First of all, the the health benefits, the antioxidants are double in wild blueberries. The flavor is much better. The cultivated blueberries, they're a fine product, but but if you have them side by, anybody will choose the wild for flavor and that's a big a big help.”

Research and development conducted by Oxford (with Dr. Pibble at the agricultural college) improved blueberry plant productivity through selection and fungicide/fertilizer optimization, enabling higher yields when combined with proper pollination.

“and with our research. We've been sponsoring research with Dr. Pible at the agricultural college and he's really taught us how to to grow plants that are more productive and with fungicides and fertilizers and we do have the basic crop there, but then you have to get it pollinated.”

Bragg uses EBITDA and cash flow metrics rather than accounting net income to evaluate business health; he focuses on how much cash a business generates and how that cash services debt and enables reinvestment, treating cash generation as the true measure of business quality.

“Conor and Buffett were a big EBIT believer. Uh the cash they generate uh if it's through depreciation that's all right. How much cash are we generating and and how can we service the debt and what can we buy with that cash? And as a private company that's worked for us.”

When Bragg entered the wild blueberry industry in 1968, it was a cottage industry of 4 million pounds total production; today the industry is over 300 million pounds and Oxford produces approximately half of it.

“When I started in the industry, the wild blueberry industry was 4 million pounds in total and I hope to do two of that and today the industry is over 300 million getting closer to four and we do half of it.”

In the commodity food business, competitive advantage comes from being the low-cost producer while maintaining top quality; top quality doesn't necessarily cost more and is often cheaper because it reduces product waste, shrinkage, and rework.

“What's necessary to be successful in a commodity business if you're making the same product in a very similar way that other people are making it? What gives you an advantage? How do you create an advantage? You have to be the lowcost producer and you have to be top quality. and blueberries and carrots. There's there are established grades and so on. So it's not battered onion rings a little different because there was only one major competitor and we were trying to compete with with that. By and large you have to be a lowcost producer and and have top quality and and top quality doesn't necessarily cost. In fact, quite often it's cheaper because you have less product on the floor and less shrinkage and you're doing it all right and the end product becomes better.”

Being private allowed Bragg to make long-term investments (20+ year horizons) that public companies cannot, such as land development on the Acadian Peninsula and large factory construction that don't show short-term returns but build enduring competitive advantages.

“I mean, we're still doing all kinds of land development and this development we have in the food business on the peninsula. It's all 20 year horizon types stuff to to get get the land cleared and developed and get it productive. Uh but it's unique and nobody else going to have it.”

Oxford's fiber network is an undervalued asset that extends from Ireland to Bermuda to the East Coast, with fiber running west through Chicago, Detroit, Toronto, and up to British Columbia; Bragg owns much of this or has strategic trades that create a network advantage competitors cannot easily replicate.

“we have fiber from Ireland to Bermuda to the to the east coast and then we fiber going west through through Chicago and Detroit through Toronto and up north and all the way to British Columbia. And a lot of this we own. Some of it we trade.”

The objective in manufacturing onion rings wasn't to make a superior product (Oxford's blind taste tests showed their onion rings could be better) but to make an identical product to competitors' so customers would buy on price rather than needing differentiation.

“And that was not as easy as you would think. And we could make better tasting ones. We could put them in a blind test and ours would win, but they were a little different and the objective was make the same as the other guy. What's necessary to be successful in a commodity business if you're making the same product in a very similar way that other people are making it?”

Oxford deliberately avoided vertically integrating into consumer-facing branded blueberry products because blueberry jam ranks only fifth or sixth in popularity in North America, and a manufacturer pursuing such vertical integration would forfeit their position as a preferred supplier to producers who need diverse fruit inputs.

“Lots of people have suggested we should have our own brand products... our real business was business to business as we call it to selling to jam manufacturers in Europe and pie manufacturers. And if you're a pie manufacturer, you're going to go where the apples are because they're 50% of the pies are apple. Or if you're in the jam business, you you know, you have to have a whole variety. So Oxford didn't have anything to offer. Blueberry jam in North America would be maybe five or six on the popularity list.”

Bragg's corporate lawyer George Kane observed that whenever multiple cable systems came up for sale, six buyers typically competed, but Bragg consistently acquired them because he was 'easy to deal with, always lived by his word, always paid top price, and didn't over-negotiate.'

“my corporate lawyer at the time, George Kane, said, 'John, there's something interesting here. All these towns come up. There's six buyers, but you always get them.' And it was basically we became easy to deal with and we always lived by our word and we always paid top price and so we just kept picking them off one at a time”

Natural entropy in business causes successful companies to gradually increase spending and complexity; Bragg maintained low-cost discipline through an explicit annual culture of improvement, refusing to become satisfied with the status quo despite success.

“There seems to be a natural entropy in business. As you become successful, you start spending more money, you start doing things that are are different or you know getting a fancy office or doing these things. But how do you maintain that low cost over 50 years? I'd like to think that we're we're low cost and hopefully we are, but we strive every day and we have a culture of every year trying to do it better.”

Buffett builds through acquisitions of existing cash-flow-positive companies, while Bragg built businesses from scratch and through leveraged growth; Buffett's strategy is fundamentally different because Bragg had to make predictions and take leverage risk, whereas Buffett can wait for market crashes with a $300 billion cash cushion.

“In my case, I built businesses from scratch and that's different and you have to have some different philosophies than than he would agree with that. You know, he wouldn't have levered the way I did.”

Bragg takes a different view of Starlink's competitive threat: Starlink is both a potential competitor (for rural internet) and a customer (Starlink sells its satellite capacity but needs fiber backhaul to customers), allowing Bragg to maintain fiber infrastructure value.

“How do you think about something like Starlink now with rural internet access? You have hundreds of millions of dollars invested in physical assets delivering internet. When it comes to the technology business, I'm the wrong one to to try and answer that. It's very difficult to be better than a good fiber system in rural Nova Scotia or rural areas because you have so many options with it. In fact, we're doing business with Starlink because when they get down, they want to have fiber that they can feed to people.”

Bragg deliberately stayed out of programming acquisitions in the cable business, unlike Bell and Comcast, viewing high programming costs as capital misallocation; programming didn't work out for those operators and Bragg views this as validation of his focus on physical infrastructure.

“One of the things that you never got into with East Link to my understanding was really buying programming which seems to be the whole nature of the last 10 or 15 years of the business where you have you know the Bells and the Comcasts and everybody's sort of like trying to buy up the programming, right? Why did you guys never get into that? I think it was probably a gut feeling. They were paying a lot for this programming. And do you think Bell are happy that they spent a lot of money buying programming now? I don't think so. It really hasn't worked out well.”

Oxford expanded beyond blueberries to carrots in the fall to extend factory utilization after blueberry season ends in mid-September, then added battered products (primarily onion rings) to keep core staff employed in winter, vertically filling the annual production calendar.

“We said what can we do in the fall extend the season because we start the first of August running 24 hours 7 days and and the minute blueberries are done we move to carrots.”

Bragg negotiated an exclusive agreement with Wallace McCain to produce onion rings under the McCain label in Canada using a simple one-page agreement that has remained fundamentally unchanged for over 50 years, demonstrating the power of honor-based, low-complexity contracts over time.

“I went to see Wallace McCain. this is over 50 years ago. And said, 'Look, I need something to keep my people busy and have you any ideas.' And he threw me a file on onion rings that they had looked at and but it didn't fit because they were doing French fries year round. And he says, 'Well, maybe you can do it.' So, needing needing something to do in the wintertime and off season, uh, we took the file and and we had a one-page agreement, which I still have, which gave us the exclusive right to make onion rings under the McCain label in Canada.”

In 1968 Bragg was losing approximately $11,000 per month in the cable business and considered selling or merging; his father advised that the educational investment (law school) shouldn't be wasted, suggesting Bragg persevere; Bragg took this wisdom and the business eventually became highly profitable.

“At one point you were losing a lot of money every month. Yeah. And you went to see your father and your brother. That's right. I guess maybe it was 11,000. These numbers, you know, grow or shrink over 50 years. I think it was 11,000 a month we were losing.”

Bragg deliberately didn't put his family name on operating companies in the food or cable businesses, keeping Oxford and subsidiary names as the brand instead, to protect his descendants from the burdens of inherited fame and security risks.

“Well, we don't have our name in the food business. Oxford's a good classical name around the world. One of the best marketing tools you can have is use your own name. People catch on. McCain's would be a great example. Everybody knows McCain French fries. But I was determined that from a family point of view and if my grandson or granddaughter want to have a just a normal job in the business or outside of the business, they don't need the burdens of of the name being everywhere.”

When hiring managers, Bragg explicitly refused to offer equity stakes despite requests, telling candidates that family companies offer good pay and job satisfaction but not ownership; this policy simplified governance and prevented the complications of external equity holders.

“Yeah, we've had uh from time to time there's been that discussion and I face it headon and say, 'Look, family companies are great to work for and we're going to pay you well and you're going to feel very comfortable here, but there's no equity available and and too complicated with with the finance structures if you start giving it away and then if they want out and I just didn't need that complication in my life.'”

Bragg has created a significant foundation through an estate freeze structure, keeping a portion of assets for himself while directing substantial wealth to public good; this gives him motivation to keep working (building foundation assets) rather than working to accumulate personal wealth.

“We have a significant foundation. I did typical estate freeze, but I kept a portion of for myself that that is going to foundation for public good. And so that's one of the reasons I keep working is to is to be able to really really leave a foundation and at the same time the children will have more than they need or more than they should have probably but but we're going to have a significant foundation”

Bragg borrowed heavily to fund acquisitions because he recognized that cable companies had consistent cash flows sufficient to service debt, making leverage less risky in that business than in blueberries where weather affects outcomes.

“We haven't shied away from using debt. Although today our balance sheets are in great shape, but through the years we've always been what I would say almost fully levered. The food business we were levered, but we had good assets. The cash flow wasn't as consistent as you'd like. But in the cable business, we were buying cable companies all over Atlantic Canada and out west and in Ontario, but the the cash flow was pretty consistent. you could budget it and see where you were going. So, I wasn't afraid of debt.”

Bragg maintained a modest lifestyle despite substantial wealth accumulation, without yachts or mansions, partly because of his personality but also because a low profile helps avoid burdens and security concerns, especially in small communities.

“How have you kept it that way? There's no yachts, no mansions. Well, we have a few too many homes around, but we don't abuse that and certainly no yachts. Uh, you know, hate to admit it, but we have a plane, but that keeps me working... One beauty of living in a small town, we're an hour and a half from downtown Halveck. I could be going to dinner every night in Halifax, but the beauty of living here is I just put on the invitation. Sorry, my sent my executive assistant sends it on. The low profile helps, but but the wear and tear of going to dinner and going to receptions and you know, takes time away. That goes back to focus.”

Bragg's definition of success is the development of great teams, particularly people who progressed from entry-level positions through the company and are now running divisions; this people-development focus is more important to him than financial metrics.

“What is success for you? Success for me is is the development of a great team. And in many cases, we have people that worked in this factory through high school, university, came back to work with us, and are now running the company. That's to me real success.”

Scale became critical to the cable television business as fiber technology required consolidation; small-town operators who didn't want to leverage themselves exited, allowing Bragg to acquire systems at reasonable prices and build a regionally dominant network.

“Well, scale ended up being very important in in that business and uh and that's why in '83 when we got Halifax and were able to tie, we couldn't really afford to have professional engineers. We were relying on suppliers to give us the technical advice and but skills absolutely important.”

Bragg built a mechanical blueberry harvester in the 1980s with his brother and a mechanic by observing existing machines in Maine and developing an improved version; he then made the design available to competing farmers rather than using it as a proprietary competitive advantage.

“There have been all kinds of people trying to uh develop a mechanical harvester and my brother and a mechanic looked at some of these efforts that were done in Maine and other places and they said, 'We can do this and we can do it better.' So, it took them quite a while because we really weren't focused.”

When interest rates were exceptionally cheap (near 0%), many economic actors didn't take advantage of the spread between borrowing cost and dividend yield, leaving opportunity on the table; Bragg recognized this as an anomaly and capitalized on it systematically.

“So we have a board and I was explaining to them what my my, you know, thoughts were and how I thought it would work and what the downside was. Well, we've just plugged away at it and we got a couple billion of equity or more now in in the portfolio. All that came late in life.”

Most substantial fortunes are made after age 50, not before; Bragg's experience was that wealth creation through age 50 was mainly building a base (land, factories, people) that didn't show on the balance sheet; real equity accumulation began after 60, with the largest growth after 70.

“most fortunes are made after 50. I was a member of YPO like lots of other entrepreneurs and you get rocked out at 50. And I remember saying, you know, for me this just the beginning cuz I've built a base now. I haven't really made any money, but I built quite a base and now I've got to take that base and move on. Most of my real equity, the way you would measure it, has come after 60.”

Civil servants applying regulations often appeal to 'this is the regulation' rather than exercising judgment about whether the rule makes sense in specific contexts; this enforcement-without-discretion approach eliminates the possibility of common-sense exceptions.

“And the most irritating comment that you get from the civil servants is, 'But this is the regulation.' Yeah. Don't talk to me about common sense. This the regulation. Yeah. You know, when the people wrote the regulations, they couldn't envision everything, but then the regulation covers everything. Just bypasses common sense.”

When asked about paying top dollar in acquisitions, Bragg clarified he doesn't overpay but was willing to pay at market top during strong cycles; this meant 12-year paybacks instead of 10-year, which is acceptable for a private, long-term owner.

“Why the reputation for paying the most? I don't think we paid too much, but we were prepared to pay at the top of the cycle. Again, we were looking at the horizon. If you paid a little too much and you're a private company, you just have to live a little longer to make it work.”

As competition forces blueberry producers to compete against cultivated blueberries and other fruits, Oxford's objective shifted from maintaining a premium price for wild blueberries to becoming the low-cost producer even against cultivated competitors.

“You know, we could sell 40 million pounds of blueberries, wild blueberries, kind of as a specialty item. But when you want to sell three or 400 million pounds, now you got to compete with with culivated blueberries and with strawberries and marmalade, raspberries. We're always trying to be to be better and and to get our cost down.”

Bragg bought approximately 3,000 acres of carrot land in the Annapolis Valley at premium prices (in some cases twice market value) to secure the supply base needed to double carrot production, treating land as a one-time acquisition opportunity rather than a commodity purchase.

“We we've bought about 3,000 acres of carrot land in the Annapolis Valley at premium prices. Why would you pay premium? We need to secure the base. That's where we grow our carrots and and we we're you know doubling the production of carrots. So we need the land base in some case paying twice what the market was but it's only available once you know if you don't it's not always available.”

Bragg has observed that successful entrepreneurs rarely self-correct after beginning to fail; when someone is winning, others listen to them, but when they lose money, their voice no longer carries weight—making the transition from success to failure psychologically devastating.

“In your experience, how often have those people self-corrected after they've started to go down that path? I I haven't seen much selfcorrection. A guy that's really doing well, when he speaks up, uh you listen to him. When he goes broke, nobody listens to what he has to say anymore. So making a million didn't make you smarter and losing it didn't make you stupider.”

The acquisition of A.M. Telecom (Ontario) and converting it from a public to private company (2007-2008) yielded $3-4 million in annual overhead savings by eliminating duplicate head offices, finance functions, and administrative layers.

“You took one public company private in 2007208 which was AM Telecom. Yeah. AM Telecom and in southern Ontario. We got some real efficiencies by taking it privately and it you know became a branch plant as compared with a separate head office separate accounting separate I don't know how much it wasn't that big a company but we probably took three or four million dollars of overhead out of it”

Bragg's mentor Hy Crawford advised him that he would 'spend $10 million on a factory but nothing on marketing,' capturing the reality that his business model was optimized for scale in production rather than brand building.

“My great friend and mentor Hy Crawford used to say, John, you'll spend $10 million on a factory but nothing on marketing.”

During high interest rate periods (e.g., 1978-1980 when rates were 18-20%), Bragg survived by cutting costs and persisting; he believes that any business that survives high-rate environments emerges stronger because competitors with worse cost discipline exit.

“back in was it 78 when interest rates were 18 and 20%. I had a cable business and financed and the interest rates were killing me. But we just hung in there and cut the cost and I remember saying, 'Well, if we can survive in this situation, we'll be in pretty good shape going forward.'”

When asking suppliers (e.g., batter and coating manufacturers) about their ingredients and processes before entering the onion ring business, they revealed more information than they probably should have, enabling Oxford to develop manufacturing capability from scratch.

“But at the time you entered that, you had no idea how to make onion rings. Didn't know how to make onion rings... But this is back in the day before Google or anything, right? Like you're not like searching how to make onion rings. Suppliers love to talk. So you talk to the people who make batter and say, 'Well, you know, what kind of batter should we use and what?' So they'll tell you more than they should sometimes.”

The blueberry industry in the Acadian Peninsula has potential to surpass New Brunswick's potato production in acreage; this represents a major economic transformation of the region.

“We're really excited about the potential in New Brunswick. We're going to have more acres and blueberries than New Brunswick has in potatoes. So, it's going to change the Acadia Peninsula and the economy there.”

Canada faces significant regulatory and bureaucratic impediments to entrepreneurship; jurisdictional restrictions between provinces (e.g., on bee imports), environmental regulations that prioritize rules over common sense, and a general lack of deregulation hamper business formation.

“Are there any policy changes you would make to encourage more entrepreneurship and business in Canada? There's so many roadblocks at every turn... jurisdictional hold up to the border, you know, with all these border deals is terrible.”