William J. Burns: America in a World of Upheaval | Foreign Affairs Interview
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In 2024, when he was the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, William Burns wrote in an essay in Foreign Affairs about “the plastic moments that come along only a few times each century”—and argued that “the United States faces one of those rare moments today, as consequential as the dawn of the Cold War or the post-9/11 period.”
If that claim seemed bold at the time, events in the past couple of years have made it undeniable—a major war in Europe, two wars in the Middle East, sharpening U.S.-Chinese tensions, a U.S. administration committed to projecting power in new and disruptive ways, and technologies adding complexity across all of these other challenges. “Inflection point” is an overused term. But this is a moment when, as Burns argued in that essay, it really does fit.
Before becoming CIA director, Burns was one of the most highly respected diplomats in recent American history. He started the secret negotiations that led to the Iran nuclear deal. He served as ambassador to Russia. As the State Department’s top Middle East official, he warned internally of the consequences of invading Iraq in 2003. He has spent years sitting across the table from American allies and adversaries, trying to understand what drives them and how Washington should—and should not—deal with them.
Dan Kurtz-Phelan spoke to Burns on the afternoon of April 1 about the course and consequences of the war in Iran, about Vladimir Putin and the war in Ukraine, about Xi Jinping and U.S.-Chinese competition, about the future of intelligence, and about what the Trump administration will mean for the future of American power.
You can find sources, transcripts, and more episodes of The Foreign Affairs Interview at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/podcasts/foreign-affairs-interview.
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Burns argues that the post-Cold War era has definitively ended and the United States faces a pivotal moment comparable to the dawn of the Cold War, but the current Trump administration's approach of hard power without institutional backing and alliance relationships represents 'slow-motion major power suicide' that undermines American advantage.
- The US still holds a stronger hand than China and Russia, but only if played through a blend of hard and soft power backed by institutions and alliances
- The Trump administration's focus on hard power while dismantling institutions, eroding trust with allies, and dismissing career public servants is counterproductive and damages long-term competitive position
- Recent geopolitical events (Iran war, Ukraine war, US-China tensions) demonstrate the cost of strategic errors driven by flawed assumptions and poor decision-making processes
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The debate that occurred in Chinese leadership a decade ago is less likely to occur now because Xi has consolidated power so effectively, which is a mixed blessing: it limits dissent but also increases exposure to ill-thought-through decisions because people learn not to challenge assumptions.
“Yeah, I mean, I suspect it's it's, you know, the the debate that may have occurred a decade ago is less likely to occur now, because he's consolidated power so effectively. And that's always a mixed blessing for autocratic leaders, because what it means is that, whether it's in Chinese intelligence services or in the PLA, there's a tendency to tell a, you know, a a very deeply entrenched autocratic leader what he wants to hear. Um, as opposed to, you know, um, generating real debate about choices right now, too. And and, you know, I suspect that that's probably increasingly the case, too. Um, especially since Xi has been so effective in consolidating power and authority right now, too. That's the flip side of doing that, is that you expose yourself more to ill-thought-through decisions, sometimes, because you don't have people who are challenging your assumptions, sometimes, too, because they've learned a long time ago it's not career-enhancing to do that.”
Putin's aggression in Crimea in 2014 helped create a sense of Ukrainian national purpose that strengthened Ukrainian determination to resist in 2022, paradoxically making Putin's own strategy self-defeating.
“And that that was the assumption on which the FSB, you know, the biggest of the Russian intelligence services, was providing advice to Putin. He thought this was going to be a walkover. And vastly underestimated the determination not just of President Zelensky, but of Ukrainians. Um, because Putin, through his aggression in Crimea in 2014, helped create a sense of Ukrainian national purpose that didn't exist, um, you know, in the same way before that, too.”
The risk of strategic declassification is overuse and losing sources, particularly human intelligence, which requires careful judgment and presidential instinct about appropriate scope of disclosure.
“the challenge because the easiest way to lose good sources of intelligence, whether it's human or technical, is to overdo it and Washington's a place where, you know, often times people think anything worth doing is worth overdoing. Um, we had to be careful about that, but I think both the process for making those judgments and, you know, the president's the President Biden's ultimate political instincts on this, you know, were very sensible one and I think they paid big dividends.”
Burns negotiated the secret Iran talks that produced the JCPOA and does not need anyone to persuade him of the dangers the Iranian regime poses, having spent nearly four decades as a diplomat with Iran hovering over his career, including friends killed in the 1983 Beirut embassy attack and leading secret talks on the nuclear issue.
“Iran's an issue that hung over most of the nearly four decades of my career as a diplomat and then as an intelligence officer, I took the exam to join the US Foreign Service in November 1979, a day after the seizure of the hostages at our embassy in Tehran. In the spring of 1983, I had friends and colleagues from both the State Department and the CIA killed in the terrorist attack in our embassy in Beirut which was guided and directed by the Iranian regime and then as you said, fast forward 30 years later, I led you know, the the secret talks with the Iranians on the nuclear issue”
Unless the CIA builds better relationships with the private sector technology companies, there is no way the intelligence community will be able to compete effectively with China in technological innovation and capabilities.
“But unless we build, you know, better relationships with the private sector, um, there's just no way we're going to be able to compete effectively with the Chinese.”
The China-Russia relationship is far more than a marriage of convenience; it is a pretty strong partnership born of mutual interest in which Russians are the junior partner dependent on Chinese support for dual-use technologies and economic support to conduct the war in Ukraine.
“I think it's been it's been far more than a marriage of convenience that, you know, people sort of talked loosely about some years ago, too. And it's not just about the relationship between Xi and Putin, although that's certainly a part of this as well. I think it's a, you know, it's it's not a formal alliance in the sense that NATO, at least as we've known it till now, is, but it's a pretty strong partnership born of mutual interest right now, too. A partnership in which the Russians and Putin are very much the junior partner right now, dependent on the Chinese in a way that the Chinese are not dependent on the Russians. And it really is only because of, you know, Chinese support and dual-use technologies and economic support, um, that the Russians have been able to continue the conduct of the war in Ukraine, too.”
Iran could make a dash toward nuclear weaponization in the absence of intrusive verification and monitoring that the JCPOA had set up, and while there is no evidence of a decision to reverse the supreme leader's 2003 edict to pause weaponization, it is possible Iran could attempt to build a crude nuclear device given it has significant highly enriched uranium and the know-how.
“It's something that worried us in the last year or two that I was director at CIA, the possibility that they could make a dash in the absence of the kind of intrusive verification and monitoring that the comprehensive nuclear agreement had set up and which had largely atrophied, you know, in the years after the Trump administration pulled out of the nuclear agreement...Although we didn't see any evidence that there had been a decision by the supreme leader to reverse, you know, his edict at the end of 2003 to at least pause their weaponization program. So, it's it's possible. I I think given the quality of Israeli and US intelligence, there's a fair chance that, you know, we we would see it happening, but it's a lot more complicated right now in the absence of having, you know, inspectors on the ground.”
Burns warned against the Iraq war in 2003 in a memo as assistant secretary overseeing the Middle East, warning of consequences, and now more than 20 years later the 82nd Airborne is being sent back to the region and there is talk of regime change and troops in another Middle Eastern country.
“I went back and read the the memo you wrote ahead of the Iraq war when you were the assistant secretary overseeing the Middle East, kind of diplomatically warning against against the war, warning of some of the consequences of that war. It's kind of remarkable that we're at another moment, you know, more than 20 years later where the 82nd Airborne is back on it on its way to the region and we're talking about regime change and and, you know, sending troops to Indo-A another Middle Eastern country.”
Africa is often neglected in both Republican and Democratic administrations despite being a continent with doubling population by mid-century, incredible potential in some well-governed societies, and huge challenges in urbanization and job creation that other parts of world must address.
“Africa is a continent that's often suffered, I think, in administrations of both parties that I've worked for in different ways from benign and sometimes not so benign neglect as well. And I think, you know, if you just look at the objective realities of population of a continent that's going to double at least by the middle of this century that you know, has both incredible potential if you look at some societies that have been able to fight corruption and are well-governed, but also huge challenges of urbanization, the movement of people to cities, the challenges of job creation that that creates, the potential for migration of peoples that, you know, other parts of the world then, you know, have to deal with as well.”
Gaza and developments in West Bank and Israel have fallen out of conversation as result of the Iran war; this is striking and the Palestinian issue will come back as a challenge because without credible pathway toward demilitarized Palestinian state, cannot serve interests of secure Jewish democratic state in Israel.
“It's also striking how much Gaza and developments in the West Bank and elsewhere and in Israel have kind of fallen out of the conversation... If you look at the pace, people used to talk about creeping annexation in the West Bank. This is at a gallop right now too in terms of settler violence and a lot that's going on there. Gaza's situation, you know, seems kind of frozen in a way right now... Even though it's not fashionable to think about the Palestinian as issue as something that's that matters. And it's fashionable to think that the two-state solution is dead. The problem is without some progress, some credible pathway over time, not overnight, but over time, toward a demilitarized Palestinian state, I don't see how you, you know, serve the interests of a Jewish democratic uh secure state in Israel, let alone the legitimate aspirations of Palestinians or the interests of neighboring countries like Jordan too.”
The post-Cold War era is definitively over; we have entered a new era marked by return of major power competition with China and Russia after 20 years focused on post-9/11 terrorism, and a revolution in technology transforming how nations live, work, fight, and compete.
“By the time I took over as director of the CIA, we had clearly entered into a new era marked by many features, but two of which were most striking to me. First was the return of major power competition with China and to a lesser extent, Russia, after 20 years in which we were preoccupied with the post-9/11 huge challenge of terrorism. Um and then uh secondly, and related to the first challenge of major power competition, was a revolution in technology, which is still literally transforming the way we live, work, fight, and compete.”
In fall 2022 when Russian military was breaking under Ukrainian pressure, the intelligence community collected intelligence suggesting contingency planning for nuclear use, and assessed there was a 50% chance Russia might use nuclear weapons if Ukraine advanced rapidly and threatened Putin's grip on Crimea.
“We had collected some intelligence which suggested that there was at least some contingency planning going on. And this was a moment where, you know, the you know, the Russian military had broken and ran east of Kharkiv in, you know, the eastern part of Ukraine, where the Russians were in an untenable position on the other side of the Dnipro River in Kherson and were pulling back. And I think our judgment at the time was that if a situation emerged in which the Ukraine advance continued at a rapid rate and put at risk Putin's grip on Crimea, that that would be a circumstance in which he'd at least consider the possibility of using tactical nuclear weapons.”
The United States still has a stronger hand to play than any of its rivals, but the question is how to play that hand effectively given the geopolitical landscape of major power competition and technological revolution.
“I still believe that even if the United States was no longer the only big kid on the geopolitical block, we had a stronger hand to play than any of our rivals. And the question, of course, coming back to your um you know, um original point about what's happened the last couple years is how do you play that hand? How do you play that strong hand?”
Even in a world of smart cities, biometric data, and facial recognition where it is much harder to conduct traditional human intelligence, especially in places like China or Russia, it is not impossible and the challenge is to master emerging technologies as well as or better than rival powers.
“Certainly just as you said, Dan, in a world of smart cities and biometric data and facial recognition, it's a lot harder to conduct traditional human intelligence especially in places like China or Russia, but it's not impossible. And you know, the challenge is to master those emerging technologies as well or better than our rivals do and we put a lot of effort into that.”
For six presidents (three Republicans and three Democrats), the United States applied a form of enlightened self-interest blending hard power (military and economic coercion) with soft power (diplomacy and development assistance), backed by strong apolitical national security institutions and a network of allies and partners that distinguished America from rivals like China and Russia.
“For the six presidents, three Republicans and three Democrats that I served over many years as a diplomat, the United States generally applied through Republicans and Democrats a a form of enlightened self-interest, you know, which was, you know, at least as I always saw it, a blend of hard power and soft power, a blend of um you you know, the the coercive influence that a strong military and strong economic leverage can bring to bear. And then the more persuasive power of diplomacy and economic and development assistance as well, backed up by institutions, strong national security institutions with apolitical public servants uh who can make that work, and a network of allies and partners that set us apart uh from relatively lonely rivals like China and Russia.”
The CIA invested a great deal of effort into intelligence partnerships, including with Five Eyes and other countries, because these partnerships are huge assets for the US even given the size and strength of the US intelligence community.
“There's still a lot of effort put into intelligence partnerships and we certainly during the four years I was I was at CIA put a great deal of effort into doing that recognizing again that you know, they're huge assets for the United States even you know, given the size and strengths of the US intelligence community, we benefit by working with others as well.”
Wars are much easier to start than to finish, especially when there is only a hazy idea of the finish line, as evidenced by the difficulty now faced in the Iran war despite initial military success.
“And you know, I think it's also a reminder that, um, of the true wisdom that wars are a lot easier to start than they are to finish, especially when you have only a hazy idea of where you think the finish line is.”
Creeping annexation in the West Bank has accelerated to a gallop in terms of settler violence and land seizures, indicating a worsening trajectory for Palestinian statehood prospects.
“you know, if you look at the pace, people used to talk about creeping annexation in the West Bank. This is at a gallop right now too in terms of settler violence and a lot that's going on there.”
Creating a process where people feel comfortable and obligated to challenge assumptions is the best insurance against making bad decisions; this was missing in Putin's decision to invade Ukraine based on false assumption that Ukraine was not a real country.
“You create a process where people, you know, feel comfortable and actually feel an obligation, sometimes, not just to speak truth to power, but to challenge assumptions. That, in many ways, is the best insurance, um, against making bad decisions, sometimes, too. And I think, whether it was Putin's decision to go to war in Ukraine based on false assumptions. You know, I and I'd heard Putin say this to me for, you know, decades, that, you know, like I was kind of a dim fourth-grader, you know, you don't understand Ukraine's not a real country.”
More than a third of all career officers in the CIA spend every day working on digital, cyber, science and technology issues, and the agency has strong in-house technological expertise that must be complemented by relationships with private sector.
“We put a lot of effort, certainly in the four years I was director, and I'm sure John Ratcliffe, my successor, has continued that, not just in investing in the pool of technological expertise that's in the agency, because, you know, more than a third of all the career officers in the agency spend every day working on digital cyber science and technology issues. So, it's a pretty strong in-house set of expertise. But unless we build, you know, better relationships with the private sector, um, there's just no way we're going to be able to compete effectively with the Chinese.”
The Marshall Plan and the PEPFAR program under George W. Bush exemplify the power of the United States' example in blending hard and soft power, with PEPFAR saving tens of millions of people from HIV/AIDS.
“all the major achievements of of, you know, through that era, the Cold War and the post-Cold War era, reflected that blend, um including the Marshall Plan, you know, just after the end of the Second World War, and the PEPFAR program under George W. Bush, which, you know, um laid out the sort of power of our example in saving tens of millions of people around the world from HIV/AIDS.”
Putin's military has vulnerabilities despite his modernization over two decades; Ukrainian forces have offset Russian manpower and munitions advantages through drone technology, electronic warfare, and other innovations, making it a mistake to accept that Ukrainians will inevitably lose.
“His economy is not in great shape. Um, and, you know, his military has its vulnerabilities as well. And it thinks in part to our support, but mostly to the courage and tenacity of Ukrainians, you know, they've managed to offset some of the obvious manpower munitions advantages that the Russians have by the use of drone technology, electronic warfare, a lot of other things, too. So, I think it's a mistake for us to accept the Putin argument that, you know, the Ukrainians are going to lose sooner or later, so should just negotiate an end to this now”
The Trump administration deserves credit for focusing more attention on the Western Hemisphere as a natural strategic home base for the United States, though care must be taken not to shoehorn policy entirely through the prism of counter-narcotics and should include development assistance.
“I think it's to you know, the this administration's credit that they've focused more attention on the Western Hemisphere, which, you know, in many ways is the natural strategic home base for the United States. Now, we've also managed, and this takes a particular effort for Americans, to piss off the Canadians, which I think is unfortunate. Um and I think we have to be careful that we don't shoehorn too much in the Western Hemisphere through the prism of counter narcotics as as huge a challenge as that is”
Xi Jinping has instructed the PLA to be ready to conduct a successful invasion of Taiwan by 2027, which was a readiness goal not a decision to go to war, and partly due to Xi's perception of Ukraine battlefield events, he may have doubts about PLA capacity to achieve invasion at acceptable cost.
“Well, I mean, 2027, um, you know, was a readiness goal, which we we knew that President Xi had instructed the PLA, the People's Liberation Army leadership, to aim toward. But it's not a decision to go to war in '27 or '28 or '26 for that matter. Um, I think, partly as a result of of Xi's perception of the battlefield in Ukraine, um, which tended to sober him and deepen his doubts a little bit about, you know, what an objectively weaker player could do on defense if sufficiently motivated and sufficiently supported. I think he still probably has some lingering doubts about, you know, the capacity of the Chinese military to achieve at acceptable cost, um, a successful all-out invasion of Taiwan.”
The pace of innovation is such that just keeping up with it, let alone getting ahead of it, is a huge challenge that is as important as anything else, and perhaps more important than any other priority the agency has.
“the pace of innovation is such that just keeping up with it, let alone getting ahead of it is a huge challenge. But it matters as much as anything else [1:01:31] that if not more so than any of the other priorities that I had at the agency.”
The US Agency for International Development (USAID) was demolished, but its work of building the kind of position in the Western Hemisphere that is seen as a shared benefit by regional leaders makes a big strategic difference.
“whether it's what the US Agency for International Development used to do before it was demolished, you know, makes a big difference too in building you know, the kind of position in the Western Hemisphere that's, you know, seen as a kind of shared benefit by leaderships in the region as well as by the United States.”
Terrorism remained a very high priority for Burns and colleagues at CIA because while focusing on major power competition and technology revolution, potential terrorist threats had to be taken very seriously.
“Terrorism, counterterrorism was, you know, remained a very high priority for me and all of my colleagues at the CIA because even as we tried to focus attention and resources on major power competition and the revolution in technology, um you know, we we had to take very seriously potential terrorist threats.”
Burns has always thought that sooner or later Russians are going to chafe at being the junior partner of China, just as they chafed at being the junior partner of the United States after the Cold War, but that is a ways down the road and for the foreseeable future, the China-Russia partnership should be assumed to remain strong.
“I've always thought as someone who's spent a lot of time in Russia as a diplomat that sooner or later Russians are going to chafe at being the junior partner of China just as they chafed at the notion of being the junior partner of the United States after the end of the Cold War. But that's a ways down the road and so I I think for the foreseeable future, um, you know, we should base our own policy on the assumption that that's going to remain a pretty strong partnership.”
Kicking the can down the road on Taiwan for half a century may not win a Nobel Peace Prize, but it's actually the best of the available choices.
“So, in this is one case, Taiwan, for half a century, we're kicking the can down the road. May not win you a Nobel Peace Prize, but it's actually the best of the available choices, too.”
There is a pervasive sense in American foreign policy circles and broader American society of pessimism about America's place in the world, a sense that the US botched its opportunity in the post-Cold War era and missed whatever opportunity it had.
“there's been a pervasive sense I think that animates a lot of a lot of the support for Trump and and Trump's rhetoric, but I think it is more pervasive in in the American foreign policy world and the and American society right now. and that's a real kind of sense of pessimism about about our place in the world, a sense that we botched our opportunity in the post-Cold War era and you know, you mentioned some of those mistakes, but I think you know, a much deeper sense that we we kind of missed whatever opportunity we had.”
In negotiating positions between the US and Iran regarding ceasefire, there are very wide gaps; the Iranians are seeking some form of long-term deterrence and security guarantees (not just a simple ceasefire) and seeking to maintain leverage through disrupting the Strait of Hormuz, setting up effective toll booths or extracting material benefit.
“The negotiating positions, at least as I understand them, you know, are have very wide gaps right now between the 15 points that the US administration evidently suggested and and where the Iranians are right now. Um, the Iranian regime seems intent on ensuring two things, cuz they're looking to avoid a situation where, you know, as the Israelis put it, the the grass is going to get mowed every 6 months or so. So, they're looking for some form of long-term deterrence and security guarantees, which would be very hard for us and the Israelis to do, um, and not just a simple ceasefire. And second, they're going to look to maintain the leverage that they've rediscovered by disrupting traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, and use that to obtain you know, if not direct material benefit, you know, they've insisted on war reparations, which aren't going to happen, but, you know, whether it's setting up a toll booth effectively in the Strait of Hormuz or anything else”
The Trump approach is built on a worldview holding that most big decisions should be made by three big guys sitting around a small table—Putin, Xi, and Trump—recalling Thucydides' statement that 'the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must,' representing a fundamentally different view of how the world works.
“And it's built around a worldview, I think, that, you know, holds that most big decisions should be made by three big guys sitting around a small table, you know, Putin, Xi, and and President Trump. And you know, recalling the, you know, famous saying by Thucydides thousands of years ago that, you know, the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.”
The JCPOA was not a perfect agreement, but it was a solid and good enough agreement; it was a serious mistake when the first Trump administration pulled out in 2018, and it was a mistake five weeks ago to launch what amounts to a war of choice with the Israelis against Iran.
“It was a comprehensive nuclear agreement which you know, was not a perfect agreement. Perfect is rarely on the menu in the Middle East, but it was certainly a solid and good enough agreement and I think it was a serious mistake when in 2018 in the first Trump administration, the White House decided to pull out of that just as I I fear that it was a mistake five weeks ago to launch what in effect is a war of choice along with the Israelis against that Iranian regime.”
For Putin, feeling genuine economic pressure and experiencing quite significant battlefield losses of over a million killed and wounded, the Iran war has provided a lifeline at a moment when it was beginning to feel pressure.
“for Putin, this has been a lifeline, you know, both in terms of more revenue as a result of higher energy prices and his ability to export more and a diminished, you know, military inventory on the part of the United States... at a moment when he was beginning to feel an a genuine economic pressure and quite significant battlefield losses, well over a million killed and wounded on the battlefield”
The wider consequences of the first five weeks of the Iran war have been to create two big winners: Russia, which has gained both higher energy revenues and reduced US military inventory available for European allies; and China, for whom every month the US is preoccupied in the Middle East is a month less focused on the Indo-Pacific.
“The wider consequences of the first 5 weeks, at least, of this war, which is to create two big winners, Russia and China. I mean, I know we'll talk about Russia in a minute, but you know, for Putin, this has been a lifeline, you know, both in terms of more revenue as a result of higher energy prices and his ability to export more and a diminished, you know, military inventory on the part of the United States for the kind of things that the Europeans want to acquire from the United States and then provide to President Zelensky in Ukraine, especially your defense interceptors as well. So, from Putin's point of view at a moment when he was beginning to feel an a genuine economic pressure and quite significant battlefield losses, well over a million killed and wounded on the battlefield, this is, as I said, a lifeline. And for China, I think the consequence, at least so far, even though they're obviously worried about their access to Gulf energy, has been that every week, every month that the United States is preoccupied in the Gulf or in the Middle East is a week or a month or a year in which the United States is less focused on the Indo-Pacific as well, which, you know, from the long-term strategic point of view of the Chinese as well as Putin and Russia, is, you know, a positive.”
Strategic declassification of intelligence about Russian invasion plans before the Ukraine war helped the US build credibility with allies and enable them to understand what was coming, was useful in exposing false Russian narratives, and was an investment that paid big dividends.
“I think the strategic declassification for which the president deserve credit, President Biden, I think was very useful. I had watched Putin over many years create false narratives or stage what are called false flag operations to try to pin the blame on the Ukrainians for provoking exactly what he planned to do anyway, which was a war. Um, and I think by carefully, you know, exposing the the falsity of a lot of those narratives and putting out um, in unclassified form a lot of what we knew, um, I I think that turned out to be a very wise investment and a pretty effective tool.”
The CIA director met with Sergey Naryshkin, head of Russia's external intelligence service SVR, in Turkey in November 2022 to deliver a message about nuclear weapons consequences, and the meeting included Chinese diplomatic support for the message that Xi Jinping did not want nuclear weapons used in Ukraine.
“the president sent me to talk to one of my Russian counterpart, Sergey Naryshkin, the head of their external intelligence service, the SVR. I met in Turkey in November of '22 for hours of my life that I'll never get back um because, you know, he was as polemical as you can imagine then. But he did get the message. And, you know, this was one instance where the Chinese both privately and publicly made clear that they didn't want to see any use of nuclear weapons as a result of the war in Ukraine. And Xi's was a voice that, you know, Putin couldn't afford to ignore as well.”
In the three most powerful countries on Earth today (US, Russia, China), you have core dynamics of powerful leaders consolidating control and limiting dissenting voices, creating disquieting patterns across all three capitals with Trump, Xi, and Putin.
“It's disquieting that when you look at the three most powerful countries on Earth today, you have those those core dynamics in all three capitals, with Trump, Xi, and Putin. Yeah, and my in different ways, but you're exactly right.”
The intelligence community faces an emerging 'looking over your shoulder' culture where people remain committed to speaking truth to power and providing the best intelligence possible, but wonder whether their effort has much of an audience given the court politics of the current administration and a president who seems convinced he knows better than anybody else.
“I worry that in the intelligence community, what you're seeing is the emergence of a kind of looking over your culture where people are no less committed to speaking truth to power and providing you know, collecting the best intelligence they can, conducting the best operations they can, providing the most straightforward analysis that they can, but it's a world in which I think people sometimes wonder even the best people about whether you know, all of that effort is has much of an audience, you know, when you have the court politics of this administration and the president you know, who still to this day seems convinced that he knows better than anybody else does.”
The Trump administration's approach takes the concept of enlightened self-interest and puts much sharper focus on the 'self' part and less on the 'enlightened' part, emphasizing hard power at the expense of soft power, dismissing institutions and the tradition of apolitical public servants, and being dismissive or hostile toward alliance relationships, particularly NATO.
“There's an alternative way of approaching this, and that what that's what we saw previewed in the first Trump term, um and I think I'm dramatic display over the last almost year and a half now in the second Trump term. And that's um takes that concept of enlightened self-interest and puts a much sharper focus on the self part and less on the enlightened part. To be fair, I think one of the sources of the appeal of that alternative approach have been some of the mistakes and the grave errors that we made when we didn't act in so enlightened a way. Iraq 2003 being, you know, one of the biggest examples of that, too. But this is a sort of different concept as well, which is much more focused on hard power at the expense of soft power, very dismissive, I think, of the institutions and the whole tradition of apolitical public servants, and dismissive, if not hostile, towards some of those alliance relationships, in particular today, um NATO.”
Allied intelligence services have expressed increasing hesitancy about sharing intelligence with the United States given the erosion of trust in American institutions and the effect of US policy on those institutions, which threatens some of the most important intelligence partnerships.
“I do worry that you know, that erosion of trust can produce you know, a diminution of some of the most important of those partnerships, too. As I said, I I think they're still treated with you know, a great deal of importance and I think on both sides, the US side as well as you know, our our allies and partners, there's a sense of the importance of preserving it, but I do worry over time. If you erode trust, it it tends to affect everything in national security relationships.”
The CIA took advantage of a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to recruit Russians after Putin launched his invasion of Ukraine, made significant advances in recruiting Russians, and set off similar recruitment efforts with regard to China with similar progress.
“We took advantage of what was a kind of once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to recruit Russians once Putin launched his invasion of Ukraine and made significant advances in recruiting Russians. I mean, even to the point of you know, putting out a series of three videos that aired on Telegram and reached you know, pretty wide Russian audience and you know, never once mentioning the the name Putin, but you know, appealing to people's sense of you know, genuine national purpose and appealing to their sense that you know, corruption was at the core of the rot in that political system as well and produced as I said, significant results there and we set off on the same kind of effort with regard to China as well and also made similar progress”
There are two fundamental misreadings of the Iranian regime: first, the durability of the regime, which is inept at many things like managing economy but is designed to preserve itself and repress its people and withstand even decapitation of senior leadership; and second, how it would react to the launching of war, which was predictable—it would try to regionalize and globalize the conflict.
“There were sort of two fundamental misreadings of this Iranian regime. The first is about its durability. This is a regime that is inept at many things, like managing its economy, but it is designed, um, you know, to preserve itself and designed to repress its own people, um, and designed to withstand even the decapitation of its senior leadership. And then the second misreading, I think, was about how it would react, um, to the launching of that war, and I think it was sadly entirely predictable that it would react by trying to regionalize and even globalize the conflict, because, you know, I think it was animated by the view that it could absorb more military pain than the United States could absorb the economic and political pain that it could inflict by disrupting, uh, traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, and by taking advantage of the relative vulnerability of energy infrastructure in the Gulf Arab states as well.”
The Ukraine conflict stakes are strategically higher than the Iran war, and accepting Putin's argument that Ukrainians will lose and should negotiate now would be a prescription for unfair outcome for Ukrainians and set dangerous precedent for European security and Indo-Pacific.
“I think that's a prescription for what be would be not only an unfair outcome for Ukrainians, but also set a precedent for European security, for, you know, the Indo-Pacific because Xi is watching us all very carefully, too, that we'll regret. And I and I think also, you know, in many respects strategically the stakes are higher in the war in Ukraine than they are in a war of choice against Iran right now.”
Cyber issues get a lot of attention but Burns worries that in this administration budgetary resources for cyber defense have been cut while resources increased for cyber offense, increasing exposure to cyber attacks from formidable players like China's Ministry of State Security.
“Cyber issues also, I think, get a lot of attention. I worry that in this administration budgetary resources for cyber defense have been cut, as I understand it, even as, you know, resources have been increased for cyber offense, which I think is a good thing. But I worry a little bit that we come more become more exposed to cyber attacks, particularly with formidable players like China's Ministry of State Security who penetrated, you know, a lot of the critical civilian infrastructure that matters so much to the United States too.”
There was no imminent threat to the United States from Iran that necessitated war, and the intelligence community believed the same thing; the rationale for going to war was partly about finishing the job and taking advantage of historic weakness, and partly about perceived opportunity for regime collapse based on deceptive analogy to the Venezuela operation.
“I say war of choice because I don't believe there was any imminent threat to the United States and I think the intelligence community from everything I read in the media, you know, believed the same thing and you know, as best I can tell, the the rationale for going to war 5 weeks ago was partly about finishing the job, taking advantage of that moment of historic weakness, and part of it was also the perceived opportunity to bring about regime collapse, to push this regime over the edge after all the popular demonstrations at the very beginning of 2026, and produce either true regime change or a more pliable regime. In part, I think, based on the deceptive analogy of the operation to snatch Maduro in Venezuela”
A good negotiated outcome for Ukraine would involve painful compromises on territory (accepting Crimea loss, most of Donbas) paired with sufficiently strong security guarantees and continued Western military support that provide reassurance against repetition of war.
“I believe that the Ukrainian government understands that they're not going to regain Crimea, you know, any any time soon even if they're not going to accept, you know, Russian sovereignty. I think that's probably true for much but not all of the Donbas right now, too. But I think what Putin is also going to drive at is to, you know, to hollow out any set of security guarantees that, you know, we and and our European allies might provide to the Ukrainians as well as commitments to continue to support, you know, their military, which is in many ways better than pieces of paper, you know, as deterrents against a repetition of this by either Putin or some successor um, in Moscow as well. So, it seems to me the basic trade-off is, you know, swallowing what will be some very painful compromises, you know, for the Ukrainian government, but being able to point to sufficiently strong security guarantees on the other hand”
Large language models and AI are being applied both to help analysts digest enormous amounts of information and conduct operations, allowing best human analysts to do what only they can do: tell the president what choices exist and second and third-order consequences of possible decisions.
“To help analysts through the use of large language models digest the enormous amount of information that's out there, whether it's open source, generally available or clandestinely acquired, to put the best human analysts in the place where they can do what I think ultimately only they can do, which is tell a president, you know, here here are the choices that we see, here are the second and third-order consequences of decisions that you might make. And so we put a lot of effort into applying large language models and and AI both for analysts and you know, and for operations officers too.”
Putin is quite cocky about Ukraine right now, believing time is on his side, that he can continue grinding down Ukrainians and eventually the US will lose interest, and he thinks he can extract concessions at negotiating table that he cannot win militarily.
“I think he's quite cocky right now, unfortunately. And you know, when you look at a million killed and wounded, it's kind of hard to explain cockiness right now, too. But I think he has seen the the sort of consequences of the Iran war as benefiting him. I think he is convinced that time right now is on his side, that he can continue to grind down the Ukrainians and that, you know, eventually, you know, the United States is going to sort of lose interest and that's how I think how he reads, you know, the president's impatience sometimes, President Trump's impatience. And he looks at the increasing fissures in the transatlantic alliance right now and that also feeds his sense that if he just keeps at this, eventually he's going to be extract something that he can portray to Russians who have lost a lot in this war, um, as a victory.”
Gaza's situation seems frozen with Gaza physically divided between an area the IDF controls and an area where most of Gaza's population is and where Hamas is re-emerging.
“Gaza's situation, you know, seems kind [1:05:39] of frozen in a way right now with, you know, Gaza itself being kind of physically divided between an area [clears throat] that the Israel Defense Forces controls and an area where most of the population of Gaza is, where Hamas is is re-emerging as well.”
When Burns was sent by President Biden to meet with Putin and Russian officials in early November 2021 to warn of invasion plans, he laid out in graphic detail what the US knew about invasion planning and the consequences; Putin was utterly unapologetic and convinced this was his strategic moment to control Ukraine.
“You know, when I became increasingly convinced that Putin was going to launch a massive invasion against Ukraine. Um, and you know, that was reinforced for me when the president sent me to talk to Putin and some of the knuckle draggers around him in early November of 2021 and I found Putin utterly unapologetic. You know, we laid out I laid out, you know, in pretty graphic detail unusually what we knew about their invasion planning and also the consequences that would flow from, you know, his going ahead with that invasion plan and he was far as I could tell um, you know, sort of convinced that this was his moment strategically to control Ukraine and its choices about which he had had a singular fixation for many years over certainly over the years that I had known him as well.”
We do not learn lessons we should from past mistakes, sometimes have short attention span for issues, and the Iraq War in 2003 now seems distant when its lessons should be seared into our memory as we weigh decisions like the current war with Iran.
“Well, we don't learn a lot. We don't learn all the lessons that we should. Um and, you know, we sometimes have a short attention span for issues like that. You know, 2000 the war in 2003 in Iraq seems a little bit distant right now and it shouldn't because, you know, the lessons of of that experience ought to have been seared in our memory as we, you know, weigh choices about decisions like the one the president made 5 weeks ago to go to war with Iran”
Burns is deeply concerned about the demolition of institutions and career public servants, which will put the US in weaker and weaker position to compete in an unforgiving world for years to come; the gleeful indignity with which apolitical career servants have been treated is shameful and practically very dangerous.
“I just think we're going to regret the demolition of institutions and career public servants as well. Um, you know, nobody should think that it's as neat as turning the clock back to the way things were before, you know, the second Trump term. You know, the it was not a perfect system, and serious streamlining and reform for any of us who served in those institutions, you know, was uh essential. But, you know, what's happening right now, I think, is just going to, you know, put us in a weaker and weaker position to compete in an unforgiving world for years and years to come. And the kind of gleeful indignity with which people have been treated, apolitical career political servants, people without a political bone in their bodies, I think is shameful on the one hand, but it's also in practical terms, I think, very dangerous for the United States over time.”
The result of the war is not regime change but change of personnel within the regime—a much weaker regime but also one that is even nastier and more radical, and less open to compromises that may have been possible before the war.
“What we're left with today is, um, is not regime change, even though I know the president has asserted this. It's a change of personnel within the regime. In some ways, it's a certainly a much weaker regime, but it's also one that's even nastier and more radical, and, you know, less open even to the kind of compromises that may have been possible before the war, from, you know, what little I understand of the negotiations that were going on before then.”
The current Iranian regime (with new leadership including Abbas Araqchi as foreign minister, a younger Khamenei as supreme leader, and Qalibaf in parliament) is still capable of decentralizing decision-making in response to war steps and still has the ability to inflict pain while viewing victory as survival.
“It's a regime and a group of people that's still capable of decentralizing, you know, some of the decision-making in terms of their responses, um, to steps that we took during the war, um, and still has, even in its weakened state, the ability to inflict pain as well. And I think it has the sense and has had the sense since this war began that, you know, victory is survival, and that, you know, if this regime still survives, and it looks like it will right now, it's going to see that as as a triumph”
Burns has long believed the Iranian regime is on a one-way street toward eventual collapse due to being deeply unpopular at home and having an unsustainable broader strategy, but worries that the war may have slowed rather than accelerated that eventual collapse.
“I've believed for a long time that this is a regime that's on a kind of one-way street to its eventual collapse, but I worry that, you know, in this war, what we've done, rather than accelerate that moment of collapse, is slow it down a little bit, even if I believe at the end of the day, whenever that is, year, 2 years, 3 years from now, you're going to see a regime regime that's very hard to sustain itself, because it's so deeply unpopular at home, and its broader strategy is just unsustainable given all the damage that's been done to it.”
In all of Burns' experience in the Middle East over the years, it is the place where grand ambitions and ill-conceived strategies go to die, and the place where pessimists always feel right at home, making careful weighting of strategic choices essential.
“In all my experience in the Middle East over the years, it's the place where grand ambitions and, you know, ill-conceived strategies go to die. And it is a place where pessimists always feel right at home.”
The CIA developed more flexible career paths to keep talented officers even if they spend only 8-9 years before going to the private sector, allowing them to return with private sector experience and benefits, recognizing that not all valuable officers want 30-year careers.
“we put a lot of effort into trying to keep the door open for people to come back and bring back the benefits, you know, of of you know, experience in the private sector too. So I think all of those are areas in which we've made some headway, but which which we just I recognized at the time need to move even faster cuz the pace of innovation is such that just keeping up with it, let alone getting ahead of it is a huge challenge.”
There should be much process rather than no process on major strategic decisions, with interagency meetings that enable thinking through consequences like Strait of Hormuz blockage, American citizen evacuation, and embassy management, even if the process feels burdensome.
“I mean, all of us bitched and moaned sometimes about, you know, the number of interagency meetings and everything else in different administrations I worked in, but I'd much rather err on the side of having, you know, too much process than no process at all on some of these issues, too, that enable you to think about issues like, well, okay, what happens if the Strait of Hormuz is blocked or disrupted? What should we be thinking about in terms of evacuating, you know, American citizens some places in which they might, you know, face considerable risks. You know, how would how should we think about managing our embassies overseas?”
After the 12-day war in June 2025, the Iranian regime objectively has been in its weakest position in the 47 years since the revolution, with its nuclear program severely degraded, its ballistic missile inventory degraded, its proxies (particularly Hezbollah) degraded, and its air defenses degraded.
“I think the reality is that after the 12-day war in June of last year, in June of 2025, the Iranian regime objectively has been in its weakest position in the 47 years since the revolution with its nuclear program not obliterated, but severely degraded. Same with its ballistic missile inventory, same with its proxies in particular Hezbollah in Lebanon, same with its air defenses as well.”
Burns has spent as much time with Vladimir Putin as anyone in recent diplomatic history, both as ambassador to Russia during the Bush administration and in more recent jobs, and has deep insight into Putin's decision-making.
“you've also spent as much time with anyone with Vladimir Putin both as ambassador to to Russia during the Bush administration and also in in your more recent jobs.”