Sarah C.M. Paine: What Is China's Grand Strategy?

Chinese civilization places primacy on avoiding chaos, rooted in thousands of years of experience with large-scale warfare in which armies numbering hundreds of thousands repeatedly devastated the region, whereas the Western world did not experience such endemic, large-scale warfare until the Napoleonic wars.

“What's Chinese civilization? Um I think the Chinese put a primacy on avoiding chaos. If you think of the wars that have afflicted that place over thousands of years, uh, Chinese have been raising an armies, raising and arming armies denominated in hundreds of thousands of people for thousands of years. The west does not do this on a regular basis as far as I understand until the Napoleonic wars. But Chinese have been butchering each other because it uh for a long long time. And so uh generations of Chinese understand that the the chaos of warfare is to be avoided.”

After 20 years of economic development, China developed a much better educated population and multinational corporations with global reach, at which point the Communist Party came to see these educated elites and business leaders as competitors for political power rather than partners.

“But then you fast forward 20 years or so and then you've got a much better educated population in China. You have really developed large multinational corporations or where corporations with global reach in China and all of a sudden the communist party feels that these people are competitors for political power.”

Xi Jinping consulted experts on the Soviet Union and learned that allowing political reforms before economic reforms was a disaster, and that the Soviets' mistake of allowing flourishing cultures and languages in nationality-based republics created discrete units that enabled separatism when the USSR collapsed.

“when Xiinping came to power, he convened his experts on the Soviet Union and said, 'Tell me why did uh the Soviet Union collapse and uh he learned political reforms before economic reforms. That was a disaster. Another piece he learned is that the Soviets had allowed flourishing cultures within all their um nationality based republics. So the Kazaks had leadership positions in Kaza Kazakhstan and those Kazak language was flourishing. The problem when when the Soviet Union fell apart, there were these discrete units that were perfect for an independent Tajikistan and independent Kazakhstan.'”

The Western assumption that the Chinese would cooperate indefinitely is analogous to Western assumptions about Russia (that it would accept the post-Cold War order) and Germany's assumption that Russia would not disrupt gas supplies despite making money from them—all reflect a wider assumption that economic incentives guarantee cooperation.

“and then you also said that well the west assumed the Chinese would always cooperate and the same assumption applies to uh German assumptions about buying gas from Russians was like hey they're making lots of money why on earth and this is the actually one of the beauties of the rules-based order is if you just join the party we'll welcome you in, you will make money.”

Like Russia, China operates under a continental worldview where control of territory is the measure of power and importance—more territory equals greater power and status—and both treat seas as territory to be controlled rather than as networks facilitating freedom of navigation and commerce.

“and it's also that like the Russians it's this continental view that if I own a lot of territory that makes me important the more I have the better and then they treat the seas like territory because they're going to more seas the better. Whereas in the maritime order seas are the network that connects everybody. It's freedom of navigation. What What good does a sea do you if you can't get within 500 miles of someone's coastline? You can't deliver anything or pick anything up.”

Western civilization is built on three foundational pillars: Greek analytical thinking (laws of identity and non-contradiction), Roman law and institutions for enforcement, and Christian values emphasizing that the individual has a soul that precedes and supersedes government.

“I think that's core western civilization. If my read of uh western civilization is it's based on three pillars. Greek analytical thinking this law of identity is one of them right things have to uh and the other one law of non-contradiction can't have mutually exclusive things going on uh another one's Roman law all of these laws and the institutions to enforce them it's not about uh personal rule you even though the west has had plenty of that and then Christian values whether or not you're a Christian and the key one is that the individual counts that the individual has a soul And that thing comes the soul precedes governments.”

In Western civilization, the primary unit of society is the individual with rights; in Chinese civilization, the primary unit is the group, and people have obligations to different groups rather than individual rights.

“so in the west we talk about rights in Chinese civilization which is based on the Han ethnic group who are that form the preponderance of China's population uh people have obligations you don't it's not rights it's obligations what you owe different groups whereas the individual is the primary unit of society in the west and China it's groups uh these have different implications”

Chinese civilization places primacy on avoiding chaos, stemming from millennia of experience with massive interstate warfare denominated in hundreds of thousands of soldiers, which Western civilization did not experience on that scale until the Napoleonic wars.

“What's Chinese civilization? Um I think the Chinese put a primacy on avoiding chaos. If you think of the wars that have afflicted that place over thousands of years, uh, Chinese have been raising an armies, raising and arming armies denominated in hundreds of thousands of people for thousands of years. The west does not do this on a regular basis as far as I understand until the Napoleonic wars. But Chinese have been butchering each other because it uh for a long long time. And so uh generations of Chinese understand that the the chaos of warfare is to be avoided.”

The Western world order is rules-based and universalistic in its principles, while the Chinese world order is based explicitly on Chinese civilization and its values, making them fundamentally different systems.

“So you have a western order that's rules-based. It's universalistic. The Chinese world order is based on Chinese civilization. And historically the Chinese believed there was one civilization, theirs. Everybody else were barbarians.”

Xi Jinping has been damaging China's economic growth rates through his domestic repression policies, demonstrating that his strategic vision is undermining China's own prosperity and power.

“and it clearly isn't Xiinping who's been tanking his uh grow growth rates through his domestic repression.”

Twenty years into Deng's reforms, China developed a much better educated population and large multinational corporations with global reach, at which point the Communist Party came to view these educated elites as competitors for political power.

“And so that fast forward 20 years or so and then you've got a much better educated population in China. You have really developed large multinational corporations or where corporations with global reach in China and all of a sudden the communist party feels that these people are competitors for political power.”

Educated and wealthy Chinese at higher levels of economic development naturally desire political voice that reflects their economic contributions, which the Communist Party explicitly rejected and continues to reject.

“You think about well what do people want at that level of economic development and it's often political say that somehow reflects their economic contributions. as well. The communist parties make clear that that's off the table.”

In China, political and administrative authority operates through 'guanxi' networks—human relationship networks structured like inverted family trees, where top-level authority cascades orders down through branching networks, and the exact implementation by lower levels is often opaque to the top.

“China, there's something different. It's called Guanchi. Guanchi are relations, human relations. Well, we've all got those. It's just more so in China. It's um the way I think of a Guanchi network, it's like an inverse family tree. So you have the original ancestor, their siblings, and their siblings and their siblings and their siblings go all the way down. So that this person at the top runs this Guanchi network. So when this person at the top says deploy to these two people and they deploy all the way down, you aren't even sure how the bottom of that Guanchi network is deploying. But I believe um that this is fundamental how Chinese institutions run.”

Both China and Russia share a continental view of geopolitics where territorial possession itself is a form of power—the more territory one owns, the more important one is—whereas the maritime Western order sees seas as networks connecting all people through freedom of navigation.

“and it's also that like the Russians it's this continental view that if I own a lot of territory that makes me important the more I have the better and then they treat the seas like territory because they're going to more seas the better. Whereas in the maritime order seas are the network that connects everybody. It's freedom of navigation. What What good does a sea do you if you can't get within 500 miles of someone's coastline? You can't deliver anything or pick anything up.”

For China, the humiliations of the 19th century (Western defeat of China on Chinese territory) and Japanese aggression created a trauma and a driving desire to restore Asia and the world to their 'normal' state, which is perceived to be China at the center.

“and uh for a year uh in the mid 19th century when the westerners came and they defeated China on China's territory what a gross embarrassment and then the Japanese double down on all of that. Um for Chinese today it's uh the great moment to reto return uh Asia to normaly and the world to normaly which is China at the center”

Historically, China dealt with other nations only bilaterally, never constructing a multilateral alliance system, and continues to do so today, treating all smaller powers as inferiors and bosses them around accordingly.

“The Chinese historically deal only bilaterally with people. They still do. Like, what's China's massive alliance system? It doesn't. And um it treats uh smaller p it says these things routinely. It treats smaller powers as inferiors, which means just about everybody on the planet is smaller. everyone's an inferior and they're going to go boss people around”

At higher levels of economic development, people naturally want political voice that reflects their economic contributions, which Xi Jinping and the Communist Party have made clear is off the table.

“You think about well what do people want at that level of economic development and it's often political say that somehow reflects their economic contributions. as well. The communist parties make clear that that's off the table.”

The Chinese ideal of 'all under heaven' refers to a theoretical state of unity where all territory is under one rule, achieving peace, order, and prosperity—this represents the ultimate goal of Chinese civilization.

“So what's the ideal? It's it's all under heaven. That's the name uh one of the names for China. It's when you unite all under heaven. Then there's it's a theoretical state and that is when you have peace and order and prosperity.”

Governments and structures of authority in China have historically always been top-down, whether under Confucianism or Communism, contrasting with Western institutions that cement authority through laws that can be independently reviewed and adjudicated.

“Um, governments and structures of authority in China have always been top down, right? Confucianism top down, communists top down. Now, the communists have set up some pretty robust party institutions and administrative institutions. But unlike the West, which cementss its institutions with laws, you can go open the law book, see what law applies. You disagree, you go to court, someone adjudicates, it's imperfect. You have to get over the imperfections, you have a succession of appeals courts, and you hope that the totality of it all will lead uh to a just outcome.”

Deng Xiaoping's reforms and strengthening of Communist Party rule ran in parallel: allowing peasants and private businesses to be more productive made the country wealthier while simultaneously strengthening Party control.

“So when Dang Xiaoping comes in, his reforms and strengthening the Communist Party rule run on parallel. So if you allow peasants to be more productive, that makes the country wealthier and that's wonderful. And so that goes and then it also applies to private businesses and things.”

China historically treated all non-Chinese peoples as barbarians and believed only Chinese civilization was legitimate, with the natural assumption being that other peoples would eventually 'sinify' and adopt Chinese culture.

“And the assumption under that one was is that it would eventually just spread. People would naturally cinify, right? Sinoentric. They these words uh cynification. Those sorts of words don't apply to other countries the way they do China. Right? This is just a piece of Chinese culture. and uh that that's the natural order of things is China at the center.”

Guanchi (关系, human relations networks) are fundamental to how Chinese institutions actually function: they operate like inverse family trees where a person at the top directs orders down through a hierarchy of relations, and those at the bottom comply without clear visibility into how the network operates.

“China, there's something different. It's called Guanchi. Guanchi are relations, human relations. Well, we've all got those. It's just more so in China. It's um the way I think of a Guanchi network, it's like an inverse family tree. So you have the original ancestor, their siblings, and their siblings and their siblings and their siblings go all the way down. So that this person at the top runs this Guanchi network. So when this person at the top says deploy to these two people and they deploy all the way down, you aren't even sure how the bottom of that Guanchi network is deploying. But I believe um that this is fundamental how Chinese institutions run.”

The Chinese ideal political state is called 'all under heaven' (Tianxia), a theoretical state of unity where all is harmonized under central Chinese authority, producing peace, order, and prosperity.

“So what's the ideal? It's it's all under heaven. That's the name uh one of the names for China. It's when you unite all under heaven. Then there's it's a theoretical state and that is when you have peace and order and prosperity.”

China's policies toward Uyghurs, including actions described as genocide, are partly explained by Xi Jinping's lesson from Soviet collapse: ensuring that ethnic minorities cannot become independent units by preventing their existence or cultural autonomy.

“So China's like no way. You wonder why it's doing what it's doing to the weaguers. That's part of it. It's part of the lesson. It's like we're going to commit genocide so these people aren't going to be around to uh hack off Shing Jang.”

Western civilization emphasizes rights while Chinese civilization emphasizes obligations: in the West, the individual is the primary unit of society and has inherent rights, whereas in China, the group is the primary unit and individuals owe obligations to different groups.

“So in the west we talk about rights in Chinese civilization which is based on the Han ethnic group who are that form the preponderance of China's population uh people have obligations you don't it's not rights it's obligations what you owe different groups whereas the individual is the primary unit of society in the west and China it's groups uh these have different implications”

The Western order is rules-based, universalistic, and based on the principle that laws apply equally to all, whereas the Chinese world order is based on Chinese civilization and historically assumed China was the only civilization with all others being barbarians who would naturally 'sinicize' over time.

“So you have a western order that's rules-based. It's universalistic. The Chinese world order is based on Chinese civilization. And historically the Chinese believed there was one civilization, theirs. Everybody else were barbarians. And the assumption under that one was is that it would eventually just spread. People would naturally cinify, right? Sinoentric. They these words uh cynification. Those sorts of words don't apply to other countries the way they do China. Right? This is just a piece of Chinese culture. and uh that that's the natural order of things is China at the center.”

For modern China, 'returning Asia to normalcy and the world to normalcy' means restoring China to its historical position at the center, which the Chinese view as having been unjustly disrupted by Western colonialism and Japanese invasion in the 19th and 20th centuries.

“For Chinese today it's uh the great moment to reto return uh Asia to normaly and the world to normaly which is China at the center and it's also that like the Russians it's this continental view”

Xi Jinping has a substantial Guanchi network attached to him, and the actual functioning of his authority depends on this network of personal relations rather than on formal institutional rules.

“So when you look at Xi Jinping, he's got quite a Guanchi network attached to him and it's just it's a different way of gluing together uh the world and they're fundamentally different.”

When Deng Xiaoping came to power, his economic reforms and strengthening of Communist Party rule ran in parallel—allowing peasants and private businesses to be more productive made the country wealthier while the Party maintained political control.

“When Dang Xiaoping comes in, his reforms and strengthening the Communist Party rule run on parallel. So if you allow peasants to be more productive, that makes the country wealthier and that's wonderful. And so that goes and then it also applies to private businesses and things.”

Historically and currently, China deals only bilaterally with other powers rather than through multilateral alliance systems, and treats all smaller powers as inferiors, which includes nearly every other state on the planet.

“The Chinese historically deal only bilaterally with people. They still do. Like, what's China's massive alliance system? It doesn't. And um it treats uh smaller p it says these things routinely. It treats smaller powers as inferiors, which means just about everybody on the planet is smaller. everyone's an inferior and they're going to go boss people around”

For a long time, the West assumed China's grand strategy was to exist within international norms, accept them, and use them to become wealthy, but today that assumption may no longer hold.

“When it comes to China, for a long time, we assumed that their grand strategy or long-term vision was to basically exist within those norms, accept them, and use them to get as wealthy as possible. I would say that that was widely accepted for quite a long time. But today when you look at China, you could make a good argument that that might no longer be their main priority anymore.”

The rules-based order is fundamentally defined not by US dictation but by international agreements and treaties that signatories voluntarily join, allowing for adjustment and incorporation of best practices from new members.

“this is the actually one of the beauties of the rules-based order is if you just join the party we'll welcome you in, you will make money...And by the way, if you do come up with a better one, we'll probably adjust our own system to incorporate your best practices. I mean, that's what the western what the world's based order isn't what the United States tells people what to do. Give me a break. Why would anyone uh yeah, people do their own thing? It's what we as human beings on this planet agree to do the treaties that we agree to sign on to with whatever provisos there are.”

The West made an assumption that China would always cooperate within the international system, similar to Germany's assumption that Russia would always pursue profitable commerce—both assumptions reflected faith in the self-reinforcing nature of the rules-based order.

“and the west assumed the Chinese would always cooperate and the same assumption applies to uh German assumptions about buying gas from Russians was like hey they're making lots of money why on earth and this is the actually one of the beauties of the rules-based order is if you just join the party we'll welcome you in, you will make money. Your alternatives to this, no one's come up with a better one.”